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Abstract
The nation-state’s struggle with liberal individualism on the one hand and the recognition of group rights
on the other is well documented in the literatures on constitutionalism, constitution-making, comparative
politics and racial/ethnic relations. However, the manner in which this conundrum manifests in a state’s
acceptance or rejection of affirmative action has been under-discussed. Traditional approaches to the
study of affirmative action are inadequate because they tend to circumscribe the universe of policies and
programs that may qualify as affirmative action by focusing only on certain groups, issue domains or
countries.
More specifically, current scholarship on affirmative action suffers from several substantive and
methodological shortcomings: (1) a neglect of the constitutional foundations of affirmative action, (2) a
fundamental definitional uncertainty when it comes to understanding what affirmative action actually is,
(3) a lack of a clear analytical framework with which to classify various types of affirmative action
policies, (4) a narrow focus on single-case studies, and (5) a paucity of inter-group and intra-group
comparisons.
To address these lacunae, this study focuses on constitutional precommitments to affirmative action.
Prior to any substantive analysis, this study first proposes a consensus definition of affirmative action and
develops a universal typology and sub-typology with which to categorize, analyze and compare affirmative
action precommitments. Next, this study employs a large N comparative methodology to examine the
constitutions of 30 countries and categorize affirmative action precommitments through the use of
constitutional textual analysis and secondary source historical materials. Finally, this study compares
affirmative action precommitments – both inter-group and intra-group – for racial/ethnic minorities and
women across the sample.
There are three principal substantive findings. First, although liberal individualism remains central to the
constitution-making process, all cases exhibited constitutional acknowledgement of some form of group
rights and/or preferences. Second, for various reasons, racial/ethnic minorities tend to fare better than
women when it comes to the overall prevalence of preferential constitutional precommitments. Third,
historical evidence suggests that both endogenous and exogenous political pressures, such as internal
ethnic conflicts and global human rights movements, matter when it comes to racial/ethnic minorities’ or
women’s chances of having affirmative action provisions included in constitutions during the constitutionmaking process.
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ABSTRACT
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION RECONCEIVED:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRECOMMITMENTS TO GROUP
PREFERENCES FOR RACIAL MINORITIES AND WOMEN
Abdel Rahman Ford
Rogers Smith
The nation-state’s struggle with liberal individualism on the one hand and the recognition of
group rights on the other is well documented in the literatures on constitutionalism, constitutionmaking, comparative politics and racial/ethnic relations. However, the manner in which this
conundrum manifests in a state’s acceptance or rejection of affirmative action has been underdiscussed. Traditional approaches to the study of affirmative action are inadequate because they tend
to circumscribe the universe of policies and programs that may qualify as affirmative action by
focusing only on certain groups, issue domains or countries.
More specifically, current scholarship on affirmative action suffers from several substantive
and methodological shortcomings: (1) a neglect of the constitutional foundations of affirmative
action, (2) a fundamental definitional uncertainty when it comes to understanding what affirmative
action actually is, (3) a lack of a clear analytical framework with which to classify various types of
affirmative action policies, (4) a narrow focus on single-case studies, and (5) a paucity of inter-group
and intra-group comparisons.
To address these lacunae, this study focuses on constitutional precommitments to
affirmative action. Prior to any substantive analysis, this study first proposes a consensus definition
of affirmative action and develops a universal typology and sub-typology with which to categorize,
analyze and compare affirmative action precommitments. Next, this study employs a large N
comparative methodology to examine the constitutions of 30 countries and categorize affirmative
action precommitments through the use of constitutional textual analysis and secondary source
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historical materials. Finally, this study compares affirmative action precommitments – both intergroup and intra-group – for racial/ethnic minorities and women across the sample.
There are three principal substantive findings. First, although liberal individualism remains
central to the constitution-making process, all cases exhibited constitutional acknowledgement of
some form of group rights and/or preferences. Second, for various reasons, racial/ethnic minorities
tend to fare better than women when it comes to the overall prevalence of preferential constitutional
precommitments. Third, historical evidence suggests that both endogenous and exogenous political
pressures, such as internal ethnic conflicts and global human rights movements, matter when it
comes to racial/ethnic minorities’ or women’s chances of having affirmative action provisions
included in constitutions during the constitution-making process.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I.

Introduction
The principal purpose of this project is to reconceptualize the idea, policy or set of policies

commonly referred to as “affirmative action.” The study of affirmative action is important to our
understanding of the political and social origins of human inequality itself, the processes and
mechanisms that either evolve into or are manipulated into existence and then harnessed through
institutions to reproduce the inequality. Whether systems of social stratification manifest organically
as a result of friction created by pre-fsexisting cleavages, or whether they are borne from the intent of
exogenous forces in furtherance of a “divide and conquer” agenda, we know that systems of social
and political inequality are ubiquitous, durable and more often than not memorialized into law. The
question then becomes: how are these systems changed? One tool used by states is the
implementation of policies that prefer the members of certain, usually subordinated, groups or
classes. Thus, in the effort to cure the malady of human inequality, preferential policies pursued by
the state, referred to as affirmative action, have become indispensable, and also controversial.
Current legal, academic and popular conceptions of affirmative action are inadequate for
several reasons. First, affirmative action discourse, regardless of where it occurs, is inherently flawed
because its assumptions, theories, hypotheses, findings and conclusions are largely constructed
without a clear and robust definitional foundation. They lack definitional certainty because they
neglect to answer the most basic question – “what is affirmative action?” The result has been a
patchwork of literature, with evidence and conclusions that cannot reliably be compared. For
example, some definitions focus on the beneficiary groups (blacks, women, etc.). Other approaches
are flawed because they are more concerned with the means by which the policy or program is
implemented (quotas, goals, etc.). Still others focus on policy domains such as employment or

1

education. These definitional approaches are simply too narrow to be applicable to a variety of
political contexts.
This study specifically focuses on the prevalence, type and groups targeted by affirmative
action precommitments found in constitutions because constitutions represent the fundamental
embodiment of the legal foundations of liberal democracies and other forms of government.
Although at its core this study will build from the comparative constitutional law research program, it
also incorporates literature from democratic theory, constitutionalism, racial projects and other
research programs. Comparative constitutional law has seldom been applied either methodologically
or substantively to the literature on affirmative action. This study applies comparative constitutional
law, constitutional textual analysis and comparative historical institutional analysis to answer seven
important questions: (1) what is affirmative action; (2) how do we go about identifying constitutional
precommitments to affirmative action; (3) what are the most basic types and sub-types of affirmative
action precommitments; (4) can patterns be discerned in the way different countries incorporate
affirmative action precommitments into their constitutions; (5) if so, what variables are the most
salient; (6) how prevalent are affirmative action precommitments; and (7) do certain groups benefit
more than others from affirmative action precommitments?
II.

Theoretical Framework
This study focuses on the prevalence, type and groups targeted by affirmative action

precommitments in constitutions. In the post-colonial era, protections for certain groups have
routinely been included in constitutions, and the inclusion of these protections have generally been
viewed as compatible with the fundamental doctrines of liberal democracy. Indeed, given the global
pervasiveness of racial and ethnic discrimination, group rights are integral to the achievement of
equality in democracy. Although “group rights” is a broad term with many permutations, this project
will focus specifically on affirmative action programs (also referred to as positive discrimination) as a
vehicle that can help to ameliorate historical inequalities. Because they are preferential and not
2

merely protective, these programs have been controversial. These programs may include quotas or
set-asides for government employment or education. They may also include power-sharing
arrangements at the federal or sub-national level. Many nations have implemented positive action
programs for racial, ethnic or other groups: India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and SA, just to name a few.
Although common, many scholars argue that positive action programs exacerbate racial antagonisms
and that they are actually counterproductive.
Racial equality through affirmative action programs can be difficult to achieve because of the
nature of the democratization process itself. One fundamental issue here is the way democracy itself
is defined in the democratization literature. In a classic minimalist conception, Robert Dahl defines
democracy as “a political system that has the quality of being completely or almost completely
responsive to all its citizens” (Dahl, 1972, p. 2).1 For Dahl, as public contestation and inclusiveness
increase within a society, that society approaches polyarchy. Unlike hegemonic regimes, which are
deficient in either one or both dimensions, polyarchy requires that individuals be able to: (1)
formulate their preferences; (2) signify their preferences to their fellow citizens by individual and
collective action; and (3) have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of government (Dahl,
1972, p. 2).
Ultimately, degrees of democratization become a function of public contestation and inclusiveness.
The first element of Dahl’s definition has come to embody the minimalist definition of democracy;
the existence of free and fair elections with reasonable competition among parties, with a reasonable
portion of the population able to exercise the franchise, is generally sufficient to pass the threshold
test of a democratic polity. However, the inclusiveness dimension in Dahl’s analysis is of much more
subsidiary importance than public contestation. Indeed, if a political system need only be responsive

1

The “almost” qualifier here is crucial, because it implicitly permits regimes to be categorized as democratic
even when some minority of the population is prohibited from participating meaningfully in contested electoral
politics, and thus does not share equitably in resource distribution and the selection of elected representatives.
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to “almost” all citizens to be considered democratic, then what does this say about the relationship
between democracy and equality? Unfortunately, prevailing measures of democracy do not
adequately account for racial equality.
In addition to definitional issues, certain practical issues present a challenge to racial equality.
For a transitioning state, the implementation of affirmative action programs could be disastrous
because it could upset the delicate social economic and political balances that existed under the
previous regime. Maintaining some semblance of institutional coherence while parties are formed,
elections are held, and economic and political relationships are reconfigured is of critical importance
lest an aborted transition or failed state result. Additionally, the viability of the modern state depends
on the creation and maintenance of a robust and deep-seated national identity. Because this national
identity necessarily supplants more particularistic loyalties, minority cultures may be eliminated or
ignored. This fragility is exacerbated during the crucible of democratic transition; thus, peace and
stability become far more important than equality simply because the survival of the state hangs in
the balance. Simply put, for the newly democratizing state, the reality is that abrupt change equals
risk because at its core the nation-state itself is a precarious geo-spatial aberration. To maintain
political integrity, marginalized groups may be excluded from the bargaining process that leads to the
drafting of a new constitution, because to engage in a new, perhaps radical, redistribution of political
and economic resources at that time might jeopardize the success of transition. Unfortunately, an
overly myopic preoccupation with the maintenance of equilibrium can leave any expectations of
racial equality unfulfilled.
Even though we know that these affirmative action precommitments exist, they have been
understudied by scholars of affirmative action and comparative constitutional law. All too often,
scholars of affirmative action focus on the moral implications of affirmative action policies in a
democratic society, the jurisprudence and legal particularities regarding a specific issue in a specific
country, or on whether affirmative action “works” – whether the policies in question achieve their
4

purported goals, through economic or sociological analysis. Additionally, the field is dominated by a
US-centric conception of race and state-society relations. Little room is left for alternative models or
approaches to societal arrangements that originate in different geographical regions, legal traditions
or histories of minority group marginalization. While insightful, these studies tend to ignore more
preliminary inquiries, e.g. what affirmative action actually is. They also tend to only focus on specific
countries, groups and issue domains. When taken in the aggregate, these shortcomings in the
affirmative action literature have led to a misunderstanding of what policies qualify as affirmative
action, a companion notion that affirmative action is rare or anachronistic and an almost visceral
reaction to affirmative action as inimical to justice, fairness, equality and other foundational liberal
tenets. This study posits that applying a comparative constitutional law approach to affirmative
action can result in a much more expansive, nuanced and formalized reconceptualization of
affirmative action.
This study improves on the existing literature in several ways. It attempts to formulate a
consensus minimalist definition of affirmative action. This definition will then serve as the
foundation for developing a typology of affirmative action precommitments through examination of
constitutional provisions that confer group preferences. Specifically, two groups will be the subjects
of intra-group and inter-group comparison – linguistic, ethnic, racial and national (LERN) minorities
and women. There have been previous studies of constitutional precommitments to affirmative
action; however, comparative studies have been relatively few, and those that have moved beyond
the single-case study compare only a few cases. This project proposes that a large N comparative
study of constitutional precommitments to affirmative action study, through the use of constitutional
textual analysis, is warranted to better determine how prevalent they are generally, and how prevalent
each type is, specifically. A large N study can also make use of comparative historical institutional
analysis and help identify potential patterns in how these precommitments come into being, how
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they operate over time and place, and pinpoint the variables and processes that make implantation
and change more or less likely.
As intimated above, this project traces the idea and practice of constitutionalism from its
liberal origins to its eventual embrace of group rights. This occurred because the imperatives of
liberal individualism which originated in western political philosophy became relaxed when applied to
the new post-WWII, non-western democracies. Both endogenous and exogenous variables played
significant role in this development. From an endogenous perspective, the prevalence of deeply
embedded – and oftentimes violently contested – social cleavages exerted pressure on constitutionmakers to appease restive minority groups that threatened the integrity and stability of the fledgling
state. Minority group demands were sometimes successful, as evidenced by the inclusion of a wide
variety of minority rights constitutional precommitments. The manner in which these processes
developed varied across geography and time. In each case the end result was a culturally
particularistic reconceptualization of constitutionalism as a foundational principle of state
institutional organization, in response to state-specific constellations of group interests. In addition,
as these constellations shift over time, opportunity structures may present political openings for
minority groups to gain constitutional group recognition previously denied during the state’s
founding, or to gain an expansion of group recognition already granted. Exogenous variables, such
as international human rights treaties, pressure for social reforms exerted by other states, and
migration patterns are also important in the alignment of constitutionalism and group rights.
Minority group recognition has often taken the form of group rights. As applied to
constitution-making, precommitment theory suggests that the framers of constitutions may behave as
individualistic, self-interested rational actors. However, because constitution-making is a group
enterprise and not an individual one, constitution-makers may use precommitments to bind
themselves and others. Constitutions must be designed to counteract passion, overcome timeinconsistency and to promote efficiency. Constitutional devices such as the separation of powers,
6

bicameral legislatures and the executive veto are intended to check legislative overreach that may
result from individualistic passions.
Similar logic can be applied to minority rights precommitments. Under certain
circumstances, constitution-makers may conclude that protection of minorities is required for state
efficiency, although it may run counter to individual framers’ interests. Thus, during the
constitution-making or -amending process, participating majority-group elites may include
precommitments that privilege the minority and bind the majority. Reasonable arguments as to the
ethical and legal legitimacy of minority group recognition by the state have been made by both
proponents and detractors. Proponents argue that such schemes can effectively manage social
conflict; they can facilitate democratic consolidation and state capacity by equalizing economic
imbalances brought about by historical asymmetries in resource distribution. Detractors contend
that affirmative action precommitments merely exacerbate group cleavages by building resentment
among the majority and reinforcing the narrative of inferiority among the minority. Consequently,
they assert, these preferences actually undermine the national project and ultimately make the state
weaker and more fractured.
Practically speaking, the debate over the normativity of affirmative action as a means of
social group management seems to be less about whether minority groups should be recognized in
certain multi-ethnic state and more about the degree and type of recognition. As the cases discussed
infra will demonstrate, minority group preferences at national, intermediate or local levels in politics,
education or the workplace are common across geography, form of government and legal tradition.
These preferences, typically in the form of quotas, minimums, set-asides, are what are popularly
understood as affirmative action. However, an examination of constitutions – the origin of all
affirmative action laws and regulations – reveals that the universe of group preferences that have
traditionally been deemed “affirmative action” fails to adequately represent the range of tools used by
constitutional designers to effectuate affirmative action objectives for LERN minorities and women.
7

Stated succinctly, the current literature on affirmative action deserves a new perspective, one
that is comparative in nature, that accounts for the constitutional genesis of affirmative action
policies, and that theorizes affirmative action in relationship to constitutionalism, constitutionmaking and minority rights. The end result will be a clear definition of affirmative action in the
constitutional context – a state mandated or permitted group preference. Furthermore, four basic types of
constitutional precommitments to affirmative action will emerge: classical, tacit, territorial and social.
In addition, three sub-types will be discussed; group-specific/non-group-specific, domainspecific/non-domain-specific and mandatory/permissive. These four types and three sub-types
often work synergistically to elucidate and effectuate constitutional preferences for LERN minorities
and women in a variety of cases.
III.

Goals of the Dissertation
There are three main goals of this dissertation: (1) to attempt a fundamental

reconceptualization of what is commonly understood as affirmative action, (2) to develop a typology
with which to classify constitutional precommitments to affirmative action and (3) to compare the
type and prevalence of constitutional precommitments to affirmative action for racial minorities and
women across a variety of issue domains. As previously stated, definitional accuracy and certainty
have been elusive in the affirmative action literature. Traditional approaches tend to circumscribe to
universe of policies and programs that may qualify as affirmative action by focusing only on certain
groups, issue domains or countries. Therefore, a much more basic conceptualization is warranted,
one that accepts the notion that affirmative action can apply to any group, even majority groups. Still
other approaches are flawed because they are more concerned with the means by which the policy or
program is implemented (quotas, goals, etc.). In practice, preferential policies can come in a myriad
of forms, and are contingent upon the political and legal histories of a particular case.
After affirmative action is reconceptualized and defined, a classificatory scheme will be
proposed for constitutional precommitments to affirmative action. To do this, the dissertation will
8

develop and elucidate a typology based upon the proposed consensus definition. The constitutions
of 30 countries will be examined, and their affirmative action provisions identified and coded into the
appropriate types and sub-types. There have been previous studies of constitutional
precommitments to affirmative action; however, comparative studies have been relatively few, and
those that have moved beyond the single-case study compare only a few cases. This project
proposes that a large N comparative study of constitutional precommitments to affirmative action
study, through the use of constitutional textual analysis, is warranted to better determine how
prevalent they are generally, and how prevalent each type is, specifically. A large N study can also
help identify potential patterns in how these precommitments come into being, how they operate
over time and place, and pinpoint the variables and processes that make implantation and change
more or less likely.
Finally, the dissertation will compare constitutional precommitments to affirmative action
for LERN minorities and women (SEX). Three foundational questions confronted by constitutionmakers provide guidance: (1) what kind(s) of precommitment(s) should we have, (2) to whom should
the precommitment(s) apply and (3) in what situation(s) should the precommitment(s) apply? Four
issue domains will be examined: political (POL), economic/employment (ECON/EMP), education
(EDU) and cultural (CULT). Affirmative action precommitments are evaluated within and across
domains for each target group category individually as well as comparatively. Of particular interest is
the prevalence of types and sub-types of precommitments within issue domains and the proposal of
hypotheses to explain preference prevalence differences across types, sub-types, issue domains and
target group categories.
IV.

Research Design
This dissertation integrates several methodologies. First, the comparative method is used to

compare constitutions to identify patterns in the way they memorialize group preferences. Unlike
most studies that compare only a few cases, this study chose a large N approach because it will add to
9

the existing literature, as well as add texture to the role of minorities and women in democratization,
constitution-making and nation/state-building processes. This number of cases is also required to
fully effectuate the core objective of this project – to achieve a better understanding of how and why
states make preferential precommitments to women and minorities.
Second, through the use of constitutional textual interpretation, particular focus will be on
the precise phraseology used in the constitutional provisions themselves, how various provisions can
be interpreted together and how courts have interpreted those provisions. In identifying patterns in
constitutional precommitments to affirmative action, the basic principles of comparative
constitutional law will be used as guidance.
V.

Findings
This study has two sets of findings. The first set relates specifically to the development of a

workable typology for constitutional precommitments to affirmative action. Textual study of the
constitutions of the cases in the sample, in light of the proposed definition, reveals four basic types
of affirmative action precommitments. First, classical constitutional affirmative action
precommitments embody what we have come to accept as conventional affirmative action policies;
preferential policies designed to benefit groups, usually minorities. They come in the form of
reservations, quotas or minimums representation requirements in specified issue domains. Classical
precommitments use “universal” language that makes a clear, unambiguous and unequivocal
commitment to conferring a mandatory or permissive state-protected preference on a particular
group or groups by undertaking extraordinary or exemplary steps, articulated in terms that are widely
accepted by the international community as conveying such preference. Second, tacit
precommitments also convey a preference, but they do not use terms that are widely accepted; thus,
textual and historical context is needed to determine whether a preference can or must be conferred.
Third, territorial precommitments are used to facilitate the devolution of political authority
to sub-national governance units. There are three sub-types: grants of autonomy, ethno-development
10

schemes fostered by ethno-federal arrangements, and efforts at conservation of LERN minorities land
and culture. For a territorial arrangement to qualify it must meet three criteria: (1) the territorial
arrangement must be provided for in the constitution, (2) territorial boundaries must be largely
coextensive with LERN boundaries and (3) the territories inhabited by minority LERN group(s), or
the members of the groups thereof, must receive some government mandated or permitted
preference that the territories inhabited by the other group(s), or the members thereof, do not
receive. Finally, social precommitments support state-authorized preferences by evidencing a clear
intent to effectuate social or socialist ideals through a state redistributionary project. This study
classifies social precommitments into three sub-types: (1) cases that are socialist because they contain
provisions that use the term “socialist” in reference to the state; (2) cases that are social because,
although they do not contain provisions that use the term “socialist,” they do contain provisions that
mandate or permit resource redistribution amongst social groups and/or provide for entitlements
such as social security, housing assistance or health care; and (3) cases that are constitutionally asocial
because they contain no provisions that clearly indicate the states responsibility or option to
redistribute resources amongst social groups.
The second set of findings is drawn from the study’s comparison of precommitments for
LERN minorities and women. When we examine the data three broad conclusions can be drawn.
First, liberal individualism remains central to the constitution-making process. However,
constitutional acknowledgement of group rights is a rather ubiquitous exception. This conclusion is
most obviously reasonable because almost every case has some form of social precommitment.
When the prevalence of social precommitments is viewed in light of the fact that almost every case
had some LERN-specific or SEX-specific affirmative action provision, liberal individualism in
constitution-making has become more of a flexible consideration than a strict directive. In the
LERN case, it would seem that in collective civic nationalism and minority rights carry substantial
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weight. For women, liberal gendered parochialism seems to be giving ground to more collectivist
notions of gender mainstreaming and a modulation of male supremacy.
Second, LERN minorities tend to fare better than women when it comes to preferential
constitutional precommitments. This may stem from the fact that LERN minorities have the
potential to be more politically disruptive by employing tactics that can destabilize nascent nationalist
projects, threatening territorial integrity and degrading trust in government. In some instances, the
demands of certain LERN minorities can be met with grants of some degree of autonomy, ethnodevelopment or conservation, making outright inclusion unnecessary. Unlike women, LERN
minorities are not homogenous; thus, different solutions may be effective for different groups. In
addition, because women are not territorially defined they lack the political salience of indigenousimmigrant or other intra-LERN group social stratification categories. Furthermore, women’s issues
tend not to destabilize the state and, thus, may be regarded as less serious.
Third, historical evidence suggests that endogenous and exogenous political pressures matter
when it comes to LERN minorities’ or women’s chances of having affirmative action provisions
included in constitutions. Endogenous pressures, in the form of grassroots mobilization, domestic
political coalition building, litigation, the election of minority and women law-makers, organized and
sustained protest, and sometimes outright violence permit subordinated social groups to take
advantage of political opportunity structures to have constitutions rewritten or amended. Exogenous
forces, such as international conventions, legal borrowing, NGOs, and even economic sanctions or
incentives, are also important to realizing institutional legal change for subordinated groups during
political transition. When these two forces operate in concert, minority groups stand the best chance
of achieving a constitutional precommitment to affirmative action. Exogenous pressures seem to be
more significant for women, while endogenous pressures seem more significant for LERN
minorities.
VI.

Contribution to the Field
12

This project makes several contributions to the field of comparative politics. First, it takes a
novel approach to affirmative action by redefining it to properly account for all state mandated or
permitted group preferences and jettisoning a narrower, ostensibly American-centric, definitions that
define it as simply government quotas for minorities and women. Second, I contribute to the
comparative constitutional law research program by focusing on constitutions, specifically the
manner and frequency with which they use the constitutional text to confer preferences on various
groups through the use of affirmative action precommitments. Third, this project elucidates a basic
classification system for affirmative action precommitments, one that accounts for historical variation
in the development of state institutions and apparatuses across cases, as well as the roles that religion,
legal tradition, and the durability of social cleavages may play in the constitution-drafting process
itself and the subsequent interpretation of precommitments by adjudicative bodies. Fourth, this
study adopts a large N methodological approach, rather than simply compare two or three cases.
This approach permits greater cross-country and cross-region comparison. Finally, the study
compare how affirmative action precommitments apply to racial/ethnic minorities and women both
intra- and inter-case.
VII.

Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of 9 chapters. This Introduction is intended to provide an

overview of the theoretical foundation, methodology, findings and contributions to the various fields
of inquiry related to affirmative action and constitutional precommitments. Chapters 2, 3 and 4
provide a review and synthesis of the relevant literatures on comparative constitutional law,
constitutionalism, precommitment theory, minority rights, racial projects, affirmative action and
ultimately my re-conceptualization of affirmative action. Chapters 5 and 6 apply the new definition
of affirmative action to the 30 cases included in the study through the use of constitutional textual
analysis and secondary source historical data. This application results in the creation of the analytical
framework and classificatory scheme described above. Chapters 7 and 8 apply the classificatory
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scheme to evaluate the prevalence of affirmative action precommitments by type and sub-type
between women and LERN minorities, respectively and comparatively. Finally, Chapter 9 provides
closing observations, identifies theoretical and practical implications of the research, and indicates
potential avenues of inquiry for future projects. A Methodology is included as an Appendix. It will
describe in detail the research design of the project, including topics such as the comparative
constitutional law, historical institutional analysis, case selection, target group definition and selection,
precommitment type and sub-type selection, and issue domain definition and selection.
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CHAPTER 2
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, PRECOMMITMENT THEORY AND MINORITY
RIGHTS
I.

The Fundamentals of Constitutionalism
Like many concepts in comparative politics, constitutionalism has no universally-accepted

definition. Influenced by the Eastern European democratization, Sajo (1999) defines it as “the
restriction of state power in the preservation of public peace” (Sajo, 1999, p. 9). In his view,
“[c]onstitutionalism is not merely a legal prescription or prudence elevated to the rank of
prescription” (Sajo, 1999, p. 9). For him, “[t]here is no satisfactory definition of constitutionalism
but one does not only feel when it has been violated, one can prove it. What brings about this almost
instinctive antipathy toward certain acts of government differs from country to country and from age
to age” (Sajo, 1999, p. 12). Ultimately, “[c]onstitutions are written out of fear of an earlier despotic
power, though, having been written, they begin a life of their own. From then on, crises will add to
the original fear, and answers to the old and new consensus constitute what will be considered
constitutional” (Sajo, 1999, p. 13).
Sajo’s fear of the previous regime eventuates in the goal of limited government so as to
prevent the reoccurrence of despotism. Rosenfeld (1994) opines that constitutionalism
fundamentally requires “imposing limits on the powers of government, adherence to the rule of law,
and the protection of fundamental rights” (Rosenfeld, 1994, p. 3). Attempting to reconcile
constitutionalism and deliberative democracy, Worley (2009) highlights three essential elements of
constitutionalism. First, the supremacy principle holds that even the government itself must be
subjected to the rule of law, accept institutional constraints and define the scope of government
power. Second, the limited government principle concerns institutional limits (judicial review, separation
of powers, etc.) placed on government intrusion into spaces of individual liberty and impingement
upon individual rights, and limits on government must be entrenched – the restrictions on state power
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cannot be easily changed. Tushnet (2006) identifies several requirement of constitutionalism. He
first identifies a commitment to the rule of law, “a generally observed disposition to exercise public
power pursuant to publicly known rules, adherence to which actually provides a substantial
motivation for acting or refraining from action.” Second, constitutionalism requires a reasonably
independent judiciary. Third, and finally, “reasonably regular and reasonably free and open elections,
with a reasonably widespread franchise” (Tushnet, 2006, p. 1230).
From a minimalist perspective, Elster (2000) describes constitutionalism as “a general
propensity to abide by the constitution and judicial review” (Elster, 2000, p. 99). Constitutions
regulate political life, through bills of rights that protects the citizenry from government interference.
Constitutions also regulate themselves by providing the rules for constitutional amendment.
Constitutional amendment is generally a slow process, requiring a range of qualified majorities, from
unanimity, through parliamentary supermajority, a popular referendum or some other standard that is
more arduous than that required for the enactment of ordinary legislation. For Elster, the processes
that lead to the creation of a constitution represent an elite game; both the upstream or downstream
authorities contribute to the creation of the constitutional constraints (Elster, 2000). Berggren &
Karlsson (2003) describe constitutionalism as “the doctrine that governmental power and majority
rule should be constrained by individual rights and a system of checks and balances, codified in a
formal constitution. At the core of this view is the idea that a well-functioning political system needs
a clear division of power” (Berggren & Karlsson, 2003, p. 99).
Taking a rational choice approach, Hardin (1999) argues that liberalism, constitutionalism
and democracy are mutual advantage theories. Citing Thomas Hobbes, he explains that under the
theory of mutual advantage “the best way to secure our personal interest in survival and economic
prosperity is to secure the general mutual interest in these things through establishing or maintaining
general order” (Hardin, 1999, p. 2). Constitutionalism is a sociological theory used to establish and
maintain social order through the acquiescence of the populace. In Hardin’s rational choice analysis
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“a constitution does not provide a particular exchange or prisoner’s dilemma interaction. It regulates
a long-term pattern of interactions. It establishes conventions in the sociological or strategic sense
that make it easier for us to cooperate or coordinate in particular moments” (Hardin, 1999, p. 86).
Simply put, constitutionalism erects those institutions necessary for coordination, between
individuals and between individuals and the state. Institutions exist to make some actions and results
possible and to constrain other actions make others costly. In Hardin’s view, the implementation of
constitutionalism is both simple and complex. It is simple because it requires agreement only on
large, general matters of national order, with minutiae being the province of legislation. On the other
hand, the difficulty in constitutionalism comes in the arrival at an agreement on those large, general
matters of national order.
The origins of the more recent efforts at constitutionalism are not singular. Western
philosophers widely regarded as the progenitors of constitutional ideals – e.g., Kant, Rousseau,
Bentham, Mill – do not enjoy the consultation of the framers of contemporary constitutions.
(Henkin, 1992-93). More recent framers tend to consult documents such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as general guides, but national idiosyncrasies play a critical role in the
constitution-making process. That said, Henkin does identify what he believes to be at least seven
demands of modern day constitutionalism. Henkin’s central themes may be summarized as follows:
(1) modern constitutionalism is based on popular sovereignty, with government legitimacy and
authority grounded in the will of the people through representative government; (2) the constitution
must be the supreme law; (3) the government must adhere to a variety of democratic principles:
limited government, separation of powers, checks and balances, civilian control of the military and an
independent judiciary; (4) the state must respect individual rights, with reasonable limitations; and (6)
a constitution should permit self-determination, or the rights of “peoples” to choose their “political
affiliation” (Henkin, 1992-93, pp. 535-36).
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Lutz (2006) remarks that “[o]ver the past two centuries, we have moved from a situation
where almost no country had a written constitution to one where almost every country has one”
(Lutz, 2006, p. 4). There has been a diffusion of constitutional principles throughout the world, not
only emulating the US and canonical French models, but also Germany and SA. Since WWII,
unitary systems, which may work well with homogeneous populations, have gradually given way to
federal, confederal or consociational arrangements. Perhaps the most noteworthy trend is the
increased recognition of racial, religious and ideological minorities. The type and durability of the
cleavages dictates the institutional form required to manage them. Relatedly, as constitutionalism has
spread, constitutions have become more rights-conscious, for both individual and group rights.
These constitutions produce pressures to help to identify lingering injustices and codify potential
solutions. Along with this emerges a possible conflict between a “national culture,” a super-ordinate
culture that essentially renders all other national allegiances subsidiary, or what Lutz refers to as a
“constitutional culture,” a culture which recognizes the diversity and multitude of nationalities within
a state while still asserting sufficient loyalty to the sovereign (Lutz, 2006, p. 14).
Constitutional culture is a product of a whole host of variables, including a state’s social,
political and economic histories, legal traditions, mode and manner of transition to a constitutional
polity, as well as the type of regime that preceded the transition. In his discussion of the global
influence of American constitution, Billias (2009), echoing Sajo, makes the point well.
Any study of constitutional influence must acknowledge at the outset that all constitutions
are autochthonous; that is, they spring from native soil and are rooted in a country’s indigenous
traditions … Constitutions are, to a greater or lesser degree, hybrid documents, since each
new constitution is part of a larger process called syncretism, by which the traditions of one
country incorporate the indigenous traditions of another country, resulting in a new creation
to which both countries have contributed (Billias, 2009, p. 4).
American constitutionalism has been credited with being the blueprint for many of the constitutions
enacted around the world. Billias’ basic understanding of constitution, adopted from Fehrenbacher
(1989), is “‘the sum total of legal and political restraints that … safeguard the exercise of power and
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protect certain fundamental rights” (Billias, 2009, p. 7). Billias adds that constitutionalism implies “‘a
complex of ideas, attitudes and patterns of behavior elaborating the principle that the authority of
government derives from and is limited by a body of fundamental laws’” (Billias, 2009, p. 7). In the
American experience, these ideas were embodied in six categories of documents: the Declaration of
Independence, the first state constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, the US Constitution, The
Federalist and the Bill of Rights. Each document contributed to the American constitutional model.
In Lutz’s view, “constitutions need to be viewed more as instruments for achieving general
fairness and justice than as instruments for efficiently pursuing specific public policies” (Lutz, 2006,
p. 11). Lutz asserts that the confluence of culture, power and justice help determine how
constitutionalism manifests in any given society. He directs attention to the power element of
constitutions. Institutions created by constitutions identify the supreme power, distribute power in a
way that leads to effective decision-making and provide a framework for continuing political struggle
through elections and litigation rather than violence. Borrowing from Montesquieu’s idea of the
“spirit of the laws” and his theoretical discussions of the freedom-coercion dichotomy, Lutz
contends that justice is the key ingredient in constitutionalism. By their very nature, written
constitutions make the rights and duties of the citizen and state publicly available, making the
functions and operations of government known.
Franklin & Baun (1995) contend that what is needed for a constitution to take root is the
appropriate political culture, a “fertile, organic environment” in which the rule of law can germinate and
flourish.2 (Franklin & Baun, 1995, p. 2). In Schlink’s discussion of the changing relationship

2 The authors argue that in the absence of such a pre-existing culture, a viable constitutional culture can come
about through: (1) an organic and evolutionary process by which the necessary political institutions emerge as a
product of a distinct national identity; (2) exogenous forcible imposition of democratic institutions; or (3) the
coalescence of a variety of homogenous ethnic groups that eventuates in the formation of a federal states. This
typology seems overly-simplistic, given that there is significant overlap among the three types and that, in
practice, the inauguration of democratic societies emerges from the interaction of a number of agents and
interests whose positions with regard to constitutionmaking are not always readily discernible. (Franklin &
Baun, 1995, p. 3).
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between constitutional legal scholarship and constitutional interpretation in German Law, he
maintains that the form of constitutional culture that is generated and propagated by a particular
constitution depends not only on the memorialization of certain fundamental democratic principles,
but also on the administration, interpretation and scholarly analysis of those principles. For him,
“[h]ow legislation and administration deal with the constitution essentially depends upon the sort of
supervision to which they are subjected by judicial decision making. How this supervising
adjudication in turn deals with the constitution, how strictly or laxly it interprets its provisions, and in
what spirit it applies them essentially depends upon how legal scholarship deals with the constitution
and with judicial decision making.” (Schlink, 1994, p. 197).
As political culture varies, instantiations of constitutionalism vary. Elster (1991) points out
that the wave of constitutionalism that began in Eastern Europe in 1989 differed from the previous
waves for five reasons: (1) the countries emerged from communist rule, (2) they have pre-communist
constitutional traditions, (3) they were transitioning from a central planning to a market-based
economy, (4) the countries had intertwined histories and (5) the democratization process proceeded
based on demonstration effects. He also points out significant differences, including the federal
arrangement of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and the economic and cultural advancement of
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland as compared to the Baltic states. (Elster, 1991, p. 448). In his
study, he compares and contrasts the constitutional trajectories of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia. All cases were ethnically
heterogeneous in some way, with varying degrees of geographic distribution of ethnic minorities.
Elster identifies three independent causes that contributed to the Eastern European wave of
constitutionalism: (1) Gorbechev’s policies of glasnost, perestroika and non-interference; (2) the
Round Table talks in Poland; and (3) Ceaucescu’s treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania
(Elster, 1991, pp. 453-455).
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In his discussion of African constitutionalism, An-Na’im (2006) echoes Sajo’s and Lutz’s
perspective on the influence of culture in determining how a particular society implements
“constitutionalism” into its various state institutions. He does so while simultaneously
acknowledging that there are in fact necessary standards to which any constitutional society must
conform. In the African context, An-Na’im maintains that constitutional culture is inevitably
comprised of pre-colonial remnants and European historicity. Thus, if a society is to approximate
what he refers to as “African constitutionalism” Africans must “recover some of the moral and
philosophical resources of the precolonial past of African societies into a present which has been
totally transformed by colonial and post-colonial conditions” (An-Na’im, 2006, p. 32). Additionally,
those vestiges of the African past must be integrated into “a theory and practice of constitutional
principles that were developed in Western societies, while retaining the new acculturated outcome
within recognizable patterns of constitutionalism” (An-Na’im, 2006, p. 32). Clearly, An-Na’im is
attempting to create a balance – on the one hand, he challenges the rigidity and particularism of
Eurocentric models of state-society relations, while on the other hand he accepts certain elements of
those models as universal and integral to the successful accomplishment of the constitutional
project.3
Especially within Africa, instantiations of political culture have varied greatly. During the
colonial period constitutional development in Africa took two forms – the imposition of an alien,
European authority that subordinated traditional political structures and the preservation of African
culture and social autonomy that later led to mobilization and anti-colonial movements. European
influence in Africa’s initial constitution-making processes played a key role in their failure precisely

3

An-Na’im crystallizes the delicate balance when he argues that
Africans should be able to seek, to retrieve, rejuvenate and develop such conceptions and institutions,
regardless of whether or not they can verify or validate such recollections in terms of Eurocentric
historiography and epistemology. But equally important is that such retrieval includes a critical
examination of the historical experience, instead of blind sentimental assertion of ideas and
institutions. (An-Na’im, 2006, p. 33).
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because their frameworks were alien. In many instances of African constitutionalism, traditional
notions of state sovereignty created tensions between elites who controlled the apparatuses and the
distribution of rights and resources and a self-determined civil society that sought greater voice,
greater autonomy or even outright secession. An-Na’im suggests that a redefinition of sovereignty
based on human rights and human dignity should be pursued. This would be a departure from an
insular state-centered approach to one where a country’s internal dynamics would be guided by
democratic frameworks and covenants put forth by the UN and other international organizations
(An-Na’im, 2006, p. 58). Again, An-Na’im calls for balance between conceptions of human dignity
derived from liberal standards of individual human rights and “traditional or communitarian
conceptions of dignity” (An-Na’im, 2006, pp. 60-61).
Many post-colonial African states followed the path of liberal statecraft which entailed a
homogenizing, assimilationist nation-building project that would denigrate ethno-pluralism and
elevate an artificially constructed national identity. The proscription of ethnic displays was
widespread and any ethno-federal arrangements that were installed to accommodate ethnic groups
were abandoned in all but Nigeria (Dersso, 2008, p. 10). Usually state machinery became
monopolized by particular groups, to the extreme detriment of others. Constitutions in countries
such as Ghana, Tanzania, Algeria, Sudan and the Central African Republic explicitly provided for
one-party rule (Dersso, 2008, p. 13). The Kenyan constitution gives the executive enormous power,
leaving the judiciary ineffective and untrustworthy, and Kenya’s bill of rights inept as it pertains to
minority protections (Ongar & Ambani, 2008).
Legal tradition can also play a role in constitutional political culture. An instructive example
may be found in Islamic Law. What may be termed the Islamic legal ethic began to take shape
during the first few decades after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, spreading throughout the
Hejaz and the garrison towns of Arab conquerors. Religious indoctrination was essential to the new
leaders of the Islamic state to unite the splintered Arab tribes. Under the caliphate of Umar I, the
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Islamic ethic began to take root, through the building of mosques by early caliphs in garrison towns
and the deployment of quranic teachers to aid military leaders in Islamic indoctrination. In the view
of Hallaq (2005), “[t]he religious activities of the commanders, the Quranic teachers, story-tellers,
preachers and quadis [Islamic judges] all combines to propagate an Islamic religious ethic and instill it
in the hearts and minds of the new Muslims. In all of this, the Quran was again the most
fundamental and pervasive element, whose spirit – if not letter – was totally, or near totally
controlling” (Hallaq, 2005, p. 55). Quranic law was applied by proto-quadis in conjunction with sunan
(laws for model behavior), Arabian customary law, caliphate decrees and their own discretion.
However, true predominance of the Prophetic Sunna law did not begin until the 680s when quadis
began to reinterpret Prophetic biography separate and apart from the sunan of Abu Bakr, Umar and
others (Hallaq, 2005, pp. 55-56). The Prophetic law continued to ascend through the second
century, with the emergence of legal specialists and the increased entrenchment of the Prophetic
authority as superior over other sunan, and the beginning of the traditionalist –rationalist conflict
(Hallaq, 2005, pp. 77-78). From 740-800 AD, further advances were made in the consolidation of
Islamic law: the judge’s office became more centralized, the judicial centralization occurred under the
Abbasid caliphate and the qadis office became more specialized and litigation, rather than story-telling
and policing, became its chief concern.4

4

The Quran and the Hadith are the principal doctrinal sources of Islamic law, or Shari’ah. The methodology of
interpretation of these texts is guided by usul-al-fiqh, generally referring to methods of legal reasoning such as
analogy (quiyas), juristic preference (istihsan), presumption of continuity (istishab) and the rules of deduction.
Kamali, 1991, 1. From the usul-al-fiqh are derived the fiqh, or the law itself. The Qur’an is the “‘the book
containing the speech of God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in Arabic and transmitted to us by
continuous testimony, or tawatur.’” Kamali, 1991, 14. The contents of the qur’an that are legal in nature
constitutie the fiqh al-Quran, effectively the juris corpus of the Qur’an. There are approximately 350 ayat (Qur’anic
verses) of legal relevance, some of which were revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca (Makki) and
others in Medina (Madani). The chronology of revelation helps in understanding Qur’anic legislation.4 Also
critical in understanding the nature of Qur’anic legislation is the distinction between qati (the definitive) and
zanni (the speculative). A definitive injunction is one that is “clear and specific; it has only one meaning and
admits of no other interpretations” (Kamali, 1991, p. 21).
Conversely, a speculative injunction is open to interpretation and ijtihad (the process of rational
interpretation). In an instance of zanni, th Qur’an is looked at as a whole or the text is searched for further
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The ethos of reciprocity, as distinguished from a liberal individualist ethos, has direct bearing
on how the role of the state is conceptualized. As Tucker (2008) opines, the reach of law into the
private realm of society was deep. This reach operated to permit the state to regulate familial
relations and, consequently, a woman’s freedom over her own body. Simply stated, “[t]he long arm
of the law did not stop at the bedroom door, and the woman’s physical comforts and sexual
experiences within marriage, the legitimacy of her pregnancy, and her special needs as a nursing
mother were all well within its purview” (Tucker, 2008, p. 28). Islamic law does countenance the
female experience, but does so in a way that makes them subject to male patriarchal priorities”
(Tucker, 2008, p. 29). This asymmetrical gender dynamic is not only strictly legal, but is articulated
and reproduced through linguistic apparatuses that infuse legal discursive. This discourse of gender
inequality had effectively silenced the woman’s voice.
elaboration in a similar or different context. Supplemental sources that would aid in interpretation include the
Sunnah and statements made by the Companions. These supplemental sources also aid Islamic jurists in
specifying the many provisions of the Qur’an that are general (Amm) in nature, as opposed to those that are
specific (Khass). Generality has been perceived as one of the virtues of he Qur’an because it allows
commentators and ulema to “derive a fresh message, a new lesson or a new principle from the Qur’an that was
more suitable to the realities of their times and the different phases of development in the life of the
community” (Kamali, 1991, p. 32). As with other legal traditions, the goal of interpretation in Islamic law is to
determine the intention of the lawmaker.
The Qur’anic conception of justice is not a rigid one. Kamali maintains that “Islam’s perspectives on
rights and liberties is somewhat different from that of constitutional law and democracy and their underlying
Western postulates” (Kamali, 2008, p. 201). He explains further that while Western jurisprudence emphasized
rights from an individualist perspective, “the rights and obligations of Islam are inter-related and reciprocal and
there is a greater emphasis on obligation that is indicative of the moralist leanings of Shari’ah” (Kamali, 2008, p.
202). For example, in the instance of gender, Islamic legal thought and doctrine have assigned men and
women distinct social roles. As Tucker (2008) explains “[a]lthough in general the Qur’an deals with women in
an egalitarian and non-discriminatory fashion, there are verses that have provided the basis on which to build
gender hierarchies (Tucker, 2008, p. 24). From Quranic passages such as chapter 4, verse 34, the man was
interpreted as breadwinner with road domestic authority over the dependents and the woman as subservient
and obedient.
Such discriminatory practices are not limited to the domestic domain. Historically, men have been
permitted to seek several wives, prostitution is criminalized but the male client faces no charges, and the
financial compensation for accidental death of a spouse is halved for a woman (Tucker, 2008, p. 26). An
ethnographic study conducted by Basu (2008) in the Kolkata Family Court in India highlighted the
disadvantages that Muslim Indian women face in seeking legal remedies in divorce and divorce maintenance
disputes. As Tucker indicated, the arena of domestic relations has historically been one in which women have
suffered material subordination, more than women of Hindu or other religious affiliation.
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The examples from Eastern Europe, Africa and Islam are intended to show how the
particularities of political culture and the idiosyncrasies of regime type, transition and consolidation,
are important variables in determining whether and how liberal constitutional principles are
constitutionally memorialized. The role of these cultural particularities is specifically salient as they
are manifested within multi-ethnic, deeply-divided societies. In such contexts, the essential basket of
constitutionalism’s requirements – rule of law, checks and balances, separation of powers, elections,
political coordination, etc. – is preserved. However, its “liberal-ness” – the degree to which it
emphasizes a state-society relationship predicated upon the rights of the individual rather than the
group – may become practically untenable for the embryonic nation-state confronting serious social
cleavages. Constitution-makers in such states must not only reconcile the apparent conflict between
individual rights and fundamental fairness, but they must also manage the tension between adherence
to certain liberal principles and maintain basic societal integrity.
II.

Constitutionalism and Precommitment Theory
If the above-articulated line of reasoning regarding constitutionalism is taken seriously, then

one of the central objectives of the constitution-making process should be to craft a document that
carefully enshrines the rights and obligations imposed upon the state and its citizens, and by doing so
defines the legal relationship between the government and the governed. As discussed above, the
conceptualization and practice of constitutionalism may differ from case to case. However, amid the
historical and cultural contingencies, common to all is the theory of precommitments – a
constitution’s principal purpose is to bind the state and its agents. In Ulysses Unbound, Elster (2000)
provides the seminal examination of constitutional precommitment theory. His discussion is based
on rational choice theory – individuals are inherently self-interested and almost invariably exhibit in
profit-maximizing behavior. In Elster’s view, even rational actors may choose to limit themselves if
they believe such limitations are beneficial. Elster identifies two types of constraints. First, there are
constraints that benefit the constrained but that are not chosen by the agent for the sake of those
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benefits. These constraints may be chosen by the agent for another reason, chosen by some other
agent, or not chosen by anyone. Elster terms these incidental constraints because the benefits are
incidental to the constraints. Second there are those constraints that an agent imposes upon himself
for the sake of some expected benefit to himself. These are termed essential constraints because the
benefits are an expected consequence of the agent’s intentional imposition of the constraint (Elster,
2000, p. 4). One reason we may bind ourselves it to protect against passion or emotional feelings.
Borrowing from Aristotle, Elster contends that decisions based on passion may cause a discrepancy
between plans and behavior in at least four ways: (1) by distorting cognition (engender confusion
about the consequences of action); (2) by clouding cognition (crowd out relevant alternative
considerations); (3) by inducing weakness of will (acting against one’s better judgment); and (4) by
inducing myopia (passion determines how consequences are weighed) (Elster, 2000, p. 8).
Elster then applies the essential-incidental binary to constitutional precommitments. Unlike
constraints in the individual scenario, constitution-makers may bind not only themselves but others.
Constitutional precommitments work on two levels. First, the constitution designs the “machinery
of government” to counteract passion, overcome time-inconsistency and to promote efficiency.
Second, the constitution creates the machinery of amendment, a purposely slow and cumbersome
process. For example, the separation of powers is a ubiquitous institutional device that organizes the
passage of legislation in two or more stages, mitigating the sometimes rash impulses of politicians
(Elster, 2000, p. 117). Similarly, bicameral legislatures and the executive veto are devices that check
legislative tyranny. While such precommitments may be indispensable to maintaining institutional
efficiency and legislative credibility, Elster acknowledges that adoption may be neither feasible nor
desirable in a given polity. He also acknowledges the limitations of extending precommitment theory
from individual choice to collective decision-making. He seems to relax his basic rational
assumptions – that states are unitary actors with consistent, stable preferences that direct decision-
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making – and argues that both individuals and groups can have divided preferences as well (Elster,
2000, p. 168).
While Elster’s conceptual application of precommitment theory to constitutions and
constitution-making provides insight into the decision-making processes that determine the structure
of government, he devotes little attention to constitutional precommitments to rights. In Towards
Juristocracy, Hirschl (2004) takes up the issue, arguing that existing theories of constitutionalism fail to
account for the nature of constitutional reform that has occurred in the past few decades. He
develops the theory of “hegemonic preservation” to explain the occurrence of judicial
empowerment; “voluntary, self-imposed judicial empowerment [occurs because] political, economic,
and legal power-holders who either initiate or refrain from blocking such reforms estimate that it
serves their interests to abide by the limits imposed by increased judicial intervention in the political
sphere” (Hirschl, 2004, p. 11). In his view, constitutionalization is a result of the strategic interplay
between political elites, economic elites and judicial elites – an interaction that permits the
preservation of hegemony by insulating policy preferences from “the vicissitudes of democratic
politics,” or majoritarian decision-making (Hirschl, 2004, p. 12). Thus, “the constitutionalization of
rights is therefore not a reflection of a genuinely progressive revolution in a polity; rather, it is
evidence that the rhetoric of rights and judicial review has been appropriated by threatened elites to
bolster their own position in the polity” (Hirschl, 2004 p. 12).
With this theoretical framework, Hirschl uses a qualitative-quantitative comparative case
study approach to examine the effects of constitutionalizaton in four cases: Canada, New Zealand,
Israel and SA. For each case he surveys all national high court bills of rights jurisprudence from the
date of enactment to 2002. He focuses on four key issues: criminal due process rights, privacy in the
contexts of freedom of expression and sexual expression; subsistence social and economic rights; and
freedom of association in the context of labor relations. Hirschl finds that in all cases there was a
tendency to emphasize Lockean individualism and anti-statism. The high courts protected the
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private sphere from interference by the collective (Hirschl, 2004, pp. 13-14.). Hirschl also examines
the impact of constitutionalization on economic redistribution to historically marginalized groups in
each of the four cases. He finds that there is serious doubt as to whether bills of rights can promote
a more egalitarian form of distributive justice. Finally, Hirschl shows how judicial empowerment
permits politicians to avoid or delay unwanted political outcomes.
In Constitutionalism and Secession, Sunstein (1991) argues that a panoply of “considerations
might lead people forming a new government to place basic rights and arrangements beyond the
reach of ordinary politics” (Sunstein, 1991, p. 637). Relevant considerations include: (1) the belief
that some rights are pre- or extra-political; (2) rights that derive from the principles of democracy
itself; (3) an effort to protect a private sphere from majoritarianism; (4) the decision to take certain
issues off the ordinary political agenda; (5) provisions designed to solve collective action problems;
and (6) strategies to overcome weakness of will on the part of the collectivity (Sunstein, 1991, pp.
637-641). The goal of these strategies is a common one – “reducing the power of highly
controversial questions to create factionalism, instability, impulsiveness, chaos, stalemate, collective
action problems, myopia, strategic behavior, or hostilities so serious and fundamental as to endanger
the governmental process itself” (Sunstein, 1991, p. 633).
Totten (2003) challenges Sunstein’s position that constitutional precommitments can remove
issues from the ordinary political agenda. Totten compares gender-based affirmative action in the
institutions of the European Union, Germany, Canada and the US. He concludes that in the cases of
Germany and the European Union – cases in which there are constitutional precommitments –
debate over the issue remained or even grew to the point where the commitment was amended in the
case of the EU and became a serious wedge between the parties in the case of Germany.
Furthermore, in the US, where there are no overt constitutional precommitments to gender
affirmative action, the commitment reflected in its jurisprudence may be sufficient to remove the
issue from political debate. Totten’s position on the value of constitutional precommitments to
28

affirmative action policies should be understood to qualify Sunstein, rather than contradict it. He
never goes so far as to maintain that constitutional precommitments are unnecessary tools in
deflecting judicial challenges and limiting public date. He simply argues that precommitments are
necessary but not sufficient to protecting affirmative action legislation and regulations from judicial
challenge. Furthermore, his analysis is applied to a limited number of cases and to only one target
group – women. Klarman (1998) distinguishes the two in the following way:
[The agency theory] conceives of legislators as agents and the People, speaking through their
constitution, as sovereign, while [precommitment theory] understands both the Constitution
and legislation to represent the will of the People, though one takes the form of long-term
precommitments and the other the form of short-term preferences that may be inconsistent
with those precommitments (Klarman, 1998, p. 152).
Like agency, precommitments suffer from the flaw of indeterminacy, which allows a judiciary to
substitute its own decision-making preferences for those intended. Furthermore, precommitments
tend to entrench normative values from a preceding generation on all successive generations.
III.

Constitutionalism and Constitution-Making
Whether and how particular constitutional precommitments exist can also be a function of

the constitution-making process itself. In their discussion of constitution-making in Africa and
Eastern Europe, Franck & Thiruvengadam (2010) identify two basic models of constitution-making
processes. Under the “old approach” the process is elite driven; “[t]he government either appointed
or attempted to control the election of a constituent assembly, parliamentary committee, technical
committee, or select committee of lawyers and politicians to write a new constitution for the
country” (Franck & Thiruvengadam, 2010, p. 8). The old approach makes no space for public
debate before the drafting process and attempts no consultation with ordinary people. In the 1990s,
Africans began to adopt a “new approach,” which emphasized dialogue, debate, consultation and
participation. The guiding principles are diversity, inclusivity, transparency, openness, autonomy,
accountability and legitimacy (Franck & Thiruvengadam, 2010, p. 8). The new approach has
spawned two new strategies for construction and enactment of a new constitution. The first is the
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appointment of a constitutional commission, followed by the action of a constituent assembly. This
strategy was employed by Uganda and Malawi. An alternative strategy, used in Benin, Niger, Gabon
and Togo, establishes a constitutional convention. Unlike in Africa, transitions in Central and
Eastern Europe did not incorporate public participation to any significant degree. In cases such as
Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, transition from communism to democracy was negotiated through a
series of roundtables, with the Communist Party on one side and the opposition on the other.
Albania, Bulgaria and Romania opted for a constituent assembly, usually followed by a referendum
process to obtain the approval of the people. Conversely, in Africa, public opinion was sought
earlier in the drafting process, but not afterward (Franck & Thiruvengadam, 2010, p. 12).
In Hart’s (2010) view, the right to participate in constitution-making is an extension of the
right to take part in public life, as articulated in art. 21 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights5 and
art. 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Art. 5(c) of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) echoes the
sentiments of both documents. It compels States Parties to eliminate racial discrimination in the area
of political rights, “in particular the right to participate in elections – to vote and stand for election –
on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as the conduct of
public affairs on any level and to have equal access to public service….” Finally, art. 7 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) compels
States Parties to ensure participation of women “in the formulation of government policy and the
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels of
government.” Regional documents with similar language include the 1981 African Charter on

5

Art. 21 states,
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely
chosen representatives. 2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 3.
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
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Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 1998 Asian Human Rights Charter, and the 2001 Inter-American
Democratic Charter. In advocating for co-habitational pluralism in Eastern and Central Europe,
Vasovic (1992) makes the point succinctly, “democracy entails the participation of people from
varying social strata in the decision-making process and the existence of structural conditions that
counteract the tendencies toward rapid and sharp social differentiation and the impoverishment of
large sections of the population” (Vasovic 1992, p. 95).
However, the right to participate in constitution-making processes is not without its limits.
In Marshall v. Canada (Communication No. 205/1986U.N. Doc. CCPR /C/43/D/205/1986 at 40)
the UNCHR responded to the a complaint filed by Canada’s indigenous Mikmaq tribe alleging that it
had been unlawfully denied attendance at a Canadian constitutional conference on aboriginal matters.
The Human Rights Committee held that the ICCPR “cannot be understood as meaning that any
directly affected group, large or small, has the unconditional right to choose the modalities of
participation in the conduct of public affairs (Marshall at 5.4). Thus, because the rights of the tribe
had not infringed and subjected to unreasonable restrictions, the Committee found no violation of
Art. 25 of the ICCPR. Subsequently, a 1996 a UNCHR General Comment did make it clear that
“the conduct of public affairs” as envisioned by the ICCPR does include constitution-making.
(UNCHR General Comment, 1996, ¶¶ 2, 6). Paragraph 1 of the Comment states that “Articla 25 of
the [ICCPR] recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public
affairs” and that “the [ICCPR] requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects.” And
under ¶ 6, the choice to change a constitution is in fact a part of the conduct of public affairs.
Hart (2010) identifies the three most common modes of constitutional participation. First,
groups may directly elect representatives to a constitutional assembly or convention. Even though
the rules of the election process are usually tightly controlled by party elites, voting for
representatives certainly ensures a more balanced, accountable outcome than reliance upon some
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self-appointed group. In addition to electing representatives to assemblies or conventions, many
states hold referenda on the final constitutional texts. As with the election of constitutional
representatives, the referendum process is subject to the manipulation of party elites. In Rwanda, the
referendum was preceded by a two-year program of education which elicited feedback from citizens.
Ultimately, the constitution gained 93% approval. Education campaigns may also include public
polling or media initiatives. For example, in SA the constitutional assembly invited public
submissions, held public meetings, aired a weekly radio program, advertised on buses and set up a
website. In Hart’s view, the election, education and referendum components should be implemented
in concert as part of a sustained participatory process that truly meet the democratic standard of
“taking part” (Hart, 2010, p. 25).
Participatory democratic scholars posit that the foundations democracy require that all
affected individuals be permitted a voice in the constitution-making process (Banks, 2008, p. 1048).
The “idea that interests are dynamic and that the process of deliberating facilitates interest
transformation is a key premise to participatory democracy” (Banks, 2008, p. 1048). These
negotiations should ideally occur within an environment of political equality free from coercion. The
two norms of inclusion and political equality are integral to designing innovative solutions,
particularly in a plural, post-conflict society with moribund political institutions (Banks, 2008, p.
1050). Both elite and popular considerations are important in curing or at the very least mitigating
power asymmetries that exist between elites and non-elites, although Banks concedes that “power
does not follow automatically from participation” (Banks, 2008, p. 1056).
Banks illustrates her position through the example of the process that led up to the
enactment of the 2003 Rwandan constitution and the gender-based affirmative action provisions.
Gathii (2008) seems to agree with Banks in that, particularly in third wave democracies of Africa,
constitution-making processes are aimed at breaking from past incarnations of government that
proved dysfunctional and inimical to democratic consolidation. However, he challenges her position
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that participatory constitution-making is more efficacious than alternatives. His comparison of
constitution-making in the DRC and Kenya illustrate how broad participation in the drafting process
does not ensure passage of the constitution in a state-wide referendum. (Gathii, 2008). Additionally,
in the Kenyan case, where there was comparatively more popular participation and authorship, the
constitution-making process failed and did not result in institutions that confronted the issue of
ethnic cleavages. However, the DRC, with less participation, but with continuing violence, may have
experienced “a coming together of the people of eastern DRC in overwhelmingly ratifying the
constitution” (Gathii 2008, p. 1137). The author identifies the crisis in the DRC as the principal
mechanism that caused the passage of the constitution.
What we can see from the relevant literature is that constitutionalism and precommitment
theory have many permutations. Ideal-type constitutionalism involves decidedly liberal principles.
However, as its principles began to migrate and become implanted in different societies, liberalism
and state-centrism came to be challenged by durable, and sometimes violent, social heterogeneity and
a recognition that exogenous political pressures from the state system and international organizations
have a profound effect on how constitutionalism manifests itself, both in terms of the aspirations of
the peoples in a particular society and how those aspirations are memorialized as rights by parties
involved in constitution drafting during constitution-making moments. Participatory constitutionmaking may be the ideal. However, in practice there is considerable variation in whether all
interested parties are granted the right to meaningful participation. Even if all parties do participate
meaningfully, there can be no guarantee that all interested parties participate equally.
IV.

Constitutions and Minority Rights
The sibling subjects of constitutionalism, constitution-making and pre-commitment theory

have significant impact on the articulation, administration and enforcement of minority rights. In the
few pages he devotes to minority rights in Ulysses Unbound, Elster makes some informative
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observations. He recognizes the need for constitutional minority rights protections in certain cases
where social passions prove deleterious to security and stability of the state.
Standing passions include national, ethnic and religious animosities, strong commitments to
equality or hierarchy, and other emotional dispositions that are widely shared and deeply
entrenched in the population. Because these passions can induce oppression of minorities
and cause severe social conflicts, it would be desirable to have some constitutional
protection against them, in the form of entrenched minority rights or power sharing among
groups. … Yet those provisions are also the least likely to be adopted, precisely because culture
and tradition work against them. In democratic societies, at least, there is no reason to
expect the framers to be exempt from the array of prejudices that animate the population at
large (Elster, 2000, p. 157).
Elster argues that people do not pre-commit themselves against strong, standing passions. Further,
constitutions are usually drafted during times of turbulence and upheaval, which clouds the judgment
of constitution-makers (Elster, 2000, p. 161).
Elster’s comments are well-taken. However, they are oversimplified and thus limited. Elster
assumes that all constitutional framers act under the same set of preferences, regardless of context.
However, as we have seen in the episodes of Eastern European, Islamic and African constitutionmaking such is not the case. Under Elster’s scenario, deeply divided societies undergoing
authoritarian thaw face an inescapable dilemma during democratic transition as it concerns
constitutional pre-commitments to minority rights. On the one hand, they face the passions of the
minority groups which seek the group recognition and protection they were not afforded under the
previous regime. On the other hand, the passions of the constitution’s framers (presumably elite
members of the majority) harbor racist, xenophobic or patriarchal passions that are prejudicial to the
rights of the minority. This conflict can be resolved in several ways. When constitution-making is an
enterprise conducted exclusively by majority elites, minority rights almost certainly will not be of
serious concern to the constitution’s framers. However, if the drafting process entails: (1) direct
participation in the drafting process by elected or appointed representatives of minority groups, (2)
indirect participation of minority groups by some form of mass mobilization or protest, (3)
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exogenous pressures from other states or international organization or (4) some combination of the
three, then minority rights can become an important part of the framers’ agenda. Part of the
problem with constitutionalism and minority rights stems from the constitution-making process
itself.6 However, the role of racial and ethnic groups – as it relates to participation in the transition
itself, pact formation and the potential political and economic redistribution – is less studied.
If we examine the issue of state recognition of minority rights generally, moving from a
rational to a more philosophical or normative perspective, many scholars argue that recognition of
collective rights is essentially required to ensure constitutional protection for minority groups. Will
Kymlicka asserts that certain strands of liberal political theory are, in fact, congruent with minority
rights (Kymlicka, 1989). He does acknowledge that liberal philosophers such as Rawls and Dworkin
have neglected minority rights, and liberal politicians have been “actively hostile” to the issue
(Kymlicka, 1989, p. 4). However, he goes on to argue that “cultural membership gives rise to
legitimate claims, and that some schemes of minority rights respond to those claims in a way that not
only is consistent with the principles of liberal inequality, but is indeed required by them” (Kymlicka,

6

In Inclusion and Democracy, Iris Marion Young advocates for a widening of democratic inclusion, which is best
pursued through the model of deliberative democracy. Because the “[d]emocratic process is primarily a
discussion of problems, conflicts, and claims of need or interest” deliberative democracy is “normatively
legitimate only if all those affected by it are included in the process of discussion and decision-making (Young,
2002, pp. 22-23). Furthermore, “when coupled with the norms of political equality, inclusion allows for
maximum expression of interest, opinions and perspectives relevant to the problems or issues for which a
public seeks solutions (Young, 2002, p. 23). Finally, “[p]articipation in an ideal process of deliberative
democracy must be equal in the sense that none of them is in a position to coerce or threaten others into
accepting certain proposals or outcomes” (Young, 2002, p. 23). But even Young concedes that deliberative
democracy cannot deliver justice if it operates within a structure of structural inequality. Young believes that if
marginalized groups are given a greater voice in political debate, then the structures can loosen and deliberative
democracy can function more effectively. However, this observation may be theoretically optimistic, because
in practice the use of systemic avenues for redress of wrongs committed against a minority by the majority have
proven to be largely ineffective. This is particularly true with regard to the most voiceless minorities. The
institutions that are the progeny of the constitution-making process not only serve as the nascent framework
that more often than not entrenches the regime of inegalitarian power relations that that preceded democratic
inauguration, but also act as the vehicle that will reproduce the regime of inegalitarian power relations into the
future.

35

1989, p. 4). With the aboriginal groups of North America as his prime example, Kymlicka
acknowledges that although far from unique, schemes for the protection of minority cultures are
often treated as an exception to liberal theory, in part because liberal theorists mistakenly feel they
must oppose them. In his view, this rather myopic position on collective rights serves only to harm
minority groups in liberal democracies (Kymlicka, 1989, pp. 137-138), groups which often feel
threatened by nation-building, and fear that it will create various burdens, or disadvantages for them
(Kymlicka, 2001, p. 1). He sums up his position on the dialectic of state building and minority rights
as follows
In both scholarly analysis and everyday public debate, minority rights are often described as
a form of ‘special status’ of ‘privilege’, and people wonder why all of these pushy and
aggressive minorities are demanding concessions and advantages from the state. In reality,
however, while minorities do make claims against the state, these must be understood as a
response to the claims that the state makes against minorities. People talk about
‘troublesome minorities’, but behind every minority that is causing trouble for the state, we
are likely to find a state that is putting pressure on minorities (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 2).
In this sense, the pressing for and the granting of minority rights claims is both a natural and
expected part of liberal nation-state building. To underscore his point, he points to the success
(peaceful) of what he refers to as the “immigrant multiculturalism” and “multinational federalism”
types of minority rights regimes in Western democracies within the framework of liberal
constitutions (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 3).
Van Dyke (1977) agrees with Kymlicka, stating the central issue succinctly; “whether ethnic
communities that meet certain criteria should be considered units (corporate bodies) with moral
rights, and whether legal status and rights should be accorded to them” (Van Dyke, 1977, p. 343).
Van Dyke acknowledges the centrality of the social contract in ordering the state-individual
relationship, as propounded by Hobbes and Locke. He also recognizes that groups cannot be
accorded moral rights because to do so would threaten the integrity of the state itself. However, Van
Dyke argues that historical precedents such as the British conferring rights on its colonies supports
his cause. Furthermore, international institutions like the UN have advocated self-determination.
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The integration of groups as right- and duty-bearing units is important, not only in intellectual
inquiry, but also in more practical ways, such as political representation, the psychology of
subordinated minority groups and the implementation of affirmative action programs. Ultimately,
Van Dyke makes a sound argument for the compatibility of individual and group rights, although he
qualifies his position by asserting that the appropriate criteria with which to determine group rights
eligibility remains under-studied.
Rather than attempting to fit a group rights theory into a liberal paradigm, Johnston (1989)
directly challenges liberalism. She maintains that although liberal rights theory does recognize
“society” as a legitimate rights holder, “[t]here is … little conceptual space for the rights of groups”
(Johnston, 1995, p. 24). She contends that the communitarian approach – a rejection of the
independent self as problematically deontological and a privileging of personhood as rooted in
community – elevates seemingly a-liberal values such as benevolence, understanding and friendship.
Johnston echoes the sentiments of Fiss (1976), opining that groups may have rights if the group has a
distinct existence apart from its members and the members are “interdependent” – “the identity and
well-being of the members of the group and the identity and well-being of the group are linked”
(Johnston, 1995, p. 183). Green (1994) agrees, and cites the example of the rights of North
American Aboriginals to self-government. In arguing for the rights of internal minorities, he
maintains that “in addition to the usual individual rights to personal liberty and associative freedom,
there are further special rights to powers and resources needed for the existence of the group”
(Green, 1995, p. 260). Finally, Hartney (1995) seems to largely agree with Johnston and proponents
of group rights. He emphasizes three key points: (1) that communities are important for the wellbeing of individuals, (2) that there may be compelling justifications for vesting legal rights in
communities and (3) members of communities could have individual moral rights to the protection
of their communities (Hartney, 1995, p. 221). He does, however object to the term “collective
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rights” because it lends itself to the unintended consequence of being used by a majority against a
minority and by a minority against a majority.
The national question is one of the central questions that must be addressed by constitutionmakers. For obvious reasons, the question becomes more serious when a given society is a plural
one, with deep social cleavages that form the basis of violent conflict. Walzer (1995) argues that
“ethnic pluralism is entirely compatible with the existence of a unified republic” (Walzer, 1995, p.
147), although he also posits that the primary function of the state is to do justice to individuals, with
group identity being one variable in the equation. He identifies two basic approaches a state can take
to ethnic group organization. The state can choose to adopt an “autonomist” strategy, to “encourage
or require the groups to organize themselves in corporatist fashion, assigning a political role to the
corporations in the state apparatus” (Walzer, 1995, p. 151). This approach would have the effect of
national liberation. Alternatively, the state can apply an “integrationist” approach, with uniform
standards for all citizens and proportional distribution of political, social and economic resources. In
Walzer’s view, this would “repress every sort of cultural specificity, turning ethnic identity into an
administrative classification” (Walzer, 1980, p. 152).
While Walzer’s points are well taken, there are at least two other options for a state
confronting the challenges of ethnic assertiveness. The state could employ outright genocide,
entirely eliminating the “troublesome” minority groups they deem a threat to the nation. Or the state
can embrace assimilationism, using non-violent means to achieve ostensibly the same goal as
genocide. These four responses to ethnic cleavages – genocide, assimilationism, integrationism and
autonomy – form a continuum. On one end, political elites choose to address the problem through
programs of violence and homogenization of minority groups to realize to goal of one supreme,
unifying national identity. At the other end, constitution-makers embrace sub-national allegiance and
accommodate them through territorial arrangements or state- mandated or –permitted group
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preferences. Most state fall somewhere in the vast middle, combining policies in a way that suits
their particular needs.
Glazer (1995) also highlights how several multi-ethnic states – the US, Canada, Belgium,
Malaysia – have indeed deviated from the liberal democratic norm of individual rights when
confronting the thorny issue of minority rights. He concedes that he favors an individual rights
approach for the US, but does not believe that one course advances democracy and equality while
the other necessarily diminishes it. In his view, the choice of approach has no bearing on whether a
state can be termed democratic, or whether it is responsive to civil or human rights. A state should
focus on the individual “if the state sets before itself the model that group membership is purely
private, a shifting matter of personal choice and degree, something that may be weakened and
dissolved in time as other identities take over…” (Glazer, 1995, p. 134). Conversely, a group rights
approach may be warranted if
the model a society has for itself … is that it is a confederation of groups, that group
membership is central and permanent, and that the divisions among groups are such that it is
unrealistic or unjust to envisage these group identities weakening in time to be replaced by a
common citizenship (Glazer, 1995, p. 134).
Glazer also argues that “special preferences” could be justified as an alternative when groups are
deeply divided and group identities have been reinforced by law or custom for the purposes of
discrimination and separation. He borrows his standard for determining whether the preferential
approach is justified from the Indian Supreme Court case of State of Madras v. Dorairajan, “the social
disparity must be so grim and substantial as to serve as a basis for benign discrimination” (Glazer,
1995, p. 137).
In Can Democracy be Designed, the authors move from controversies over the philosophical
justifications for group rights to the practical concerns over their implementation. They build upon
Elster’s point that democratic institutions may be redesigned to
create safeguards against the excessive concentration of power under ‘winner takes all’
electoral democracy; to increase the rights protection and political representation enjoyed by
minorities; to bring government closer to the people by decentralization and to increase the
39

responsiveness of democratic governments to the political demands of poor and socially
marginalized groups (Bastian & Luckham 2003, p. 2).
The authors recognize that democracies come into being in specific historical contexts. The fact is
that “[d]emocratic institutions and elected governments … may or may not open spaces for
democratic politics; they may or may not be responsive to the political demands of the poor, women
and minorities; they may or may not facilitate the management of conflicts” (Bastian & Luckham
2003, pp. 2-3). In their treatment of the Sri Lankan case, which has endured three episodes of
constitutional reform, efforts at democratic consolidation have been hampered by a politically
partisan constitution-making process, a borrowed Western model of democracy, and a mono-ethnic
constitutional design.
Vanhanen (1990) tends to agree, arguing that “[i]n ethnically heterogeneous societies it is
very difficult to invent institutional solutions to satisfy the requirements of democratic competition
for power and at the same time safeguard the sharing of power among the major ethnic groups at the
level of decision-making institutions” (Vanhanen, 1990, p. 149). Vanhanen commends a twopronged approach to increasing democratization in such societies: (1) changing the social conditions
that affect the distribution of power and (2) adapting political institutions to their social environment
in a way that allows competing groups to share power (Vanhanen, 1990, p. 165). Vanhanen believes
that “in principle” democratic deficiencies that are a result of ethnic conflict can be resolved by
“political crafting” or “constitutional engineering” and argues that federalism, proportional
representation and parliamentarism are potential solutions. The ideological dimension of policies
that foster inegalitarian resource distribution may be especially difficult to overcome. Oftentimes,
crises must be created in order for entrenched elite interests to promote reforms that may dislodge
the position of the superordinate group. Thus, the calculus is more complicated than when we deal
solely with economic reforms because reforms that redistribute wealth may actually be inimical to
overall economic growth. Here we are dealing with additional reforms such as access to capital,
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access to real property ownership, access to education, access to health care, access to political
offices, transformation of legal institutions and acknowledgement of alternative cultural identities.
Bastian & Luckham concede the difficulty in, if not the impossibility of, democratic
engineering. For them, “[t]here is a kind of hubris in the idea that constitutional experts, political
scientists, donor agencies or even national decision makers can assure democracy or solve conflicts
by designing institutions” (Bastian & Luckham, 2003, p. 304). Indeed, institutional design is an
apparent oxymoron. “Institutions, in the sense that many political thinkers use the term evolve,
grow, become rooted or become ‘institutionalzed’ … and are not designed. And where attempts are
made to design them, history, ‘accident and force’ and political manipulation may turn them on their
heads and produce perverse and unforeseen outcomes…” (Bastian & Luckham, 2003, p. 304). The
authors contend that an historical approach is needed to understand shifting power relations and
social transformations (Bastian & Luckham, 2003, p. 306). Also of critical importance is the manner
in which decision-makers choose to exploit political opportunities at critical historical junctures. The
political and economic forces pressing for reform – and the reforms themselves – may tug in
contradictory directions. Even incomplete or politically loaded institutional choices may sometimes
create political openings that can be used to expand democratic opportunities or resolve conflicts.
V.

Constitutions and Women’s Rights
With regard to constitutional pre-commitments for a different minority – women – the

analysis is somewhat different. Baines, Barak-Erez & Kahana (2012) describe feminist
constitutionalism as “the project of rethinking constitutional law in a manner that addresses and
reflects feminist thought and experience.… Feminist constitutionalism demands that we not only
revisit classical topics from new perspectives but, more importantly, pose new questions, introduce
new topics and take responsibility for changing the focus of constitutional discussion and debate”
(Baines et al., 2012, p. 1). Nedelsky concurs, arguing that feminist constitutionalism involves a
reimagination of: (1) the scope and practices of institutions that should be held accountable to core
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values, (2) the forms of deliberation about those values and their political meaning, and (3) multiple
forms of accountability (Nedelsky, 2012, p. 15). Case (2012) contends that “feminist
fundamentalism” – an uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes – should be an
integral part of the feminist constitutionalism program (Case, 2012, p. 48). At its core, feminist
constitutionalism challenges the hidden assumptions associated with conventional constitutionalist
discourse and injects a variety of additional topics for scholarly consideration: equality jurisprudence,
center and periphery constitutional law, rights and institutions, and global and comparative law, and
the integration of diversity theories.
For Barak-Erez (2012), feminist constitutionalism hinges upon a feminist constitutional
interpretation. She identifies three important types of feminist theories. Under liberal feminism,
men and women are granted equal opportunities. This approach requires that gender-neutral texts be
read to apply to both men and women. It also requires that distinctions between men and women be
given a narrow interpretation. Barak-Erez cites several cases from Israel and South Africa covering
issues from service in the military, the taxation of married women and the interpretation of
customary law. Ritter (2006) contends that the liberal turn in American constitutional law benefitted
women’s rights. She argues that prior to the twentieth century, women’s place in the American
political community was relational because they had legal standing only through their husbands,
fathers and masters. She asserts further that in the late nineteenth century a shift began to occur; a
shift from a citizenship based on domesticity and dependency to one “imperfectly” based on liberal
individualism and America’s emergence as a modern constitutional order. For Ritter, US civic
membership and gender politics is situated squarely within the framework of constitutional politics.
She describes civic membership as referring to the legal and political status of all persons under US
political authority. It also refers to the broader political, legal and social meanings attached to one’s
place in the polity. Furthermore,
[i]t is conceived of dynamically and historically, as involving everyday political practices and
processes in which the state and its members both enact and contest members’ rights, duties,
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and civic statuses within different institutional and discursive settings. Civic membership is
located in all of the places where the state and the populous intersect: the legal realm, the
regulatory and policy realms, and the realm of political representation and popular culture
(Ritter, 2006, p. 6).
Constitutional order creates, binds and orders the legal community. They are designed to regulate
social order; some constitutions make the nature of the social order clear while others are more
ambiguous.
Second, cultural feminism emphasizes an ethic of care, or positive duties toward
disempowered people. Finally, radical feminism focuses on the liberation of women from their social
subordination and subjection to violence. Kapai (2012) cites the CEDAW and the UN General
Assembly’s Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) as important
international instruments aimed at domestic violence. Rather than choose amongst these interpretive
approaches, which at times conflict with one another, Barak-Erez maintains that constitutional
interpreters simply ask “the woman question,” a method first proposed by Katherine Bartlett (1991).
Case asserts that asking “the woman question” can help avoid interpretive choices that
disproportionately affect women and instead promote the allocation of burdens in a more just
manner (Barak-Erez, 2012, p. 95).
When it comes to women’s participation in the constitution-making process itself, Katz
(2012) asserts that
women, much like minority groups, have unique interests in the drafting of their nation’s
constitutions. Women’s participation is thus crucial to ensuring that women’s rights and
priorities are included or at least addressed in a nationwide dialogue. Women’s involvement
results in substantive textual changes, a broader and more inclusive discussion, and the
empowerment of women (Katz, 2006, p. 222).
For example, in Afghanistan, the severe restrictions on women changed dramatically with the defeat
of the Taliban in 2001. According to Katz, women were involved in all stages of the new
constitution-making process. Of the interim government, the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga – 220 of
the 1,500 delegates were women. Unfortunately, much of the discussions were dominated by
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warlords and few women were able to voice their opinions. Likewise, when it came to political
involvement, women’s voices were muted. Women for Afghan Women, a diverse Afghan NGO,
drafted a women’s bill of rights which includes 21 essential rights to improve women’s status in the
education, political and economic spheres. Many of their suggestions were ignored, although they
were successful in achieving quotas in the upper and lower houses of parliament (Katz, 2012, pp.
206-207).
Also important to the discussion on gender and constitutionalism is the multicultural
dimension. Williams (2012) characterizes the issue of “internal minorities” – e.g., minority women –
as an important one faced by liberal democracies with regard to constitutional interpretation and
design. For her, “[t]he problem of vulnerable internal minorities arises when a minority religious or
cultural group requests an accommodation for its practices from the state and those practices cause
significant harm to a group within the minority community” (Williams, 2012, p. 394). Williams
contends that multicultural accommodation must support vulnerable internal minorities. In the case
of women, this support may take the form of positive action measures and the initiation of internal
dialogue. To support her contention, Williams asserts a dialogic view of democracy – one in which
the purpose of democratic politics is to form a political community in which people can seek a way
forward together. She openly acknowledges the problems associated with imposing a model of
dialogic democracy on minorities, as it may be just as intrusive as the imposition of the liberal
democratic ideal of individualism. However, dialogic democracy can actually help minority groups’
focus more on their core values while simultaneously help the state safeguard its own legitimacy
(Williams, 2012, pp. 403-408).
Narain (2012) concurs with Williams; “[a] feminist critique of multiculturalism is critical to
bring hidden perspectives into the dialogue between the community and the state, to highlight the
gendered dimension of the issue, and to ensure that the community and state include subaltern
voices in the dialogue on the accommodation of difference” (Narain, 2012, p. 377). She advocates
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for an understanding of multicultural citizenship that allows for the possibility of difference without
exclusion and pluralism, and that recognizes constitutional rights as the appropriate arena for
addressing women’s inequality. She grounds her arguments by focusing on Muslim women’s rights,
thus highlighting the potential antagonism between multiculturalism and feminism. In her
estimation, “[m]inority women are viewed as victims of their culture and gender subordination is
located in racialized communities and culture” (Narain, 2012, p. 382). Furthermore,
constructing an either feminism or multiculturalism dichotomy obscures the forces that
actually shape culture, denies women agency within patriarchy, and discounts the notion that
women have as much of a stake as men do in the continuance of the culture of their group.
Moreover, it discounts the level of systemic gender discrimination in the wider society and
Muslim women are seen as more subordinated and more oppressed by their cultures
(Narain, 2012, p. 382).
Narain illustrates her position by focusing on the plight of Muslim women in India.
Although the Indian Constitution guarantees equality between the sexes, Muslim women’s familial
relations are governed by religious personal laws as the state’s guarantee of equality does not extend
into the private sphere. Narain cites the Shah Bano case as an example. In that case, a 73-year-old
Muslim woman sought spousal support from her husband who had left her. The woman was
successful under India’s secular law. After her husband was granted a unilateral divorce under
Muslim personal law, he appealed the spousal support decision, arguing that under the principles of
iddat he was only required to pay support for forty days after divorce. The Indian Supreme Court
denied his appeal, sparking outrage from religious leaders who accused the Court of interfering with
Muslim personal law. The Indian government capitulated and enacted a new law regulating Muslim
women’s access to spousal support (Narain, 2012, p. 379). Fournier (2012) discusses the nuances of
Islamic divorce in additional detail.
VI.

Conclusion
Historically, liberal constitutionalism has provided a firm foundation for nascent

democracies endeavoring upon consolidation or for already consolidated democracies seeking to
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refine their political institutions. However, as liberal constitutionalism has spread, it has become
clear that the application of liberal orthodox principles, specifically the principle of individualism,
must be compromised or simply outright discarded if political elites in multi-ethnic states are to
succeed in fashioning a constitutional framework that satisfies its various social factions and
maintains territorial integrity. To accomplish these goals, constitution-makers may enact
constitutional precommitments that adhere to basic democratic principles such as rule of law,
separation of powers and due process, but must also bind the state by prescribing rights and
privileges for minority groups.
What we have seen is that when constitution-makers adopt constitutional provisions that
protect minority rights, they not only bind themselves, but also future generations of legislators and
political elites. In addition, they bind certain members of society, most pertinently the majority racial
or ethnic group and males. However, rationality alone does not explain the proliferation of
constitutional minority rights protections. As discussed previously, philosophical, cultural, or moral
considerations also play a role, both with ethnic minorities and women. These pressures not only
provide the impetus for minority rights protections, but also minority rights preferences, such as
precommitments to affirmative action.
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CHAPTER 3
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
I.

Introduction
The previous chapter detailed how liberal constitutionalism and precommitment theory

could be modified so as not to be incompatible with minority rights protections, both philosophically
and practically. One tool used by states to protect minority rights is affirmative action. As with all
laws, without the requisite constitutional foundation, affirmative action legislation promulgated by a
congress or parliament may be defeated or moderated through judicial challenge by members of
a/the superordinate group, thus potentially undermining the intent of the framers. Thus, a focus on
those states that have constitutional precommitments to affirmative action policies is appropriate and
should provide a unique perspective into how norms of redistribution come into being, become
memorialized in state constitutions, and influence judicial institutions in a manner that protects
policies of distributive justice for historically disadvantaged minorities.
In this study, affirmative action pertains to actions undertaken by the state or state-affiliated
institutions. Although it would seem that identifying affirmative action is a simple exercise, it is not
necessarily so. Affirmative actions are given different nomenclature depending upon a number of
factors including geography, legal system and country history. However, there are three main
manifestations of affirmative action that have made their way into law, policy and scholarship: (1)
“affirmative action,” as derived from the American context; (2) “positive action,” as derived from the
European context; and (3) “special measures,” as derived from international law. These three
concepts will be compared and contrasted to demonstrate the lack of both intra- and inter-term
cohesion.
Subsequently, the scholarship on affirmative action will be discussed, including both singlecase and comparative studies. The discussion will reveal a proliferation of literature on single cases,
but a paucity of truly comparative studies. Ultimately, it will become clear that, although different,
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the three affirmative action permutations are sufficiently similar in purpose and application to be
amenable to comparative study, and that the scholarly landscape is fertile for a comparative study of
affirmative action that focuses on constitutional precommitments.
II.

Race, the State and Affirmative Action
As a preliminary inquiry, it is important to properly characterize the relationship between the

state and the creation/reproduction of those politically salient social cleavages that necessitate
affirmative action remediation in the first place. As a research program within political science,
“comparative racial politics” is in its infancy, and has attempted to explain state-race relations.
Although relatively new, it holds much promise; “comparative studies of racial politics provide a
singular opportunity to consider some of the analytic and conceptual challenges posed by the
recognition that ideologies of race and racism in the twenty-first century connect disparate peoples,
regimes, institutions, and national mythologies in peculiar, often startling ways” (Hanchard & Chung
2004, p. 337). Furthermore,
[t]he study of race provides opportunities for cross-national research that can ultimately be
linked to some of the classic preoccupations of comparative political science: for example,
the interaction between state and civil institutions, between social movements and states, as
well as determinants of political stability, flexibility, and democratic rule in a particular
nation-state (Hanchard & Chung 2004, p. 337).
In From Race Relations to Comparative Racial Politics: A Survey of Cross-National Scholarship on Race in the
Social Sciences, Hanchard argues that Katznelson’s (1976) Black Men, White Cities was the first work to
“compare systematically racial politics in two multiracial societies while going beyond the pluralist
and behaviorist approaches to ‘race relations’ that dominated the field from the 1930s to the early
1960s” (Hanchard & Chung, 2004, p. 323). He contends that Katznelson was the first to: (1) analyze
structural factors as independent variables that define and limit the parameters of group and
individual choice; (2) argue that race and power are intrinsically related; and (3) suggest that different
governmental systems could converge with respect to their treatment of a particular minority group
(Hanchard & Chung, 2004, p. 324). Ultimately, Hanchard identifies as the four general approaches
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to comparative racial politics. (1) the political economy of race; (2) comparative analyses of culture,
symbols and ideas; (3) social movements; and (4) state-centered approaches (Hanchard & Chung
2006, p. 344).
In their seminal work, Race Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s Omi &
Winant (1994) lay the conceptual foundation for the state-centered approach by outlining the
concept of “race formation.” They argue that the three predominant paradigms for understanding
the origin and operation of race as anchor for group classification, hierarchization and conflict –
ethnicity, class and nation – are insufficient analytical devices with which racisms can be unpacked
and compared. Instead, the authors propose the idea of race formation, a socio-historical process by
which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed. This approach posits that
race remains fundamental to human interaction and social relationships, and must not be reduced to
liberalism, Marxism, nationalism or other categories of stratification.
Subsequent work by Winant would build on and clarify the race formation theory. In The
World is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War II, Winant (1998) assumes a more global posture,
contending that the world has experienced a drastic increase in white supremacy in the last two
decades. With intimate links to Gramscian hegemony, he characterizes race formation as a process
of historically situated projects in which human bodies and social structures are represented and
organized. Racial projects can be neo-conservative, nationalist, liberal, or even operate in everyday
life. Within race formation theory, race and racial projects are interpreted social-structurally; race is
conceived of as an unstable and de-centered complex of social meanings constantly being
transformed by political struggle. Consequently, these interpretations shape our relationship to
institutions. Ultimately, any plausible theory of race must: (1) apply to contemporary relationships,
(2) apply to an increasingly global context and (3) apply across historical time (Winant, 1998).
He argues further that “racial hierarchy lives on; that it correlates very well with worldwide
and national systems of stratification and equality; that it corresponds to glaring disparities in labor
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conditions and reflects differential access to democratic and communicative instrumentalities and life
chances” (Winant, 1998, p. 2). In comparing the US, Brazil, South Africa and the European Union,
Winant identifies a “break” in anti-racist activity since World War II. By “break” Winant implies a
shift away from the hegemony of white supremacy and a movement towards human rights. Winant’s
position on a global approach to the analysis of racism is appropriate, with one principal failing.
Winant’s analysis neglects any mention of nations not traditionally associated with the trans-Atlantic
slave trade. Because Brazil, the US, South Africa and Europe all share similar histories, the inclusion
of other non-slave-trade related nations would have provided a more persuasive argument. That
said, the thrust of Winant’s thesis – that race remains central in the global discourse and that white
supremacy remains pervasive – is compelling. Finally, Winant’s construction of race as a dichotomy
is also congruent with race’s historical and philosophical underpinnings as presented herein.
While Winant’s concept of race formation and racial projects is first and foremost sociohistorical, there are clear allusions to the role of the state and its institutions in the formation and
potential transformation of racial regimes. Goldberg (2001) further elucidates the role of the state in
creating race. For Goldberg, modernity and the nation-state are premised on notions of
homogeneity; and consequently racial exclusion. In this way, the state is a state of power, “the
existence and elaboration of which is a necessary condition … of the possibility of invoking the
power(s) of the state” (Goldberg, 2002, p. 8). In assigning the state such a personality, Goldberg
directly challenges the purported epiphenomenality of the state. And in the case of race, the state
uses its power to shape and discipline spaces in conformity with the homogeneity ideology. In
Europe, racial “others” (Blacks) were seen as hybridizing elements; thus they had to be excluded.
Sates rationalize, routinize and naturalize racial hierarchies.
Upon examination, Goldberg’s “racial states” seem to be the direct progeny of what
Winant’s racial projects. As intimated earlier, within race formation theory, race and racial projects
are interpreted social-structurally; race is conceived of as an unstable and de-centered complex of
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social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle. Particular social meanings
become hegemonic, embed themselves in state institutions and become difficult to dis-embed. This
means that the racial hierarchies that existed prior to the inauguration of a democratic regime exhibit
a durability that resists any attempt to implement egalitarian reforms. The recalcitrance of racial
states in the face of democratic reform has a path dependent quality that operates on a structural
level, making transitions from autocracy to democracy resistant to political redistribution in plural
societies. Stated otherwise, “racial projects” “encompasses literature on the role of the state in
constituting and maintaining racial classification, whether to enforce situations of inequality…, or, as
seen in the cross-national phenomena of affirmative action debates in nation-states…, utilize the
state apparatus to redress situations of racial inequality in civil society and the economy” (Hanchard
& Chung, 2004, p. 328). Of central importance here is the marriage between racial inequality and
formal institutions, and the manner in which these institutions operate to reinforce inequalities
though judicial and legislative pronouncements.
In The Making of Race and Nation, Marx (1998) demonstrates the application of the
comparative method to the state-centered approach to racial politics. He, like Winant, asserts that far
from displacing race as an issue, industrialization, class conflict, nationalism and state consolidation
have actually spurred racially defined contention. Stated simply, states made race – official actions
enforced racial distinctions through the actions of political and economic elites who ensure stability
by building institutions of coercion and coordination. To diminish racial conflicts, the states in his
study – the US, South Africa and Brazil – divided loyalties and unified whites. To explain why both
the US and South Africa had de jure racial discrimination policies while Brazil did not, Marx eschews
explanations that focus on demography, labor differences, Portuguese colonialism or miscegenation
The key to Brazil’s “racial democracy” was its relatively low degree of intra-white conflict, conflict
which resulted in the Civil War in the US or Boer War in South Africa. Thus, Brazil had no official
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regime of racial exclusion, allowing it to camouflage its legacy of discrimination and avoid
implementing an official policy of discrimination.
In agreement with the previous authors, Nobles (2000) contends that the state manipulated
race discourse through manipulation of the census, which affects public policies that either vitiate or
protect the rights associated with citizenship. Regarding the relationship between race and the state
in the US and Brazil, she makes four claims: (1) race is not an objective category, but is a fluid and
internally contradictory discourse, partly created and embedded by institutional processes; (2) census
bureaus are not politically neutral institutions, and state agencies that use census data as instruments
of governance; (3) racial discourses influence the rationale for public policies and their outcomes; and
(4) individuals and groups seek to alter the racial discourse in order to advance political and social
aims, and have targeted censuses to advance such aims. Similar studies have been undertaken with
regard to schemes of taxation (Lieberman, 2003).
From the above discussion, we can see that the relationship between the state and the
creation and exacerbation of racial cleavages is an intimate and somewhat co-creative one. If
colonialism and other enterprises can be seen as racial projects undertaken in furtherance of race
formation, as characterized by Winant and others, affirmative action policies undertaken by the state
may be termed “de-racial projects” in furtherance of “race transformation.” To be sure, comparative
racial politics has its shortcomings. For example, contributions to its corpus have come
disproportionately from historians and sociologists, and much less so from political scientists. One
of the first political scientists to study the issue was Louis Hartz in The Founding of New Societies (1969),
but the study of race as a phenomenon that determines and is determined by state institutions in the
subfield of comparative politics generally has been under-discussed. Furthermore, many studies in
comparative race focus on some permutation of a black (African)-white (European) binary.
However, many peoples in various states have had the same experience and have a struggle that
parallels the trajectory of Blacks in the Americas, Europe and Africa. The comparative racial politics
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agenda must resist construing race in such a manner and should instead expand to encompass a
greater variety of racial projects, including affirmative action measures.
III.

Defining Affirmative Action
Though the practices, policies and programs that constitute affirmative action seem to be

readily identifiable by courts, policymakers, and observers, there is no legally or scientifically rigorous
consensus definition of the term. Academic writing, agency reports as well as government laws and
regulations all seem to adopt some definition encompassing the idea of group dispensations;
however, justification and explanations as to why particular definitional verbiage is adopted is
difficult to come by. This is true even in the non-American context when affirmative action
analogues such as “positive action” and “special measures” are discussed.
A.

Affirmative Action in the US
Understood historically, the term “affirmative action” is the progeny of American efforts to

address the discriminatory effects of Jim Crow segregation against blacks. As Glazer (1975)
recounts, through the mid twentieth century “the pattern of American political development has
been to ever widen the circle of those eligible for inclusion in the American polity with full access to
political rights” (Glazer, 1975, p. 22). This was essentially a policy of assimilationism, as the
American pattern of ethnic politics has been to reject the creation of ethnic-based political entities.
However, the status of ethnic groups was ambiguous, as typified by the dissonance between the
“melting pot” and the “salad bowl.”
The foundation for affirmative action in the US was laid by Pres. Roosevelt and Executive
Order 8802, issued in 1941 under pressure from civil rights leader A. Philip Randolph. As the US
stood on the precipice of WWI, the order reaffirmed “the policy of the United States that there shall
be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of
race, creed, color, or national origin” and declared that “it is the duty of employers and of labor
organizations, in furtherance of said policy and of this Order, to provide for the full and equitable
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participation of all workers in defense industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color,
or national origin….”
The expression “affirmative action” originates from Pres. Kennedy’s 1961 Executive Order
10925 which established the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and
required the federal government and its contractors to take “affirmative action to ensure that
applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their
race, creed, color, or national origin.”1 President Lyndon Johnson extended the program in 1965
with Executive Order 11246 which declared that the US “provide equal opportunity in federal
employment for all persons, to prohibit discrimination in employment because of race, creed, color,
or national origin, and to promote the full realization of equal opportunity through a positive,
continuing program in each executive department or agency.”1 President Richard Nixon followed
with his Philadelphia Plan, which required Philadelphia contractors to submit pre-award hiring goals
for minorities. The goals were based on the percentage of blacks in the metropolitan Philadelphia
labor force. Nixon subsequently issued Revised Order No. Four which required all government
contractors holding contracts of $50,000 or more to file affirmative action programs with the OFCC
within four months of contract award. But in spite of their influence on US affirmative action policy,
none of these orders actually defined affirmative action.
Comparative constitutional law scholar Michel Rosenfeld defines affirmative action
narrowly:
The preferential hiring, promotion, and laying off of minorities or women, to the preferential
admission of minorities or women to universities, to the preferential selection of businesses
owned by minorities or women to perform government public contracting work for
purposes of remedying a wrong or for increasing the proportion of minorities or women in
the relevant labor force, entrepreneurial class, or university student population. Moreover,
such preferential treatment may be required in order, among other things, to achieve a
defined goal or to fill a set quota (Rosenfeld, 1991, p. 47-48).
Rosenfeld derives his definition from Greenawalt (1983) and Fullinwilder (1980). According to
Greenawalt, affirmative action “refers to attempts to bring underrepresented groups, usually groups
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that have suffered discrimination, into a higher degree of participation in some beneficial program.
Some affirmative action programs include preferential treatment, others do not” (Greenawalt, 1983,
p. 17). Fullinwinder characterizes preferential treatment in the following way; “a black is
preferentially hired over a white when the black, because he is black, is chosen over at least one
better qualified white, where being black is not a job related qualification” (Fulinwider, 1980, p. 17).
Preferences may be achieved by the use of goals or quotas. Sterba (2003) defines affirmative action
as “policy of favoring qualified women and minority candidates over qualified men or minority
candidates, with the immediate goals of outreach, remedying discrimination, or achieving diversity,
and the ultimate goals of attaining a colorblind (racially just) and gender-free (sexually just) society”
(Cohen & Sterba, 2003, p. 200). This formulation allows affirmative action policies to achieve a wide
variety of immediate goals.
Common definitions of affirmative action suffer from several conceptual deficiencies. As
White (2004) notes, “few writing on affirmative action even bother to offer what could pass as a
doctrinal legal definition of their subject” (White, 2004, p. 2122). Legal commentators “treat
affirmative action as a social phenomenon, without an independent legal character, and around which
legal issues arise, even as they talk about affirmative action as though its legal character were well
delineated,” while the US Supreme Court itself has an affirmative action jurisprudence “built on a
tremendous, unexamined assumption - that affirmative action constitutes negative discrimination”
(White, 2125, p. 2127). Indeed, although US Supreme Court has adjudicated numerous cases
involving affirmative action, it has never defined the term. Perhaps the most cogent American
definition was put forth by the US Commission on Civil Rights in its 1977 Statement on Affirmative
Action which defined it as “any measure, beyond simple termination of a discriminatory practice,
adopted to correct or compensate for past or present discrimination or to prevent discrimination
from recurring in the future” (Commission on Civil Rights, 1977, p. 2).
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B.

Positive Action in Europe
Although the American model of affirmative action and controversy surrounding it has

influenced much of the current debate surrounding minority group preferences, preferential policies
are neither contemporary nor specific to American politics. Indeed, there has been a long, although
not well-documented, history of preferential policies world-wide and a great deal of cross-fertilization
of policies. Several governments – Nigeria, Brazil, Israel, Germany, Canada, Uganda, SA, Malaysia,
Fiji, the EU, and regions within sovereign states, e.g. Northern Ireland and South Tyrol – have
enacted policies that provide preferences to historically disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities,
religious minorities and women. Some scholars refer to these programs as “positive action”
programs. Some states have implemented positive action policies because they were inspired by their
use in the US. Other states, such as India, have long histories of positive action, or “reservations,”
for those of the low or backward castes. However, like its “affirmative action” counterpart in the
US, a precise definition of positive action remains elusive.
In a study comparing affirmative action policies in the EU, US, Canada and South Africa,
the European Commission defined positive action as “proportionate measures undertaken with the
purpose of achieving full and effective equality in practice for members of groups that are socially or
economically disadvantaged, or otherwise face the consequences of past or present discrimination or
disadvantage” (EC, 2009, p. 24). The report makes an attempt to distinguish between American
affirmative action and European positive action, as well as between positive action and positive
discrimination in European Court of Justice jurisprudence. In its comparison, the report emphasizes
the relative “strength” of affirmative action and positive discrimination (which is illegal in EC law)
and the weaker positive action which disallows “unconditional priority” or “unconditional
preferential treatment” (EC, 2009, p. 25). However, in a 2007 report for the European Commission,
De Vos defines positive action as “a process to introduce a dynamic, result oriented approach that
internalizes group dimensions into an equality static and individual formal equality model” (De Vos,
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2007, p. 11). De Vos makes sure to mention that one should not simply identify European positive
action with affirmative action or special measures because they all stem from their own legal and
societal backgrounds (De Vos, 2007, p. 12).
C.

Special Measures in International Law
From an international perspective, affirmative action in the form of special measures is

firmly entrenched. Broadly speaking, international minority rights “reflect an obvious concern for
human dignity” and “guarantee an individual dignity and well-being in keeping with the very notion
of human rights” (Gaetano, 2002, p. 49). The first system for the protection of minorities was set up
by the League of Nations after WWI. However, there grew a gradual disenchantment with the
League’s system, and along with it a belief that there should be no special guarantees for minorities,
but only protection of human rights for all. Minority rights language was even omitted from the UN
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Post WWI minority rights treaties had all
but ceased to exist. In a post-WII atmosphere, the 1948 Resolution 217C (III) reopened the
minority rights issue; but, again, progress remained slow. The Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) was approved in 1948. In the
aftermath of the Holocaust, an event fomented by state-supported racial animus, the convention
condemned the commission of certain acts “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” (Genocide Convention, 1948, art. 2). The
Convention Related to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) has provisions related to racial
discrimination.7
Approved in 1965, CERD reaffirmed “that discrimination between human beings on the
grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin is an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations among
nations and is capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples and the harmony of persons

7 Article 3 of the convention reads, “[t]he Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to
refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.”
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living side by side even within one and the same State” (CERD 1965, Preamble). State parties to the
convention “[r]esolved to adopt all necessary measures for speedily eliminating racial discrimination
in all its forms and manifestations, and to prevent and combat racist doctrines and practices in order
to promote understanding between races and to build an international community free from all
forms of racial segregation and racial discrimination”8 (CERD 1965, Preamble). The ICCPR
included a provision on minority rights at Art. 27.9 Finally, the Declaration on the Rights of
Minorities is intended as an affirmation of the value in preserving minority group cultural solidarity
and provides for state intervention toward that end; “states shall take measures where required to
ensure that persons belonging to minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights
and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law”
(Declaration on the Rights of Minorities, 1992, art. 4(1)).
Unfortunately, while many states acknowledged that discrimination against racial minorities
was a global problem in need of confrontation, they were less than forthcoming about the
discrimination that existed within their own polities; “not all states have acknowledged that a legal
framework outlawing racial discrimination is a necessary, if insufficient, prerequisite to effecting
social change in order to promote equality of opportunity” (MacEwen, 1995, p. 2). For example, the
members of the EU have more recently developed conspicuously diverse polities, whether the result
of the merger of a plurality of ethnic groups during state formation, the historic migration of external
groups which subsequently settled in their host states, refugee flows, colonial immigration or guest
workers. Yet, “the organs of the [European states] and the ideologies which underpin them are
mono-cultural” (MacEwan, 1995, p. 8). Thus, in practice, the UN mantra of “equality in diversity” is
often very difficult to achieve.

As of June 2004, the convention had been ratified by 177 member states.
The section reads “[i[n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”
8
9
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In a 2006 report, Global Rights authored a minority rights report for the UN. The report
identified four broad areas of concern were recognized: (1) protecting a minority’s existence –
through protection of physical integrity and prevention of genocide; (2) protecting and promoting
cultural and social identity – right of individuals to choose group identity and to reject forced
assimilation; (3) ensuring non-discrimination and equality by ending structural or systemic
discrimination; and (4) ensuring effective participation of members of minorities in public life
(Global Rights 2003, ¶ 73) The political inclusion of minority groups was deemed integral to societal
stability and peace. Potential concerns were racial exclusion, discrimination, racism, conflict and
genocide. The report made it clear that the effort to include minorities was intended to be a
collaborative one, with interagency cooperation envisaged for the promotion of “effective
mainstreaming of minority issues across the UN system, recognizing that situations involving
minorities often lie at the nexus of efforts to promote human rights, development and security”
(Global Rights, 2003, ¶ 73). Stated succinctly, “all States should seek to realize the goal of equality in
diversity, in law and in fact” (Global Rights, 2003, ¶ 84).
The UN has not only supported minority group rights, but also minority group preferences
similar to affirmative action or positive action. These preferences tend to come in the form of
“measures” or “special measures.” In his June 17, 2002, report to the UN Economic and Social
Council Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Special Rapporteur
Mr. Marc Bossuyt defined affirmative action as “a coherent packet of measures, of a temporary
character, aimed specifically at correcting the position of members of a target group in one or more
aspects of their social life, in order to obtain effective equality” (Bossuyt, 2002, ¶ 6). In the
international context, “special measures” has its origin in a proposal, ultimately withdrawn, by the
Government of India during the drafting of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). (Bossuyt, 2002, ¶ 40). The Government of India again raised the issue
during the drafting of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); however, the
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provision was not included in the final text. Instead, it was included as a general comment (Bossuyt,
2002, ¶ 48).
Thus, although endorsed by the drafting committee, in the cases of both the ICESCR and
the ICCPR the inclusion of a special measures provision was scuttled in favor of its reference in a
non-binding explanatory comment. However, Bossuyt argues that prohibitions of discrimination and
distinction found in the ICESCR and the ICCPR do not prohibit affirmative action and that “there
were cases in which the law was justified in making distinctions between individuals or groups”
(Bossuyt, 2002, ¶ 52). Other instruments such as CERD, CEDAW, and the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) include language that may be interpreted as mandating
that states implement special measures, for racial groups (CERD, art. 2(2))10; (CEDAW, arts. 4(1) and
(2))11; and (CRPD, art. 5(4))12. After a thorough review of the relevant conventions and case law,
Bossuyt ultimately concludes that “[t]here is no doubt that a persistent policy in the past of systemic
discrimination of certain groups of the population may justify – and in some cases even require –
special measures intended to overcome the sequels of a condition of inferiority which still affects
members belonging to such groups” (Bossuyt, 2002, ¶ 101).

The referenced article reads, “States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social,
economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and
protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the
full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case entail as
a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for
which they were taken have been achieved.”
11 The referenced articles read “1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at
accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the
present Convention, but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate
standards; these measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment
have been achieved. 2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those measures contained in
the present Convention, aimed at protecting maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.”
12 The referenced article reads “Specific measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto equality
of persons with disabilities shall not be considered discrimination under the terms of the present Convention.”
The previous three clauses in Art. 4 make clear the convention’s distinction between the mere elimination of
discrimination (weak rights) and positive action in the form of the special measures permitted by clause 4
(strong rights).
10
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As discussed above and in the previous chapter, the conception and implementation of
minority group rights is ubiquitous. Although there is substantial literature on affirmative action,
domestic law scholars, international law scholars, and policymakers alike seem to find elusive a clear,
accepted definition of affirmative action. However, while definitions vary widely and each instance
of preference articulation and implementation is culturally unique, three basic historical models –
“affirmative action” in the US, “positive action” in Europe, and “special measures” in international
law – can be reasonably interpreted in such a way that comparison across cases can be comfortably
and justifiably undertaken. All three concepts embody a common spirit of recognizing the historical
injustices perpetrated against minority groups and a need to remedy the consequences of said
injustices through state-sponsored programs of preferences. Thus, while specifics such as which
groups qualify as “minority groups,” which “minority groups” qualify for preferences, which
preferences those minority groups qualify for, and the type and scope of those preferences, may
differ, a core emphasis on minority group rights is apparent in each case.
IV.

Rationales for Affirmative Action
Not only do states differ in their definitions of affirmative action, but they may also differ in

the reasons why they enact affirmative action policies. Indeed, rationales for affirmative action are as
varied as its definitions. Perhaps the most fundamental justification for affirmative action policies is
the achievement of the ideal of equality. Rosenfeld (1991) contends that the manner in which
equality is interpreted determines what policies are permissible when it comes to preferential
treatment for minorities and women. In the US, two major assumption underlie how equality is
practiced: (1) first order discrimination (discrimination against minorities and women because they
are different and inferior) is morally repugnant; and (2) equality must be meted out on an individual
basis, not a group basis. Traditional liberal theory, as well as the “equal protection” clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, embraces this latter assumption that Rosenfeld calls
the “postulate of equality” (Rosenfeld, 1991, p. 20). The postulate “posits that individuals are
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entitled to equal autonomy and equal respect as subjects of moral choice capable of devising and
pursuing their own respective life plans” (Rosenfeld, 1991, p. 22).
Rosenfeld also delineates between equality of opportunity and equality of result. With
reference to Rae (1981) and Rescher (1966), Rosenfeld maintains that equality of result means that
each member of the designated class receives an equal amount of the good to be distributed.
Equality of opportunity, by contrast, means that each member of the class receives the same
opportunity as every other member to obtain the good. Rescher argues that when equality of result
is not feasible, equality of opportunity is obligatory in the interest of justice. In the case of redress
for those who have suffered injury as a result of past rights violations, mere removal of those legal or
quasi-legal obstacles may be insufficient to effect restoration of those rights. Distributive justice may
be defined narrowly, to encompass only certain economic goods, or broadly, to pertain to the
products being distributed as well as the process of distribution in the social, political and economic
domains (Rosenfeld, 1991, p. 30-31).
In contrast, compensatory justice generally restores the victim to the position he enjoyed
before victimization. Goods are transferred from one party to another (individuals of groups) prior
to their involvement in the voluntary or involuntary transaction that initiated the disequilibrium. The
ideas of compensatory and distributive justice may coincide or conflict depending on the case. In the
former instance, compensation to the victim occurs because some wrongful act has been perpetrated
by the adverse party which has left the victim worse off. In the case of distributive justice, there need
be no discernible wrongful act that infringed upon the right of another. The goal may be to simply
spread a particular pecuniary loss across the members of a group in the interest of justice.13

13

Rosenfeld examines how his conception of affirmative action squares with four traditional notions of justice:
libertarian, contractarian, utilitarian and egalitarian. Libertarians would argue that affirmative action is
anathema to “the overall maximization of freedom,” a phrase Rosenfeld borrows from Goldman (1979, p. 39).
People have the freedom to enter into contractual arrangements with anyone they wish. In Rosenfeld’s words,
“from the libertarian perspective, the postulate of equality finds concrete embodiment in the equality of free
association and equality to acquire and transfer property freely” (Rosenfeld, 1991, p. 53). If any equality of
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Cohen (2003) argues that racial preferences are morally wrong. In his view, the basic
principle of equality entails that “[[i]t is wrong, always and everywhere, to give special advantages to
any group simply on the basis of physical characteristics that have no relevance to the award given or
to the burden imposed. To give or to take on the basis of skin color is manifestly unfair” (Cohen &
Sterba, 2003, p. 23). For Cohen, race preferences are not an appropriate remedy under a
compensatory theory because the compensation should be for the injury, not the skin color. For
example, compensation to blacks today for injuries that occurred during slavery is misguided because
the persons who suffered the injuries are no longer alive. Additionally, by providing race
preferences, we are only perpetuating and reinforcing the same discriminatory behavior we seek to
eradicate. Not only does Sterba view compensatory arguments as illegitimate, but he also takes issue
with the more forward-looking purpose of achieving diversity because all too often, “diversity” is
narrowly defined as racial/ethnic diversity, and other forms of diversity – e.g. religion, class – are not
worthy of preferences.
Cohen also assails race preferences because they are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.
They are over-inclusive because all of those of a certain skin color will benefit even though not all

opportunity policy were implemented in the names of fairness, justice or social welfare, the individual right to
control property would be violated. Contractarian analysis follows a similar logic. Social contract theory,
expounded by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls, presupposes that free and equal individuals may
enter into a social contract for the purpose of generating an institutional framework that provides the optimal
equilibrium between a properly functioning state and the individual right to pursue one’s interest. On their
faces, libertarian and contractarian approaches seem to counsel against affirmative action. However, some
from within these traditions argue that poverty is actually an impediment to the exercise to individual freedom;
thus, policies that could lead to greater efficiency in the production of goods and services are permissible
because they increase overall freedom. Orthodox libertarians would disagree, citing the supremacy of
individual choice and a basic antipathy toward state intervention in the economic marketplace.
Unlike the libertarian and contractarian approaches, utilitarians focus on the common good. Thus,
this approach can be compatible with group rights and minority preferences. It also permits preferences to
groups even though the members likely to benefit suffered the least discrimination and even though not all of
the members suffered discrimination. Unfortunately, the utilitarian approach can also support first-order
discrimination against minorities and women. Finally, the egalitarian approach presupposes the moral equality
of each person and the ostensible right to equality of result as an integral part of fairness and justice. On its
face, this approach seems to favor affirmative action policies.
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suffered harm. Thus, some minorities can be admitted to universities or be awarded government
contracts undeservedly. Race preferences can also be under-inclusive because some who are
deserved of redress will be left out. If just compensation should be apportioned to compensate
those most injured the most, and those least injured the least or not at all, then most systems of race
preferences fail. Furthermore, the underlying assumption that absent discrimination minority
representation in education, politics or the economy would be commensurate with their proportion
of the population or should conform to some “goal” or “quota” is merely conjecture. This method
unjustifiably imposes burdens on members of the majority, many of whom had no role in imposing
harm on the minority. Cohen sees this burden as more than trivial, as most who have lost a
university seat or government contract are completely unaware (Cohen and Sterba, 2003). Finally,
Cohen argues that affirmative action actually harms the minorities it purports to help by creating
widespread resentment, reinforcing stereotypes and humiliating the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries
must suffer the burden of perceived inferiority. If they fail, then they are disgraced. If they succeed,
they do not know whether their success was because of merit or because of their race.
Like Rosenfeld and Cohen, Nieli (2012) assails affirmative action, particularly in university
admissions and employment, as negative and contrary to “the inter-ethnic norm of reciprocity and
fairness, which is the very lynch-pin holding together racially and ethnically diverse societies like the
United States” (Nieli, 2012, p. 10). He contends that the imperatives of liberal individualism, or what
he refers to as “American personalism” operates against defenses of preferential policies based on
race. Indeed, such preferences merely serve to foster “the poison of ethnic tribalism” (Nieli, 2012, p.
94).
In his debate with Cohen, and in later work, Sterba (2003, 2009) contends that affirmative
action programs are, in fact, defensible. In the case of compensation for past discrimination, Sterba
notes that the US Supreme Court has held that “it is permissible to adopt remedial affirmative action
in an institution as compensation for identifiable acts of purposeful discrimination committed by that
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very institution” (Cohen & Sterba, 2003, p. 206). He cites the examples of AT&T and Texaco
reaching settlements for sex and race discrimination, respectively, in their hiring practices. This form
of remedy is relatively un-controversial, because it benefits those who were actually injured. Greater
controversy arises when those who suffered no injury benefit. Sterba provides the example of Local
28 of the Sheetmetal Workers Union v. EEOC, 478 US 421 (1986). In that case, the Court upheld a
compensatory affirmative action program that required the union to increase its minority
membership to 29 percent. The goal was based on the percentage of minorities in the New York
City labor pool.14 Although those admitted would have suffered no discrimination, the standards
created an equal opportunity for prospective minority workers and could correct for harm done by
other companies such as AT&T and Texaco.
Sterba proposes a standard of proof for remedial affirmative action that could permit
compensation for widespread discriminatory practices. Sterba suggests several requirements. First, if
past discrimination is proven, affirmative action is permissible even if the institution implicated in the
affirmative action did not discriminate. Second, given the history of racial discrimination, US law
should not view all racial classifications as suspect and the standard of proof needed to prove
discrimination – for women or minorities – should not be unreasonably high. However, not all
members of the group may benefit. Only candidates who have qualifications that, when combined
with an educational enhancement program, will allow them to be qualified in a reasonable amount of
time may be admitted to affirmative action programs (Cohen & Sterba 2003, pp. 233-234).
Sterba takes affirmative action opponents like Cohen and to task. In response to arguments
that slavery does not justify affirmative action, Sterba argues that it was precisely slavery and racial
segregation that laid the foundation for present day disparities in education, health care, housing and

Sterba argues that statistical disparities are important because they show prima facie evidence of
discrimination in U.S. employment discrimination lawsuits. He believes that this use of statistical disparities to
establish prima facie discrimination should be expanded to other areas of society (Cohen & Sterba, 2003, p.
210).

14
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employment. He argues further that there is no true distinction between what opponents view as
acceptable efforts at eliminating racial and sexual discrimination, and “problematic” efforts which
seek proportionate outcomes. In his words, “when we engage the first form of affirmative action, we
are led, naturally and justifiably, to engage in the second form of affirmative action…” (Cohen &
Sterba, 2003, p. 254). Sterba also contends that the group rights criticized by detractors of
affirmative action can, in fact, be consonant with moral entitlement. Affirmative action can also be
an appropriate remedy even if only the most qualified members of the target group benefit. The
most qualified members did not necessarily suffer less discrimination; they may have simply resisted
it better. And even if they did suffer less, affirmative action can nevertheless be a suitable remedy for
their degree of discrimination. Those non-minorities who feel slighted because a minority has
benefitted from a scholarship or promotion are unjustified. What they are actually objecting to is the
leveling of the playing field. Athletic preferences in scholarships and veterans’ preferences in hiring
and promotion have existed for decades. Finally, alternative programs such as Kahlenberg’s (1995)
class-based approach, and the lottery approach proposed by Guinier & Sturm (2001) have had some
success but remain problematic because of their limited scope.
Other proponents of affirmative action argue that programs can be justified because the
policies target groups which have suffered historical wrongs. Lapenson (2009) argues that this was
the primary argument raised by some of the architects of the Philadelphia Plan: Secretary of Labor
George Schultz and Assistant Secretary of Wage and Labor Standards Arthur Fletcher and Assistant
Attorney General for Civil Rights Jerris Leonard. Buttressing this rationale is that the state itself
played a pivotal role in creating and reproducing the social inequalities – whether race/ethnicity or
gender based – which require affirmative action measures to ameliorate them. In his study of the US
and nine Latin Americans cases, Gargarella (2010) traces how the ideals of egalitarianism would
eventually give way to the coercion of particular religious groups, would discourage civic
participation and reduce popular controls to a minimum expression (Gargarella, 2010, p. 2). He
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arrives at his conclusions by analyzing constitutions and related documents. Therefore, it is argued,
as the principal “bad actor” the state must put its own house in order, or at the very least permit, the
implementation of preferences for disadvantaged groups through legislation or constitutional
precommitment.
Goldman (1979) takes a moderate approach. He argues that “reverse discrimination” is
permissible, but should be limited in scope. It is permitted “to compensate specific past violations of
… rights or denials of equal opportunity” and can be justified if it “create[s] equal opportunity in the
future for the chronically deprived” (Goldman, 1979, p. 6). However, reverse discrimination should
not be permitted “when directed indiscriminately at groups defined only by race or sex, in order to
merely increase their percentage representation in various social positions” or the programs
“encourage or directly mandate such group-oriented policies” (Goldman, 1979, p. 6). Goldman’s
chief concern is the preservation of the privilege of merit and competence in awarding positions,
specifically with regard to employment and education. For him, the basic principle of merit-based
hiring aligns quite well with ideas of justice, egalitarianism and public welfare and is a distributive rule
that is superior to others.
The merit principle becomes qualified in the case of compensation for victims of injustice,
but Goldman rejects compensation for women and blacks under a group rights theory. He claims
that because it cannot be proven that each member of the entire group was harmed, reverse
discrimination should not be directed toward an entire minority group. For Goldman, only direct
violations can be compensated.
groups that are defined only according to some shared characteristic, that have no official
representative bodies, whose members have no formal interaction, and whose individual
members may suffer harms from injustices that do not necessarily affect others,
compensation can be owed only to the individual members who have been harmed and not
the groups as a whole (Goldman, 1979, p. 88).
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V.

Case Studies in Affirmative Action
Once we proceed beyond the philosophical and normative discourse surrounding affirmative

action, we can see that most studies are single-case studies, with far fewer adopting a comparative
approach. Nonetheless, these studies do underscore the uniqueness of the racial formations in which
positive action programs are implemented and provide fertile ground for generalization. Some
appear in edited volumes (Jenkins & Moses, 2014; Gomes & Premdas, 2013; Brown et. al., 2012;
Kennedy –Dubordieu, 2006). Perhaps the most studied cases are the US and India.15 Glazer’s
Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy is a seminal text. There are also studies that
examine affirmative action in Brazil (Cicalo, 2012), India (Despande & Zacharias, 2013; Patnaik,
2005) and SA. Fewer studies have been performed on cases such as Malaysia (Wyzan, 1990). Some
studies have focused on affirmative action for transnational groups. For example, Turgeon (1990)
studied affirmative action for gypsies in Eastern Europe. Like many ethnic and racial minorities,
Gypsies (Roma) suffered severe discrimination.16 The Nazi regime attempted to exterminate Gypsies
during WWII is perhaps the most noteworthy example, but discrimination in employment, education
and politics continues to this day post-totalitarian in Eastern Europe and Russia.17

15

Hasan (2009).
Racism against Roma occurred because of linguistic and religious differences, because they were nomadic
and because of their social structure. These characteristics, derived from their origins in the Punjab region, set
their culture apart from the Europeans. However, skin color was also an important dimension of racial
othering. As Duna (2011) indicates, “[w]hen Gypsies first appeared, Christianity had shaped the doctrine of
war between light and dark and personified the white angels against the black devils. To the church the Gypsy
culture was non-acceptable and their dark skin exemplified evil and inferiority.”16 This pattern mirrors the
theo-politics inherent in the early relations between Europeans and Africans. In both cases, religion was
employed to instigate and invigorate race antagonisms. For Africans abducted into the American chattel
slavery system ““[t]he heathen condition of negroes seemed to be of considerable importance to English
settlers in America – more so than to English voyagers upon the coasts of Africa – and that heathenism was
associated in some settlers’ minds with the condition of slavery.”
17 To illustrate identity convergence between marginalized racial/ethnic groups, some Roma, a group
synonymous with Gypsies, refer to themselves as “Black” (chernyi) although their ethnic origins are not
African. As Lemon (1995) explains,
16

[i]n Russia, a "black" is, among other meanings, a person whom many North Americans probably
would describe as "ethnic looking" people with "olive" skin and dark eyes and hair. However, in
Russia as in many other places, “race” also is linked to categories that can be connected via tropes of
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This project does not seek to diminish the importance of single case studies. They can be
useful for descriptive or idiographic purposes, by articulating the particularities of affirmative action
in Nigeria’s federal character principle, Malaysia’s New Economic Policy or affirmative action in
Brazil. There are several edited volumes (e.g., Kennedy-Dubordieu, 2006) that are loosely
comparative, at best. The problem is that whether contained in an edited volume or as a stand-alone
paper, single case studies suffer from the same limitations – they are limited in their contribution to
established theory and their ability to promote new, alternative theories to explain social and political
phenomena.
Comparative studies of affirmative action are far fewer. Tushnet (2003-04) argues that
comparativists must proceed with caution when comparing affirmative action regimes because
substantive constitutional doctrine is sometimes closely ties to particular institutional arrangements,
such as the nature of the relationship between the legislature and the courts. As an example, he cites
the “creamy layer” doctrine in Indian affirmative action jurisprudence – as discussed earlier – and
maintains that its application to the American context might be limited because the term operates

generation or "blood" and thus mobilized in political arguments, as in this recent issue of one of the
many nationalist newspapers in the capital: “The highest goal of the government must be to preserve
that racial nucleus which alone can create culture, beauty and all the highest values.
Furthermore,
[y]ounger Roma display a fascination with the music and dress of American "Blacks" on MTV that
rivals their fascination with Russians. Those of wealthier, merchant Lovari families, especially, trace
their identification with American Blacks not in terms of defeat or secondclassness, as did the
Keldelari metalworker, but in terms of an “attitude” that they say they can detect in expressions and
movements of American musicians that renders them “like us.” They also equate blackness with
America (as in, “the statue of liberty isn't that where Michael Jackson dances in the video?”) and see
America as “better then Russia.” Thus they reverse the valence of blackness and shift their own place
in racial hierarchies: Roma, if more like American blacks, and thus more like Americans, must be
better than Russians.
What these quotes show is that racialized minority groups outside of the African Diaspora can and do
adopt the name “Black,” and they do so for a variety of reasons. In the case of the Roma in Russia, to be Black
is both derogatory and emancipatory, albeit in a manner somewhat different from Black Americans. We also
see how the intra-ace class differences help to determine how racial signifiers are selected and interpreted.
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within a doctrinal framework specific to India. In addition, Indian courts have justified affirmative
action on the grounds of compensatory justice, distributive justice and the relative status of groups
rather than individuals. US courts recognize none of these; it recognizes only the interest of diversity
as a legitimate justification for race preferences. Ultimately, Tushnet’s is a much broader argument
against judicial borrowing. In his view, “constitutional systems are systems so that even if one has a
good grasp on the way another constitutional system deals with a particular problem, one might not
fully understand the way in which that solution fits together with other aspects of the constitutional
system (Tushnet, 2004, p. 663). Thus, “it is not entirely clear that looking elsewhere is actually a
productive way of coming up with new approaches to existing problems” (Tushnet, 2004, p. 663).
More rigorous examples tend to explore the cross-country variation in policies with a general
focus on four major issues: (1) identification of their intended beneficiaries, (2) the form of the
programs involved (quota/non-quota), (3) the level of legal norms from which they derive
(constitutional, legislative, administrative); and (4) their domain of implementation (Sabbagh, 2004, p.
2). Both qualitative and quantitative approaches have been employed. These studies engage such
issues as: how states demarcate various groups according to their race, caste or religion, the precise
form of affirmative action programs, whether such programs apply to the public or private sectors;
whether the policies are implemented at the administrative, legislative or constitutional levels; and
whether such programs produce a net benefit for the targeted beneficiary group.
Studies comparing race/ethnicity-based affirmative action include: Zhou & Hill (2010)
(comparing China and the US); Daniel (2007) (comparing the US and Brazil); Hassan & Nussbaum
(2012) (comparing the US, South Africa and India); de Vries & Pettigrew: (1994) (comparing the US
and the Netherlands); Wiesskopf (2004) and Bhagat (2007) (comparing the US and India); Nesiah
(2004) (comparing the US, India, and Malaysia); Guillebeau (1999) (comparing SA, Brazil and the
US); Sabbagh (2004) (comparing the US, India, Malaysia and SA); Boston & Nair-Reichert (2003)
(comparing the US, India and Brazil); and Sowell (2004) (comparing India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka,
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Nigeria and the US). Less rigorous examples include Bhagwat (2009) and Sowell (2004) which,
although thought provoking and insightful, lack methodological rigor of true comparative work.
Affirmative action for women has received less attention. Some pertinent single case and
comparative studies include: Seidman (1999) (comparing Germany, the US, and the EC); Lihamba et
al. (2006) (examining affirmative action for women at the University of Dar es Salam, Tanzania);
Bereni (2006) (affirmative action for women in political representation); Stock (2006) (comparing
affirmative action policies in Germany for women and the disabled); Totten (2003), discussed above,
examined the role of constitutional precommitments to gender affirmative action in the European
Union, Germany, Canada and the US. Other relevant works include Bacchi (1996) (comparing the
US, Canada, Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway); Ozkanli & White (2008) (comparing
female professors in Australia and Turkey).
The scholarship on constitutional precommitments to affirmative action is even thinner than
the number of truly comparative studies. An exemplar of the approach is provided by Cottrell &
Ghai (2007), who examined precommitments to affirmative action based on ethnicity in the context
of Fiji. They argue that in the Fijian context affirmative action programs have been “faulty and
ineffective” because of corruption and ineptitude. Perhaps more fundamentally, the authors argue
that a constitutional focus on ethnicity seems at odds with notions of markets and individualism;
“[a]ffirmative action for identity and affirmative action for equality in Fiji are tugging largely in
opposite directions” (Cottrell & Ghai, 2007, p. 249). The authors recommend inclusion of a fuller
range of social, economic and political rights, with priority given to the most deprived. While the
authors make no pronouncements with regard to the propriety of constitutional precommitments
generally, their skepticism with regard to the effectiveness of the Fijian precommitments and their
acknowledgement that “[w]hen affirmative action is statutory or administrative (without objectives
stated in the Constitution), there is considerable discretion in structuring these schemes, and different
rationales and approaches can be adopted” (Cottrell & Ghai, 2007, p. 228).
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From a comparative perspective, and building from the work of Seidman (1999), Totten
(2003) studied affirmative action and gender in the EU, Germany, Canada and the US. Although he
articulates no formal methodology, Totten’s approach to evaluating the effectiveness of
constitutional precommitments to gender affirmative action is to determine whether the
precommitment successfully removed debate over the issue from the national political agenda. He
borrows this test from Sunstein (1991). Essentially, his is a basic correlational study; his independent
variable is “the existence of a constitutional precommitment to affirmative action” and his dependent
variable is “the elimination of public debate over the issue at which the precommitment is targeted.”
Totten’s evidence is almost exclusively qualitative; he examines jurisprudence from each case to find
whether judicial decisions were met with increased political debate, or whether political debate
proliferated in the absence of any such decisions. For him, the persistence of political debate is the
appropriate standard because it can lead to political divisiveness, disruption, destabilization and, by
implication, de-democratization. His ultimate findings are inconclusive: Germany and the EU were
the clearest cases of the failure of precommitments to remove debate over gender affirmative action
from the political agenda while the Canadian case was less clear.
It seems that Totten’s emphasis on the correlation between the precommitments and the
elimination of political debate misses the point. In a newly democratizing state, contention over the
issue of resource redistribution to marginalized groups will not be eliminated simply because
precommitment language was agreed upon or acceded to at the outset. In fact, one might reasonably
hypothesize that in the short term, contentiousness might increase because of the socioeconomic
reconfigurations redistribution can cause. Then, after some increase in public debate, contention
over the issue could decrease, as the policies become more familiar and embedded in the social fabric
of the new democracy. This hypothesized trajectory seems much more plausible than the rigid test
adhered to by Totten. His formulation even elides the durability of ideological animus directed
toward the beneficiary groups by the groups which perceive themselves as “losers,” a durability that
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could quite easily survive a constitutional precommitment. Thus, Totten’s application of Sunstein’s
standard for determining the effectiveness of constitutional precommitments to the issue area of
affirmative action is misplaced and is not a reasonable metric for measuring effectiveness.
In addition to its conceptual deficiencies, the case selection in Totten’s study limits the
generalizability of its results. Perhaps most obviously, he studies only gender; thus, whether a study
of affirmative action programs targeted at other cleavages (race, ethnicity, religion) would produce
similar results is unclear. Similarly, if we accept his standard for determining effectiveness (which I
argue we should not) we do not know whether certain cleavages are more prone to deeper political
debate because of societal norms, the prevalence of discriminatory institutions, etc. All of his cases
are western, with long established democratic institutions. Again, this limits the generalizability of
results to other regions of the world such as Latin America and Africa. To compound matters,
Totten does not explain his case selection, which makes basic methodological assessment difficult.
Finally, Totten’s study seizes upon none of those concerns with which political scientists of the
comparative politics subfield would be familiar: process tracing, the uncovering of causal
mechanisms, the explanation of divergent or convergent developmental trajectories, etc. It should be
noted that Totten’s formal training was as a jurist and not a political scientist.
VI.

Conclusion
The current affirmative action literature suffers from several shortcomings. Perhaps the

most prominent is the lack of definitional certainty and a reconciliation of the international,
European and American varieties of group preference. Next, there is very little comparative work
being done in the field of affirmative action. To be sure, much research has been conducted on
single cases around the world. However, very few studies have compared cases in a rigorous,
systematic manner and even fewer have attempted to engage in any true large nNanalysis. Finally, a
minimal amount of studies have examined the role constitutional precommitments, either singularly
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or comparatively, play in the conferring group preferences. For the affirmative action program to
move forward, these three core deficiencies must be addressed.
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CHAPTER 4
Reconceptualizing Constitutional Group Preferences: Toward A Modern Approach to Comparative
Affirmative Action
I.

Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 have revealed some important lacunae in the research regarding

precommitment theory, racial projects and affirmative action, as separate fields of inquiry and as they
intersect. These three bodies of scholarship converge on the issue of the relationship between
minority rights and the state, a convergence significantly informed by the research programs of
constitutionalism and comparative constitutional law. Each has robust normative and
methodological debates; however, the debates have yet to be applied to affirmative action in any
meaningful way. This project attempts to bridge this gap by making four crucial conceptual
contributions to the literature on affirmative action: (1) the application of a large N approach to
comparing cases of group preferences; (2) a focus on constitutional precommitments, constitutionmaking and constitutional interpretation; (3) the proposal of a working definition of “affirmative
action” that can be used for comparative purposes; and (4) the creation of a novel analytical
framework that can be used to classify precommitments to affirmative action.
II.

A Large N Comparative Approach
The vast majority of affirmative action studies have either been single case studies or small N

comparisons. These studies do play a foundational role in the comparative constitutionalism
research program by directing attention to specific causal mechanisms, identifying important
variables in the evolution of constitution-making or the evolution of constitutionalsm, and
elucidating socio-historical processes that make certain political outcomes more or less likely to
occur. However, as Law (2005) and Yeh & Chang (2008) argue, economic and cultural globalization
have made inter-state dialogue over common legal issues almost a necessity. Not only is such crosscultural legal communication judicially efficient because legal borrowing can allow one state to find
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solutions to constitutional dilemmas without having to start from scratch, but it may also aid in the
mutual global evolution of a certain body of law so that stable, predictable international norms can
be developed. These sentiments must not only be reflected in our courts, but also in our academic
research.
As previously mentioned, and further explicated in the Methodology, there are detractors of
such as Tushnet (2003-04), and while his concerns must be acknowledged; however, they should not
impede scholarly progress toward what Hirschl identified as the third and fourth types of
comparative constitutional law inquiry – concept thickening through multiple description and
movement beyond thick description and concept formation to theory-building and causal inference
(Hirschl, 2005, pp. 129-132). This study seeks to accomplish these goals through a large N
comparative constitutional study of 30 cases and their constitutions. A study of this size is certain to
add to the existing literature on comparative constitutional law and comparative constitutionalism, as
well as add texture to the role of minorities and women in democratization, constitution-making and
nation/state-building processes. This number of cases is also required to justify the core objective of
this project – to achieve a better understanding of how and why states make preferential
precommitments to women and minorities.
III.

Toward a working definition of affirmative action
Before any serious analysis of affirmative action precommitments can bear any fruit, a

serious concern must be addressed; there is currently no consensus definition of affirmative action.
As the brief review of the literature has demonstrated, conventional approaches tend to circumscribe
the universe of policies and programs that may qualify as affirmative action. Some definitions focus
on the group(s) that are the proposed beneficiaries of the program or policy (blacks, women, etc.).
Such an approach is lacking because any group can be the beneficiary of affirmative action, not just
minorities and women. Many states have preferential policies that target veterans, persons with
disabilities, the poor, single mothers and any number of other social groups. These sorts of policies
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are not usually referred to as affirmative action because the political discourse around “affirmative
action” as such has developed so as to limit its application largely to policies that target racial/ethnic
minorities and women, particularly in the American context. A much more basic conceptualization –
and one that challenges the current epistemology that has left the term rigid – accepts the notion that
affirmative action can apply to any group, even majority groups. Still other approaches are flawed
because they are more concerned with the means by which the policy or program is implemented
(quotas, goals, etc.). In practice, preferential policies can come in a myriad of forms, and are
contingent upon the political and legal histories of a particular case. This definitional ambiguity
makes comparative study difficult, if not impossible.
To resolve this ambiguity, this study seeks to formulate a unified, minimalist working
definition of affirmative action that incorporates both international and domestic law standards
toward the end of broad applicability across countries and issue domains and analytical simplicity that
can assist in generating generalizable theories. The definitions of Rosenfeld, Fullinwinder and
Greenawalt are helpful but are too group- and issue domain-specific, and are implicitly Americancentric. Similarly, the definition proposed by Special Rapporteur Bossuyt is flawed. His definition
asserts that affirmative action policies should be a “coherent packet of measures.” However, in
practice these measures are rarely coherent, either as to potential groups of beneficiaries of the types
of measures mandated or permitted. Furthermore, coherence is temporal; selection of policy which
may at one time have been coherent may subsequently become incoherent, as regimes change,
demographics change, laws change and constitutions themselves change. Nor should affirmative
action measures be required to be temporary. Some states may decide that certain groups are so
materially disadvantaged that preferences need be conferred ad infinitum, or at least for an
indeterminate period of time. Finally, the requirement that the measure be designed to achieve
“effective equality” is problematic. Effective equality is tantamount to what Rosenfeld refers to as
equality of result, and measures aimed at its achievement surely qualify as affirmative action.
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However, efforts aimed at equality of opportunity, where no equal result is guaranteed but is only
made more likely, may also constitute a group preference. An obvious example is the distinction
between party list quotas for women and seat reservations. In the latter case, reserved seat laws
guarantee that women will have minimum legislative representation and, thus, clearly qualify as an
affirmative action measure. In the former case, minimum representation is not guaranteed, but the
increased likelihood that party list quotas provide nevertheless constitutes a group preference.
This project asserts that in defining affirmative action, the focus should be only secondarily
on specific groups, time constraints, whether equality is substantive or of opportunity, or the
rationale for implemented the measures. Instead, the definition should be based primarily on three
basic propositions: (1) that the core relationship is that which exists between the state and social
groups – multi-ethnic states regularly use preferential policies as a tool to manage the demands of
various ethno-political factions in an effort to stave off ethic conflict and ameliorate power
asymmetries that cause inequality; (2) that the state – through its executive, legislative and judicial
apparatuses – plays a pivotal role in conferring, managing and directing the distribution of the
privilege, the type of privilege, the degree of privilege and the target groups that may benefit; and (3)
that the preferential policies in question do in fact intend to, or can be legally construed to, confer a
privilege on a target group of beneficiaries such that the target group receives a privilege that other
groups either do not receive in the same proportion or do not receive at all. In accordance with
these fundamental propositions, affirmative action shall be defined succinctly as a state mandated or
permitted group preference.
IV.

An Analytical Framework for Affirmative Action Precommitments
This project uses an examination of the various constitutional precommitments to

affirmative action for racial minorities and women to do what previous literatures on comparative
constitutionalism, minority rights and affirmative action have yet to do – propose a typology of
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constitutional precommitments to affirmative action. The precommitment types are set forth in
summary form below and are explained at length in subsequent chapters.
A.

Classical and Tacit Precommitments
Taking into account the minimalist definition, four basic types of constitutional

precommitments can be discerned: classical, tacit, territorial and social. Classical constitutional
affirmative action precommitmnts generally embody what we have come to accept as conventional
affirmative action policies and those routinely described by affirmative action scholars: preferential
policies designed to benefit groups, usually minorities and women. Classical precommitments often
come in the form of reservations, quotas or minimum representation requirements in education,
employment or legislatures. These provisions may either mandate or permit state action in
furtherance of their goals. Classical precommitments may include terminology such as: “affirmative
measures,” “special measures,” “measures,” “specific measures,” “special provision,” “positive
measures,” “reservations” or “quotas.” India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, discussed at length later, all
have constitutions with classical precommitments that use the terms “reserved” or “reservation.”
Similarly, the Ethiopian constitution, also discussed later, contains a classical precmmitment, using
instead the phrase “special attention” when referring to preferences for women.
Tacit precommitments also convey a preference, but they do not use terms that are widely
accepted and textual interpretation is needed. Whereas classical precommitments make the framers’
intent to confer a preference patent, the language of a tacit precommitment must be interpreted in
light of the history of the provision(s) in a particular case. Classical precommitments are generally
the strongest of the three types because their meanings tend to be more stable over time and they can
better withstand judicial scrutiny when legal challenged are mounted against them. Four common
examples of tacit language are: “promote,” “protect,” “real and effective,” and “safeguard.” The
Colombian constitution uses the term “real and effective’’ when referring to the enforcement of
equality for “groups which are discriminated against or marginalized” (Colom. Const. art. 13)
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Article 9(2) of the Spanish constitution also uses the term “real and effective,” in addition to the
terms “facilitate” and “promote.”
B.

Territorial Precommitments
Territorial precommitments are perhaps a bit more controversial than their classical and tacit

counterparts. These precommitments convey group preferences through constitutionally designed
territorial arrangements. These provisions occur in constitutions enacted amidst a variety of sociopolitical contexts and cleavages, legal traditions, and economic systems. For a territorial arrangement
to qualify it must meet three criteria: (1) the territorial arrangement must be provided for in the
constitution or special status, (2) territorial boundaries must be largely coextensive with LERN
boundaries and (3) the territories inhabited by minority LERN group(s), or the members of the
groups thereof, must receive some government mandated or permitted preference that the territories
inhabited by the other group(s), or the members thereof, do not receive.
Some territorial precommitments take the form of ethno-federal arrangements in which the
territorial boundaries of political subunits are more or less coextensive with ethnic boundaries.
Under this scenario, minority-inhabited areas are granted by the central government an autonomous
status, thus conferring substantial control over their own political and economic institutions. In
other cases, there is no grant of autonomy, but in an effort to address asymmetrical economic
circumstances among majority and minority LERN groups, the state may implement ethnodevelopments policies targeting impoverished minority sub-national units. Oftentimes ethnodevelopment schemes involve economic incentives, subsidies or outright quotas to spur agricultural
or industrial development, as well as enhanced financing to increase access to health care, education,
housing and public employment. Schemes aimed at cultural and land conservation are also used.
Many territorial affirmative action precommitments take the form of ethno-federal
arrangements. Although widely discussed in the political science and economic theory, there is no
consensus definition of federalism. According to Hueglin & Fenna (2006) “[i]n a federal system of
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government, sovereignty is shared and powers divided between two or more levels of government
each of which enjoys a direct relationship with the people” (Hueglin & Fenna, 2006, p. 32). The
ultimate goal is a balance between the federal and regional units. Filippov, Ordeshook & Shvetsova
(2004) categorizes a state as federal if “its governmental structure can be characterized by multiple
layers … such that at each level the chief policy makers – governors, presidents, prime ministers,
legislatures, parliaments, judges – are elected directly by the people they ostensibly serve … or
appointed by public officials thus directly elected at that level” (Filippov et al., 2004, p. 9). Federal
arrangements generally have two interrelated justifications, economic and political. For an economic
perspective, federal arrangements may be preferred because “[g]overnment (i.e., coercive) action may
be required to resolve those market failures associated with informational asymmetries, externalities,
and wholly decentralized decision making over public goods” (Filippov et al., 2004, p. 1).
Furthermore,
[b]ecause technology, taste and our understanding of things are never static, the
decentralization and political competition that federalism allows offers the possibility of
designing a state that can, in principle at least, move back and forth between acting in a
centralized versus a decentralized way, and that makes such adjustments over time and
across issues according to fixed democratic rules, especially safeguarding individual rights
(Filippov et al., 2004, p. 2).
Thus, economically speaking, federalism in its ideal form facilitates the allocation of responsibilities
across the state guided by the principle of rationality, the avoidance of transaction costs and the
management of externalities.
Conversely, political justifications for federal arrangements are much more varied and do not
always conform to the principle of rationality. Hueglin & Fenna (2006) identify three normative
propositions that support a federal system. First, decisions are best made at the local level because
local elites have the best knowledge to do so. This arrangement also enhances citizens’ voice because
holding local decision-makers accountable is easier than holding accountable those who reside far
away. Second, local governments can administer services in a manner consistent with the culture of
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the particular locality, all the while participating in the national whole. Thus, these “subcentral
communities” can better protect their distinct interests. Third, the dispersal of power among several
levels of government decreases the likelihood of tyranny from any one level. This constitutionalist
argument applies to both parliamentary and presidential regimes; in parliamentary systems federalism
can act as a counterbalance to the power amassed by a fusion of legislative and executive branches,
while in a presidential system the vertical stratification of federalism can complement the horizontal
separation of powers that three branches of government can provide (Hueglin & Fenna, 2006, pp.
40-41).
Perhaps the most pertinent binary here is what Hueglin & Fenna characterize as cultural
federalism vs. territorial federalism. In the former case, the geographic boundaries that demarcate
subnational units coincide with those that separate cultural groups (Switzerland). In the latter case,
geographic boundaries are cross-cutting and the composition of subnational units is heterogenous.
Cultural federalism may be a result of the persistence of what Amoretti (2004) refers to as territorial
cleavages. In his view, “[a] territorial cleavage exists when a self-conscious minority is concentrated
in a specific area of a state’s territory. … What matters is that the minority and the majority perceive
themselves as collectively different and therefore deserving of some kind of different treatment”
(Amoretti, 2004, p. 2). Oftentimes, these cleavages lead to “ethnic” conflict. The realization and
scale of any conflict is difficult to predict as it is contingent upon a number of variables. However,
the result of such conflict is well known: mass inter-group violence, diminished state capacity and
legitimacy, crumbling political institutions, the demise of the rule of law, unfettered refugee flows, a
dilapidated economic infrastructure and perhaps the failure of the state itself. Given this potential
scenario, plural societies with deeply embedded territorial cleavages can enact measures of
accommodation. These measures can include minimizing violence and extra- and counterinstitutional mobilization, minimizing alienation and hostility toward the state, and encouraging
respect for minority civil and political rights (Amoretti, 2004, p. 2).
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What Hueglin & Fenna refer to as cultural federalism can also be referred to as ethnofederalism.
Hale (2004) defines the ethnofederal state as a federal state in which at least one constituent
territorial governance unit is intentionally associated with a specific ethnic category. Borrowing from
Riker’s (1964) seminal work, he opines that ethnofederal states must meet two criteria. First, the
state must be federal. This means that: (1) there must be two levels of government that rule the same
land and people, (2) each area has at least one domain of action in which it is autonomous and (3)
there is some guarantee of the autonomy of each government within its own sphere. Second, there
must be a minimal level of democracy, which entails “direct regional elections and in Freedom House
rates these countries as either ‘free’ or ‘partially free’” (Hale, 2004, p. 168). Under these criteria states
like Uganda and China would be disqualified. In this study, ethnofederalism does not require
democracy. Here, the key principle in ethnofederalism decentralization of national administrative
authority which is devolved to subnational governance units.
Federalism is the conceptual precursor to consociationalism. Lijphart characterizes federal
theory as a “special type” of consociational theory, one which implements segmental autonomy,
which permits some social groups to have some decision-making authority independent of a central
government (Lijhpart, 1977). Both federal and unitary states can use territorial demarcations as a tool
for assigning preferences to certain groups. In a unitary state, Lijphart uses the term
consociationalism to describe an institutionalized power-sharing arrangement implanted in divided
societies for the express purpose of managing social group conflict. In its ideal form, a
consociational arrangement has four characteristics: (1) governance by a grand coalition of political
leaders of all significant segments of society; (2) a mutual veto or “concurrent majority” rule; (3)
proportionality as the principle of political representation; and (4) a high degree of autonomy for
each segment (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25). In practice, these arrangements are far from ideal.
The normativity of consociational arrangements are not without controversy. As O’Leary
notes, the crux of the detractors’ argument is that consociation “reinforces the presumed sources of
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conflict. It freezes and institutionally privileges (undesirable) identities at the expense of more
‘emancipated’ or more ‘progressive’ identities, such as class or gender” (O’Leary, 2005, p. 5).
Furthermore, they argue that proportional representation will only lead to the irreversible formation
of sectarian parties, replacing the politics of interests with the politics of identity. They also argue
that these arrangements are inherently undemocratic. (O’Leary, 2005, p. 6). Feminists, liberals and
socialists are common purveyors of this line of argument.
Roeder & Rothchild (2005) argue that power-sharing hinders peace and democracy in postconflict societies. They identify seven potential problems. First, they limit democracy by creating a
small elite cartel among ethnic groups. Democracy requires competition among elites, not
conspiracy. Second, power-sharing institutions can actually undermine power-sharing agreements by
giving ethnic groups the ability to challenge the agreement for fear of defection by other parties.
Third, the issue of inter-ethnic resource allocation monopolizes the political agenda. Fourth, there is
a “second-generation problem”; even though the initial parties to the agreement may be committed
to its implementation, subsequent generations of ethnic elites may not be as committed.18 Fifth,
because power-sharing involves increasing representation of minority ethnic groups, government
becomes inefficient. Sixth, power-sharing institutions tend to be rigid and unable to adapt to
changing circumstances. Finally, power-sharing agreements are difficult to enforce. Legitimate
sanctions may become conflated with predation, and the absence of an external guarantor prevent
defection (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005).
Cohen (1997) found that federal arrangements encourage discontented ethnic groups to
engage in protest more frequently, but with less severity. His explanation is a simple one; unlike in
unitary states, in federal arrangements “[t]he dispersions of centers of power de-intensifies
ethnopolitical convergence on the central government and, therefore, takes pressure off it.

Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) argue that multi-faceted power-sharing arrangements tend to make power-sharing
institutions more durable. Institutions must be multidimensional, focusing not only on the security dimension,
but the military, territorial and economic dimensions as well.
18

84

Federalism dilutes the intensity of ethnic demands by redirecting them to many centers instead of
one” (Cohen, 1997, p. 624). In applying the ethnic security dilemma analytical framework, Saideman,
Lanoue & Campenni (2002) found that federalism may increase protest, but reduces the level of
ethnic violence because minority groups have more local influence and those groups may have less
fear that their way of life will be threatened by a national majority. In remarking upon the interaction
of their federalism and minority population concentration variables on the likelihood of ethnic
conflict, the authors hypothesize that “[f]ederal systems, for example, may be more effective in
reducing unrest in areas where minority groups inhabit specific regions of a country (thus allowing
for federal boundaries to correspond with ethnic populations) (Saideman et al. 2002, 121). Lake &
Rothchild (1996) argue that “the establishment of regional autonomy and federalism are important
confidence-building measures that, by promoting the rights and positions of minority groups,
mitigate the strategic dilemmas that produce [ethnic] violence” (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, p. 42).19
Of course, the federal design is not a panacea. Quantitative analysis performed by Brancati
(2006) suggests that while federal arrangements may mitigate the likelihood or severity of ethnic
conflict and/or secession, they may also contribute to the formation of regional parties, thus
increasing the probability of both. In addition, the actions of one subnational governance unit may
have a deleterious effect on another. Burgess (2006), in a reappraisal and expansion of Riker’s (1964)
conception of a federal state as a grand bargain among politicians, sets forth an analytical framework
of “circumstantial causation” that privileges two broad independent variables, “perceived common
interests”20 and “internal threats” (Burgess, 2006, p. 99). These variables, the relative salience of
The authors cite as successes Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Cyprus and Sudan, among others. However, they also
acknowledge that regional autonomy and federalism can have unintended consequences, as in the cases of
South Africa, Ethiopia and Russia.
20 In assessing comparative studies by Wheare (1946), Deutsch (1957), Riker (1964), Birch (1966) and Watts
(1966) Burgess identifies the following “common interests”: shared political values, expectations of strong
political ties and associated benefits, a multiplicity of ranges of communications and transactions, the desire for
political independence, prior political association, strategic (territorial) considerations, geographic proximity,
common cultural-ideological factors, political leadership and a broadening of the political elite, similarity of
social and political institutions, the appeal of federal models and the combination of historical processes that
were founded upon prior political commitments. He also lists the following four “threat” factors: a sense of
19
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which is context dependent, enter into constitution-makers’ calculus when determining whether a
federal system is appropriate and how a federal system should be configured. Hueglin & Fenna
(2006) identify four binaries, the combination of which will help determine the pattern of
intergovernmental relations: cultural diversity vs. territorial division of powers, presidential vs.
parliamentary, senate vs. council and legislative vs. administrative subnational authority (Hueglin &
Fenna, 2006, p. 57).
Thus, as a tool of state-building, federal arrangements can be used as leverage against
minority groups which resist incorporation into any truly national unit. As Burgess maintains
“[f]ederations were conscious rational attempts or experiments designed to create and foster a sense
of belonging to what … was an artificial political community … with an overarching political
authority that encompassed, institutionalized, accommodated and gave official recognition to those
identities that were politically salient” (Burgess, 2006, p. 104). Here, Burgess, like Amoretti,
highlights the nexus between the federal and national projects, the erection of a system of political
devolution and geographic demarcation that could allay, eliminate, co-opt or peripheralize competing
minority nationalisms that threatened to disrupt a state’s territorial and/or ideological integrity. The
federal project accepts a heterogeneous, multinational state by recognizing at least the disruptive
potential of a distinctive or contrary culture, and at most acknowledging the value of diversity as a
contribution rather than a hindrance to a national culture. In sum, “[f]ederations emerge … because
of the imperative to structure and institutionalize difference and diversity” (Burgess, 2006, p. 156).
The central difference between traditional federalism and consociational or ethno--federal
arrangements is that traditional federalism presupposes an equal distribution of power among
subnational units. Under a power-sharing, arrangement, some units may have more power than
others. In some cases, divided states opt for a grant of autonomy to some units. According to Ghai

military insecurity, a sense of economic insecurity, a sense of cultural insecurity and a perceived threat to the
stability of the existing political order.
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(2000) there is no developed or reliable theory of autonomy (Ghai, 2000, p. 4). In her study of 9
Latin American cases, Van Cott (2001) concludes that indigenous demands for autonomy succeed
when their claims are integrated into larger regime bargains and when opportunity structures favor
the making of such claims.
In practice, preferences for territories inhabited by discrete “ethnic” group can take several
forms, perhaps best described as falling along a spectrum of preference. On one end, there can be
reasonably conservative arrangements in which the central government retains all or the
preponderance of administrative decision-making authority but confers preferred status on peoples
from national sub-units. These measures may be principally economic in nature, using principles of
redistribution to justify providing increased investment to those subunits which are inhabited by
minority groups and which are underdeveloped. In addition, preferred employment in the public
sector may be implemented for disadvantaged groups. On the other end, the structure of territorial
arrangements in plural societies, particularly those in which ethnic cleavages have been the cause of
inter-group violence and institutional disruption, delegations of partial sovereignty or autonomy may
be undertaken, to the degree required to quell continued violence and prevent outright secession.
Many states designate autonomous regions for this purpose, with the degree of autonomy granted on
a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the variation in the type and degree of preferential arrangements is
made apparent through not only inter-case analysis, but through intra-case analysis.
As indicated above, this study adopts the basic definition of the ethno-federal state, with
some qualification. The requirement that the state be “democratic” must be relaxed because it has
no bearing on whether the state confers preference. In addition, the goal of managing ethnic conflict
necessarily entails conferring a preference on those minority groups which benefit from the
devolution of political power, either to states or to communities. Thus, in some cases, ethno-federal
arrangements are vehicles for implementing affirmative action. Of course, not all federal
arrangements are ethno-federal, or have segmental cleavages that coincide with territorial cleavages.
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To determine whether a constitutionalized federal arrangement is or is not, whether by its very
language or by application, ethno-federal in nature requires attention paid to plain constitutional
language as well as to historical facts which when aggregated suggest so. This study posits that the
connection between territorial arrangements and affirmative action lies in the redistributional policies
that the national government uses to not only prevent conflict but to resolve political and economic
power asymmetries and effectuate more egalitarian outcomes among territorial demarcated
subnational groups.
C.

Social precommitments
In addition to the classical, tacit and territorial types, constitutional affirmative action

precommitments can also come in the form of social precommitments, an umbrella term used here
to encompass constitutional provisions that evidence a clear intent to incorporate socialist,
communist or social democratic ideals. Although Marx and Engles first distinguished between
communism, a working-class revolutionary movement, and socialism, a middle-class reformist
movement, socialism has now become a general term for state-initiated economic reform to
reapportion wealth, principally among classes. This project argues that “social” precommitments can
just as easily be used to justify affirmative action legislation that benefits at LERN minority groups
and women because of (1) the elevated normative value that “social” states grant to wealth
redistribution along class cleavages and (2) the significant coincidence of class lines and LERN and
gender lines in many states.
Often set in contradistinction to more liberal socio-economic arrangements, “social”
arrangements carve out a much more prominent role for the state in society and economy. As
Lindemann (1983) acknowledges, “no platonic authority exists that can provide us with a ‘real’
definition of socialism” (Lindeman, 1983, p. xi). Furthermore,
It would be satisfying to conjure up some concise and air-tight definition of [socialism] …
[b]ut attempts to provide such definitions have always failed, for the simple reason that
language, and particularly the language of political persuasions, evolves in ways that defy easy
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description…. We must thus reconcile ourselves to the uncomfortable truth that often
people who call themselves socialists so define their beliefs as to exclude others who also
claim to be socialists (Lindemann, 1983, p. xi).
Indeed, not only is the particular arrangement of socialist state institutions important, but the
history which spawned these institutions is important as well. Thus, the manner in which “social”
precommitments manifest themselves in any particular society is historically contingent. As Wright
(1986, p. 1) maintains “[t]he history of socialism is the history of socialisms.” That said, there are
characteristics that can be said to be inherent in the concept itself, despite its multifarious
manifestations. Socialism emphasizes cooperation, social justice and community over the needs of
the individual. It also presupposes the innate gregariousness of human beings and the optimal
development of humanity through cooperation rather than competition.
Socialism is often discussed in juxtaposition to liberalism; however, the two do share some
very fundamental goals amidst their very different approaches to realizing them. Both ideologies
encourage liberty and a means of achieving social progress. Liberalism seeks liberty through
individual competition, private property ownership and free elected representatives. Conversely,
socialism objects to individualism and finds the valorization of capitalist private property ownership
often to be destructive. Both liberalism and socialism espouse equality; liberalism favors equality of
opportunity while socialism elevates social equality or equality of outcomes.
In contrast to capitalism, socialism attributes the hegemony of the capitalist economic
system, and the manner in which social institutions and the state apparatus have developed, to the
self-interested machinations of the capitalist bourgeoisie as it turns most of society into proletarians.
The term “socialism” owes its origin to socialist thinkers in Great Britain, Ireland and France in the
early 19th century. In the view of Marx & Engles (1948), the bourgeoisie appropriated the means of
production by transforming it from individual to social and from agricultural to industrial, facilitated
by the transformed division of labor that the factory brought. Although the means of production
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had been socialized, the appropriation of commodities produced was concentrated in the hands of
the capitalists.
According to Engels (1892), this contradiction between social production and capitalist
appropriation will end in a violent explosion of rebellion by the productive forces, eventuating in the
state taking control of production. However, because the state itself is a bourgeois construct, further
steps are required. The means of production must revert to the control of the proletariat, which will
then turn the means of production into state property. As Engels summarizes,
[t]he proletariat seizes the public power, and by means of this transforms the socialized
means of production, slipping from the hands of the bourgeoisie, into public property. …
The development of production makes the existence of different classes of society
thenceforth an anachronism. … To accomplish this act of universal emancipation is the
historical mission of the modern proletariat (Engels, 1892, pp. 86-87).
In essence, the state, no longer a manager of government administration and social relations,
becomes superfluous and dies out (Engels, 1892, p. 86).
The Marxism described above represents an ideal type of socialism. Other theorists
regarded socialism as indispensable in fostering a more egalitarian distribution of capital
appropriation, but challenged some of the fundamental assumptions of Marxist socialism. As
elucidated by Kautsky (1892) the general trajectory of economic development – specifically
production for sale and the unforeseen growth of the capitalist system itself – actually requires state
intervention. Simply put, “the economic development forces the state, partly in self-defense, partly
for the sake of better fulfilling its functions, partly also for the purpose of increasing its revenues, to
take into its own hands more and more functions or industries (Kautsky, 1892, p. 100). Luxemburg
(2006) argued that a proletariat revolution is not necessary for the proletariat to gain political power,
but that democratic institutions alone might suffice. Indeed,
[democracy] is necessary to the working class because it creates the political forms
(autonomous administration, electoral rights, etc.) which will serve the proletariat as
fulcrums in its task of transforming bourgeois society. Democracy is indispensable to the
working class because only through the exercise of its democratic rights, in the struggle for
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democracy, can the proletariat become aware of its class interests and its historic task
(Luxemburg, 2006, p. 63).
These and similar revisions of Marxism can be seen as a moderated, more pragmatic placement of
the role of the state in any socialist program. Ideas such as these ultimately paved the way for what
politicians and political thinkers refer to as social democracy.
From a more liberal perspective, Meyer & Hinchman (2007) trace the roots of social
democracy to the individual rights refrain of classical liberalism and the gap between what they term
“formal validity” and “efficacy in the real world.” Formal validity “implies that one should take legal
steps to ensure individual freedom by establishing a legal sphere of privacy shielded from the
intervention of third parties” (Meyer & Hinchman, 2007, p. 10). Conversely, efficacy in the real
world places emphasis on actual impact. Under traditional liberal theory, integral to individual
freedom is the right to own property, protected by negative liberties (as opposed to positive ones) the
concept of negative liberties assumes that the interference of third parties, including the state.
The writings of classical liberal theorist John Locke do lend some support to the notion that
liberalism and individual rights can be compatible with the common good. To him, the natural state
of man “is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and
persons as they see fit, within the bounds if the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending
upon the will of any other man” (Locke, 1681, p. 262). However, liberty is not synonymous with
abject license, as there are ethics of equality, charity, justice, and fairness at work. As Locke
maintains,
[a]nd, being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of Nature, there
cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorise us to destroy one
another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for
ours. Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by
the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he as much as
he can to preserve the rest of mankind …. (Locke, 1681, p. 264).
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Furthermore, Locke rejects the idea that justice and equity should be assessed by each individual in
the light of his own interest. He states that “[t]his unjust view has always been rejected by the wiser
amongst mankind, those who retained some sense of common humanity, some concern for the
welfare of society” (Locke, 1664, p. 178). Locke not only seems to suggest the compatibility of the
liberal/self-interested and the social/common, but also indicates that, at times, the former dictates
the necessity off the latter. He maintains that men will relinquish the power, liberty, and equality they
held in the state of nature to a government only “as the good of the society shall require,” and “only
with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property,” with the
“peace, safety, and public good of the people” as the ultimate end (Locke, 1690, p. 68). Thus, it
would seem that for Locke individual rights and social rights are perhaps in some practical instances
antagonistic, but are not at all mutually exclusive.
British philosopher Tawney (1965) challenges the notion that equality is inimical to liberty.
He observes that “while inequality of power is a condition of liberty, since it is the condition of any
effective action, it is also a menace to it, for power which is sufficient to use is sufficient to abuse”
(Tawney, 1965, p. 286). He notes that just as there are limits to individual liberty in the political
sphere, it is incumbent upon industrial society to extend such limits to the economic sphere. He
states his position on the matter plainly: “when liberty is construed, realistically, or implying, that the
economically weak will not be at the mercy of the economically strong … a large measure of equality,
so far from being inimical to equality, is essential to it” (Tawney, 1965, p. 290). Tawney’s position
not only underscores the compatibility between liberty and equality realized through “social”
interventions, but it also intimates the potential harmony between “social” interventions and
democratic institutions. This is a belief that social democrats such as Laurat (1940) and Durbin
(1940) espouse, construing democracy as an organizational principle that inherently demands
economic equality and social justice.
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Critical to distinguishing between liberal democracies and more social states is how the state
perceives its role in meting out fairness and equality through its management of positive and negative
rights. The companion notions of positive legal rights and social citizenship gained currency in the
aftermath of WWII and the enactment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As this study
shows, many states incorporated these rights into their respective constitutions as fundamental rights,
the contravention or curtailment of which requires state intervention. Under this arrangement, the
state may compensate groups affected by the negative consequences of risks it helped to create
(Meyer & Hinchman, 2007).
As the above discussion shows, “social” states tend to embrace norms of fairness, equality
and redistribution in obligating themselves to provide for workers or the poor. However, group
remediation need not stop with the proletariat or the poor. Constitutional social precommitments
may also be used to justify preferences, or affirmative action, for other groups such as racial
minorities given that in many instances, there is significant overlap between the two groups. By their
very nature, social precommitments are the affirmative action precommitments with the broadest
application. In theory at least, they can support legislation that assigns preferences to all target
groups across all issue domains. I argue here that while social precommitments strictly construed
concern principally economic redistribution along class lines, it can have a meaningful preferential
impact on redistribution to primarily LERN groups, but also to women. Again, in many societies
there is substantial coincidence between class and minority group lines. The precise arrangement of
these cleavage overlappings is necessarily country specific. However, in instances where such
coincidence can be observed, “social” precommitments, even absent a precommitment targeting a
LERN group or women specifically, should provide legal justification sufficient to support
affirmative action legislation or policies.
It is of course argued that “[n]ationalism and Marxism are philosophically incompatible”
because for a Marxist class interests would supersede national interests (Walker, 1984, p. 5). For the
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nationalist, the opposite would be true. As Walker interprets Marx and Engels, the nation as such
was a superstructural phenomenon that came into existence after the demise of feudalism and with
the rise of capitalism. “Nationalism was mainly a device of the bourgeoisie for identifying their class
interests as the interests of the entire society,” (Walker, 1984, p. 7), and was used to “dampen the
class consciousness of the proletariat by obscuring the conflicting class interests within each nation,
and by encouraging rivalry among the proletariat of various nations (Walker, 1984, p. 7). However,
as Walker points out, “Marxists not only learned to accommodate themselves to an expediential
coexistence with a world filled with nationalisms, but they also developed a strategy to manipulate
nationalism into the service of Marxism” (Walker, 1984, p. 6). Furthermore, “the unmistakable
growing impact of nationalism upon world politics that took place during the lifetime of Marx and
Engels demanded a greater appreciation of the power of nationalism” (Walker, 1984, p. 11). Walker
also contends that respect to nationalism is congruent with Marx’s dialectical view of progress, where
the ends is more important than the means (Walker, 1984, p. 14).
Ultimately, the reaction of classical Marxists to the real-world influence of nationalist
movements mirrors that of classical liberals. Although philosophically neither is compatible with
serious political appreciation of national identities, practical considerations force a re-thinking of
ideological allegiances to how societies are to be organized. Thus, more “pliable” iterations of
Marxism, such as those embodied in social democracies, and even constitutionally communist cases
such as China, recognize group rights of national minorities. As the analysis in Chapter 8 will show,
most cases in the sample have both social and affirmative action precommitments of some sort.
V.

Conclusion
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 were intended to accomplish four goals. First, they reviewed the

relevant literature on constitutions, constitutionalism, and precommitment theory to show how states
and the political elites that govern them use constitutions and the institutions that are created by
them to manage and distribute resources to various segments of the national population. Second,
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they explained that, as a result of a myriad of endogenous and exogenous political pressures,
affirmative action is one of the tools many states use to manage and distribute resources to various
segments of the population in a preferential manner. Third, they demonstrated how the existing
literature of affirmative action is inadequate, primarily because of its conceptual and definitional
uncertainty, its single-case emphasis and its American- and/or Euro-centric focus. Finally, they
proposed to resolve these inadequacies with a large N, thirty-case comparative study that focuses on
the constitutions themselves, a simple, consensus definition of affirmative action that can be broadly
applied to a variety of contexts, and a working typology of affirmative action precommitments that
proceeds beyond just conventional forms (classical, tacit) to encompass those that are more
unconventional (territorial, social).
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CHAPTER 5:
CONVENTIONAL PRECOMMITMENTS TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
I.

Introduction
From a review of the constitutions of the 30 cases in the sample, a basic framework can be

derived by which we can characterize affirmative action precommitments. For the purposes of
simplicity and parsimony, this project will focus on four major types that can be used to organize
affirmative action precommiments: classical, tacit, territorial and social. Subsequent chapters will
examine other dichotomized sub-types: group-specific vs. non-group-specific, domain specific vs. non-domain
specific and permissive vs. mandatory. The four types and the three sub-types were selected because they
address the three key foundational questions that constitution-makers must confront after agreeing
that some form of affirmative action precommitment is indeed warranted: (1) what kind(s) of
precommitment(s) should we have, (2) to whom should the precommitment(s) apply and (3) in what
situation(s) should the precommitment(s) apply? This study addresses two target group categories:
LERN minorities (an acronym for linguistic, ethnic, racial and national) and women. The prevalence
of the various types of affirmative action precommitments within and between LERN minorities and
women will be the subjects of the next chapter.
Classical constitutional affirmative action precommitments embody what we have come to
accept as conventional affirmative action policies; preferential policies designed to benefit groups,
usually minorities. Classical precommitments often come in the form of reservations, quotas or
minimums representation requirements in specified issue domains. These provisions may either
mandate or permit state action in furtherance of their goals. Classical precommitments use
“universal” language that makes a clear, unambiguous and unequivocal commitment to conferring a
mandatory or permissive state-protected preference on a particular group or groups by undertaking
extraordinary or exemplary steps, articulated in terms that are widely accepted by the international
community as conveying such preference. Tacit precommitments also convey a preference, but they
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do not use terms that are widely accepted; thus, textual and historical context is needed to determine
whether a preference can or must be conferred. Stated otherwise, whereas classical precommitments
make the framers’ intent to confer a preference patent, the language of a tacit precommitment must
be interpreted in light of the history of the provision(s) in a particular case.
Second, multi-national states use a variety of territorial precommitments to facilitate the
devolution of political and administrative authority to sub-national governance units. There are three
sub-types: grants of autonomy, ethno-development schemes fostered by ethno-federal arrangements, and
efforts at conservation of LERN minorities land and culture. However, not all territorial arrangements
qualify as affirmative action precommitments. For a territorial arrangement to qualify it must meet
three criteria: (1) the territorial arrangement must be provided for in the constitution, (2) territorial
boundaries must be largely coextensive with LERN boundaries and (3) the territories inhabited by
minority LERN group(s), or the members of the groups thereof, must receive some government
mandated or permitted preference that the territories inhabited by the other group(s), or the
members thereof, do not receive. Territorial precommitments only apply to the LERN category.
Finally, social precommitments may operate in a manner sufficient to support stateauthorized preferences for target groups. These constitutional provisions must evidence a clear
intent to effectuate social or socialist ideals through a state redistributionary project. Social
precommitments can qualify as affirmative action because in almost all societies there is significant
overlap between class cleavages on the one hand, and LERN and SEX cleavages on the other. As
will be discussed, this study classifies social precommitments into three types: (1) cases that are
socialist because they contain provisions that use the term “socialist” in reference to the state; (2) cases
that are social because, although they do not contain provisions that use the term “socialist,” they do
contain provisions that mandate or permit resource redistribution amongst social groups and/or
provide for entitlements such as social security, housing assistance or health care; and (3) cases that
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are constitutionally asocial because they contain no provisions that clearly indicate the states
responsibility or option to redistribute resources amongst social groups.
The framework presented here should in no way be interpreted as definitive. The actual
outcomes of the affirmative action precommitments (whether they “work” or not) is not the focus of
this project. Any discussion of outcomes in this project is used only to: (1) provide social, political
and/or historical context for how the constitution-making process itself came about; (2) explain the
rationale behind the inclusion of affirmative action precommitments and the inclusion and exclusion
of certain target groups; (3) highlight events that may have occurred subsequent to initial
constitutional ratification that may have led to the creation of a legal or regulatory framework in
furtherance of precommitment goals, or (4) highlight events that may have led to the modification of
precommitment interpretation or a constitutional amendment that expanded or restricted
precommitment application. It is also important to understand how different types of
precommitments can work together. For example, how might a territorial precommitment and a
social precommitment work together? We will see that in some instances provisions can reinforce
one another to effectuate the intent of constitution-makers or to permit minority group plaintiffs to
make good faith legal arguments that they are entitled to preferential treatment from the state or
state-run institutions. There may also be conceptual and practical overlap among the types. This
precommitment synergy may also change over time. Legally speaking, precommitment synergy may
manifest in an in pari materia reading of constitutional provisions to properly understand the
affirmative action precommitment landscape.
II.

Equality Precommitments
Prior to discussing the preferential provisions that appear in constitutions, an examination of

provisions that grant equality is warranted. Equality precommitments are provisions that
memorialize a stare’s commitment to enforcement of equality among individuals and groups, and
may or may not be domain specific. Some constitutions adopt a minimalist posture with regard to
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equality, typified by the US Constitution’s “equal protection” clause, with no additional supporting
equality provisions. Other provisions mirror two of the affirmative action precommitment sub-types
– group specific vs. non-group specific and domain specific vs. non-domain specific. Some are
phrased as anti-discrimination provisions and still other provisions specifically prohibit state
prescribed preferences. Many constitutions incorporate an “equal protection” clause and support it
with some additional provisions, including affirmative action precommitments. Whether an equality
provision indicates a commitment to equality of opportunity or equality in practice, or substantive
equality, is difficult to determine without historical and legal context. It is important to highlight that
any equality precommitment has the potential to become an affirmative action precommitment
because, over time, courts’ interpretations of constitutional “equality” language can change. When
equality provisions are present and can be read in pari materia with classical, tacit, territorial or social
precommitments then the intent is to mandate or permit a preference is made clearer. When there is
no other language suggestive of preferential treatment, reference to alternative legal sources such as
legislation and case law is required to determine accurately the particular meaning of equality.
Mexico provides a basic example of equality language. Mexico is the only case in the sample
with no discernible “equal protection” provision. However, Mexico does have equality provisions
for the EDU and ECON/EMP domains and for the women and LERN target groups. Art. 3(I)(c)
maintains that the Mexican education system
shall contribute to better human relationships, not only with the elements which it
contributes toward strengthening and at the same time inculcating, together with respect for
the dignity of the person and the integrity of the family, the conviction of the general interest
of society, but also by the care which it devotes to the ideals of brotherhood and equality of
rights of all men, avoiding privileges of race, creed, class, sex, or persons.
Art. 123(A)(VII) provides that “[e]qual wages shall be paid for equal work, regardless of sex or
nationality.” With resemblance to the “equal protection” clause, Art. 24 of the Ukraine Constitution
states that “[c]itizens have equal constitutional rights and freedoms and are equal before the law.”
However, an equality provision in Art. 21 adds that ‘[a]ll people are free and equal in their dignity”
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and a SEX provision in Art. 51 ensures that “each of the spouses has equal rights and duties in the
marriage and family.”
Other states have adopted “equal protection” provisions but have added additional
bolstering equality provisions. Indonesia and the Russian Federation are two examples. In Indonesia
“[a]l citizens shall be equal before the law and the government and shall be required to respect the
law and the government, with no exceptions” (Ind. Const. art. 27(1)). Furthermore, “[e]very person
shall have the right of recognition, guarantees, protection and certainty before a just law, and of equal
treatment before the law” Ind. Const. Art. 28(d)(1)). There are provisions that buttress the state’s
obligation to enforce equality and art. 28(I)(2) ("Every person shall have the right to be free from
discriminative treatment based upon any grounds whatsoever and shall have the right to protection
from such discriminative treatment”). The Russian constitution is similar: under art. 6(2), “Every
citizen of the Russian Federation shall have all the rights and liberties on its territory and bear equal
duties, stipulated by the Constitution of the Russian Federation”; art. 8(2); “Private, state, municipal
and other forms of ownership shall be recognized and shall enjoy equal protection in the Russian
Federation”; art. 13(4); “Public associations shall be equal before the law”; art. 19(1), “All people
shall be equal before the law and in the court of law”; and art. 123(3) “Judicial proceedings shall be
held on the basis of controversy and equality of the parties.” While each provision is worded
differently indicating a separate emphasis, all constitute fairly general equality provisions that
highlight a commitment to equality.
Many constitutions couch equality in terms of anti- or non-discrimination. These provisions
span virtually all issue domains and target groups. In China, “[d]iscrimination against and oppression
of any nationality are prohibited…” (China Const art. 4). Likewise, in Brazil “the law shall punish
any discrimination attacking fundamental rights and liberties (Brazil Const. art. 5(XLI)). The
Pakistan Constitution has non-discrimination equality provisions for SEX and POL, "[t]here shall be
no discrimination on the basis of sex alone” and [n]o citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in
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the service of Pakistan shall be discriminated against in respect of any such appointment on the
ground only of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth” (Pak. Const. arts. 25(2), 27(1)).
A final example can be found in Nigeria, “[a]ccordingly, national integration shall be actively
encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or
linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited” (Nig. Const. art. 15(2).
As we saw in the case of Mexico, some equality provisions refer to a particular group, or are
group-specific. For example, art. 14 of Japan’s constitution states that "[a]ll of the people are equal
under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because
of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.” Under the Turkish constitution “[a]ll individuals
are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex,
political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations” (Turk. Const. art.
10). In addition to its more general equality provision in art. 3(9), Iran’s constitution holds that “[a]ll
people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; color,
race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege” (Iran Const. art. 19). The Russian
Constitution goes perhaps the furthest in the number of groups mentioned; “[t]he state shall
guarantee the equality of rights and liberties regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin,
property or employment status, residence, attitude to religion, convictions, membership of public
associations or any other circumstance” (Russ. Const. art. 19(2)).
Some, like art. 2(14) of the Constitution of the Philippines, mention only women as meriting
equal protection of the laws; “[t]he State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.” Others discuss women’s
equality and applicable domain(s). For example, art. 48 of the Chinese Constitution states that
"[w]omen in the People's Republic of China enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life,
political, economic, cultural and social, and family life,” with specific mention of equal pay for equal
work. Other provisions relate to domestic relations. Art. 64 of the Vietnamese Constitution states
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that “[m]arriage shall conform to the principles of free consent, progressive union, monogamy and
equality between husband and wife.” Article 41 of the Turkish Constitution is similar; “[t]he family is
the foundation of the Turkish society and based on the equality between the spouses.” A final
example can be found in Art. 36(1) of the South Korean Constitution; “[m]arriage and family life are
entered into and sustained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes, and the State
must do everything in its power to achieve that goal.”
Perhaps the most interesting subset of cases is those that have both equality provisions and
classical affirmative action precommitments. In the case of Ethiopia, Art. 25 of its constitution
guarantees equal protection and “[i]n this respect, the law shall guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection without discrimination on grounds of race, nation, nationality, or other social
origin, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status.”
However, Ethiopia permits the state implementation of “affirmative measures” and provision of
“special attention” to remedy the “[h]istorical legacy of inequality and discrimination suffered by
women” (Eth. Const. art. 35). Although seemingly prohibited by the Art. 25 proclamation of nondiscrimination on the basis of sex, art. 35 memorializes what will be later referred to as a classical
SEX affirmative action precommitment, giving clear preferences to women in the POL,
ECON/EMP and EDU domains. Furthermore, art. 54 establishes “special representation for
minority Nationalities and Peoples” in the House of Peoples’ Representatives. Again, this statement
qualifies as a classical precommitment and, although it lies in apparent contravention of Art. 25’s
non-discrimination mandate, it is an explicit exception.
In Nigeria we find a similar situation. Art. 15(2) maintains that “national integration shall be
actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status,
ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited.” Article 42 under the constitution’s
“Fundamental Rights” chapter makes Nigeria’s commitment to equality even clearer;
(1) A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex,
religion or political opinion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person:
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(a) be subjected either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in
force in Nigeria or any executive or administrative action of the government, to
disabilities or restrictions to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic
groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions are not made subject; or
(b) be accorded either expressly by, or in the practical application of, any law in
force in Nigeria or any such executive or administrative action, any privilege or
advantage that is not accorded to citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic
groups, places of origin, sex, religions or political opinions.
Like Ethiopia’s constitution, Nigeria does carve out an exception for its “federal character”
preference scheme.
The task of interpreting equality provisions is made more difficult when there is little other
constitutional evidence that minority preferences can be conferred. The best example here is the US
which will be treated here at some length. Generally speaking, the US constitution is a minimalist
one, with significant influence from a liberal individualistic ideology and consequently no classical or
tacit affirmative action precommitments. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US
Constitution states, “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States … without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” On its face, this provision is general in its
applicability, with no mention of any specific group or domain. Nor does it describe how the
provision is to be implemented; that task is left to legislation, regulation and judicial decision. But
does the equal protection clause embody strict liberal equal opportunity, thus prohibiting affirmative
action, or does it permit some public or private activity aimed at substantive equality? Reference to
the relevant socio-historical context and judicial precedence clearly shows that the Fourteenth
Amendment permits affirmative action and is a particular precommitment.
In fact, the US has a long history of affirmative action, most notably for whites. Rubio
(2001) argues that preferences for whites began as early the early 18th century in the legal distinctions
between the rights of white indentured servants and black slaves. For example, in 1691 the Virginia
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General Assembly prohibited the setting free of black slaves. Later blacks lost the right to vote and
to engage in sexual relations with whites. By contrast, “Christian white servants” in Virginia could
gain freedom through the payment of “freedom dues” and they could not be beaten by their masters
without an order from the justice of the peace (Rubio, 2001, p. 5). In Rubio’s view, “white privilege
is implicated in black subordination. No matter how poor you were, being white meant not being a
slave” (Rubio, 2001, p. 9). This racial order became memorialized legally by the Supreme Court in
Dred Scott, 60 US 393 (1857).21 Justice Taney had made clear that under the US Constitution, blacks
were not citizens of the US and thus had no rights under it. Under Pres. Andrew Jackson, racial

21 The facts and procedural history of the case can be a bit confusing. Dred Scott was born a slave in Virginia
around 1799. In 1834, Dr. Emerson bought Scott in Missouri and moved him to Illinois, a free state. In 1836,
Emerson and Scott moved to Fort Snelling in Minnesota. Under the 1820 Missouri Compromise, an
agreement between pro- and anti-slavery factions that regulated slavery in the western territories, slavery was
not permitted in Fort Snelling. In 1838, Emerson and the Scott family moved back to Missouri. When
Emerson died, Scott became the property of his wife. Scott then requested that he be set free and she refused.
Scott filed suit in a Missouri state court alleging false imprisonment and battery. After having his claim denied
on a procedural issue, his lawyers successfully argued for a retrial.
By the time the case went to trial, Ms. Emerson had moved to Massachusetts and her brother Sanford
took over her financial affairs. Scott received a favorable ruling in the Missouri lower court. The jury found
that Scott and his family should be free under the Missouri doctrine “once free, always free.” Sanford appealed
to the Missouri Supreme Court and won. Scott did not appeal to the Supreme Court because he thought he
would lose. By 1853, Sanford was the legal owner of the Scotts and he had moved to New York. The case was
then refiled in the Federal District Court for the District of Missouri under the diversity jurisdiction of Article
III, Section 2. The judge rejected Sanford’s argument that Scott was not a citizen, instructing the jury that Scott
was subject only to the laws of Missouri. The jury found for Sanford. Scott then appealed to the Supreme
Court.
The primary legal issue for the Court was relatively simple: Can a negro, whose ancestors were
imported into this country, and sold as slaves become a member of the political community formed and
brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights,
and privileges, and immunities guaranteed by that instrument to the citizens? The decision was a resounding
“no.” The Court reasoned that the citizenship a state confers within its own limits is legally different from the
citizenship that the Union confers. Thus, citizenship of a state is not equivalent to being a citizen of the United
States. The key inquiry is to determine who was a citizen of the United States at the time the Constitution was
adopted. Upon examining the legislation, history and the language in the Declaration of Independence, as well
as the Constitution, the Court concluded that slaves were not intended to be included as citizens. As a result,
blacks had no rights that the white man was bound to respect, and he could be freely bought and sold like
merchandise. It was acknowledged that public sentiment regarding slavery may have changed since the
adoption of the two documents; however, the Court maintained that a change in public opinion cannot change
the meaning we give the Constitution from when it was framed and adopted.
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hierarchy had become further cemented in what Rubio refers to as the “democratization of white
inclusion” (Rubio, 2001, p. 24). “Jacksonian democracy” included an extension of the franchise to
non-propertied white males. This, along with access to American Indian land the creation of the
“white job” helped to solidify whiteness in opposition to blackness and other ethnic identities.
During Reconstruction22 , the Thirteenth23, Fourteenth24 and Fifteenth25 Amendments raised
the idea of equality in political discourse. Many who had reluctantly relented on the Thirteenth
Amendment’s abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude argued that the “equal protection” clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to be included because it amounted to special protection for
blacks and abrogated states’ rights (Rubio, 2001, p. 43). The succeeding civil rights bills caused an
even greater stir because they attempted to codify the idea of social equality found in the
Reconstruction amendments. Black congressional representative John Roy Lynch (R-Mississippi)
accused opponents of social equality of being white supremacists. The first black senator, Hiram
Revels (R-Mississippi) attempted to reassure whites that black uplift would not injure whites.
Nevertheless, many white politicians protested vigorously, even as the 1875 Civil Rights Act was
passed and the Freedman’s Bureau was erected. During Reconstruction, blacks made gains in

22 In From Slavery to Freedom, John Hope Franklin examines the political dynamic between blacks and whites
during Radical Reconstruction. He opines that the Republican Party played a critical role, but was moved to
adopt the cause of Blacks only because of political expediency. For example, the Freedmen's Bureau, not only
supervised educational activities relating to refugees and freedmen, which included issuing rations, clothing and
medicine, but it was also used by missionaries and teachers from the North to civilize the Black “barbarians” in
the South. Republicans also used the Union League to recruited blacks into the Republican Party, to help
protect the fruits of the Northern victory. By the fall of 1867, there were chapters of the League all over the
South. This helped to deliver the Black vote to the Republican Party.
23 The Thirteenth Amendment reads “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction.”
24 Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment is pertinent here. It reads, “[a]ll All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
25 The Fifteenth Amendment reads, “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
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electoral politics, employment and educational achievement through what ostensibly amounted to
state preferences. These benefits, however, were severely curtailed by the Compromise of 1877, and
were mitigated by the pre-existing Black Codes, laws which the states used to regulate a myriad of
civil and legal rights, from marriage to the right to hold and sell property, to the ability of black
agricultural laborers to work. As the Black Codes of the 18th and 19th centuries became the Jim Crow
of the 20th century, preferences for blacks dissipated.26 The controversy then re-emerged with the
executive orders issued by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.
What has today become known as affirmative action finds its origins in the post-Civil Rights
era of greater black empowerment. Several important disputes over whether and how race-based
affirmative action was to be applied under the Equal Protection Clause have been litigated in federal
courts in the post-Civil Rights era. Most scholars agree that the benchmark cases regarding
affirmative action in education are Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,27 438 U.S. 265 (1978)

The history of the US. with regard to inequality between the races and between the sexes is well documented
according to Katznelson (2005) argues that affirmative action actually existed in the US post-New Deal South
to the benefit of whites. Whites used three mechanisms to safeguard the status quo racial power asymmetry in
the South. First, they sought to leave blacks out of any legislation by inscribing race into the law, particularly
where it concerned occupations in which blacks were over-represented like farming and maid service. These
jobs constituted over 75% of blacks employed in the South and were excluded from legislation that created
modern unions, minimum wage laws, laws that dictated work hours and Social Security. Second, whites
insisted that the administration of the laws be placed under the control of local officials, who were racist.
Third, and finally, they prevented Congress from attaching anti-discrimination provisions to the social welfare
legislation. As a result, “at the very moment when a wide array of public policies was providing most white
Americans with valuable tools to advance their social welfare – insure their old age, get good jobs, acquire
economic security, build assets and gain middle class status – most black Americans were left behind or left
out” (Katznelson, 2005, p. 23).
27 A brief review of the facts in Bakke is warranted. In the early 1970s, the medical school of the University of
California at Davis admitted 100 students each year. The university used two admissions programs: a regular
admissions program and a special admissions program. The purpose of the special admissions program was to
increase the number of minority and "disadvantaged" students in the class. Applicants who were members of a
minority group or who believed that they were disadvantaged could apply for the special admissions program.
In the regular admissions program, applicants had to have a grade point average of at least 2.5 on a scale of 4.0
or they were automatically rejected. In the special admissions program, however, applicants did not have to
have a grade point average of 2.5. Under the school’s quota system, sixteen of the 100 spaces in the medical
program were reserved only for the disadvantaged students. From 1971 to 1974 the special program admitted
21 black students, 30 Mexican Americans, and 12 Asians, for a total of 63 minority students.* The regular
26
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and the two Michigan cases, Gratz v. Bollinger, 538 US 244 (2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 306
(2003). In Bakke, the Court held that the university’s affirmative action scheme violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it was not narrowly tailored and did not provide for individualized
assessments for all available slots. Later, in Gratz, petitioners Gratz and Hamacher filed a class action
alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 after both were denied admission as undergraduates to
the University of Michigan. Although the Law School Admissions Council considered Gratz to be
well qualified and Hamacher to be within the qualified range, both were denied admission. They
alleged that the “points system” used by the university to help underrepresented racial or ethnic
minority group members gain admission was unconstitutional. The Court held that the university’s
affirmative action program was not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents’ asserted interest in
diversity, the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court’s decision in Grutter was different.28 The Court ultimately held that the law school
program admissions program was sufficiently narrowly tailored because it did not insulate each

program admitted 1 black student, 6 Mexican Americans, and 37 Asians, for a total of 44 minority students. No
disadvantaged white candidates were admitted through the special program.
Allan Bakke was a white male. He applied to and was rejected from the regular admissions program in
1973 and 1974. Minority applicants with lower scores than Bakke's were admitted under the special program.
After his second rejection, Bakke filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Yolo County, California. He wanted
the Court to force the university to admit him to the medical school because the special admissions program
violated the Fourteenth Amendment and his denial of admission constituted unlawful race discrimination. In
accordance with precedent the Supreme Court first held that the proper standard of review was strict scrutiny
because the Equal Protection Clause applies to all persons regardless of race. The strict scrutiny standard, first
articulated in U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), and applied in Korematsu v. U.S, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
is the most stringent of the three standards courts use to determine if state action that contravenes a
constitutional right is legal. Under this standard in a State must show that its purpose or interest is both
constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary to the
accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest.
28 That case involved the University of Michigan School of Law, which sought to achieve student body
diversity through compliance with Bakke. Focusing on students’ academic ability coupled with a flexible
assessment of their talents, experiences, and potential, the policy requires admissions officials to evaluate each
applicant based on all the information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of
recommendation, an essay describing how the applicant will contribute to Law School life and diversity, and
the applicant’s undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score.
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category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants.
Rather, it considered race or ethnicity only as a “plus” in a particular applicant’s file and was flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
individual applicant. Attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper
institutional mission, and its good faith is presumed absent a showing to the contrary. Enrolling a
“critical mass” of minority students simply to assure some specified percentage of a particular group
merely because of its race or ethnic origin would be patently unconstitutional.
This brief historical and legal review of American affirmative action and constitutional
pronouncements of equality, as well as the examination of equality provisions in other cases, was
intended to show the diversity in constitutional language and the potential difficulties in
interpretation and application. By themselves, equality provisions do not settle the debate over
whether a constitution mandates or permits affirmative action. However, it does invite its possibility,
and, at the very least, equality provisions, whether in Indonesia, Russia or the US, guarantees a
minimum of equality of opportunity.
III.

Classical Precommitments
Classical affirmative action precommitments extend beyond equality of opportunity into

substantive equality, or preferences. Classical precommitments are the most familiar type of
precommitment. They are termed “classical” because they take the form of what most scholars,
politicians and members of the general public envision affirmative action policies to be. These
precommitments involve such policies as civil service quotas, admissions quotas in public institutions
higher education or minimum reserved seats in legislatures. Classical precommitments apply to both

Additionally, officials must look beyond grades and scores to so-called “soft variables,” such as recommenders’
enthusiasm, the quality of the undergraduate institution and the applicant’s essay, and the areas and difficulty of
undergraduate course selection. The policy does not define diversity solely in terms of racial and ethnic status
and does not restrict the types of diversity contributions eligible for “substantial weight,” but it does reaffirm
the Law School’s commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclusion of African-American,
Hispanic, and Native-American students.
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LERN minorities and women. Conversely, tacit provisions utilize less accepted language that
requires reference to historical and legal context to determine whether a preference was intended or
whether a group can qualify for preferential treatment, whether intended by constitution-makers or
not. Classical precommitments have interpretations that tend to be more stable over time and
exhibit greater robustness in the face of legal challenges. Conversely, tacit terms can be more
ambiguous, and thus more malleable in terms of judicial construction.
Classical affirmative action precommitments come in a variety of forms - there is no one
singular phrase or term required to indicate that a preference is intended. However, the provisions
have one commonality – the precommitment language makes a clear, unambiguous and unequivocal
commitment to amelioration the status of a particular group or any group it deems necessary by
undertaking extraordinary or exemplary steps. The language used to craft these precommitments
does not readily lend itself to multiple interpretations. The plan language of the provisions requires
the conclusion that a preference is constitutionally mandated or permitted and does not constitute
illegal discrimination. Although there is no one specific phrase or term required to indicate that a
preference is intended, certain phrases are almost certainly indicative of the intention to create a
preference for particular target groups. In the case of classical precommitments, not only is the text
clear as to whether an affirmative action precommitment is intended, the text is also generally clear as
to whether a precommittment is mandated or permitted by the state.
In this study, classical precommitments are those which adopt the specific language or
terminology readily identifiable as a clear indication of the intent to bestow a preference upon a target
group. Such terminology includes, but is not limited to: “affirmative measures,” “special measures,”
“measures,” “specific measures,” “special provision,” “positive measures,” “reservations,” or
“quotas.” These terms, or variants thereof, indicate adherence to the ideal of equality of outcomes
with regard to the group(s) identified as eligible by the constitution drafters.
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India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh all have constitutions with classical affirmative action
precommitments that use the term “reservation,” “reserved” or some other variant. This is not
surprising because their development as independent states derived from a singular historical
trajectory, and all share a long-standing commitment to affirmative action. The only difference
among the three cases is that Pakistan and Bangladesh have religious precommitments while India
does not. Indeed, Pakistan and Bangladesh have classical precommitments for religious minorities
(non-Muslims). In the case of Pakistan, these religious preferences include reservations for seats in
national parliament and provincial assembly elections.29 For Bangladesh, the precommitment to
religious minorities is far more narrow, referring only to public service hiring.30 Both states are
majority Muslim.31 In neither case are the specific religious minority groups listed. Indonesia and
Ethiopia, take different linguistic approaches.
In the case of Indonesia, its constitution has arguably the broadest classical precommitment
in the sample: “[e]very person shall have the right to receive facilitation and special treatment to have
the same opportunity and benefit in order to achieve equality and fairness.” (Indon. Const. Art.
28(H)(2)). Its breadth makes it facially applicable to any target group or domain. In addition, the
provision’s language intimates a duty on the part of the state to provide such special treatment,
making it mandatory. The language “facilitation and special treatment” here indicates a right to

The following provisions of the Pakistan Constitution are instructive: art. 51(1), 1(a)(“There shall be three
hundred and forty-two seats of the members in the National Assembly, including seats reserved for women
and non-Muslims”); art. 51(4)(c) (“the constituency for all seats reserved for non-Muslims shall be the whole
country”); art. 51(4)(e) (“members to the seats reserved for non-Muslims shall be elected in accordance with
law through proportional representation system...”); art. 106(1) (“Each Provincial Assembly shall consist of
general seats and seats reserved for women and non-Muslims as specified herein below”); art. 106(3)(b) (“each
Province shall be a single constituency for all seats reserved for women and non-Muslims allocated to the
respective Provinces under clause (1)”); and art. 106(c)(3)(“the members to fill seats reserved for women and
non-Muslims allocated to a Province under clause (1) shall be elected in accordance with law through
proportional representation system”).
30 Bangladesh Const. art. 29(3)(2) ("Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from giving effect to any law
which makes provision for reserving appointments relating to any religious or denominational institution to
persons of that religion or denomination….).
31 Under art. 2(a) of the Bangladesh Constitution "[t]he state religion of the Republic is Islam, but other
religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in the Republic." Under art. 2 of the Pakistan Constitution
"Islam shall be the state religion of Pakistan."
29
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positive action, for both the achievement of the “same opportunity” and “benefit” or outcome.
Affirmative action legislation enacted by the Indonesian legislature mandates a 30% quota for seats
(Art. 65(1), Law No. 12 (2003)), a 30% quota for new political party membership (Art. 2, Law No. 12
(2003) and a 30% quota for new party leadership at the national, town and provincial levels ((Art. 20,
Law No. 12 (2003). (Katjasungkana, 2008, p. 489).32
Ethiopia also has classical precommitments for both women and LERN minorities.
However, unlike Indonesia, it has separate provisions, distinct classical language and domain
specificity for each target group. Its precommitment for women under art. 35(3) is quite expansive,
“[t]he historical legacy of inequality and discrimination suffered by women in Ethiopia taken into
account, women, in order to remedy this legacy, are entitled to affirmative measures. The purpose of
such measures shall be to provide special attention to women so as to enable them to compete and
participate on the basis of equality with men in political, social and economic life as well as in public
and private institutions.” First, the provision uses classical language twice, “affirmative measures”
and “special attention,” leaving little doubt as to the framers’ intent. Second, the domain application
of affirmative action measures is broad. The language mentions specifically the political, social and
economic domains, and the framers took exceptional care to pre-empt any potential judicial
controversy as to the provision’s applicability to the private sphere.

However, as Stockmann (2008) points out that the Indonesian constitution contains no provision
pronouncing the equality of men and women, in apparent contravention of its commitments under CEDAW
and the state’s own 1998 Human Rights Action Plan (Stockmann, 2008, pp. 59-60). That said, the Indonesia
Constitution has several broad equality provisions that implicitly safeguard equality between the sexes. Under
Art. 27(1), “All citizens have equal status before the law and in government and shall abide by the law and the
government without any exception.” Additional protections can be found in the constitution’s chapter on
human rights, arts. 28A-28J, enacted in the second amendment to the constitution. Some representative
provisions include: art. 28(d)(1) (“Every person shall have the right of recognition, guarantees, protection and
certainty before a just law, and of equal treatment before the law”); art. 28(3(d) (“Every citizen shall have the
right to obtain equal opportunities in government”); art. 28(I)(2) (“Every person shall have the right to be free
from discriminative treatment based upon any grounds whatsoever and shall have the right to protection from
such discriminative treatment”).
32
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By contrast, Ethiopia’s provisions under the LERN category are a bit more restricted.
Under art. 89(4) "[g]overnment shall provide special assistance to Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples
least advantaged in economic and social development.” This provision seems broad and its
application undoubtedly mandatory; however, it is not as broad as the classical precommitment for
women for two reasons. First, it lacks the historical explication and the emphasis on redress
associated with the SEX precommitment. Second, art. 89, under which Ethiopia’s broad LERN
precommitment falls, is dedicated to “Economic Objectives.” Articles 90 and 91, which enumerate
Ethiopia’s “Social Objectives” and “Cultural Objectives,” respectively, make no mention of special
assistance. That said, further provisions reinforce art. 89(4) by adding a political dimension. Article
54 establishes “special representation for minority Nationalities and Peoples” in the Council of
Peoples’ Representatives in the form of quotas; “minority Nationalities and Peoples shall have at
least 20 seats.” Its companion, art. 61(2), establishes a one-seat quota for the Council of the
Federation, the other chamber of the Ethiopian Parliament.
A selection of classical preferences for women may help to illustrate the point further. As
previously indicated, art. 35(3) of the Ethiopian Constitution makes it clear that the framers intended
to bestow a preference upon women. In addition, other provisions that provide for “special
representation” for minorities in congress, with quotas, demonstrate that the framers of the
Ethiopian Constitution embraced the idea of equality of outcome for disadvantaged groups. To
conclude otherwise would betray the plain meaning, framers’ intent and the overall structure of the
document. Similarly, the current Ukrainian Constitution employs language memorializing
preferences for women, permitting “special measures for the protection of health and work of
women” (Ukr. Const. art. 24). However, Ukraine’s constitution is currently undergoing revision and
the “special measures” language for women may be removed. According to the Venice Commission,
such a removal “is in conformity with new approaches to gender equality abstaining from granting
women special privileges, especially if these are based on a traditional conception of the different
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roles of men and women.” (Venice Commission Opinion 534, 2009, ¶ 21). This new approach may
be at odds with Ukranian realities. Zhurzhenko (2001) argues that Ukraine’s transition from
socialism to a free market economy was deleterious to women because it corresponds with the
patriarchal gender ideology construction of women and perpetuates the notion of a natural division
of labor between the sexes. In the Ukraine, the “transition to democracy” project resulted in the
demise of the “working mother” gender contract, under which the state protected the health and
work of women. Economic reforms led to a decrease in funding for these programs. What’s more,
using data compiled by the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) Ganguli & Terrell
(2005) found that the disparity in wages between men and women from communism to posttransition has persisted. Currently, women do earn less than men in both the formal and informal
sectors. Pignatti (2010) attributes the formal market discrepancy to wage discrimination, and the
informal discrepancy to more personal variables.
Finally, the Argentine Constitution also memorializes a precommitment to affirmative action
for women. The 1994 reforms state clearly that “[a]ctual equality of opportunities for men and
women to elective and political party positions shall be guaranteed by means of positive actions in
the regulation of political parties and in the electoral system” (Arg. Const. § 37).33 This
precommitment is buttressed by article 75(23); the state is tasked with legislating “positive measures
guaranteeing true equal opportunities and treatment, the full benefit and exercise of the rights
recognized by this Constitution and by the international treaties on human rights in force, particularly
referring to … women ….” International treaties, including CEDAW, are incorporated into the
constitution under art. 75(22), (23). Under these provisions, Argentine Law No. 24012 has been

Section 2 of the Temporary Provisions ensures that the measures implemented under art. 37do not result in
any diminution of rights; “[p]ositive actions referred to in the last paragraph of § 37 shall not comprise less
guarantees than those in force at the time this Constitution was approved, and their duration shall be
determined by law.”
33
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promulgated to establish a minimum 30% quota for women candidates on election lists submitted by
parties.34
In sum, Ethiopia, Ukraine, Argentina and the other cases illustrate how constitutions use can
employ a variety of classical affirmative action terms to confer preferences upon groups.35
Constitution-drafters’ use of certain widely-accepted terms almost always indicate the intent to
memorialize an affirmative action precommitment. That these precommitments are aimed at
achieving substantive equality is patent and can be ascertained by adjudicators because they are
recognized legal terms of art found in international covenants and constitutions around the world.
IV.

Tacit Precommitments
It has been argued here that classical precommitments evidence an intent to confer a

preference or can be used by aspirant target group to assert its legal right to a preference because
they employ widely accepted language that post-WWII constitution-makers and jurists largely agree
upon. Thus, a simple plain meaning approach to textual interpretation is sufficient. Like classical

The relevant provision reads “The lists submitted shall contain at least thirty percent women candidates for
the elected offices and in proportions such that there is a possibility of being elected. A list that does not meet
these requirements will not be made official.” Women’s advocacy organizations played a critical role in the
passage of the Quota Law, which preceded the 1994 reforms. However, according to Lubertino (2003) the
reforms buttressed the efficacy and enforceability of the Quota Law as it “serve[d] as a protective umbrella and
have defeated the usual traditional male argument regarding the ‘unconstitutionality of positive action’ as a
violation of the right to equality before the law” (Lubertino, 2003, p. 5). Indeed, it was the quotas, which had
existed in Argentina since 1991, that provided that 100 of the 300 members of the constitution assembly be
women, which, in turn, permitted the positive action language contained in Arts. 37 and 75 and the transitory
provisions. Furthermore, subsequent to the 1994 reforms, the city of Buenos Aires passed a constitution with
positive action provisions broader than those found in the national constitution.
35 The ROK and Germany use the term “promote” to indicate an affirmative action precommitment. In the
ROK Constitution, “the State shall endeavor to promote the welfare and rights of women” (ROK Const. art.
34(3)). Article 34(3) works in conjunction with the express precommitment in 32(4); “[s]pecial protection shall
be afforded to working women, and they shall not be subjected to unjust discrimination in terms of
employment, wages and working conditions.” The gender preference has been made practical in the 2004
reforms to the Political Part Law installed 50% gender quotas for party lists in the Kuk Hoe (National
Assembly). The same can be said of the German Constitution’s Art. 3(2); “Men and women shall have equal
rights. The state shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps to
eliminate disadvantages that now exist.” Among EU member states, Germany has taken the lead on positive
action for women.
34
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precommitments, tacit precommitments also evidence intent to confer a state-mandated or statepermitted preference upon a particular group or groups. However, these provisions contain no
commonly recognized language. Instead, they employ phraselogy that is either unambiguous as to
intent despite not being classical, or language which, upon scrutiny of historical context, case-specific
legal precedent and other constitutional provisions, reveals itself to be preferential. In the absence of
legal precedent or the actual implementation of affirmative action legislation without legal challenge,
identifying tacit affirmative action precommitments may require some degree of subjectivity. The
core task is to distinguish between a facial intent to carve out a legally enforceable preference from an
effort to merely implement equality or anti-discrimination policies without preferring a group.
A review of the 30 cases in the sample reveals several tacit terms. Four are the most
common: “promote,” “protect,” “real and effective” and “safeguard.” For example, art. 13 of the
Colombian Constitution begins with an equality provision but then proceeds further: “[t]he state will
promote the conditions necessary in order that equality may be real and effective will adopt measures in
favor of groups which are discriminated against or marginalized” (emphasis added). The tacit terms
“protect” and “real and effective” are used in conjunction with the classical term “measures” to
indicate a state obligation to prefer certain minority groups. The extent and type of preferences
authorized by the Columbian Constitution is discussed in some detail in the next chapter. Similarly,
art. 13(1) of the Philippine Constitution states,
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
and disposition of property and its increments.
This example combines tacit terminology, classical terminology (“priority”) and a social
precommitment which authorizes wealth redistribution. Art. 13(14) also uses tacit term “protect,” as
well as “realize their full potential” in the context of a women-specific precommitment. In both the
Columbian and Filipino cases, the terminology used, and the preferences implemented, indicate a
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desire for the state to implement programs and policies that do more than simply prohibit
discrimination. Rather, the intent is to facilitate equality of outcomes through group preferences.
Constitutional provisions from Colombia and Ukraine illustrate how the particular term
“promote” can be interpreted as an affirmative action precommitment. Article 11 of the Ukrainian
Constitution uses tacit language but is not classified as a tacit precommitment. It states that “[t]he
State promotes the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, of its historical
consciousness, traditions and culture, and also the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and
religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.” Although the term
“promote” is used, it is used to refer not only in reference to the indigenous peoples and national
minorities mentioned in the latter part of the provision, but also to the nation as a whole. Moreover,
the constitution does use the classical term, “special measures” when referring to the protection of
health and work of women in art. 24. This use of “special measures” for women but the term
“promote” for LERN groups would seem to indicate that art. 11 is not intended to be applied in the
same preferential manner as art. 24.
The Colombian Constitution provides another example. In Colombia,
[t]he state has the obligation to promote and foster the equal access of all Colombians to
their culture by means of permanent education and scientific, technical, artistic, and
professional instruction at all stages in the process of creating the national identity. Culture
in its diverse manifestations is the basis of nationality. The state recognizes the equality and
dignity of all those who live together in the country. The state will promote research, science,
development, and the diffusion of the nation's cultural values (Col. Const. art. 70).
Here, “promote” is used twice. In the first instance, the state “promotes” access for all Colombians
for the purpose of fostering a national identity. The use of the term “all” means that no preference is
accorded to any specific group or groups. Later in the provision, and just as we saw in art. 11 of the
Ukrainian Constitution, there is an attempt to balance the social homogenization that accompanies
any process of nationalization with an overture recognizing the value of cultural or ethnic
particularism. The second instance again uses “promote” to refer to the development of the nation
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as a whole. If we compare these two provisions with Columbia’s art. 13 we can see a clear distinction
between “promote” used in a merely anti-discriminatory way and “promote” used as a tacit
affirmative action precommitment. Article 13 reads, in its entirety,
[a]ll individuals are born free and equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection
and treatment by the authorities, and to enjoy the same rights, freedoms, and opportunities
without discrimination on the basis of gender, race, national or family origin, language,
religion, political opinion, or philosophy. The state will promote the conditions necessary in
order that equality may be real and effective will adopt measures in favor of groups which
are discriminated against or marginalized. The state will especially protect those individuals
who on account of their economic, physical, or mental condition are in obviously vulnerable
circumstances and will sanction any abuse or ill-treatment perpetrated against them.
The first sentence is undoubtedly an equality precommitment. It is reasonably expansive in scope; it
mentions several variations of “equality” (“equal before the law,” equal protection” and “without
discrimination) while also identifying specific social categories. The second sentence, however, is
undoubtedly an affirmative action precommitment. As in art. 70, the term “promote” is used. But
the subject or beneficiary of the “promotion” is not the “nation” writ large, or all groups. Instead,
“promote” is accompanied by “measures” and “real and effective.” Furthermore, the use of
“promote” is associated with a particular group or groups to be named later, identified in the
constitution as “groups which are discriminated against or marginalized.” Thus, unlike the case of
LERN groups in Ukraine, LERN groups in Colombia, as well as women the poor and persons with
disabilities can receive preferential treatment through what is arguably mandatory (art. 13 uses the
term “will” rather than “may” or “can”) particular affirmative action precommitment. Furthermore,
we know that Colombia permits LERN preferences because art. 176 of its constitution provides for
POL-specific preferences in the form of electoral quotas.
The Spanish case is also instructive with regard to the interpretation of tacit terms. Article
9(2) of the Spanish Constitution states that public authorities must “promote conditions ensuring that
freedom and equality of individuals and of the groups to which they belong are real and effective, to
remove the obstacles preventing or hindering their full enjoyment, and to facilitate the participation of
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all citizens in political, economic, cultural and social life” (emphasis added). No classical terms are
used, but the phrase “real and effective” seems to be an allusion to substantive equality or equality of
outcomes. However, under the equality provision found in art. 14, “Spaniards are equal before the
law and may not in any way be discriminated against on account of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion
or any other personal or social condition or circumstance.” Additionally, and reminiscent of the
duality found in the Ukraine case, the Spanish Constitution does use classical language when referring
to persons with disabilities; “[t]he public authorities shall carry out a policy of preventive care,
treatment, rehabilitation and integration of the physically, sensorially and mentally handicapped by
giving them the specialized care they require, and affording them special protection for the enjoyment of
the rights granted by this Part to all citizens” (Spain. Const. § 49) (emphasis added). There is also a
classical provision at § 3(3). All three provisions were included in the original 1978 constitution, not
added later through amendment.
When viewed in its entirety, § 9(2) is a tacit precommitment (later classified as non-groupspecific, non-domain-specific). A 1992 CEDAW report outlines the affirmative action policies that
have been implemented under art. 9(2). They include: Act No. 10/1994 which funds measures to
promote recruitment and hiring in under-represented professions, employment and unemployment
protection; Royal Decree 631/1993 authorizing the National Vocational Training and Employment
Plan, to enact measures preferring unemployed persons with particular difficulties in entering or reentering the labor market, especially women; the Second Plan of Action for Equal Opportunities for
Women (1993-1995) announcing scholarships and internships for women, and encouraging
affirmative action in business through various initiatives; and an Order of 25 May 1995 regulating
State funding for activities promoting and developing affirmative action in universities as a way of
encouraging the principle of equal opportunity for women (Spain CEDAW Report, 1996, art. I.1).
There are also 40 percent party list electoral quotas for women in the Congress of Deputies and the
Senate. A 2009 UN Economic and Social Council Report summarizes that affirmative action for
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women is “mainstreamed into all the development policies of the Spanish Government, in addition
to being a sectoral priority, in view of the need to respond to inequalities through the development
of temporary affirmative action measures until gender equality is achieved” (Spain ESC Report, 2009,
p. 8).36 The Spanish case shows that real and effective and promote, even in the absence of a
classical term, can be sufficient to constitute an affirmative action precommitment.
Terms such as “safeguard” and “protect” can also be tacit terms. Article 36 of the Pakistani
Constitution maintains that “[t]he State shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of
minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and Provincial services.” Again, we have
no classical language and, thus, no clear textual indication as to whether “safeguard” intends to
confer a group preference. The phrase “due representation” could be read to imply representation
commensurate with relative population, some sort of proportional representation scheme. Such a
scheme could be classified as affirmative action because minorities would be preferred in national
and sub-national civil service hiring. However, art. 37(a) complicates the matter: “[t]he State shall
promote, with special care, the educational and economic interests of the backward classes or
areas….”37 Here, we have the pairing of a classical and a tacit term, preceded by mandatory
language, used to indicate a preference for backward classes or areas. Both arts. 36 and 37(a) first
appeared in the 1973 Constitution, and as far back as its 1962 constitution Pakistan has shown its
ability to distinguish textually between equality of opportunity and substantive equality.38 Further
discussion of the three subcontinent cases – India, Pakistan and Bangladesh – will highlight how
shifting definitions of what it means to be a member of a “minority” group or “backward class”
Article 13 also uses the implied precommitment phrase “real and effective,” but is uses the express term
“measures” as well.
37 Waseem (1997) identifies four aspects of affirmative action in Pakistan. First, there is ethnic preference.
Second, positive action laws in Pakistan are usually based on geographic region. Third, the policies are defined
along sectoral lines. Finally, the implementation of policies is in part determined by the mobilization of a
particular ethnic group.
38 Chapter I, Art. 6(2)(2)(1), (2(a) of the 1962 constitution read, “[all citizens should be equal before the law, be
entitled to equal protection of the law and be treated alike in all respects. This principle may be departed from
where in the interest of equality itself it is necessary to compensate for existing inequalities, whether natural,
social, economic or of any other kind….”
36
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impacts judicial interpretation of who qualifies for state preferences and under what circumstances.
All in all, it seems as if we have a situation similar to that found in Spain – classical language used for
one provision, but tacit language used for another.
Even still, we know that “safeguard” as written into art. 36 does permit minority preferences
because Pakistan has in fact implemented minority quotas for civil service appointments. In
Pakistan, the state is the largest employer. In the years after independence, economic inequality
among the regions began to grow as a result of uneven developmental activity in the educational,
industrial and agricultural sectors, and increased inter-provincial flow of resources. Quotas were
introduced to address this inequality. The first was introduced in 1948. Under the system East
Bengal was to receive 40% of the civil service positions, 23% for Punjab, 2% for Karachi, 15& for all
other provinces and 20% to be based on merit. This system failed to achieve its purpose of uplifting
those from minority groups because migrants were benefiting from the preferences more than the
locals. The quotas were extended under the 1956 and 1962 constitutions, for 15 and 10 years
respectively. Then Pres. Yayha extended the quotas to the urban and rural sectors of Sindh province;
under-represented rural Sindhis were given 60% representation in the federal and provincial services
and over-represented, Urdu-speaking migrant urban Sindhis were given 40%. Under the 1973
Constitution the quotas were again extended and changed to embrace a greater number of Sindh
settlers, reduce met-based seats from 20% to 10% and reschedule the share of constituent parts of
post-Bangladesh Pakistan (Waseem, 1997).
“Protect” is another term that requires contextual interpretation. For example, art. 48 of the
Chinese Constitution states that “women in the People’s Republic of China enjoy equal rights with
men in all spheres of life, political, economic, cultural and social, and family life. The state protects the
rights and interests of women, applies the principle of equal pay for equal work for men and women
alike and trains and selects cadres from among women” (emphasis added). Further, under Art. 49(1)
“[m]arriage, the family, and mother and child are protected by the state” (emphasis added). If we
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interpret “protect” as synonymous with “safeguard” then it might be reasonable to conclude that
these two provisions at least permit preferences for women. The plain language suggests that
mothers receive state protection and fathers do not, but the existence of an affirmative action
precommitment for women is questionable for at least three reasons. First, when read by itself, the
language does not readily permit distinction between a preference and an equality/antidiscrimination. Second, when read together with the other sub-articles of art. 49, it seems that the
overarching intent is not to protect women, but to protect the family unit. Finally, the article that
immediately precedes art. 49 entitled “Gender Equality” does maintain that “the state protects the
rights and interests of women,” but it does so by employing overt equality language. Thus, when
arts. 48 and 49 are considered in pari materia the Chinese Constitution seems to have no womenspecific precommitment.39
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Chinese women have made significant strides toward equality since the ascendance of the Communist Party,
but none of the laws enacted have been preferential. In 1950, marriage and family laws were changed to give
men and women equal status in the home, equality in choice of occupation, and equality in possession of family
property and inheritance rights (Hong, 1976, 546). However, more recently, Bulger (2000) argues that even
despite constitutional protections, employment discrimination against women in China persists. Bulger
recounts the story of Sun Lili who became pregnant without receiving permission from her employer’s family
planning office. She had become pregnant and aborted twice before because she and her husband did not
believe they would get employer approval. This time the couple decided to go through with the pregnancy, a
decision which Sun’s work unit found inconvenient. The work unit demanded that Sun terminate her
pregnancy. Sun refused and was eventually dismissed. All of Sun’s legal challenges to the decision failed.
In Bulger’s view, Sun’s story epitomizes the failures of the non-discrimination promises made to
women in the Chinese Constitution, the Labor Law, the Law for the Protection of Women’s Rights and
Interests. Many employers continue to prefer men to women to avoid maternity leave, Chinese women are
under-represented in higher paying jobs, and women are often the last hired and first fired. In the EDU
domain, the Chinese government has provided no incentives to ensure that boys and girls receive equal
educational opportunities. Women’s advocacy organizations like the Coalition on Women’s Employment
Rights (CWER) and the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) have protested against policies that steer
women toward jobs as temporary domestic helpers, “periodic employment” proposals that would require
women to sop working for several years after marriage or the birth of a child and earlier retirement ages for
women than for men (Bulger, 2000).
As an aside, art. 16(1)(d) of Nigeria’s Constitution also contains an provision that uses “protect” and
is not an affirmative action precommitment. “The State shall...without prejudice to the right of any person to
participate in areas of the economy within the major sector of the economy, protect the right of every citizen to
engage in any economic activities outside the major sectors of the economy.” Nigeria does have a vicarious
territorial precommitment, but this article accords no preference to any groups. Rather, it protects “every
citizen.”
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However, we know that art. 48 does in fact require affirmative action for women. As Guo
& Yongnian (2008) point out, affirmative action for women began in 1949 with the establishment of
the People’s Republic of China. Preferential measures resulted in an increase in the proportion of
women in the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultants
Conference. These achievements grew into the 1980s but then declined in the 1980s. There was a
resurgence in the 1990s following the Fourth World Congress on Women in Beijing. Quotas for
hiring were implemented and were effective. According to Guo & Zheng, there were 10 million
female governmental officials across the country in 1991, approximately 31.2% of the total. The
total rose to 12.4 million in 1994, or 32.5%; 13.8 million in 1997, or 34.4%; 14.9 million in 2000, or
36.2%; and 15.026 million in 2005, accounting for 38.9%. Women also made gains in senior official
positions. In 1994, there was one woman vice premier in the State Council, 16 female ministers and
deputy ministers, more than 300 female mayors and deputy majors; and 21,012 women judges. The
share of women among NPC representatives also expanded. There were 626 women representatives
at the Eighth NPC in 1993, accounting for 21% of the total, and 19 female Standing Committee
members, making up 12.3%, 2 percentage points higher than the previous committee. The numbers
increased in 1998 (Guo & Yongnian 2008, pp. 5-7).
If we examine the use of “protect” in an apparent Chinese LERN-specific affirmative action
provision and compare the findings with those for women, we arrive at a similar result. Article 4 of
the Chinese Constitution reads, in pertinent part,
[t]he state protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and
develops the relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China's
nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are prohibited; any
acts that undermine the unity of the nationalities or instigate their secession are prohibited.
The state helps the areas inhabited by minority nationalities speed up their economic and
cultural development in accordance with the peculiarities and needs of the different minority
nationalities (emphasis added).
Here, “protect” seems indicative of a tacit affirmative action precommitment because it is
accompanied by a territorial precommitment, a subject which will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Here, the territorial precommitment permits the state to prefer minority LERN groups through the
use of territorial boundaries as a proxy. Additionally, there is provision for state “help” for areas
inhabited by those minorities, and an expediting of development predicated upon the particular
needs to those minority groups.
China’s art. 4 tacit LERN-specific precommitment has not only territorial elements, but also
social aspects. Article 122, which reads, in pertinent part,
[t]he state gives financial, material and technical assistance to the minority nationalities to
accelerate their economic and cultural development. The state helps the national
autonomous areas train large numbers of cadres at different levels and specialized personnel
and skilled workers of different professions and trades from among the nationality or
nationalities in those areas.
Of the 56 state-designated ethnic groups the Han ethnic group comprises about 92% of the Chinese
population. Redistributive justice has been the principle goal of China’s preferential policies in an
effort to achieve equality-in-fact, an outcome simple equality of opportunity cannot produce
(Sautman, 1998, pp. 87-88). Preferential policies in China affect marriage (minorities are permitted to
marry at a younger age), family planning (under the 1992 family planning law urban Han are
permitted to have one child while minority groups are permitted to have two) and education (special
funds for minority education, a points-based preference system for admission to universities within
and outside of minority areas) and in official positions. In the private sector, the 1993 Regulations
on Work with the Urban National Ministries urges municipalities to encourage enterprises to recruit
minorities, sometimes achieved through hiring quotas. With regard to representation in legislative
organs, there are minority quotas for the National People’s Congress (NPC) as well for urban
resident committees and local people’s congresses outside of the autonomies. While these broad
preferences for Chinese minority nationalities have engendered some resentment among the Han,
ethnic tensions over the policies have been relatively muted (Sautman, 1998).
The tacit precommitment terms discussed here show how determining whether an
affirmative action precommitments were intended can be a rather involved task. To reiterate, textual,
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historical and legislative context are crucial in identifying tacit precommitments. As with classical and
equality provisions, interpretation of tacit provisions can change over time. Thus, a group preference
that at one time is adjudged to be a violation of the equal protection principle can later be deemed
constitutional as norms of what constitutes justice and fairness change, or as internal and external
pressures dictate change. Indeed, the meaning of particular terms or phrases is not fixed, but subject
to the political and cultural shifts among peoples and states. This means that categorization of
specific particular terms as affirmative action precommitments must be a fluid, ongoing enterprise
rather than a rigid and definite one. Certainly, interpretations of classical language are likely to be
more stable over time as compared to tacit terms. However, just because a constitution mandates or
permits “special measures” for women or LERN minorities does not mean that any preferential
measure is constitutional. In the case of classical precommitments, the type of measure, along with
the mode and method of effectuation, are subject to judicial interpretation which can change over
time. In the case of tacit provisions, not only might the type of preferential policy be controversial,
but whether preferences are authorized at all may be contested.
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CHAPTER 6
UNCONVENTIONAL PRECOMMITMENTS TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
I.

Territorial Precommitments
While classical and tacit precommitments may be the easiest to identify and parse, not all

affirmative action precommitments employ readily identifiable language. Territorial affirmative
action precommitments, which apply only to the LERN category, are less obvious. These provisions
occur in constitutions enacted amidst a variety of socio-political contexts and cleavages, legal
traditions, and economic systems. Like tacit precommitments, territorial precommitment
identification requires an examination that proceeds beyond a plain language method of
interpretation and toward an analysis of impact. As mentioned earlier, for a territorial provision to
qualify as an affirmative action precommitment, three criteria must be met: (1) the territorial
arrangement must be provided for in the constitution, (2) territorial boundaries must be largely
coextensive with LERN boundaries and (3) the territories inhabited by minority LERN group(s), or
the members of the groups thereof, must receive some government mandated or permitted
preference that the territories inhabited by other group(s), or the members thereof, do not receive.
Territorial affirmative action precommitments come in a variety of forms in which a constitution
uses territorial divisions to convey various degrees of political, economic and cultural autonomy on
LERN minority groups. This study identifies three types of territorial affirmative action provisions:
autonomy, ethno-development schemes and conservation. There is some overlap among the three
types.
Regardless of type, all require some form of ethno-federal arrangements in which the
territorial boundaries of political subunits are more or less coextensive with ethnic boundaries.
Under territorial autonomy precommitments, minority-inhabited areas are granted by the central
government an autonomous or semi-autonomous status, thus conferring substantial control over
their own political and economic institutions. Degrees of autonomy may vary among different
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subunits of the same country. In the case of ethno-development precommitments, there is no
outright grant of autonomy, but in an effort to address asymmetrical economic circumstances among
majority and minority LERN groups, the state may implement policies targeting impoverished
majority-minority sub-national units. Oftentimes ethno-development schemes involve economic
incentives, subsidies or outright quotas to spur agricultural or industrial development, as well as
enhanced financing to increase access to health care, education, housing and public employment.
The principal difference between the autonomy and the ethno-development precommitments is that
in the former case the central government takes on a passive role, allowing the LERN-minority subnational unit to exercise authority in certain domains, while in the latter case the central government
takes on an active role by redistributing economic resources to the under-developed LERN-minority
subunit. In addition, conservation precommitments are usually embodied in provisions that allude to
autonomy or economic redistribution, but use language that focuses more on conservation of
indigenous culture, customs and resources.
A.

Autonomy Precommitments
The precise constitutional language used to express territorial precommitments varies. In

the case of autonomy precommitments, some provisions explicitly provide for autonomy. Other
precommitments are more difficult to identify. Perhaps the most difficult cases to code are those in
which, in practice, a multi-LERN state exhibits some scheme of authoritative devolution to a LERN
minority political subunit, but constitutional language is threadbare or ambiguous as to whether
certain of those sub-national units may or must receive preferential treatment. The cases of the US
and Spain are instructive. As it pertains to territorial divisions, the US Constitution makes it clear
that a federal system is contemplated and “States” shall be the principal political subunit. Although
never defined, there is no indication that any one State can or must receive any preferential
treatment. Moreover, there is ample evidence that the relationship between the central government
and the states, as well as between the states themselves, is to be governed by the principle of equality.
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Article IV(1) guarantees that each State give full faith and credit to the public acts records and judicial
proceedings of other States. Under art. IV(2), “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” Only in art. IV(3) does the constitution
mention a political subunit other than a state; “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of
the United States, or of any particular State.” However, the phrase “Territory or other Property”
receives no elaboration.
Even if the Territoriality Clause seems textually ambiguous as to the creation of an ethnofederal arrangement that grants certain subunits varying degrees of autonomy in political decisionmaking, we know that such an arrangement does indeed exist. For example, aside from states, the
US is comprised of several islands that are not “States,” such as American Samoa, the Virgin Islands,
Puerto Rico and Native American tribal lands. For the purposes of this study, the inquiry is not so
much upon what constitutional authority does the US rely to justify acquiring and holding territory,
exercising sovereignty and dominion over them and incorporating them as non-“State” political
subunits. This authority is well recognized (Leibowitz, 1979). Rather, the pertinent question is upon
what constitutional authority does the US rely to justify treating the residents of such territories in a
distinct, arguably preferential (or perhaps discriminatory), manner relative to the residents of
“States”?
In the case of Puerto Rico, the so-called Insular Cases provide guidance. Specifically, the
Court in De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), made it clear that territory acquired by the US is within
its “constitutional boundaries.” As an acquisition stemming from the Spanish-American War, the
commander-in-chief has the authority to make decisions regarding the territory. After the end of
military operations and the re-establishment of civil rule, the Congress has the power to legislate over
the acquired territory within the limitations and prohibitions set by the Constitution. The Court
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found that the Treaty of Paris that ceded Puerto Rico to the US was valid and that US authority over
the island is plenary. The Court notes that the usual course of action would be admission to
statehood; however, in this instance it was left to Congress. Legally, Puerto Rico became “a
commonwealth” through its 1952 constitution. However, whether this designation has curtailed in
any way the plenary congressional authority granted under the Territory Clause is a matter of dispute
Indeed, Puerto Rico and other American non-state subnational political units possess a
status distinct from that of the states. According to Laughlin (1979), when Congress legislates for the
territories it need not concern itself with conformity to the interstate commerce clause, enumerated
powers or war powers provisions because the territorial clause “effectively deprives territories of the
analogous sovereignty reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment” (Laughlin, 1979, p. 340).
However, the denial of analogous status does not necessarily mean the territories have lesser status.
In some situation, the territories’ non-state status accords them more decision-making authority than
states. For example, American Samoa, ceded to the US by articles signed in 1900 and 1904, has legal
institutions that combine western law with traditional Samoan law. Its basic constitutional structure
mirrors that of most American states, with executive, legislative and judicial branches. But under art
1, § 3 of the Samoan Constitution,
[i]t shall be the policy of the Government of American Samoa to protect persons of Samoan
ancestry against alienation of their lands and the destruction of the Samoan way of life and
language, contrary to their best interests. Such legislation as may be necessary may be
enacted to protect the lands, customs, culture and traditional Samoan family organization of
persons of Samoan ancestry, and to encourage business enterprises by such persons.
In accordance with this policy, American Samoa has enacted land alienation restrictions that prohibit
the alienation of land to any person of less than fifty percent native Samoan ancestry. On its face,
such a provision would seem to be a clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it
discriminates based on race. However, in Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, AP No. 10-79 (1980), the
High Court of American Samoa held that although it involved a suspect classification (race) the
statute met the Fourteenth Amendment “strict scrutiny” because there was a compelling state
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interest in preserving the lands of Samoa and the Samoan culture. The Samoan example shows that
the American Constitution, arguably the most minimal and liberal in the sample, permits not only
affirmative action for LERN minorities in the classical sense, but also through territorial
arrangements that allow for autonomy in rule-making and economic distribution.
Conversely, Guam has been advocating for years for greater self-determination and authority
over its political affairs. Under Organic Act legislation, Guam is designated an “unincorporated
territory” and although its residents are US citizens, Guam is not a legal part of the US. Rather, it is
“appurtenant to the United States and belongs to the United States” (Ruffatto, 1993, p. 385). In
1980, the Guam legislature established the Guam Commission on Self-Determination (CSD) and a
1992 referendum showed that three-quarters of residents favored commonwealth status and one
quarter favoring statehood. Negotiations between the CSD and the US have made little progress
with the US refusing to compromise on key reforms: (1) Chamorrow (Guam’s indigenous group)
rights to self-determination; (2) a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone; (3) mutual consent for the
applicability of federal laws over the island; (4) US power of eminent domain in Guam; and (5)
Guam’s participation in international organizations (Ruffatto, 1993, p. 388). Meanwhile, Micronesia,
acquired by the US in 1945, was able to negotiate self-determination through a Compact of Free
Association. US policy over Micronesia was initially dominated by concerns over military security.
However, the overwhelming predominance of the military concern led the US to neglect economic
development on the island. This neglect did not go unnoticed in the international community. In
response, investments were made into the island and the US Secretary of the Interior established the
Congress of Micronesia. Subsequently, negotiations over Micronesian sovereignty began to
accelerate. After the Third Round of negotiations in 1971, Micronesia adopted its own constitution.
In 1978, the constitution was ratified by the four islands that would later become the Federated
States of Micronesia: Yap, Pohnpei, Truk and Kosrae. Palau and the Marshall Islands rejected the
constitution and were later granted their own sovereignty (Ruffatto, 1993).
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The cases of Puerto Rico, American Samoa and Guam show that the US Constitution’s
Territoriality Clause operates as a territoriality/autonomy precommitment insofar as it permits the
state to engage in treatment of the LERN minority groups that reside there in a manner that is
preferential to those who reside in “states.” The examples also illustrate a hierarchy of sorts among
the non-State entities (e.g., unincorporated vs. incorporated and unorganized v. organized). In the
American case, the permissive nature of the precommitment and the broad congressional authority
over the various types of units means that not only are preferential policies permitted, but also
policies that discriminate negatively against the groups in question. For example, residents of
American Samoa may have some rule-making authority over the transfer of ancestral lands; however,
unlike the residents of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the Northern Mariana Islands, residents of
American Samoa are legally considered “nationals,” not citizens. (Faleomavaega, 1994, p. 115). While
legal citizens, residents of American Samoa cannot vote in Presidential elections and have no
representation in either chamber of the legislature. Further, Puerto Rican individuals and
corporations are exempt from federal taxation laws, but they receive a disproportionately low share
of federal funding for social programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and
Medicaid. This disparate treatment was upheld in Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980). Leibowitz
(1978) aptly summarizes the dilemma.
The territorial government and its citizens have been subjected to broad federal action
without political representation, equal treatment, and full economic participation. Even the
territorial constitutions approved by Congress, which extended basic civil rights to territorial
citizens do not establish an area beyond the reach of federal authority and are subject to
congressional override. No criteria restrict the potential exercise of congressional authority
to intrude upon local territorial matters. Neither judicial precedent nor legislative and
executive action has established that the territories must be treated equally with the states or
even with each other. Indeed, the operative principle appears to be that each territory will be
treated individually, but the guidelines upon which this individual treatment rests have never
been formulated (Leibowitz, 1978, p. 452).
His statement has application beyond the American context. Indeed, even in the case of group
preferences in the form territorial autonomy, political sovereignty and cultural self-determination,
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without outright independence LERN subunits operate in a socio-political limbo that is always
changeable. In the cases just discussed, the devolution of power from the center is unilaterally
revocable by the center, unlike the grant of authority in a federation. However, the mode and
manner of revoking or amending the grant of authority has little impact on the categorization of both
types of arrangements as territorial. Ultimately, any evaluation of whether actual preferential
treatment exists for any LERN subunit is necessarily a case-specific, domain-specific and even an
issue-specific endeavor.
The Spanish case also uses imprecise language when it comes to naming specific territories
to be preferred. However, it differs greatly in the amount of attention paid to how its system is to be
organized, how self-determination through a process of autonomy can be achieved and the powers
granted to self-governing units. Article 2 attempts to strike a balance between the national and multinational imperatives; “[t]he Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to selfgovernment of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them
all.” In its Part on “Territorial Organization of the State” the document maintains “The State is
organized territorially into municipalities, provinces and the Selfgoverning Communities that may be
constituted. All these bodies shall enjoy selfgovernment for the management of their respective
interests” (Spain Const. art. 137). Furthermore, art. I38 provides for “a fair and adequate economic
balance between the different areas of the Spanish territory” to effectuate the principle of national
solidarity articulated in art. 2. In striking the economic balance, “special consideration,” is given to
island territories. Territories have the right to form Self-governing Communities. These include
“provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, insular territories and
provinces with a historic regional status may accede to self-government and form Self-governing
Communities (Comunidades Autónomas) in conformity with the provisions contained in this Part
and in the respective Statutes” (Spain Const. art. 143(1)). Territories that do not meet the above
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criteria may also seek self-governing status through a Statute of Autonomy, but through a process
mediated by the Cortes Generales rather than through the referendum.
Section 148 enumerates the extensive powers granted to Self-governing Communities. They
include organization of its institutions of government, transportation systems within the territory,
economic development within the territory and protection of culture, language and customs.
Sections 156 and 157 elaborate on the “financial autonomy” of the territories. – taxes and other
revenue-raising policies must be implemented in coordination with the state treasury and must
conform to the principle of Spaniard solidarity. Section 149 enumerates the competencies of the
state, which are much broader. Key areas include regulation of basic conditions guaranteeing
equality, international relations and defense, and monetary and judicial systems. Under § 150(2)
some of the state powers may be delegated to the Self-governing Territories. For example, seven of
the 17 autonomous regions have taken over the provision of healthcare from the state. However,
complete power has not been transferred from the Institute Nacionale de la Salude, and the
provision of services varies greatly among the regions (Reverte-Cejudo & Sanchez-Bayle, 1999). The
Spanish Constitution outlines the procedure for drafting the Statutes of Autonomy (Spain Const. §§
151, 152) and how the relationship between the state and the territories is to be managed (§§ 154,
155). Finally, §§ 158(1) and (2) makes a clear reference to LERN territorial preference; “[a]n
allocation may be made in the State Budget to the Self-governing Communities in proportion to the
amount of State services and activities for which they have assumed responsibility and to guarantee a
minimum level of basic public services throughout Spanish territory.“ More to the point, “[w]ith the
aim of redressing inter-territorial economic imbalances and implementing the principle of solidarity, a
compensation fund shall be set up for investment expenditure, the resources of which shall be
distributed by the Cortes Generales among the Selfgoverning Communities and provinces, as the
case may be.”
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For Spain, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a time of authoritarianism and
centralism. Later, various decentralization projects attempted, such as Catalonia’s Mancommunidad
autonomy movement during the Second Republic (1931-36) and the grant of the Basque autonomy
statute in 1936, but true progress came only after democratic transition in 1978. As described above,
the autonomy provisions of 1978 constitution offer the possibility of autonomy but the territories’
constitutions remain secondary to the Constitution. Disputes over the division of powers between
the central and autonomous governments are adjudicated by the Constitutional Court (Aja, 2001).
Discrepancies between powers sought and powers sought have historically generated centrifugal
tendencies, often culminating in armed conflict, in communities such as the Basque region and
Catalonia. Franco’s obsession with anti-communism and anti-separatism in the pursuit of national
unity denied these culturally unique communities’ pursuit of self-determination and rejection of
assimilationism. Ethnic differences, however, remained palpable. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
took up arms in its battle for Basque autonomy while other groups sought greater autonomy through
more peaceful means.
Guibernau (1995) argues that § 2 was the most controversial provision of the 1978
constitution because it “exemplifies the tension between the unity of Spain and the social pressure to
recognise historic nations such as Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country….” (Guibernau, 1995,
p. 245).40 These three territories were granted immediate autonomy under the constitution as
“historic nationalities” while others had to wait for five years. In the end, however, all territories that
are granted self-governing status, regardless of process, receive the same rights of self-determination.
Residents of Catalan and the Basque Country, which represent distinct LERN minority groups
within Spain, disapprove this uniformity and instead favor “asymmetrical decentralization” of
authority in a manner that permits them enhanced autonomy. The Basque region does have greater

Conversi (2000) argues that “the objective of a homogenous Spain has competed with a pluralist vision of
Spanishness since the beginning of the nineteenth century and both are part of the centuries-long political
practice in which centralising attempts clashed with regional resistance” (Conversi, 2000, p. 122).
40
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authority over taxation than most other regions, which means that residents do not pay income,
corporate, wealth or inheritance taxes to the central government. The Basque government does pay a
cupoi, or compensatory tax, to the central government as remuneration for services rendered.
Included in this compensation is a contribution to the Inter-territorial solidarity fund, a fund
designed to help poor regions grow, in accordance with obligations set forth under § 158(2). With
the exception of Navarra, the other regions are legally classified as “common” regimes, with limited
taxation powers and a consequent reliance on wealth transfers from the central government. Among
the common regimes, there were initial asymmetries in the devolution of fiscal authority, however,
reforms made in 1993, 2001 and 2001 has largely removed them (Garcia-Mila & McGuire, 2007).
Garcia-Mila & McGuire argue that this territorial scheme has benefitted Spain by easing some of the
political tensions among nationalists in the Basque, Catalonia and Galicia.
The Territoriality Clause in the US Constitution embodies a minimal, rather vague
permissive affirmative action territorial precommitment. The Spanish constitution was ambiguous as
to the precise territories to be granted autonomy, but was detailed as to the process of achieving selfgovernment. In other cases, however, preferential territorial precommitment provisions are even
more remarkable because they explicitly name the preferred territories. The cases of Russia and
Pakistan illustrate the point. Under the 1993 Russian Federation Constitution. Article 3(1)
acknowledges the Russian Federation as a multinational one. Under Art. 5(1) “[t]he Russian
Federation shall consist of republics, territories, regions, federal cities, an autonomous region and
autonomous areas, which shall be equal subjects of the Russian Federation.” Further, art. 5(2)
maintains that “[t]he republic (state) shall have its own constitution and legislation. A territory,
region, federal city, autonomous region and autonomous area shall have its own charter and
legislation.” Article 5(3) describes the balance of power between the state and its “constituent
entities” (republics, krays, oblasts, autonomous oblasts and autonomous okrugs), while also
incorporating an equality precommitment and a reference to the “self-determination of peoples in
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the Russian Federation” as a basis of its federal structure. Then, art. 5(4) states the constitution’
position on the relationship between the constituent entities and between the constituent entities and
the state more plainly; “[a]ll constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall be equal with one
another in relation with federal State government bodies.” Such a statement seems to be intrinsically
at odds with the hierarchy of sub-national units mentioned in Art. 5(1) and listed in art. 65, as well as
with basic principles of self-determination.
By way of background, Medushevsky (2006) posits that Russia has undergone three major
constitutional cycles since the early twentieth century. These phases are structurally similar. The first
was the 1905-1907 constitutional revolution, the transition from absolutism to monarchical
constitutionalism, and then to the sham constitutionalism embodied in the April 1906 Russian
Fundamental Law and its subsequent iterations. The second cycle manifested in the toppling of the
monarchy and the establishment of a republican regime under a dictatorship and nominal
constitutionalism. This cycle had three stages: (1) deconstitutionalization through transition from
monarchy to republic and repeal of old legislation (1917); (2) constitutionalization in the form of a
democratic constitution enacted by the Constituent Assembly in 1918; and (3) reconstitutionalization
and an outright rejection of the constitution and liberal constitutionalism. The third cycle also has
three similar stages: (1) deconstitutionalization – a crisis of legitimacy and nominal constitutionalism
in the Soviet Union (1989-1991); (2) constitutionalization, in the form of the 1993 Russian
Constitution; and (3) reconstitutionalization which has been occurring since 2000 (Medushecsky,
2006, p. 16-17).
Recognition of national identity was an integral part of the Bolshevik strategy. Both Stalin
and Lenin publicly supported the right of self-determination. As Walker demonstates, these
overtures may have been more strategic than ideological. Many Bolsheviks thought that support of
self-determination would divert attention away from more serious matters, such as the military threat
of counter-revolutionary forces. Moreover, support for self-determination was merely a recognition
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of the political status quo, and may have been a hedge against outright secession (Walker, 1984, pp.
47-48). The reality was that both Lenin and Stalin wanted to reabsorb minority areas, and by 1922 it
had occurred (Walker, 1984, pp. 50-51). Even though the 1924, 1936 and 1977 Soviet constitutions
all permitted secession, any talk of serious self-determination or secession was largely rhetorical.
Walker identifies several strategic purposes: (1) for internal propaganda purposes; (2) for external
propaganda purposes – to convince the colonies of the Third World that the Soviets were adherents
to self-determination; (3) to advance the appeal of the republic nearby groups; (4) to aid the
Communist partiies of multi-national states in believing the Soviet Union to be the motherland of
socialism and self-determination; (5) to correct policy on the national question (Walker, 1984, pp. 5257).
Mirsky (1997) provides an alternate view. The Soviet Union was a highly centralized
totalitarian regime, but with substantial local autonomy granted to local elites who were an integral
part of the overall ruling class. Curiously, this process of elite-building in a communist state structure
also resulted in the promotion of the national consciousness of diverse ethnic groups. Mirsky (1997)
remarks how great efforts were made to foster native culture and artistry. Mirsky explains this
encouragement of ethnic identity by the influence of the Marxist ideology, the practical political
advantages gained by supporting local ethnic groups and using that support to reinforce regime
loyalty (Mirsky, 1997, p. 3). Soviet republics were ranked according to their weight and importance.
According to Mirsky, the “basic” nations were referred to as republics. Others were deemed
autonomous Union republics, national okrrugs (areas) or autonomous oblasts (regions). Regarding the
ethnic groups, there were fifteen Union Republics, twenty autonomous republics, eight autonomous
oblasts and ten autonomous okrugs. No meaningful objective criteria explain the classification. The
only ascertainable purpose was divide and rule by the Kremlin. Stated succinctly, “[t]he hierarchical
setup was a recipe for permanent national ethnic tension” (Mirsky, 1997, p. 5). The least populous
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ethnic groups had no official statehood at all; their small numbers made them easy to ignore.
Groups with a few more numbers had the lowest degree of statehood, and so on.
This territorial scheme proved effective for some time; however, during the collapse of the
Soviet Union ethnic grievances and claims for autonomy surfaced. Perestroika and Glastnost and
Gorbechev’s de-Stalinization effectively doomed the Soviet regime and its Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Amidst the ensuing economic collapse, several republics demanded Sovereignty. The Baltic republics
sought outright secession.” In what Lankina (2009) calls the “parade of sovereignties,” “[p]owerful
and resource-rich republics like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan declared sovereignty, adopted their own
constitutions, elected presidents and parliaments, and pursued paradiplomacy with foreign nations.
Other ethnic republics were quick to follow their lead” (Lankina, 2009, p. 227). Mirsky opines that
ethnic nationalism and calls for liberation did not play a decisive role in the demise of the Soviet
Union. Rather, it was the culmination of the demise and the cause of ethnic violence in post-Soviet
Georgia, Ossetia, Moldova and other states (Mirsky, 1997, p. 9).
Stoner-Weiss (2004) agrees with Lankina’s assessment; “…Yeltsin’s political jockeying with
Gorbachev in 1990 and 1991 for Russia’s supremacy over the unraveling USSR also undoubtedly
hastened the devolution of power from USSR to Russian Republic and from Russian Republic to
constituent provinces” (Stoner-Weiss 2004, 302). Many constituent territories readily adopted the
new constitution, although many adopted constitutions which violate the Russian constitution (Ross,
2002, p. 35). However, several republics rejected the constitution and voter turnout was below 50%
in some places. Chechnya engaged in outright boycott the referendum. When combined with a lack
of federal democratic culture, the new constitution was viewed as illegitimate and subject to
interpretation by the republics and other constituent territories (Ross, 2002, p. 31). To preempt the
wholesale secession of these territories, Yeltsin embraced the assertions of autonomy. While this
prevented complete secession, republics gained control over their own natural resources and
revenues, designed their own institutions and enacted laws at policies that were at timed contrary to
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laws promulgated by the federal constitution or legislation. To quote Ross, “as long as republic and
regional leaders pledged support for Yeltsin and ‘brought home the bacon,’ in the way of ethnic
stability, tax revenues and electoral support federal authorities have been quite happy to turn a blind
eye to the flagrant violations of the Russian Constitution by regional elites” (Ross, 2002, p. 157).
Four of five autonomous oblasts – Adigai, Gorno-Altai, Karachia, and Khakassia – declared
themselves republics. Ross argues that the greater the degree of autonomy granted, the more
authoritarian the subnational unit becomes.
Decisions as to the recognition of minorities were generally made arbitrarily by the state.
For example, Khazanov (1995) points out that in 1929 there were 194 nationalities, 109 in 1939, 106
in 1970 and 101 in 1979 (Khazanov, 1995, p. 98). Some minorities were forced to change their
nationality. Muslim minorities in Azerbaidjan, such as the Talysh and Tats were forced to register as
Azerbaidjanis. Members of the Pamir ethnic group were forced to register as Tadjiks. Ironically,
these attempts at assimilation usually invigorated ethnic nationalism. According to Kkazanov (1995)
the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism in the Russian Federation is distinct for three reasons. First,
because the population size, socio-economic development and degree of dispersal vary so greatly, the
demands of the groups also vary greatly, ranging from demands for maximum political and economic
independence to simple cultural autonomy. Second, titular nationalities constitute a majority in only
8 if the twenty-one republics, while in 10 they constitute 30% or less. Third, Russia is an ethnoterritorial federation.
Tatarstan, one of two Muslim republics, held a referendum on independence shortly after
the collapse of the USSR. The referendum passed and, in response, Russia a series of federative
agreements to all constituent regions. Tatarstan rejected the offer, but later agreed to a series of
treaties that established a “special” relationship between Tatarstan and Moscow. It was the
leadership of Mintimer Shaimiev, a seasoned Soviet-era politician, and his emphasis on stability,
consent and unity that helped Tatarstan achieve self-rule. His more gradualist “autonomy” approach
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was often at odds with the radical secessionist approach of Tatar nationalists, but it did allow for the
devolution of greater authority from Moscow without widespread ethnic conflict. He advocated the
equality and inclusion of all peoples in Tatarstan, rather than exclusion, as shown in the 1990
Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan. The 1992 Constitution of the
Republic of Tatarstan focused on economic sovereignty. In 1992, Tatarstan was granted republic
status, and in 1994 became a signatory to additional power-sharing treaties that permitted
management of economic affairs and conduct of international affairs (Williams, 2011). Specifically,
“…it reserved for [Tatarstan] a special set of rights that other regions did not share – in particular,
control over key social and educational programs that enabled the preservation of Tatar ethnicity”
(Stoner-Weiss, 2004, p. 303). Tatarstan also gained control over its mineral resources. This brief
review shows how a majority-Muslim Tartarstan sought and eventually achieved semi-autonomous
status, a status duly recognized in the Russian Constitution and one that imparts a preference that is
not imparted to other sub-units.
Not all cases are so clear-cut when determining whether a preference is actually applied in a
manner that confers a preference on a group. As in Russia, the 1973 Pakistan Constitution
incorporates a typology of subnational units based principally on degree autonomy from the central
government. Among other units, it specifically distinguishes between provincial governments and
Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Under the 1973 constitution, Pakistan is comprised of
four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). It is also
comprised of a federal capital (Islamabad), Federally Administered Tribal Areas41 and Provincially
Administered Tribal Areas.42 Both Provinces and Tribal Areas are subject to executive authority.

Under art. 246(c) these areas include Tribal Areas adjoining Peshawar district; Tribal Areas adjoining Kohat
district; Tribal Areas adjoining Bannu district; Tribal Areas adjoining Dera Ismail Khan district; Bajaur Agency;
Orakzai Agency; Mohmand Agency; Khyber Agency; Kurram Agency; North Waziristan Agency, and South
Waziristan Agency.
42 Under art. 246(b) these areas include the districts of Chitral, Dir and Swat (which includes Kalam),[the Tribal
Area in Kohistan district,] Malakand Protected Area, the Tribal Area adjoining [Mansehra] district and the
41
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However, with regard to legislative authority, acts of parliament do not apply to Tribal Areas unless
so directed by the President (Pak. Const. art. 247(3)). Conversely, the operation of provincial
governments is more limited, subject to the supremacy of federal legislation (Pak. Const. art. 143).
Neither the Supreme Court nor any high court has jurisdiction over the FATA. Thus, it seems that
FATA and Tatarstan are similarly situated with regard to the disproportionate benefits that semiautonomy can bring. However, apparently independence for the FATA does not come without a
cost. As Ali (1999) notes, the constitution “reaffirms the separate legal status of the tribal areas,
continuing in the tradition of the colonial powers of simply “containing” the “unruly tribals” rather
than extending to them the rights and privileges which are theirs as responsible and equal citizens of
an independent country” (Ali, 1999, p. 45). Using FATA as an example, Ali characterizes the legal
framework that governs ethnic minorities, specifically affirmative action measures, as counterproductive because it inadequately distinguishes between ethnic and religious groups, thus restricting
the availability of citizenship and resources to minorities.
Unitary states can also have autonomy precommitments. Article X, § 1 of the Philippine
Constitution designates Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras are designated as “autonomous
regions.” These regions are created by organic act of congress with input from the regional
consultative commission. The act defines the “basic structure of government for the region”
including the executive department and legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family,
and property law in a manner consistent with the provisions of the national Constitution (Phil.
Const. art. X, § 18). The President exercises only “general supervision” over autonomous regions
(Phil. Const. art. X, § 16). The grant of autonomy to Mindanao came amidst the historical backdrop
of decades of conflict between the ten ethnic groups that make up Muslim Mindanao and: (1) the
Spanish when it colonized most of the Philippines in 1565, but tried unsuccessfully to occupy the

former State of Amb. They also include Zhob district, Loralai district (excluding Duki Tehsil), Dalbandis
Tehsil of Chagai District and Marri and Bugti tribal territories of Sibi district.
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Mindanao region an convert its inhabitants from Islam to Catholicism; (2) the US when it occupied
the islands after defeating Spain in Spanish-American War and implemented a program aimed at the
secularization of Mindanao peoples; and (3) against the Philippine government after it denied
Mindanao autonomy and continued repressive US policies after independence in 1946 (Islam, 1998).
In response to land confiscation and increasing poverty, the Mindanao Independence
Movement (MIM) was formed with the goal of independence. After some of its leaders were coopted, the MIM was succeeded by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which engaged in
armed conflict with the Marcos government. A short-lived ceasefire was reached, in the form of the
form of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, a splinter group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
was formed. In return for support for Corazon Aquino’s call for a democratic government, MNLF
and MILF were promised autonomy. The 1987 reflects this promise; however, the constitution
provisions pertain only to four provinces while the earlier Tripoli Agreement granted autonomy to
thirteen provinces (Islam, 1998). A subsequent agreement between the Ramos regime and the
MNLF made the MNLF the overseer of economic projects in all Mindanao projects for 3 years.
Finally, it may be important to distinguish between autonomy and outright secession. The
Ethiopian Constitution enshrines the right of every nation, nationality or people to selfdetermination, including secession (Eth. Const. arts. 39 (1), (4)). While the enumerated requirements
to actual secession are rigorous, Abbay (2004) argues that Art. 39 has two purposes
On the one hand, it is designed to serve as a threatening stick against the perennially
centralizing and assimilationist forces. On the other hand, not only does it give people the
feeling that they are part of the Ethiopian household of their own free will, but it may also
give them the feeling that their equitable access to power is safeguarded (Abbay, 2004, p.
608).
There are at least seventy cultural groups in Ethiopia, with the Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, Afar and
Somali being the largest. There also exists a significant religious cleavage, with Christian and Muslim
each accounting for 40% of the population. Since 1889, the Amharic people have occupied a
position of privilege in Ethiopian society. The emergence of Addis Ababa and the construction of a
141

railroad linking the city with the French port of Djibouti cemented their dominance. In the 1950s
the Ethiopian state was a unitary one and followed a strict program of assimilationism. Ethnic
particularization was viewed as anathema to nation-building, thus the project of amharanization was
undertaken, principally through the elevation of the Amharic language and the denigration of
minority languages as well as English. These developments, along with unbalanced economic and
educational policies contributed to what Abbay “centrifugal inclinations” in the Ethiopian state
(Abbay, 2004, pp. 595-597). These attempts as manufacturing homogeneity ultimately failed, as
evidenced by the secession of Eritrea and the accommodation of the Oromo amidst the backdrop of
secessionist threat (Abbay, 2004).
The succession of ethnic conflicts led Ethiopia to jettison the unitary ideal and embrace a
federal model that could mitigate potentially destabilizing conflict and continue trends toward
accommodation. The federal concept was introduced by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991. It was proposed to resolve the war between the EPRDF – a
coalition of four ethnic groups – and the Amhar-dominated government. EPRDF believed that a
federal arrangement would address “the legacy of the ethnic domination and marginalization in the
history of the Ethiopian state” and the “Amhara hegemony” which should be replaced by EPRDF
leadership (Aalen, 2006 245-246). However, in practice, the new federal system allocates most
economic power to the executive, which then doles out grants to state governments to run their
respective administrations. Article 37(f) of the Pakistani Constitution is similar; “[t]he State shall
enable the people of different areas, through education, training, agricultural and industrial
development and other methods, to participate fully in all forms of national activities, including
employment in the service of Pakistan….”
The examination of cases in this section was meant to highlight the variety of ways
constitutions memorialize precommitments to degrees of autonomy for a variety of sub-national
units. There seems to be a fundamental aversion to outright secession, although there are overtures
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to the norm of self-determination in Russia, rhetoric about self-determination was used to prevent
movements for secession, a failed strategy in Walker’s view (Walker, 1984, p. 60). This approach
seems to have also failed in Spain, with the cases of Catalonia and Basque country being illustrative.
There are many factors at play in determining whether and how degrees of autonomy are conferred;
the ideological predisposition of the regime in power; whether violence is used by independenceseeking minorities and the timing in which claims for preferences are pressed; geo-strategic concerns
about how important a territory is politically or militarily, as in the case of Washington, DC; or
whether increased autonomy might jeopardize the economic health of the state, as in the case of
Catalonia.
B.

Ethno-development Precommitments
Russia, Pakistan and the Philippines are examples of ethno-federal states with autonomous

or semi-autonomous sub-national units in which LERN minorities enjoy preferences that those in
majority subunits do not. Ethno-development precommitments differ in that they do not necessarily
confer autonomy but do constitutionally authorize economic redistribution to minorities based on
territory. Although ethno-development schemes may be authorized by legislation, few cases receive
explicit mention. Articles 4 and 122 of the Chinese Constitution have already been discussed. The
Indian case offers another example. Article 38(2) of the Indian Constitution asserts that “[t]he State
shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities in income, and endeavour to eliminate
inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst
groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations.” This provision is a
clear combination of a social precommitment, evidenced by the patent commitment to alleviating
income inequality, and a territorial precommitment, made apparent by the reference to “different
areas.”
The Nigerian Constitution contains a mandatory ethno-development precommitment
focused primarily on civil service employment. Articles 14(1) and (3) states, in its entirety,
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(1) The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a State based on the principles of
democracy and*social justice. The composition of the Government of the Federation or
any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as
to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, -and
also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance
of persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that
Government or in any of its agencies.
The Nigerian Federal Character Commission (FCC) was established through legislation 1996 to
“promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the principles of the proportional sharing of all
bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels of government.” Neither the relevant
constitutional provisions nor the FCC’s enacting legislation mention ethnicity or religion as a basis
for reservations made under the principle. Rather, the FCC statute maintains, in pertinent part, that
the commission is tasked with creating “an equitable formula … for distribution of socio-economic
services, amenities and infrastructural facilities” and “modalities and schemes for redressing the
problems of imbalances and reducing the fear of relative deprivation and marginalization in the
Nigerian system of federalism as it obtains in the public and private sectors….” (FCC A, Part I
(4)(1)(d)(i)(ii). The legislation calls for formulae on both the federal and state levels to enforce to
enforce “equitable representation in all national institutions and in public enterprises and
organizations” (FCC B, Part I (1)). This means that under Nigeria’s federal character policy, persons
belonging to ethnic and religious minority groups do in fact receive a preference with regard to civil
service employment at the state and federal levels. Furthermore, because state boundaries are largely
coextensive with ethnic boundaries, certain states are intended to receive greater preferences than
others.
China presents an example of the overlap between autonomy and ethno-development. art. 4
of the Chinese Constitution reads, in pertinent part,
The state helps the areas inhabited by minority nationalities speed up their economic and
cultural development in accordance with the particularities and needs of the different
minority nationalities. Regional autonomy is practised in areas where people of minority
nationalities live in compact communities; in these areas organs of self- government are
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established for the exercise of the right of autonomy. All the national autonomous areas are
inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. The people of all nationalities have the
freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, and to preserve or
reform their own ways and customs.
Article 122 reinforces art. 3
The state provides financial, material and technical assistance to the minority nationalities to
help accelerate their economic and cultural development. The state helps the national
autonomous areas train large numbers of cadres at various levels and specialized personnel
and skilled persons of various professions and trades from among the nationality or
nationalities in those areas.
Article 113 establishes political preferences minorities within the minority autonomous region
In the people's congress of an autonomous region, prefecture or county, in addition to the
deputies of the nationality or nationalities exercising regional autonomy in the administrative
area, the other nationalities inhabiting the area are also entitled to appropriate representation.
The chairmanship and vice- chairmanships of the standing committee of the people's
congress of an autonomous region, prefecture or county shall include a citizen or citizens of
the nationality or nationalities exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned.
Finally, art. 114 preserves minority political control over their regions; “[t]he administrative head of
an autonomous region, prefecture or county shall be a citizen of the nationality, or of one of the
nationalities, exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned.”
When the CCP came to power in 1949 it implemented two policies on minorities. First,
China was to be a unitary state composed of numerous equal ethnic groups, none of which has the
right to secede. Second, the minorities have a right to autonomy (Mackerras, 2003, p. 21). The early
years of the CCP saw gains for minorities, but the class orientation of the Cultural Revolution,
combined with the rebellion in Tibet, led to the erosion of minority autonomy. Subsequent reforms
reinstated autonomy. Inner Mongolia was the first of the five autonomous regions to be established
in 1947. The 1984 Law of Regional Autonomy (LRA) memorialized the rules for autonomous
subdivisions. Sautman (1998) contends that China has some of the broadest and deepest preferential
policies for minorities. There are 156 ethnic minority autonomous areas, composed of five regions,
30 prefectures and 121 counties. Most minorities live in rural areas. Chinas preferential policies,
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referred to as youhui zhengce, are an effort to achieve equality-in-fact (shishishandge pingdeng) between
ethnic groups, as most of these areas are impoverished and underdeveloped.
Not only do minorities receive economic benefits, but they also receive cultural benefits
such as vacation days from work to attend traditional festivities and holidays, exceptions from family
planning policies such as marriage laws and the “one child” policy. There are also substantial
educational preferences for minority children, including the Ethnic Minorities Education Aid Special
Fund (shaoshu minzy jiaoyu buzhu zhuankuan) Project Hope (xiwang gongcheng) and the Border Areas
Construction Aid Find (banjing diqujianshe buzhu fei). Minorities also receive preference in attending
university outside of their homes. In the area of employment, minorities enjoy preferences in civil
service appointments and hiring quotas in some sectors. There are also quotas for minority
representation in local government bodies, but not within the CCP leadership (Sautman 2009). Some
minorities have been able to take advantage of micro-credit programs (Gustafsson & Shi 2003, p.
808).
The autonomous system does, however does have its restrictions. The LRA stipulates that
autonomy must be under unified state leadership, apply the principle of democratic centralism and
place the interests of the state above anything else. In addition, the laws of the autonomous entities
must be approved by higher bodies: the laws of the five autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia,
Guangxi, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Tibet) must be approved by the NPC Standing Committee, and the
laws of the 30 autonomous prefectures and 124 counties must be approved at the provincial level.
Even still, the LRA affords autonomous areas’ legislatures flexibility in passing laws that nonautonomous areas are not afforded. The State Council’s 1992 Circular on Some Questions about
Further Implementation of the LRA directs that state investment prefer minority areas. Minority
areas can offer more investment incentives to firms in non-minority areas and can retain a greater
proportion of taxes. A second set of regulations, the 1993 Regulations on the Administration of
Ethnic Townships, give minority areas preferential access to infrastructure and natural resource
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development, use local languages in instruction and schools may employ more staff than in other
areas. Finally, under the 1993 Regulation on Urban Nationality Work, subsidized loans, other funds
and teachers are allocated for minzu ban (ethnic cohorts), cities must protect ethnic structures and
minority customs (Sautman, 1999, p. 293). An obvious explanation for the expanse of preferences
available to China’s minorities is socialism and the companion imprimaturs of economic
redistribution and substantive equality. According to Hawkins (1978) it is the combination of
regional autonomy and Marxism-Leninism that makes China’s minority policies unique. China’s
move toward regional autonomy occurred over a ten-year period, culminating in the 1949 Common
Program and later in the 1954 Constitution. As indicated in the previous chapter, Russia also has a
rather nuanced scheme or hierarchy of autonomous subdivisions and, like China has a long history of
affirmative action (Martin 2001).
C.

Conservation Precommitments
Conservation provisions differ from autonomy and ethno-development provisions in that

they tend to emphasize protecting the land and culture of indigenous groups. These provisions tend
to be easily recognizable. Article 66 of the Thai Constitution provides an instructive example;
[p]ersons so assembling as to be a community, a local community or a traditional
community shall have the right to conserve or restore their customs, local knowledge,
good arts and culture of their community and of the nation and participate in the
management, maintenance, preservation and exploitation of natural resources, the
environment and the biological diversity in a balanced and sustainable fashion.
Article 13(6) of the Philippines Constitution contains similar language;
[t]he State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to
agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
Finally, art. 231(2) of the Brazilian Constitution maintains that “[t]he lands traditionally occupied by
Indians are destined for their permanent possession, and they shall be entitled to the exclusive
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infrastructure of the riches of the soil, rivers and lakes existing thereon.” Furthermore, under art. 23,
§ 3, Indians may, with the approval of the National Congress, use water resources and exploit
mineral wealth on indigenous lands. Under art. 231, § 5, absent catastrophe or epidemic, indigenous
groups may only be removed from their land by referendum of the National Congress. As bolstering
provisions, art. 215, § 1 makes it clear that the state “shall protect” indigenous and Afro-Brazilian
cultures and art. 210, § 2 permits indigenous groups to be educated in their native languages.
The Colombian case illustrates how autonomy and conservation can overlap in practice.
Columbia confers territorial preferences on its indigenous ethnic groups. Article 176 of the
Colombian Constitution states that “[t]he law may establish a special electoral district to ensure the
participation in the Chamber of Representatives of ethnic groups and political minorities and
Colombians resident abroad. Up to five representatives may be elected for this district.” Under art.
246 “[t]he authorities of the indigenous (Indian) peoples may exercise their jurisdictional functions
within their territorial jurisdiction in accordance with their own laws and procedures provided these
are not contrary to the Constitution and the laws of the Republic. The law will establish the forms of
coordination of this special jurisdiction with the national judicial system.” Finally, under art. 330
“[i]n accordance with the Constitution and the laws, the indigenous (Indian) territories will be
governed by councils formed and regulated according to the customs of their communities.” The
1991 Colombian Constitution departed from previous legislation by granting increased autonomy
and ethnic self-determination. Legislation passed under the Constitution creates Indigenous
Territorial Entities (ETI), autonomous units for indigenous minorities. ETIs could supersede the
previous Spanish-era indigenous reserve system, the resguardo, which permitted ethnic groups like the
Paez to use but not own the land. ETIs could permit the indigenous to gain political control over
the resguardo, and non-indigenous groups can stay so long as the rules of the indigenous groups
permit (Field, 1996).

148

Indigenous mobilization, beginning in 1971, against exploitation and illegal land
appropriation helped prompt the constitutional reforms in Colombia. Prior to this mobilization,
Columbia’s policy toward the indigenous was assimilationist. During the 1991 national constituent
assembly, three of the 70 participants were from indigenous groups (Garcia-Guadilla & Hurtado,
2000, p. 9). Two of the delegates represented the Colombian National Indigenous Organization
(ONIC) and the Southwest Indigenous Authorities (AISO), organizations concerned with agrarian
reform and the rights of traditional ethnic minorities. The third indigenous participant was
appointed. These delegates were successful in having their agenda included in the constitution for
two main reasons. First, the groups had an alliance with a centre-left bloc in the National Assembly,
led by ASM-19, which had the ability to block legislation. Second, the delegates espoused the ideas
of indigenous rights which coincided with Pres. Gaviria’s pronouncements about democracy and
human rights (Van Cott 2002, 49). In Van Cott’s (2002) view, “[c]onstitutional recognition of
autonomous territories for indigenous peoples and, to a lesser extent, Pacific Coast black
communities, was facilitated by a strong movement for municipal decentralization among a
significant sector of the political elite and non-traditional actors represented in the Constituent
Assembly” (Van Cott, 2002, p. 50). Indigenous representatives were able to insert their interests into
that framework with little opposition. Eventually over 100 resguardos were created for the indigenous
communities. They also secured legislation that transferred state resources to the resguardos.
Disbursement of these funds began in 1994, and as of March 1997 each resguardo was receiving
$61,000. The indigenous also received support from the new Constitutional Court for exercise of
indigenous customary law.
The analysis of territorial precommitments was intended to bring to light the appropriateness
of viewing constitutionally prescribed, ethnically-based territorial arrangements through the lens of
affirmative action and group preference. The principal objective was to illustrate the different types
of arrangements, how those types can overlap and be mutually reinforcing in practice, and to raise
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questions about determining whether preferences exist. Although overlapping, the three types are
distinct. Autonomy precommitments are more panoramic and all-encompassing than the other two.
They involve a devolution of power that encompasses several issue domains. Conversely, the ethnofederal type focuses mainly on economic redistribution to ethnic groups whose populations are
largely contiguous with territorial boundaries. Finally conservation is largely about cultural
preservation.
II.

Social Arrangements
Social precommitments may operate in a manner sufficient to support state-authorized

preferences for target groups. Social precommitments can qualify as affirmative action because of
the significant overlap between class cleavages on the one hand, and LERN and gender cleavages on
the other. This study classifies social precommitments into three types: (1) cases that are socialist
because they contain provisions that use the term “socialist” in reference to the state; (2) cases that
are social because, although they do not contain provisions that use the term “socialist,” they do
contain provisions that mandate or permit “social justice,” “social welfare,” resource redistribution
amongst social groups and/or provide for entitlements such as social security, housing assistance or
health care; and (3) cases that are constitutionally asocial because they contain no provisions that
clearly indicate the state’s responsibility or option to redistribute resources amongst social groups.
These classifications refer to the state as a whole, rather than to a specific provision, and even within
these categories there can be wide variation in how certain state’s economies operate in practice.
These differences can be in both the type of measures the state may use, as well as the degree to
which they may be used.
The cases presented in this section are analyzed mainly by geography and religion (Islam).
We can see that three non-majority-Muslim Asian cases - the PRC, Vietnam and India - are formally
socialist. The PRC has the most clearly worded statement of socialist intent. Several articles make its
intent clear, however Article 1 conveys the overall principle quite cogently: “[t]he People's Republic
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of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and
based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The socialist system is the basic system of the
People's Republic of China.” The form of socialism practiced in China is must be distinguished from
others in the sample, simply because it is generally considered a non-democracy. Popular elections
for local people’s congresses (legislative bodies) are held on the local level; however, elections for
congresses at higher levels permit voter participation by deputies elected at the level immediately
below. Thus members of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the President are not directly
popularly elected and the Communist Party - ostensibly the only party - maintains effective control
over legislative affairs.
Like China, art. 1 of Vietnam’s Constitution also makes its socialist intent clear: “[t]he
Socialist Republic of Vietnam is an independent and sovereign country enjoying unity and territorial
integrity.” Even prior to the Vietnam War, the three Soviet-borrowed tenets of socialist legality,
democratic centralism and collective mastery formed the foundation for what became for the
socialist legal principles that undergirded the state. According to these principles, law comes from
the state, but the state itself is not constrained by laws. The Party is the leader of both the state and
the people. Finally, individual rights must be subordinate to the collective good (Gillespie, 2005, pp.
49-50). As early as 1955, North Vietnam pursued an economic development program of fast
collectivization, a shift away from agriculture and a preference in favor of producer goods rather than
consumer goods.43 After its victory over the South, North Vietnam instituted a five-year plan (19761980) aimed at alleviating a host of post-war problems, including the differences in standards of
living between the north and south, urban unemployment, lack of security and loyalty among those
in the South, and reconstruction of agriculture and industry (Tran, 1994, p. 7).

These policies led to runaway inflation, which the leadership attempted to address with monetary reform in
1959. Inflation did subside, but resurfaced two years later. This was accompanied by a substantial decrease in
rice production. Foreign economic aid provided some temporary solution (Tran, 1994, p. 5).
43
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These socialist principles were combined with the revolutionary and moral precepts
espoused by Ho Chi Minh. State economic management took firm root, particularly after the Fourth
Vietnam Workers Party Congress in 1976. Subsequently, the party adopted its doi moi reform
program officially at its Sixth National Congress in December 1986. The reforms stemmed from an
accumulation of economic difficulties, a policy uncertain about the party’s competence, a loss of
confidence within the leadership and demonstration effects spurred by other countries (Turley, 1993,
p. 1). Even with the market-oriented doi moi reforms, Vietnam remains staunchly socialist. Turley
(1993) attributes the similarities between Vietnam and China to several factors: (1) the manner in
which the socialists came to power (social revolution through guerilla warfare), (2) power based on
peasants within agrarian societies rather than the proletariat in an industrial society, (3) shared
culture, (4) geographical proximity, (5) familiarity between the two parties’ leadership and (6) the
presence of the Chinese experience in Vietnamese political debates.
Finally, the Indian Constitution’s precommitment to socialism is made most explicit in its
42nd Amendment, which came into force in 1976 and clarified the social imperatives articulated in
articles 36-51. The amendment substituted the words “sovereign democratic republic” with
“sovereign socialist secular democratic republic.” As relayed by the amendment’s Statement of
Objects and Reasons, the impetus for the change was the attempts of “vested interests” to subvert
the democratic institutions to promote their own selfish interests rather than “end[ing] poverty and
ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity.” Articles 39, 41, 43, 43A, 45 and 47 detail the
obligation of the state to the citizenry in fulfilling its socialist agenda. Generally speaking, the Indian
constitution, socialism is aimed at achieving human dignity, stability, peace and progress. As former
Justice of the India Supreme Court P.B. Sawant states,
There is no master and no servant. All are owners and equal partners in the process of
production and distribution which has to be organized for the greatest good of all. It is
practicable to achieve that said goal by intelligent planning of the use of resources and by
evolving a cooperative and participatory model of management of production and
distribution it is not and cannot be disputed that man can intelligently use the resources for
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the benefit of all. If that is so, there cannot be a rational objection to any system which
intends to do so. That is the essence of the concept of socialism. It is the concept of
socialism which was also in the contemplation of the framers of our Constitution (Sawant,
1994, p. 3).
According to Sawant, the framers of the Indian Constitution did not envision a totalitarian socialism
similar to that of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe or China. Instead, India was to
implement its own version of democratic socialism with political parties, civil rights as fundamental
rights and social autonomy. The lack of these ingredients is what led to the failure of socialism in its
totalitarian form. In his view, there can be neither democracy nor socialism unless the state ensures
both political and economic rights.
If we examine the four remaining Asia-Pacific cases – Thailand, South Korea, Japan and the
Philippines – we see that all lack the overt socialist language of China and Vietnam. However,
Thailand, the Philippines and the ROK do demonstrate social leanings. Although the ROK is a
former Japanese colony and, like Japan, had American legal influence since its independence44, its
constitution does make social democratic overtures which are notably absent from the US
Constitution. Article 119 reads that the state may “regulate and coordinate economic affairs in order
to maintain the balanced growth and stability of the national economy, to ensure proper distribution of
income, to prevent the domination of the market and the abuse of economic power, and to democratize the
economy through harmony among the economic agents.” This provision seems to be limited by art.
12645 arguably because of the American liberal influence in their post-war constitution-making
processes. Nevertheless, the constitution’s commitment to distributive justice is a departure from
orthodox liberalism, albeit not nearly the departure undertaken by the “Socialist Constitution” of its
peninsular counterpart, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).

For example, the South Korean Constitution has a preamble, individual rights and freedoms, separation of
powers and a rigorous amendment process (Ahn, 1997, p. 73).
45 Under this article, “private enterprises may not be nationalized nor transferred to ownership by a local
government, nor shall their management be controlled or administered by the State, except in cases as
prescribed by law to meet urgent necessities of national defense or the national economy.”
44
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Like the ROK, the Philippines has a legal tradition with notable American influence (in
addition to the Islamic adat and Spanish civil law traditions). It also has social precommitments.
Article 2(9) obliges the state to pursue policies that free the people from poverty, provide adequate
social services, promote full employment and raise the overall standard of living. The succeeding
article incorporates social justice as an integral part of national development. Labor protections are
contained in Section 18 and respect for private enterprise is found in Sec. 20. When read together,
art. XII, § 1 and art. XIII, § 1 encapsulate the Philippine Constitution’s “social” position:
The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by
the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key raising the
quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
In addition,
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
and disposition of property and its increments.46
Thailand and Japan lie at the other end of the social “spectrum.” Article 84(1) of Thailand’s
Constitution calls for a “free and fair economy based upon market forces and encourage sustainable
economic development through repealing and refraining from enacting business-controlling laws and
regulations that do not correspond to the economic necessity….) Under art. 84(6) the fair
distribution of income is stated as an economic goal, but the constitution makes no other readily
identifiable social overtures. Finally, Japan’s has a minimal social precommitment. Under art. 25(2),
“[i]n all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social
welfare and security, and of public health.” Article 25 entitles all citizens to a minimum standard of

Because the provision refers not only to “measures” but also the reduction of inequalities through
redistribution, Art. 13(1) could be both an express and social precommitment. The 1935 constitution also
attempted some balance between the social and the liberal (Benitez, 1935).
46
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living. Japan’s post-war constitution – the Meiji or Imperial Constitution – placed sovereignty in the
Emperor. Popular rights were curtailed and the duty to obey and serve the emperor was absolute.
Conversely, Japan’s 1947 constitution instituted popular sovereignty, with the emperor granted
symbolic powers, and mandated pacifism. Under the supervision of General MacArthur, a speciallyappointed panel laid the foundation for the 1947 constitution. The constitution was adopted after
the first democratic elections in June 1946 and did include several fundamental human rights
provisions (Hook & McCormack, 2001). These provisions ensure non-discrimination in “political,
economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin” (Japan Const.
art. 14, and equality between the sexes in marriage (Japan Const. art. 24). However, absent from the
constitution is any mention of a social, socialist or communist institutional orientation. We do find
allusions to a social impulse in statements guaranteeing “right of workers to organize and to bargain
and act collectively” (Japan Const. Art. 28), and the right of the state to appropriate private property
for public use with just compensation (Japan Const. art. 29).
All seven majority Muslim cases in the sample – Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria - have social precommitments. However, as in the Asian-Pacific cases, there
are varying degrees. According to Ismail (1989) the Islamic state must behave as a Vice-Regent of
God and successor to the Holy Prophet. It must discharge its duty by creating those conditions
within the state which are necessary for the people to realize the purpose of their own creation.
Ismail identifies two cardinal principles of an Islamic economy. The first is the prohibition of riba, or
interest. It is prohibited because it promotes selfishness and greed, traits which are inimical to the
fraternity and human sympathy reverence to Allah requires. The second is charity. In an Islamic
state the economy must be balanced. The profit motive is permitted, but only to the extent that it
conforms to the moral imperatives of Islam.
From a production standpoint, individuals must realize that they are actually not producing,
but simply manipulating raw materials that have been produced by Allah. Thus, contrary to a secular
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state, an Islamic state’s perspective on economic management elevates recognition of the true
relationship between the Creator and man. Regarding distribution, Ismail examines the four factors
of production (land, labor, capital and entrepreneur) and poses the following question in his critique
of the capitalist model: “how far can a contract entered into between a hungry labourer and a bellyfilled entrepreneur be called equitable? In the joint venture of the four [factors], the labour seems to
have been shabbily treated, in spite of being as much human as the landlord, the capitalist and the
entrepreneur” (Ismail, 1989, p. 337). The Islamic state must collect zakat (charitable donations) and
distribute the proceeds to those most in need, such as widows, the orphaned and the poor. The
Islamic state is one which strives to create a welfare state, characterized by Ismail as one which
aspires to provide gainful employment is available, with income sufficient to educate one’s children,
help poor neighbors and pay taxes.
In the sample, all majority Muslim cases except Nigeria have constitutional provisions that
make Islam the state religion. For example, Islam is the state religion of Pakistan (Pak. Const. art. 2)
and the state shall take steps “to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and
basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the
meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah” (Pak. Const. art. 31). Articles 37 and 38
enhance the document’s social impulse with express affirmative action precommitments to backward
classes or areas (Pak. Const. art. 37(a)), by ensuring just and humane conditions of work (Pak. Const.
art. 37(e)), by reducing wealth disparities (Pak. Const. art. 38(e)) and by “preventing the
concentration of wealth and means of production and distribution in the hands of a few to the
detriment of general interest and by ensuring equitable adjustment of rights between employers and
employees, and landlords and tenants (Pak. Const. art. 38(a)). Furthermore, the Pakistan constitution
makes the following statement in the succeeding article: “[t]he State shall ensure the elimination of all
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forms of exploitation and the gradual fulfillment of the fundamental principle, from each according
to his ability to each according to his work.”47
The constitutions of the other majority-Muslim cases contain similar language. Not
surprisingly, the 1972 Bangladesh constitution (suspended in the 1982 coup and reinstated in 1986)
contains a proclamation that Islam religion, (Bang. Const. art. 2a) followed shortly thereafter by a
succinct statement of its fundamental principles; “[t]he principles of absolute trust and faith in the
Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice, together
with the principles derived from them as set out in this Part, shall constitute the fundamental
principles of state policy”48 (Bang. Const. art. 8(1)). These “fundamental principles of state policy”
Bangladesh permits state intervention in the social democratic mold. Indeed, the synthesis between
democracy and socialism (referred to as Mujibism in Bangladesh) was the most important issue
debated by the constitution’s framers at the Constituent Assembly (Huq, 1973; Jahan, 1973). The
constitution provides for fundamental individual rights inspired by the liberal tradition; however,
under Art. 13 the people own and control the means of production through the state and
cooperatives, and Art. 14 requires the state to “emancipate the toiling masses the peasants and
workers and backward sections of the people from all forms and exploitation.” Nasir brought “Arab

47 This analysis is supported by historical and political events that preceded the enactment of the 1973 Pakistan
constitution. As early as the 1960s, even before the partition of Bangladesh, Pakistan showed socialist leanings
(Jawed, 1975; Chengappa, 2002). Much of the success of Zulfikar Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) in the
1970 elections can be traced to his emphasis on “Islamic Socialism.” As related by Richter (1979), “‘during the
first yeas of Pakistan, capitalism dominated. The upper class tortured the workers and became very wealthy by
exploiting them. … The lower class developed a hatred for capitalism. Then Mr. Bhutto came with the
demand for Socialism and there was much support for this’” (Richter, 1979, p. 553). The PPPs charter
acknowledged the need to protect peasants with a form of socialism with the influence of Islamic values
(Monshipouri & Samuel 1995, 977-978).
48 The transition to socialism in Bangladesh was facilitated by the installation of a parliamentary government,
and by permitting the state to requisition of private property without the possibility of legal challenge.
Socialism was an integral part of the political platform of the Awami League (AL), the party that had the most
support during the constitution-drafting process and which won 292 of 299 parliamentary seats in the 1973
elections. (Maniruzzaman, 1975, pp. 892-93). After the constitution was implemented the size of the public
sector increased from 34% to 92% as the AL nationalized abandoned industrial assets, textiles, sugar, banking
and insurance. This effort, however, was short-lived as the assassination of Sheikn Mujibhir Rahman along
with persistent economic losses, low worker productivity and poor public sector management led to a
rethinking of industrial policy (Kochanek, 1996, pp. 710-711).
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Socialism”49 to Egypt and its principles are reflected in its constitution. Egypt is “a democratic,
socialist State based on the alliance of the working forces of the people”50 (Egypt. Const. art. 1) and
has Islam as the state religion (Egypt. Const. art. 2). Likewise, Turkey is a “social” state (Turk. Const.
art. 2) and must “strive for the removal of political, social and economic obstacles which restrict the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in a manner incompatible with the principles of
justice and of the social state…” (Turk. Const. art. 4). The social awakening occurred in Turkey after
the 1960 revolution. The social sentiment of the Turkey constitution is clear. Finally, the nexus
between Islam and the Iranian Constitution can be summed up by Khan’s (1988) observations
The Iranian Constitution incorporates the principles of socialist justice and roots them into
the framework of Islamic values…. The hard-core Islamic clergy, is founded upon the thesis
than an Islamic state … is essentially an egalitarian state. – but rooted of course in the will of
God. …While rejecting both secular socialism and corruptive capitalism the Iranian
Constitution gives new meaning to the concept of “Islamic socialism” by attempting to
synthesize social justice with Islamic standards (Khan 1988, 293).
Thus, the 1979 Iranian Constitution: (1) rejects capitalist modes of production and the concentration
of privately-held wealth (Iran Const. art. 43); (2) vests the guardians of ideology are with decisionmaking authority – the Guardian Council (Iran Const. art. 91); and (3) embraces the principles of
distributive justice and socio-economic rights (Iran Const. arts. 3(12); 28(2); 29; 31; 43; and 48)
(Khan, 1988).
Nigeria and Indonesia are the two majority-Muslim cases that do not have Islam as the state
religion. So to what can we attribute the social impulse evident in both cases? In the case of

In Ayubi’s (1980) view Nasserist socialism was mare like state capitalism (Ayubi, 1980, p. 485).
Article 4 provides elaboration; “[t]he economic foundation of the Arab Republic of Egypt is a socialist
democratic system based on sufficiency and justice in a manner preventing exploitation, conducive to
liquidation of income differences, protecting legitimate earnings, and guaranteeing the equity of the distribution
of public duties and responsibilities.” The socialist turn in Egypt began in 1952 with land reforms imposed by
President Nasir. He continued in 1961 with the promulgation of “Socialist Laws” intended to bring about the
realization of what he termed “Arab Socialism.” Measures included the nationalization of all banks and
insurance companies, the inclusion of a “workers’ representative” on all boards of directors and an increase in
taxes on the upper class (Kerr, 1962, pp. 128-130).
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Indonesia, the Islamic influence is apparent although it is not a formal Islamic state because, under
art. 29(1) of its constitution, “[t]he state shall be based on belief in only one God.” While it does not
reference Islam specifically, we do know, however, that Indonesia experienced Islamization since the
13th century and currently has a Muslim population of 86% Muslim, the largest Muslim population of
any country in the world. Articles 33(2) under the document’s “Social Welfare” chapter Indonesia’s
economy shall be organized as a common endeavor and the state shall control the most important
branches of production, along with natural resources for the benefit of the people. Respect for zakat
s also evident in art. 34; “[The poor as well as destitute children shall be cared for by the state.”
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Indonesian socialism is a product of Islam. The influence of
Islam may also be the reason why Indonesia is the only case with a pre-WWII constitution that also
has a social precommitment.
In the Nigerian case, the constitution grants the state substantial power over the economy.
The state may “(b) control the national economy in such manner as to secure the maximum welfare,
freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and
opportunity… (Nig. Const. art. 16(1)(b)). The state must also ensure that “the economic system is
not operated in such a manner as to permit the concentration of wealth or the means of production
and exchange in the hands of few individuals or of a group…” (Nig. Const. art. 16(2)(c)). Nigeria’s
1979 Constitution Drafting Committee engaged in much debate over whether the document should
adopt any ideological preference. Specifically, there was fervent disagreement over economic
matters, with the Sub-Committee on National Objectives and Public Accountability arguing in favor
of an overt commitment to socialism51 and the whole committee firmly against it. The language that
was eventually adopted makes no specific mention of socialism. However, when the two above-

The Sub-Committee advocated for the following language; “within the concept of a participatory democracy,
informed by the ideals of Liberty, Equality and Justice, the state shall, as a long term goal strive toward a
socialist order based on the public ownership and control of the means of production and distribution” (Read,
1979, p. 137).

51
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mentioned provisions are read together a case can be made that some moderated “social” influence
can be found in Nigeria’s effort to preserve its mixed-economy heritage (Read, 1979). Moreover, the
language could be said to be a form of African Socialism, popularized by Ghanaian President Kwame
Nkrumah.
Three of the four Latin American countries – Brazil, Argentina and Colombia – have social
precommitments. Social tendencies in Brazilian constitutions is nothing new. An analysis by Wyler
(1949) shows that beginning with Brazil’s 1937 Constitution, Brazil had become influenced by Italian,
Portuguese and German ideas. The 1937 constitution permits state intervention into private
enterprise, but “only in so far as it supplies the deficiencies of private initiative and coordinates the
factors of production” and to introduce “the thought of the interests of the Nation” into individual
competition (1937 Braz. Const. art. 135). Labor, however receives substantial protection;
“[i]ntellectual, technical and manual labor has the right to protection and special care of the State”
(1937 Braz. Const. art. 136). Article 137 enumerates the labor protections. They include collective
labor contracts, the right to weekly rest and paid vacation, a minimum wage, an eight-hour work day
and a right to medical insurance. However, even amid the special protections for labor, the 1937
constitution effectively outlaws the Communist Party (Wyler, 1949, p. 58). Labor protections are
also found in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution (Comparato, 1990). Article 1(IV) makes it clear that
Brazil is a social democracy that acknowledges “the social value of labor and of free enterprise.”
Furthermore, one of Brazil’s stated objectives is “to eradicate poverty and substandard living
conditions and to reduce social and regional inequalities…” (1988 Braz. Const. art. 3(III). Workers’
rights are included under Art. 7 of the “Social Rights” chapter and are far more extensive than those
listed in the 1937 constitution. Brazil’s economic order must be in accordance with “the dictates of
social justice” (1988 Braz. Const. art. 170).
Like Brazil, Colombia is a social state (Col. Const. art. 1) that protects the economically
vulnerable (Col. Const. art. 13). Chapter 5, entitled “Concerning the Social Purpose of the State and
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of the Public Services” elaborates in relative detail the obligations of the state to secure the general
welfare and improve the quality of life (Col. Const. Art. 366). Public expenditures receive budgetary
priority (Col. Const. art. 366). Regarding labor, in Colombia, “[w]ork is a right and a social obligation
and in all its forms enjoys the special protection of the state. Every person is entitled to a job under
dignified and equitable conditions” (Col. Const. art. 25). The same article, in conjunction with arts.
39 and 53 - 57, recognizes the legitimacy of labor unions and workers’ rights. Article 48 provides for
social security and art. 58 protects and promotes collective forms of property. The state is
responsible for the general management of the Colombian economy (Col. Const. art. 334) and makes
“special effort” to ensure full employment and the availability of goods for the poor (Col. Const. art.
334). Free enterprise in Colombia is promoted, so long at it observes its “social function.”
In the cases of Argentina and Mexico, both countries exhibited what Ameringer (2009)
refers to as the “socialist impulse,” but only in Argentina do we find an explicit social declaration.
The social and economic reforms found in Mexico’s 1917 constitution, advocated by Zapatista Diaz
Soto y Gama and late by anarchists and jacobinos obregonistas at the constitutional convention,
undeniably gave the state more interventionist authority over industry and land use. The Mexican
socialist state grew through the 1970s, but the ideal began to fade after the 1982 oil crisis crippled
Mexico’s economy. President Miguel de la Madrid, elected in 1982, then instituted neo-liberal
policies and privatized state-owned enterprises (Ameringer, 2009, pp. 4-7). Mexico’s constitution
does, however, contain state control over natural resources (Mex. Const. art. 27) and worker’s rights
protections reminiscent of Brazil and Colombia (Mex. Const. art. 123.1). Perhaps the most liberal of
the cases is Argentina, and a reasonable explanation is readily available. An economic boom early in
the twentieth century attracted Italian and Spanish immigration to and British investment in
Argentina. These immigrants encountered discrimination and began political agitation, drawing on
European anarchist and syndicalist movements. Combined with Argentine intellectuals like Jose
Ingenieros and Juan Justo, the socialist movement was able to invigorate the political and economic
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transformation that occurred under the Peron regime. Article 14(b) is of the constitution provides
for social security and art. 75(19) empowers Congress to embark upon “economic progress with
social justice” and “to promote differential policies in order to balance the relative unequal
development of the provinces and regions.” However, many economists attribute Argentina’s 1989
financial crisis to the failure of Peron’s statist policies, thus creating the political opening for a more
liberal free-market economy instituted by Menem (Miller, 1993).
Next, we have the European cases: Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany. That the Eastern
European cases – Russian and Ukraine – have social precommitments is not surprising, given their
communist legacies. Russia is a social democracy that supports the labor and health of its citizens
(Russ. Const art. 7(1)). However, its constitution guarantees “the integrity of economic space, free
flow of goods, services and financial resources, support of competition, and the freedom of
economic activity…” (Russ. Const art. 8(1)). This is a clear departure from the overtly socialist
language used in the former Soviet constitution. However, as we have seen in cases such as Vietnam
doi moi, eventual moderation seems to be less of an anomaly and more of a trend. The Ukrainian
Constitution is also a social democracy (Ukr. Const. art. 1). Additional provisions emphasize the
social orientation of the economy. Article 13 states plainly that “[p]roperty entails responsibility.
Property shall not be used to the detriment of the individual or the society.” The language of art. 41
bolsters Ukraine’s social qualification to the ownership and use of private property. Although
everyone has “the right to own, use, or dispose of his property,” “[t]he use of property shall not
prejudice the rights, freedoms, and dignity of citizens [or[ the interests of society….” Economic
competition, as well as workers’ rights, are protected (Ukr. Const. art. 42; 43-46). Medical care, a
minimum standard of living and housing (Ukr. Const. arts. 49, 48, 47).
The Western European constitutions also memorialize social democratic principles. Article
2(1) of the French Constitution declares the French state as social, but the minimalist document
mentions little else in the way of state power, economic institutions or labor. In this way, France’s
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1958 Fifth Republic constitution differs from the 1946 constitution which did make clear reference
to these concerns in its Preamble. This difference between the two constitutions makes sense, for as
Wahl (1958) notes Cold War liberals inspired the 1958 constitution as much as the socialists inspired
its immediate predecessor (Wahl, 1959, p. 377). Language ostensibly directed at banning the
Communist Party was considered but ultimately left out (Wahl, 1958, p. 368). Germany is also a
social state (Germ. Const. art. 20(1)) and permits state taking beyond simple eminent domain: “[l]and
and landed property, natural resources and means of production may, for the purpose of
socialisation, be transferred to public ownership or other forms of publicly controlled economy by
way of a law which shall regulate the nature and extent of compensation” (Germ. Const. art. 15).
Like France and Germany, Italy is a social state. Although “private economic initiative is free” (Italy
Const. art. 41), private enterprise may not conflict with social utility and “the law determines the
appropriate programs and controls is “a democratic republic based on labor” (Italy Const. art. 1), and
will remove obstacles which prevent “the effective participation by all workers in the political,
economic and social organization of the country” (Italy. Const. art. 3; arts. 35-40; art. 46).
III.

Conclusion
The primary objective of Chapters 5 and 6 was to elucidate a basic conceptual framework

with which to evaluate the existence and prevalence of different categories of constitutional
precommitments to affirmative action. When constitutional precommitments to affirmative action
are viewed through the conceptual lens provided here we can see how multifarious and
multidimensional they are. To properly understand the constitutional underpinnings of affirmative
action all of the categories and sub-categories must be considered together in a synergistic way. The
synergy, in addition to the periodic overlap, of the types is what permits the true nature of
preferences for LERN minorities and women to be made clear. Conversely, traditional approaches
to affirmative action applied no general method of classification. The categories articulated here are
intended to facilitate technical and substantive evaluation of the precise terminology used to
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construct precommitments to affirmative action, as well as how that language may be interpreted in
various political moments. To be sure, other categorization schemes may be possible. However, the
framework elucidated here is parsimonious and efficient created so that it may be easily improved.
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CHAPTER 7
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PRECOMMITMENTS FOR WOMEN
I.

Introduction
The previous two chapters developed a framework that can be used to identify affirmative

action provisions in constitutions and to help us understand how those provisions can operate
singularly or cooperatively to confer preferences on certain groups. This chapter is concerned chiefly
with applying those categories to women. Four issue domains will be examined: political (POL),
economic/employment (ECON/EMP), education (EDU) and cultural (CULT). This chapter
examines affirmative action precommitments within and across domains. Of particular interest is the
prevalence of types and sub-types of precommitments within issue domains and the proposal of
hypotheses to explain preference prevalence differences across types, sub-types, domains and target
group categories. The social varieties of precommitments are, unless accompanied by a direct
mention of a domain, non-domain specific.
II.

A Note on Group and Domain Sub-types
In addition to the four broad categories of precommitments – classical, tacit, territorial and

social – precommitments can also be categorized as group-specific or non-group-specific. As the
name indicates, non-group-specific precommitments do not mention a specific group, but rather
embody a much broader precommitment to any group that may deserve preferential treatment, as
adjudged by state officials in interpreting the constitution. Non-group-specific, non-domain-specific
precommitments are the most expansive form of affirmative action precommitments. For example,
art. 28(H)(2) of the Indonesian Constitution provides a classical, minimalist example: “[e]very person
shall have the right to receive facilitation and special treatment to have the same opportunity and
benefit in order to achieve equality and fairness.” The use of the classical term “special” indicates
that the intended goal is equality of outcome or substantive equality; thus, it supports the legality of
state-instituted preferential treatment for any person. The provision mentions neither a specific
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group nor a specific issue domain, making it potentially applicable to all groups and all domains. The
language in § 30 of Thailand’s Constitution is similar; with “measures” effectively substituted for
“special”; “[m]easures determined by the State in order to eliminate obstacles to or to promote
persons’ ability to exercise their rights and liberties as other persons shall not be deemed as unjust
discrimination….” Article 9(2) of the SA Constitution also uses “measures” to assist persons or
categories of persons “disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.” These provisions illustrate a general
model for articulating non-group-specific affirmative action precommitments. The breadth of these
provisions give legislatures great latitude in passing preferential legislation and give courts similar
latitude in interpreting statutes in a manner favorable to minority groups.
The Columbian and Argentine Constitutions also contain non-group-specific, non-domainspecific provisions, replacing the classical terms “special” and “measures” with the tacit terms “real
and effective” and “promote” while still retaining the underlying sentiment of eliminating unduly
discriminatory obstacles that act an as encumbrance on the full exercise of constitutionally
guaranteed rights and liberties. Article 13 of the Columbian Constitution maintains “[t]he state will
promote the conditions necessary in order that equality may be real and effective and shall adopt
measures in favor of groups which are discriminated against or marginalized.” Similarly, in Argentina
the state must “[p]romote conditions ensuring that freedom and equality of individuals and of the
groups to which they belong are real and effective, to remove the obstacles preventing or hindering
their full enjoyment, and to facilitate the participation of all citizens in political, economic, cultural
and social life (Arg. Const. art. 9(2)). Finally, art. 13(1) of the Filipino Constitution adopts perhaps
the most powerful non-group-specific, non-domain-specific recommitment, combining it with a
social precommitment and emphasizing economic and political redistribution; “[t]he Congress shall
give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.”
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Group-specific affirmative action precommitments are precommitments that identify a
specific group of persons to be the target of the state-mandated or -permitted preference. By
identifying a particular group as the recipient of preferential treatment, constitutional framers
acknowledge historical discrimination against the said group and the state’s obligation to mandate or
permit certain actions to remedy the material consequences of the discrimination. Group-specific
precommitments differ from non-group-specific precommitments in several ways. First, they allow a
constitution’s framers to define the potential pool of preference recipients so as to not only include
groups, but to exclude groups that are not entitled to a preference. This can most easily be seen in
precommitments for women. As discussed above, Art. 35 of the Ethiopian Constitution provides
for “special attention” for women because of the “historical legacy of inequality and discrimination
suffered by women….” The obvious implication is that men are not the targets of the preference
and thus have no right to initiate litigation to enforce such a right. Second, group-specific
precommitments can make target groups’ legal claims easier to prove should litigation arise over the
constitutionality of affirmative action legislation. Group-specific precommitments can offer greater
interpretive certainty to bodies (supreme courts, constitutional courts) tasked with adjudicating legal
disputes over the proper identification of target groups. However, there can also be drawbacks to
group-specific precommitments. Their lack of flexibility may hinder preferential opportunities for
groups which may not have been originally intended by the framers, but who subsequently are found
to be worthy. Additionally, group specificity might require any group not specified to seek a
constitutional amendment, a very arduous undertaking in most states.
Affirmative action precommitments may also respond to a certain issue domain. Nondomain-specific provision can theoretically apply to any domain. The Indonesian and Thai examples
discussed in the previous section are instructive. As stated above, this study uses four domains for
both women and LERN minorities: POL, ECON/EMP, EDU and CULT. Several examples of
domain-specific provisions of the group-specific variety are presented throughout this chapter. With
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regard to domain-specific provisions of the non-group-specific variety, they often take the form of a
general “right to” a particular service provided by the state to all citizens. For example, art. 6 of the
Brazilian Constitution states, “[e]ducation, health, nutrition, labor, housing, leisure, security, social
security, protection of motherhood and childhood and assistance to the destitute, are social rights, as
set forth in this Constitution.” Here, art. 6 mentions several domains and essentially operates as a
more detailed art. 3, which is Brazil’s primary social precommitment. Other constitutions contain
provisions that apply to singular domains such as EDU (e.g. Russ. Const. art. 43, § 1; Phil. Const. art.
XIV, § 1; Turk. Const. art. 42); Ukr. Const. art. 53) and ECON/EMP (e.g. Iran Const. arts. 29, 43, §
1; Spain Const. art. 41; Thai Const. art. 55; ROK Const. art. 34). These provisions are important
insofar as they may buttress or be interpreted as adjunctive to other preferential precommitments, as
the discussion of the Brazilian case in the chapter will illustrate. However, for the purposes of this
study, neither social nor equality precommitments are categorized by domain. Thus, non-groupspecific, domain-specific provisions will not play a major role in the instant analysis, but can be the
subject of future research.
III.

Non-group-specific precommitments
Before analyzing the precommitments for women, a brief elaboration of the prevalence of

non-group-specific, non-domain-specific precommitments is warranted. Of the 30 cases studied,
only eight had a non-group specific, non-domain-specific precommitment. Given its marriage of
classical and social precommitments, the Philippines non-group-specific precommitment appears to
be the most legally robust model for interested constitution-makers to adopt. Indonesia, Colombia
and Spain have social precommitments as well, but none combine the social and non-group-specific
and only in the case of Spain is the redistributionary imprimatur as well articulated as it is in the
Filipino Constitution. All states enacted their current constitutions after WWII; however, aside from
that broad commonality, it is difficult to determine why these countries chose to incorporate a nongroup-specific, non-domain-specific precommitment. They are not geographically linked and have
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diverse legal traditions. All are ethnically or racially diverse to varying degrees, and the Catholic,
Muslim and Buddhist traditions are all represented. Not even all constitutions were enacted under
democratic regimes or during transition toward democracy – Thailand’s constitution was passed
under the rule of a military junta in 2007. In all of these cases, constitutions also contain provisions
indicating LERN and women-specific precommitments.
It is difficult to determine why so few cases have non-group-specific affirmative action
precommitments. One might speculate that too general a grant of rights may result in interpretive
ambiguity for legislators and judges. This might lead to a preference “free for all” and any group
with even a marginal claim for redress may attempt to make a claim. Such a situation might be
detrimental to judicial economy and may divert sometimes scarce legal resources away from more
meritorious claims. The result can be administrative inefficiencies and undue delays in resolving
crucial disputes. On the other hand, a non-group-specific precommitment could facilitate timely
resolution of issues of equality, can have significant impact on the amelioration of LERN cleavages,
and could facilitate nation-building and democratic consolidation by offering a judicial mechanism
for groups which had previously sought to address grievances over power asymmetries through
violence. All in all, the ambiguity of non-group-specific, non-domain-specific constitutional
precommitments to affirmative action, and the prospect of “preference exploitation” by groups not
anticipated as beneficiaries by constitution-makers, seems to best explain their paucity in the sample
of cases considered here.
IV.

SEX-specific Precommitments
In large part, the criteria for identifying women-specific precommitments mirrors the basic

principles for identifying classical precommitments as explained in the previous chapter. As with
classical precommitments, women-specific precommitment language should make a clear,
unambiguous and unequivocal commitment to the amelioration of the status of women by
undertaking extraordinary or exemplary steps. Classical language or terminology may not be
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necessary to deem a particular provision a precommitment for women, as many take the form of
sporadic precommitments. The economic, social and political marginalization of women is
historically and geographically ubiquitous. In none of the cases under study here were men an
historically marginalized group.
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Table 1: Total cases with SEX-specific affirmative action precommitments by group and domain
Group
Specific
Non-Specific
Specific
21
Domain
Non-Specific
9
8
Table 2: Cases with SEX-specific affirmative action precommitments by group and domain
Group
Specific
Non-Specific
China, India, Brazil,
Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Mexico, Philippines,
Ethiopia, Vietnam,
Specific
Germany, Turkey, DRC,
Iran, Thailand, France,
Italy, South Korea,
Domain
Myanmar, Ukraine,
Columbia, Argentina
India, Pakistan,
Indonesia, Philippines,
Bangladesh, Ethiopia,
Thailand, SA, Vietnam,
Non-Specific
Germany, Turkey, DRC,
Columbia, Spain,
South Korea, Argentina
Argentina

The data show that 22 of the 30 cases have some form of SEX-specific, domain-specific
affirmative action precommitment.
Table 3: Cases with SEX-specific, domain-specific and equality precommitments
Equality precommitment
Yes
No
China, India, Brazil,
Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Mexico, Philippines,
Vietnam, Ethiopia,
France, Argentina
Yes
Germany, Egypt, Turkey,
SEX-specific
DRC, Iran, Thailand, Italy,
precommitment
ROK, Myanmar, Ukraine,
Colombia
Nigeria, Russian
No
Federation, Japan, SA,
US, Indonesia
Spain
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Table 4: Cases with SEX-specific, domain-specific and social precommitments
Social precommitment
Yes
No
China, India, Brazil,
Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Philippines, Vietnam,
Ethiopia, Germany, Egypt,
Yes
Mexico, ROK, Myanmar
Turkey, DRC, Iran,
SEX-specific
Thailand, France, Italy,
precommitment
Ukraine, Colombia;
Argentina
SA, Spain, Nigeria, Russian
No
US, Indonesia
Federation, Japan

Of those 22, 20 have SEX-specific equality precommitments – Iran and Argentina do not. Nineteen
of the 22 cases have some sort of social precommitment. Five of the cases with non-group-specific,
non-domain-specific precommitments – the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Colombia and Argentina
– also have SEX-specific affirmative action precommitments. Nine cases had SEX-specific, nondomain-specific precommitments: India (art. 15, § 3), Pakistan (art. 25, § 3), Bangladesh (arts. 10, 28,
§ 4); Ethiopia (art. 35), Germany (art. 3, § 2), Turkey (art. 10)) DRC (art. 14), South Korea (art. 34(3))
and Argentina (art. 75, § 23). Precommitments within the ECON/EMP domain were most
prevalent at 17. Five were found in the POL domain and none in the EDU domain. Finally, two
cases had SEX-specific, CULT-specific affirmative action precommitments. All constitutions were
enacted post-WWII, however not all post-WWII cases have these precommitments. As variables,
geography and legal tradition do not seem to explain variation.
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A.

SEX-specific, non-domain-specific
As previously mentioned, this study classifies group-specific affirmative action

precommitments into two basic sub-types – domain-specific and non-domain-specific. Nondomain-specific precommitments contain language broad enough to arguably be applied to any of
the four policy domains that pertain to the SEX category. For example, art. 3, § 2 of Germany’s
Constitution states that “[m]en and women shall have equal rights. The state shall promote the
actual implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages
that now exist.” The use of the tacit terminology, “actual implementation” and “steps,” would seem
to indicate an affirmative action precommitment and the lack of domain specificity could indicate
that the framers intended the preference to apply across domains. However, as Totten (2003) notes,
there has been considerable disagreement over how art. 3, § 2 is to be interpreted. The Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) argued that the precommitment excludes quotas as a vehicle for realizing
substantive sex equality while the Social Democrats (SD) argue that quotas are permissible. As of
2006, the German Federal Constitutional Court has not ruled directly on the issue. In this case, the
German provision is a SEX-specific, non-domain-specific affirmative action precommitment because
it theoretically applies across domains. However, the manner in which the preference for women is
implemented within these domains is not unlimited.
Like Germany, the Turkish and ROK SEX-specific, non-domain-specific affirmative action
precommitments use tacit language. Under the Turkish Constitution, “[m]en and women have equal
rights. The State shall have the obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice” (Turk. Const.
art. 10). This rather vague provision was approved in September of 2010 along with a package of 26
constitutional amendments proposed by Pres. Erdogan. Just as the constitutionality of quotas is an
issue in the German case, Turkish courts have yet to determine whether the positive discrimination
amendment permits quotas. However, given the history of the amendment, there is little doubt that
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the intent is to accord preferences to women in some form.52 The ROK language is more minimal
and indefinite than Germany’s or Turkey’s; “[t]he State endeavors to promote the welfare and rights
of women” (ROK Const. art. 34, § 3). Although marginal, this provision is classified as a SEXspecific, non-domain-specific affirmative action precommitment because the tacit term “promote” is
used.53 Perhaps more to the point, the ROK government has, in fact, passed legislation instituting
quotas for women in certain civil service occupations as well as for local elections.
The remaining cases with SEX-specific, non-domain-specific provisions use classical
precommitment language. As might be expected, the Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi provisions
employ substantially similar classical language. India’s art. 15, § 3 and Pakistan’s art. 25, § 3 use
identical language; “[n]othing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision
for women and children.”54 The Bangladeshi Constitution has two provisions. Its art. 28, § 4 is
substantially similar to India and Pakistan, with the substitution of “or” for “and” and the
accompaniment of a LERN affirmative action precommitment. Its art. 10, however, uses sporadic

52 Akman and Tutuncu (2011) maintain that the 2010 amendments opened the way for positive action for
women, although whether and how such policies will be implemented remains to be seen.
53 Indeed, affirmative action has been credited with increasing the number of women in the South Korean
foreign and civil services, as well as the number of professors at public universities. South Korean women had
begun to fight for “gender mainstreaming” as early as 1995 at the United Nations International Conference on
Women in Beijing. They employed a strategy of engagement with the government which resulted in the
creation of various governmental organizations tasked with oversight off gender policy and the increased
participation of women leaders. The umbrella organization, Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU),
Policy successes such as the Gender Equality Employment Act and the Gender Discrimination Prevention and
Relief Act helped provide the legal basis for implementing affirmative action. Revisions made in 2002 to the
government’s Framework Act on Women’s Development actually substituted the term “affirmative action” for
“temporary measure of preferential treatment.” Additional achievements were the passage of the 2004 Act to
Prevent Prostitution and the 2005 Abolition of the Family-Head System, both of which ended long-established
institutionalized patriarchal regimes (Kim & Kim, 2011).
54 In the case of India, MacKinnon (2006) acknowledges that India’s constitution “holds a great potential for
ameliorating the subordination of women to men” (MacKinnon 2006, 189). India’s equality provisions, when
considered in conjunction with the affirmative action provision of art. 15, § 3 have led to courts upholding
preferential policies for women under a theory of “compensatory justice.” Upon interpreting the court’s
decision in University of Madras v. Shanta Bai, 1854 A.I.R. (Mad.) 67 (1954), Davis (1996) concludes that when the
court determines the constitutionality of state action that discriminates on the basis of sex, “[i]f the bias is
‘favorable’ to women then there is no discrimination and the legislation cannot be challenged on the ground
that there is no reasonable basis for the classification because the affirmative action provision under art. 15, § 3
automatically validates the provision in question (Davis, 1996, pp. 47-48).
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language; “[s]teps shall be taken to ensure participation of women in all spheres of national life.”55
The language of art. 75, § 5 of the Argentine Constitution leaves little doubt as to whether a SEX
preference is intended; “[t]o legislate and promote positive measures guaranteeing true equal
opportunities and treatment, the full benefit and exercise of the rights recognized by this
Constitution and by the international treaties on human rights in force, particularly referring to
children, women, the aged, and disabled persons.” The DRC offers a more recent example (ratified
in 2005); “[t]he [public authorities] take in all areas, and most notably in the civil, political, economic,
social and cultural areas, all appropriate measures in order to ensure the full realization of the
potential of women and their full participation in the development of the nation” (DRC Const. art.
14). This provision uses classical language and, although certain domains are mentioned, is nondomain-specific because the provision makes no indication that the preferences are exclusive or
restricted to any specific domain. Article 35 of the Ethiopian Constitution also mentions domains,
while being explicitly applicable to both the public and private spheres and offering a justification for
the precommitment.
It is somewhat surprising that Turkey’s SEX-specific, non-domain-specific precommitment
does not employ classical language, given that it is the most recent of all eight. A reasonable
explanation might take into account other endogenous variables, such as the impact of religious
mores on sex equality, specifically the role of Islam and Turkey’s general policy of equal opportunity
rather than substantive equality. We would then have to explain the presence of classical language in
the Pakistan and Bangladesh constitutions, which could be done by invoking the normative influence
of the Indian constitutional lineage. Both the German and Argentine precommitments were enacted

The 1972 constitution was the first to explicitly recognize the equality of the sexes, albeit in a circumscribed
manner. To be fair, the transitional government was likely preoccupied with institution-building, rule of law
and political stability. This could have led them to focus much less on equality of the sexes. However, the
secular platform of the Awami League, the party that came to power immediately after independence and
stewarded the 1972 constitution, established the space necessary for women’s rights to germinate.
55
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in 1994 but only the latter contains classical language. The South Korean language came just a few
years earlier with the 1987 amendments, and also lacks classical language. The DRC case seems to
make the most intuitive sense because it is very recent and very expansive. The only informed
conclusion that can be drawn here is that no single variable can explain why certain cases have SEXspecific, non-domain-specific affirmative action precommitments, and why those that do opt for
classical or particular language.
B.

SEX-specific, domain-specific precommitments
When we turn to domain-specific affirmative action precommitments the wide variety of

preferences becomes clear. The data used in this section are gleaned from Tables 1, 2, and 3 above.
i.

POL-specific precommitments
SEX-specific, POL-specific precommitments almost invariably take the form of party-list

quotas or outright seat reservations in electoral bodies at the national, provincial (intermediate)
and/or local levels. In the context of party-introduced quotas, Caul (2001) argues that gender quotas
may arise from a combination of exogenous and endogenous factors including: (1) women activists –
a “critical mass” of women participating in parliament or within a particular party; (2) electoral
system – party list PR systems seem advantageous to women; (3) diffusion and competition –
through “contagion” one party may influence another party to adopt its policies; and (4) party
characteristics – a party’s ideology, organizational structure, and age (Caul, 2001, pp. 1215-1218).
Krook (2006) identifies four similar factors: (1) women’s mobilization, (2) strategic advantage
recognition by political elites; (3) emerging notions of equality and representation; and (4)
international norms spread through transnational sharing (Krook, 2006, pp. 307-309). Although
controversial from a normative and outcomes-based perspectives, political parties in more than 90
countries have some gender quota, and international groups such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union,
the Socialist International, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African Union and the Organization of American States
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have endorsed implementation (Baldez, 2006). In a cross-national comparison of 153 countries,
Tripp & Kang (2007) analyzed the effect of a variety of institutional, social, economic, cultural and
religious variables on women’s representation and found that the best predictors are a combination
of institutional factors, including quotas. The authors concluded that quotas, particularly those for
reserved seats, are the most consistent explanatory factor for female legislative representation.
Dahlerup & Freidenwall (2009) define electoral gender quotas as “legal or voluntary
regulations of public elections that require a certain minimum number or percentage of women or of
both sexes on one of three levels: aspirant, candidate or electee (Dahlerup & Freidenwall, 2009, p.
33). They identify six quota types: legal aspirant quotas, voluntary aspirant quotas, legal candidate
quotas, voluntary candidate quotas, legal reserved seat quotas and voluntary reserved seat quotas.
Aspirant quotas regulate the pool of potential candidates from which a political party’s nominating
body selects the electoral list. Candidate quotas require that a certain percentage of candidates be
represented on a candidate list that political parties present to voters.56 Reserved seat quotas require
a fixed minimum number of women be elected. In general, different types of quotas are chosen for
different electoral systems. Forty-eight countries have some form of gender quota. This is true for
democratic, semi-democratic and non-democratic systems. Democratic states tend toward voluntary
party quotas while semi-democratic countries tend toward legal quotas (Dahlerup & Freidenwall,
2009).
Experiences with gender quotas have varied by region. Several European countries have
gender quotas. In the UK, which has no formal constitution, the Labour Party has internal quotas
for women. In 1993 Labour extended its quota policy, referred to as the “all women shortlist
policy,” but it was subsequently stricken by an Industrial Tribunal decision (Jepson v. Dyas-Elliot v. The

In a candidate quota system, it is important to include rules about rank ordering in the quota rules. As
Dahlerup & Friedenwall note, “[a] quota of 30 percent women candidates who are placed at the bottom of a
candidate list in PR systems, closed or open, means nothing but disappointment” (Dahlerup & Freidenwall,
2009, p. 37). Many systems require that there must be at least one woman among the top three on a list of
candidates, one among the next three, and so on.
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Labour Party [1996] IRLR 116 ET (holding that selection as a candidate for office qualifies as
“authorization or qualification” for employment under Section 13(1) of the SDA). However, upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals held that selection as a candidate does not qualify as “employment”
under either the SDA or the RRA (Russell & O’Cinneide, 2003). Since then, the passage of the 2010
Equality Act extended the the period in which all-women shortlists may be used to 2030 (Kelly &
White, 2012, p. 11). Conversely, quotas in Sweden (a case not under study here, but one which does
have SEX affirmative action precommitment57) have been in place since the Social Democratic Party
implemented them in 1994. As a result of agitation from women’s groups, quotas were
implemented, with little antagonism. Germany, a case with a classical SEX-specific, non-domainspecific affirmative action precommitment, but not a POL-specific one, appears to permit quotas.
However, there has been controversy over whether such quotas are congruent with Arts. 21 and 38
of the German Constitution. Finally, France amended its Constitution in 1999 to permit gender
quotas58 (Russell & O’Cinneide, 2003).
Globally, Latin America has been the trailblazer on gender quotas. Between 1991 and 2000,
12 countries passed national legislation establishing a minimum of 20-40% for women’s participation
as candidates in national election. The confluence of women’s movements in the 1970s and
international agreements such as CEDAW and the Beijing platform for action contributed to the
maturity of gender norms toward equal participation in politics (Htun & Jones, 2002). In her study
of Mexican gender quotas, Baldez (2006) argues that gender quotas result from three additional
factors: (1) factions within a party exploit electoral uncertainty to initiate internal party reform; (2)
courts which view equal protection pivotal when evaluating gender quotas; and (3) female legislator

Chapter 2, art. 16 of Sweden’s 1974 Instrument of Government states that “[n]o act of law or other
provision may imply the unfavorable treatment of a citizen on grounds of gender, unless the provision forms
part of efforts to promote equality between men and women or relates to compulsory military service or other
analogous official duties.”
58 The relevant language in art. 1 reads, “[s]tatutes shall promote equal access by women and men to elective
offices and posts as well as to positions of professional and social responsibility.”
57
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cross-party mobilization raises issue awareness and increases costs of opposition. Bruhn (2003) adds
the “democratic-ness” of the party and a lack of will to balance tickets as additional variables.
Women currently occupy approximately 13% of the seats in the lower houses of parliament in Latin
America (Htun & Jones, 2002). More than half of Latin American democracies have some form of
gender quota at the national or sub-nation levels (Jones, 2009, pp. 1-2).
Women’s representation in Sub-Saharan Africa generally lags behind other regions. In 1997,
the member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)59 passed the
Declaration on Gender and Development. The Declaration commits member states to increase
women’s participation in decision-making to 30% by 2005. In 2001 the Programme on Women in
Politics and Decision-making recommended the use of quotas to achieve the goal. South Africa and
Mozambique use voluntary party-based quotas in a proportional representation system.
Consequently, in 2004 SA and Mozambique had the highest levels of female participation in national
legislatures at 31.2% and 31.3%, respectively (Kethusegile-Juru, 2004, p. 23). Other countries have
adopted mandatory legislative quotas in a PR system (Namibia), mandatory legislative quotas in a noparty system (Uganda), special nominations and appointments (Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe) or
constitutional quotas (Tanzania, Rwanda). Yoon (2004), posits that access to education, labor force
participation, a country’s economic condition and a country’s culture work to determine women’s
legislative participation. Like Tripp & Kang, she found that gender quotas, along with proportional
representational systems, play a substantial role in women’s representation in African parliaments
(Yoon, 2004, p. 458).
The Argentine women-specific, POL-specific provision is the most expansive; “[a]ctual
equality of opportunities for men and women to elective and political party positions shall be
guaranteed by means of positive actions in the regulation of political parties and in the electoral

59 The SADC has 15 member states: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, SA, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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system”60 (Arg. Const. art. 37). This classical precommitment is bolstered by art. 75, § 23, under
which the state must “[legislate and promote positive measures guaranteeing true equal opportunities
and treatment, the full benefit and exercise of the rights recognized by this Constitution and by the
international treaties on human rights in force, particularly referring to children, women, the aged,
and disabled person.” Electoral laws promulgated under art. 37 require party lists to have a
minimum 30% of female candidates in both the Senado (currently 35% female) and Camara de
Depudaos (currently 39% female). There are also quotas at the sub-national level. None of the
other Latin American cases in this study have similar precommitments, although both Brazil and
Mexico have legislative electoral quotas.61 The quota debate in Argentina came at a time of political
upheaval as the country was rebuilding democratic institutions after years of dictatorial rule. The
Peron Party had instituted party quotas, but, after intense lobbying by a coalition of women’s groups,
the Argentine parliament approved the Ley de Cupos which mandated a 30 percent minimum quota
for women on party lists62 (Dahlerup & Freidenwall, 2009, pp. 40-41).
In contrast to the classical language of Argentina’s art. 37, France’s precommitment is tacit
and embedded in an equality provision. art. 1 of the French Constitution states that, “[s]tatutes shall

Lubertino cites the following influences for electoral quotas: the travel of some Argentine women to the
United Nations Women’s Conference in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1985; the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; discussions with Spanish socialist women when
they traveled to Argentina in the early years of the transition; distribution of the first proposed legislation on
real equality for women, and the resolutions of the XVIII Congress of the Socialist International, in June 1989,
in Stockholm, Sweden (Lubertino, 2003, p. 2). Argentine women benefited from electoral quotas even before
Art. 37 became part of the constitution. In fact, the quota laws that exited prior to art. 37, made it possible for
26.2% of the delegates elected to the 1994 Constituent Assembly to be women. This representation, in turn,
made it possible for art. 37 to be part of the constitutional reform package. (Gray, 2003).
61 Legislation passed in 2000 established 30% party-list gender quotas in the upper and lower houses. In
Mexico, parties must meet a 40% threshold (QuotaProject.org).
6262 In 1993, President Menem clarified the quota law by issuing Executive Decree 379/93. The decree
identified the 30 percent quota as a “minimum quantity” that should apply to the entire party list. In addition to
the number of seats a political party is expected to win. Under Art. 4 of the decree, the list must include one
woman for every two men until the percentage require by law is met across all seats up for election. Even with
the clarification, many party lists failed to conform. Lawsuits were filed challenging the constitutionality of the
quota law. These disputes were settled when the 1994 constitutional reform amended art. 37 (Dahlerup &
Freidenwall, 2009, p. 41).
60
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promote equal access by women and men to elective offices and posts as well as to professional and
social positions.” In addition, art. 4 maintains that “[political parties and groups] shall contribute to
the implementation” of equal access of women to elected office. France’s Socialist Party instituted
quotas in 1974, and in 1982 Parliament passed a provision on town council elections limiting
candidate lists to a maximum of 75 percent of people of the same sex. The Constitutional Council
invalidated the quota law finding that it violated the principle of universalism and equality set forth in
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. In 1999, the issue resurfaced, with
proponents making a “parity” argument – parity could not contravene the issue of universalism
because sex was a universal difference among human beings. A subsequent law, Law no. 2000-403,
limited the application of the quota rule to larger town councils, regional councils, the Corsican
assembly, the half of the Senate elected by proportional representation and the European Parliament.
In the first election held under the new parity law in June 2002, the proportion of female
parliamentarians increased by only 1.3 percent. In the next election it increased by only 6.3 percent.
Both results were far from stipulated goals. Results in local election were much better, with an
overall 21.8 increase in female council members (Dahlerup & Friedenwall, 2009). Dahlerup &
Friedenwall attribute the results to the difficulty of implementing quotas in majority/plurality systems
because of the limited number of seats for which a candidate is competing. They also highlight the
importance of good faith compliance and strong sanctions for non-compliance (Dahlerup &
Friedenwall, 2009, p. 43).
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh all have women-specific, POL-specific precommitments that
specify level of government and, in some instances, the precise numerical quota. The Indian
electoral reservations for women apply only to the panchayat and municipal levels (arts. 243, § (D)(3);
243, § (T)(3)), with none for the national or provincial levels. Both provisions require 33% direct
seat reservations. The Pakistani Constitution has women-specific precommitments at all three levels
of government. Article 51, § 1 states that “[t]here shall be three-hundred and forty-two seats for
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members in the National Assembly including seats reserved for women and non-Muslims.” Sixty
seats in the National Assembly are reserved for women. The Pakistani Constitution does not provide
for reservations in the Senate, but they are required by legislation.63 Regarding provincial assemblies,
“[e]ach Provincial Assembly shall consist of general seats and seats reserved for women and nonMuslims….” (Pak. Const. art. 106, § 1). On the local level, “[the State shall encourage local
Government institutions composed of elected representatives of the areas concerned and in such
institution special representation will be given to peasants, workers and women” (Pak. Const. art. 32).
Finally, Bangladesh has a local election women-specific precommitment similar to Pakistan (Bang.
Const. Art. 9), as well as a quota for its national Parliament. (Bang. Const. art. 65, § 3).64 Thirteen

63 Reyes (2002) notes that in March 2000, Pakistan’s military regime adopted a Devolution of Power Plan as
part of its democratization process. Under the plan, provision was made for a 33 percent quota for women in
the district, tehsil and union councils. A total of 6,022 seats were reserved for the union councils, 305 for the
tehsil council and 96 for the district councils. At the national level the National Reconstruction Bureau
announced 17% gender quotas in the Senate and National Assembly. The 17% quota fell far below the 30%
demanded by women’s groups such as the Ministry of Women and Development and the National Campaign
for Restoration of Women’s Reserved Seats, even though a number of political parties endorsed the 33% quota
(Reyes, 2002).
64 Under the rule of the British, women in Bangladesh had little political power, gaining the franchise in 1935
(Panday, 2008, p. 491). With regard to local government participation, the 1976 Union Parishad Ordinance
ensured that women would be reserved two seats in each union parishad. The quota was increased to three in
1983, with reservations being further cemented by the Local Government Second Amendment Act. Quotas
for women in national electoral politics has also grown in Bangladesh, increasing from 15 seats (4.8%) under
the original constitution in 1971, to 30 (9.7%) seats in 1979, a three-year lapse of the relevant provisions from
1987-89 and a reinstatement of the 30-seat quota in 199. The quotas lapsed again in 2000 and, through
constitutional amendment and amidst much controversy, was again reinstated and increased from 30 to 45
seats in Parliament to be distributed among political parties based on their strength. (Panday 2008, 492). That
said in 1994, women occupied only 8% of ministerial level positions, and only 9.1% of parliament seats in 2001,
below the 13.8% global average (Hossain & Tisdell, 2005, p. 449).
According to Panday (2008) it was the confluence of actions by the government, women’s
organizations, NGOs and donors that made the electoral quotas possible. Overall, the government of
Bangladesh has done much for the advancement of women. According to Panday (2008). It is a signatory to
several international initiatives geared toward women, such as the Beijing Platform for Action (PFA). The
government has also made increased economics resources available for health, education, employment and
credit for women and girls. Panday concludes that “[a]ll told, the government of Bangladesh has set up a
comprehensive network of mechanisms and institutions for the advancement of women” (Panday, 2008, p.
498). This institutional reform has aided the growth and influence of women’s organizations in Bangladesh.
Once small in number, modest in influence and narrow in its agenda, women’s organizations were able to
expand beyond their urban confines and welfare-related activities. They were able to do this by growing their
memberships from the 1970s through the 1990s, adopting a platform that included both welfare as well as

182

percent of its Parliament seats are reserved for women. Pakistan and Bangladesh are the only two
majority-Muslim cases with women-specific, POL-specific precommitments. The Philippine
Constitution also offers temporary preferences for women in national elections (Phil. Const. art. VI,
§ (5)(2)).
No African case has women-specific, POL-specific affirmative action precommitments.
Regarding Nigeria, Omotola’s (2007) survey of the Nigerian gender studies literature revealed that
Nigerian women are considered the weaker sex, and this perception is borne out politically. During
the First Republic (1960-66) there were but two female legislators in the federal parliament. During
the Second Republic (1979-83) there was one female senator out of 571 and 11 members in the
House of Representatives out of 445. Omotola posits that constitutional inadequacies, a lack of
political will on the part of Nigerian leadership, harmful traditional practices, and the legacy of
colonialism may have contributed to women’s political inequality. Okeke-Ihejirika & Franceschet
(2002) point to lack of a viable women’s movement, or state feminism. They argue that, unlike Latin
American countries, African countries have not undergone sufficient democratic consolidation.
Nigerian women did play a role in the national liberation struggle, but the movement suffered during
the post-colonial transition. Women’s gains in electoral politics were marginal during the First (196066) and Second (1979-83) Republics and elite women’s groups steered the equality discourse toward

development issues (credit, employment, literacy health care, etc.) and by becoming more inclusive, courting
both urban and rural constituencies.
Panday also highlights the role of the Bangladesh Mahila Parishad (BMP) as an example of how
women’s organizations were able to be effective institutions in lobbying for progressive change. They
established support groups for the women representatives and built meaningful alliances with political leaders
and government officials. As a result of these political relationships, the women “realized their individual
potentials better and gained confidence in their ability to challenge social norms and other forms of
discrimination” (Panday, 2008, p. 500). NGOs have also played an integral role in elevating the economic
potential of Bangladeshi women, through micro-credit programs offered by enterprises such as the Grameen
Bank and efforts to encourage rural constituents to run for local offices. Finally, Panday recognizes the role of
international donors such as the UN of the IMF, but dedicates only a brief discussion to the issue and provides
no specific data, quantitative or qualitative, as to how they enhanced the political bargaining power of women.
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charitable causes and more neutral subjects. In the opinion of the authors, deeply ingrained social,
political and social gender roles have forced African women to “build their political platforms around
socially acceptable roles in society, cautiously framing their demands to the state to avoid
overstepping the boundaries set by existing gender ideologies that keep them outside the formal
political sphere” (Okeke-Ihejirika & Franceschet, 2002, p. 450). In Omotola’s view, the art. 15(2)
equality provision is insufficient, as are the other governmental measures taken to achieve gender
equality.65
ii.

ECON/EMP-specific precommitments
There are 17 cases that have women-specific affirmative action precommitments in the

ECON/EMP domain. Like the POL domain, economic and employment relations are colored by
historical cultural gender inequalities that, although ubiquitous, vary by case in type, degree and cause.
Two main types of precommitments were found – those that concern maternity and those that
authorize labor market incentives. One case – China – has a SEX-specific, civil service provision at
art. 48. Article 49(B) of the Turkish Constitution is the most minimal classical example of a SEXspecific working-conditions precommitment; “[m]inors, women and persons with physical or mental
disabilities, shall enjoy special protection with regard to working conditions.” Turkey has enacted
wage equality legislation. However, Ozkanli & Ozbilgin (2001) maintain that despite constitutional
and legislative efforts, and the pressure of feminist groups and academics, gender equality in Turkey
remains rudimentary. They argue that the negative social effects of economic recession, together
with accelerated migration from rural to urban areas and the resurgence of the religious right, has
operated to sustain gender inequality in the Turkish labor market, even in light of Art. 49(B) and the
broader art. 10.

Omotola identifies the 1995 creation of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, various economic empowerment
strategies for women and the work of a number of NGOs as initiatives aimed at helping Nigerian women. It
must be noted that Omotola believes that affirmative action policies may not be a good idea because of a lack
of substantive outcomes. Instead, the author urges us to “refocus beyond affirmative action” and look to
power politics (Omotola, 2007, p. 43).
65
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Other provisions address the issues of maternity and working conditions more specifically.
Article 32, § 3 of the ROKConstitution reads, “[s]pecial protection shall be accorded to working
women, and they shall not be subjected to unjust discrimination in terms of employment, wages or
working conditions.” This provision is bolstered by art. 34, § 3 and art. 36, §§ 1 and 2, which
promote the rights of women and protect maternity, respectively. Kim (2006) argues that art. 32, § 3
gained inclusion into the Sixth Republic Constitution in 1987 because women’s organizations and
feminist law scholars were active during the democratization process. These same groups, in
conjunction with labor organizations, fought for revisions to the Labor Standards Act (LSA) to
ensure maternity protections. By working with female members of the Korean Assembly, revision
was achieved.66 The 1987 Korean Gender Equality in Employment Act (GEEA), and its subsequent
revisions, was also the result of interest group mobilization and pressure.67 South Korea does have
affirmative action legislation, permitting the state to use special measures in the promotion of
women’s equality. GEEA defines affirmative action as “temporary special measures to be taken to
give preference to a particular gender to remove the existing discriminations” (Kim, 2006, p. 63).
Article 13, § 14 of the Philippines Constitution has a tacit maternal reference; “[t]he State
shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into account
their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and
enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation.” The provision makes no
mention of wages, although the Philippines does have equal pay legislation. The Philippines has had

66 Under the legislation, women were prohibited from working in hazardous occupations during pregnancy or
soon after childbirth. These women could consent to working nights and holidays, with certain qualifications
for overtime pay. Maternity leave was increased from 60 to 90 days, with 30 days unpaid. In 2003, women’s
menstrual leave was debated, but ultimately, retained as unpaid leave. In 2005, new maternity provision
required employers had to provide protection in case of natural abortion or still birth, and women in small and
mid-size firms could be paid for 90 days leave before and after childbirth from employment insurance (Kim,
2006, pp. 57-58).
67 GEEA prohibited employment discrimination in recruitment, hiring, firing and dismissal. Women had to be
granted childcare leave of up to a year if a female worker with a child less than one year old so requested.
Nursing facilities also had to be implemented. In 1989 an equal par provision was included. Revisions made in
1995 and 1999 outlawed indirect discrimination, such as height requirements (Kim, 2006, pp. 59-60).
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maternity leave policies since 1952, but the leave applies only to those employed in the formal sector;
agricultural workers or urban poor who are “informal” are not covered. What’s more, maternity
leave is tied to social security and not all businesses comply with the social security law (Rivera,
2008). In the Mexican Constitution, the type and amount of maternal benefits receive further
explication;
[d]uring the three months prior to childbirth, women shall not perform physical labor that
requires excessive material effort. In the month following childbirth they shall necessarily
enjoy the benefit of rest and shall receive their full wages and retain their employment and
the rights acquired under their labor contract. During the nursing period they shall have two
special rest periods each day, of a half hour each, for nursing their infants (Mex. Const. art.
123, § (A)(V)).
Also,
[w]omen shall be entitled to one month's leave prior to the approximate date indicated for
childbirth and to two months' leave after such date. During the nursing period, they shall
have two extra rest periods a day, of a half hour each, for nursing their children. In addition,
they are entitled to medical and obstetrical attention' medicines, nursing aid, and infant care
services (Mex. Const. art. 123, § (B)(X)(c)).
The Ukrainian and Ethiopian Constitutions contain similar language (Ukr. Const. art. 24; Eth. Const.
art. 35, § A).
Brazil is the only case with affirmative action precommitments that concern women in the
labor market. Brazil’s art. 7, § (XX) is concise and broad; “[i]n addition to any others designed to
improve their social condition, the following are rights of urban and rural workers: protection of the
job market for women through specific incentives, as provided by law.” Brazil, a social state, permits
such broad intervention by the state into the economy on behalf of women writ large. Whether such
intervention occurs, however, is debatable. During Brazil’s democratization in the 1970s, women
fought for and achieved several constitutional protections. Women, specifically Afro-Brazilian
women, were able to make greater labor market inroads through “pink-collar” jobs. From 1976-1998
women’s participation in the labor force grew by 175%. From 2001 to 2007 women participants in
the labor force grew from 20.1 million to 25.8 million. (Wageindicator.org, 2009, p. 16). Brazil is a
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signatory to several international labor recommendations and conventions, including ILO
Recommendation No. 90 and Convention No. 100 on the equality of remuneration of male and
female workers, and Recommendation No. 165 and Convention No. 156 on the equality of
opportunity and treatment of men and women with dependents, Brazil’s 2005 National Plan of Policies
for Women makes it clear that “the State undertakes the responsibility for implementing public policies
[and] the consolidation of citizenship and of gender equality” (National Plan of Policies for Women,
2004, p. 23). These actions may include the elimination of economic inequalities through wealth and
income distribution. More to the point, the federal, state and local governments should “encourage
and implement affirmative action policies as instruments necessary for the full exercise of all
fundamental rights and liberties to different groups of women” (National Plan of Policies for
Women, 2004, p. 25). For example, in the agricultural sector, the Programme of Affirmative Actions,
of the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), established that a minimum of 30% of the
resources of the National Programme of Family Farming (PRONAF) should be earmarked to female
farmers.
iii.

EDU-specific precommitments
No case has an EDU-specific precommitment. The closest is Vietnam;
[w]omen workers shall enjoy a regime related to maternity. Women who are State employees
and wage-earners shall enjoy paid pre- natal and post-natal leaves during which they shall
receive all their wages and allowances as determined by law. The State and society shall
create all necessary conditions for women to raise their qualifications in all fields and fully
play their roles in society, they shall see to the development of maternity homes, paediatric
departments, creches and other social-welfare units so as to lighten house work and allow
women to engage more actively in work and study, undergo medical treatment, enjoy periods
of rest and fulfill their maternal duties (Viet. Const. art. 63).

This provision does not mention any specific educational preferences for women, and overall tenor is
that of maternity. Thus, it does not qualify as an EDU-specific preference.
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iv.

CULT-specific precommitments
Two cases had a precommitment in the CULT domain – the DRC and Iran. The CULT

domain concerns principally interpersonal gender role performativity within the home and in
domestic financial matters. On the one hand, gender roles are constructed based on case-specific
cultural norms and, thus, by their very nature, become particularized. On the other hand, the cultural
ubiquity of patriarchy in the formulation, institution and reproduction of both individual and group
male-female relations cannot go undiscussed. Issues such as domestic violence, dowry, the
assignment of household tasks, rights of inheritance, and even issues of maternity and motherhood
may prevent many women from taking advantage of affirmative action preferences in the other more
“public” domains: ECON/EMP, EDU and POL. Thus, arguably, the most critical domain is the
one that is least addressed.
Article 14 of the DRC Constitution does address the issue of personal protections for
women, specifically in the area of sexual violence; “[decisionmakers] take measures in order to fight
all forms of violence against women in their public and private life.”68 It works in conjunction with
art. 15 and its prohibition of sexual violence as a tool to destabilize or displace families, and its
labeling of such an act a crime against humanity. During the Congolese civil war, armed groups on
both sides of the conflict routinely used “sexual terrorism” as a weapon against women. Abduction,
gang rape and sexual enslavement of young women were not uncommon. In 2002, as the new
constitution was being contemplated, women’s groups met with rebel groups and civil society
organizations to ensure that the post-civil war peace process incorporated women’s issues. On the
basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1325,69 women were ultimately included in the Inter-

In the 2005 constitutional referendum 60% of all voters were women. Women were active participants
during the entire constitutional process.
69 Key provisions of the resolution include: increased participation and representation of women in all levels of
decision-making; attention to specific protection needs of women and girls in conflict; gender perspective in
post-conflict processes; gender perspective in UN programming, reporting and in Security Council missions;
and gender perspective and training in UN peace support operations.
68
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Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which was called for by the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Of the 73
delegates selected to represent the Congolese at the dialogue 6 were women and some women were
specifically asked not to voice women’s issues. Rape of Congolese women was prevalent during the
war and unfortunately continues after the cease-fire. Whitman concludes that participation in the
peace process was positive, but more work needs to be done (Whitman, 2007, p. 47). Indeed, as
Davis (2009) maintains, even with the constitutional provisions and the sophisticated legislation
promulgated under its authority very few cases of sexual violence go to court, and those that do are
recommended for settlement so that the perpetrator can avoid justice70 (Davis, 2009, p. 21).
Although, the DRC may seem an extreme example, the dearth of affirmative action
precommitments in the CULT domain is striking. Social, cultural and familial discrimination does
not go unaddressed in the constitutions sampled in this study. Nine cases have women-specific
equality precommitments that address cultural and familial relations between the sexes: China (art.
48), Japan (art. 14), Vietnam (arts. 63, 64), Ethiopia (art. 35), Egypt (art. 11), Turkey (art. 41), South
Korea (arts. 11, § 1; art. 36, § 1), Ukraine (art. 51) and Colombia (art. 42). Some provisions are quite
minimal, such as Turkey – “[t]he family is the foundation of Turkish society and based on the
equality between the spouses” (Turk. Const. art. 41) – and South Korea – “[m]arriage and family life
are entered into and sustained on the basis of individual dignity and equality of the sexes, and the
State must do everything in its power to achieve that goal” (ROK Const. art. 36, § 1).
Provisions like art. 35 of the Ethiopian Constitution present a borderline case and fall at the
other end of the spectrum; “[m]en and women without any distinction as to race, nation, nationality
or religion, who have attained marriageable age as defined by law, have the right to marry and found

70 Poor, rural Congolese women face several obstacles in trying to seek justice for sexual violence, including
lack of funds to file a complaint or obtain a medical certificate, lack of access to counsel, the lack of available
courts and no provision for witness protection. Furthermore, women generally have the responsibility of
taking care of families, making it difficult to find time to travel to court (Davis, 2009, p. 21). As a result, many
women are forced to endure the physical and psychological trauma, unwanted pregnancies and social rejection.
NGOs have raised awareness about these issues (Bosmans, 2007). For an in-depth analysis of rape during the
ethnic conflict in the Congo see Kirchner (2008).
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a family. They have equal rights while entering into, during marriage and at the time of divorce.”
Articles 35, secs. (1) and (4) provide further protections; “[w]omen have equal rights with men in
marriage as prescribed by this Constitution” and “the State shall enforce the right of women to
eliminate the influences of harmful customs that oppress women or cause bodily or mental harm….”
Futhermore, “[w]omen have the right to participate in national development policies” (Eth. Const.
art. 35, § 6), and to acquire administer, control, transfer and benefit from property“(Eth. Const. art.
35, § 7). Because art. 35, sec. (3) is a classical women-specific affirmative action precommitment and
is located under the section entitled “Rights of Women,” it may be reasonable to assume that the
rights accorded to women via the other sub articles of art. 35(3) can in fact justify state preferences
for women within the PERS domain. However, the language of art. 35(4) suggests nondiscrimination rather than a preference.
IV.

Discussion
All in all, the review of the relevant data shows that most cases have some form of women-

specific precommitment. However, the range of precommitments is not very broad. Those in the
POL domain are relatively recent, with Pakistan’s being the most recent. Precommitments in the
ECON/EMP domain are almost entirely confined to issues of maternity, and precommitments in
the EDU and CULT domains are almost non-existent. One explanation for this paucity might be the
lack of shocks, both endogenous and exogenous, that could serve as an impetus for constitutional
amendment. As we have seen in the POL domain with cases such as France and Argentina, and in
the ECON/EMP domain with Turkey and the ROK, the creation and exploitation of opportunity
structures that would permit the enactment of constitutionalized SEX preferences require a particular
confluence of events. Mobilization and political pressure applied by women’s movements and
academics appear to be indispensable in forcing political elites to act. From an exogenous vantage
point; demonstration effects and the pressure of international and regional standards memorialized in
covenants work to determine whether an enactment of a precommitment is possible, either during
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transition to democracy or through later amendment. Precisely how these factors must manifest and
interact to produce the desired outcome in a particular political context is complex and requires
further study.
What is clear is that some form of classical constitutional precommitment would be optimal
to ensure the constitutionality of gender preferences, particularly quotas. It is also clear that a
women-specific, non-domain-specific affirmative action provisions alone, without domain-specific
additions, may be insufficient to provide legal protections for certain gender preferences. India, for
example, has a women-specific, non-domain-specific precommitment and a POL-specific
precommitment in the form of local-level seat reservations. The other three domains have no
women-specific affirmative action provisions; however affirmative action legislation in these domains
has been upheld. In her discussion of gender relations in India, MacKinnon (2006) relates that
Indian jurisprudence has upheld reservations for women in employment, underscoring its evolution
toward achieving substantive equality for women. However, gains in the CULT domain lag behind.
As evidence, she points to the 1996 Hindu Succession Act, which gives sons of intestates almost
unilateral authority to block property sales, even to the detriment of a daughter’s inheritance.
Christian personal laws regarding divorce required women to allege several grounds while men need
only allege one. Under Muslim personal laws in India, women must be monogamous, but men may
have up to four wives and can divorce unilaterally. In MacKinnon’s view “[i]t appears to be more
important [to Indian courts] to leave determinations of family life to religion than to deliver on the
constitutional and international sex equality rights that the Court has shown itself so capable of
guaranteeing in other areas, and the challenges to family laws have so amply justified (MacKinnon,
2006, 192-93). Indeed, MacKinnon finds this reluctance by the state to extend sex equality to the
family to be culturally ubiquitous, as all societies are male dominated. Thus, although the
entrenchment of religious and cultural norms may make it difficult, the safeguarding of affirmative
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action rights for women may require that constitution drafters include non-domain-specific
provisions as well domain-specific provisions.
In fact, explicit and detailed mention of some domains in a constitution may be more
important for ending discrimination in those domains than in others. Bangladesh has no womenspecific, EDU-specific precommitment but does have a social precommitment at art. 10, a womenspecific equality precommitment at art. 28, § 2, and a non-group-specific, non-domain-specific
precommitment at art. 28, § 4. However, evidence suggests that women and girls have nevertheless
made great strides in education thanks to special measures (Siddique, 1998, p. 1097). Although the
traditional position of women in Bangladesh has been inside the home, and the high poverty level
forces many parents to choose to educate male children over female, various educational indicators
show progress. A study by Hosain (2005) shows that, in absolute terms, between 1974 and 1998
primary school enrollment grew by about 200, secondary school enrollment grew by more than
700%, college enrollment grew by 2,300% and university enrollment grew by 230%. When
compared to males, female-male enrollment ratios (FMER) demonstrate that the gender gap has
been reduced and, if current trends persist, enrollment at the primary, secondary and college levels
should be equalized by 2009, 2012 and 2021, respectively (Hosain & Tisdell, 2005, p. 442).71
Bangladesh’s progress toward gender equality has not been as robust in the CULT and
ECON/EMP domains. For example, in 2004, the UN Human Development Report listed
Bangladesh as 110th out of 144 countries on gender-related violence. Child marriage is still practiced,
property rights that exist under Shar’iah have not undergone egalitarian reform and domestic
In their study of primary school enrollment in Bangladesh, Mushtaque, Chowdhury, Nath & Chowdhury
(2003) point out that government “affirmative action” programs targeted at the disadvantaged – school
stipends and “food for school” incentives – worked in conjunction with NGO recruitment programs to narrow
the enrollment gap between girls and boys. As the authors state plainly, “[t]hat the increase in girls’ enrollment
is induced by affirmative action taken by the government and NGOs cannot be doubted…” (Mushtaque et al.,
2003, p. 613). There has also been an increase in workforce participation and income earning activities,
principally among rural women. Hossain concludes that there have been significant improvements in
education and labor force participation, a measurable decrease in earnings inequality in the manufacturing
sector, and modest improvement in formal political participation. There, is, however much more to be done to
achieve equality (Hossain & Tisdell 2005, p. 451; Siddique, 1998).
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violence remains a viable tool for men to enforce domestic gender roles (Khan, 2005, p. 221). In
addition, many women have become the items of sex trafficking and prostitution, perhaps a
consequence of the familial disruption that occurs during rural-to-urban migration. And even with
gains in labor force participation in the garment and shrimp export industries72, women continue to
face job insecurity, rape, harassment and acid throwing. (Khan, 2005, p. 223). Khan contends that
economic development in Bangladesh has shifted the site of gendered violence from the private to
the public, perhaps increasing its frequency. In doing so, she highlights the irony seemingly inherent
in the relationship between economic development and women’s equality
In a society where women have remained invisible for generations, economic development
through private and public initiatives has very quickly thrown them outside their protected,
albeit discriminatory private settings. The exploitation of their vulnerability and
powerlessness in the marketplace as well as the backlash from the traditional patriarchy have
left them with little safeguard and, hence, agency (Khan, 2005, p. 229).
Therefore, it stands to reason that when it comes to legal protection for legislative preferences aimed
at substantive sex equality, certain domains require more explicit and detailed precommitments than
others, particularly where paradigms of gender inequality are most durable and most pernicious.
Specifically, the CULT domain requires the most attention because of its inherently private nature,
which tends to shield it from state interference Articles 14 and 15 of the DRC Constitution provide
a basic blueprint, but specification of sub-domains such as preferences in spousal abuse, marriage,
divorce and inheritance should be made, even though this is generally done through legislation. The

The forces of globalization were the central impetus for the growth of the garment industry, and the
consequent expansion of employment opportunities for women. Kabeer & Mahmud (2004) report that trade
liberalization has greatly expanded the wage-earning opportunities for women of all backgrounds. However,
the poorer women who populate the garment factories suffer much more discrimination and job insecurity
than the more educated women who are hired in the export processing zones (EPZ). Additionally, all women’s
voices, regardless of class, remain muted, with their reluctance to unionize under the threat of layoffs and their
fear of promotion within the factory hierarchy because of the fear of sexual harassment. Fears of greater voice
also penetrated the domestic site, as garment factory women handed their entire pay over to their husband so
as not to disrupt traditional gender roles and notions of social stratification (Ahmed, 2004). Thus even though
the garment industry has allowed rural women to earn income, its effect on public and private liberties seems at
best negligible and at worst deleterious. As Ahmed (2004) notes, “[b]ecoming a garment worker and keeping
your job is synonymous with losing collective voice and staying mute” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 41).
72
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Ethiopian language addresses these issues. Under the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution, women
challenging customary laws can choose to have a dispute adjudicated under customary laws or under
the 1960 Civil Code which attempted to harmonize the discordant personal laws of the diverse ethnic
and religious group in Ethiopia. The Civil Code expanded women’s economic and personal rights in
matters of inheritance and ownership of household property (Gopal, 1999, p. 6).
It should be noted at this point that most of the majority-Muslim cases in the sample – Iran,
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Turkey – have a SEX-specific preference. Only Nigeria and Indonesia do
not, but Indonesia does have the broad non-group-specific, non-domain-specific precommitment at
art. 28, § (H)(2). Article 21 of the Iranian Constitution addresses women’s rights and provides for
“special insurance for widows, and aged women and women without support” (Iran Const. art.
31(4)). That said, the implementation is explicitly qualified by a “conformity with Islamic criteria”
requirement. This qualification is important, as relevant literature shows that in the instance of
gender, Islamic legal thought and doctrine have assigned men and women distinct social roles. As
Tucker (2008) explains “[a]lthough in general the Qur’an deals with women in an egalitarian and nondiscriminatory fashion, there are verses that have provided the basis on which to build gender
hierarchies (Tucker, 2008, p. 24). From Quranic passages such as chapter 4, verse 34, the male was
interpreted as breadwinner with broad domestic authority over the dependents and the woman as
subservient and obedient. Such discriminatory practices are not limited to the domestic domain.
Historically, men have been permitted to seek several wives, prostitution is criminalized but the male
client faces no charges, and the financial compensation for accidental death of a spouse is halved for
a woman (Tucker, 2008, p. 26). An ethnographic study conducted by Basu (2008) in the Kolkata
Family Court in India highlighted the disadvantages that Muslim Indian women face in seeking legal
remedies in divorce and divorce maintenance disputes.
In accord with MacKinnon, Tucker opines that the arena of domestic relations has
historically been one in which women have suffered material subordination. The reach of law into
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the private realm of society was deep. This reach operated to permit the state to regulate familial
relations and, consequently, a woman’s freedom over her own body. Simply stated, “[t]he long arm
of the law did not stop at the bedroom door, and the woman’s physical comforts and sexual
experiences within marriage, the legitimacy of her pregnancy, and her special needs as a nursing
mother were all well within its purview” (Tucker, 2008, p. 28). Islamic law, in its many permutations
does countenance the female experience, but does so in a way that makes them subject to male
patriarchal priorities. (Tucker, 2008, p. 29). This asymmetrical gender dynamic is not only strictly
legal, but is articulated and reproduced through linguistic apparatuses that infuse legal discursive.
Thus, it would seem as if there is a conflict between the fundamental fairness and redistributive
tenets of Islamic Socialism and the effectuation of substantive women’s equality, particularly in the
CULT domain. Given this, backdrop the paucity of SEX-specific precommitments is predictable.
Perhaps we can best explain the existence of precommitments in Pakistan and Bangladesh through
their reliance on, and arguable improvement upon, the Indian legal tradition of reservations for
women. Turkey’s precommitment is relatively new and was likely enacted as a result of exogenous
pressures – to buttress its application for EU membership.
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CHAPTER 8
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PRECOMMITMENTS FOR LERN MINORITIES
I.

LERN-specific precommitments
In large part, the criteria for identifying LERN precommitments follows the basic principles

for identifying precommitments, as explained infra. In their classical form, LERN precommitment
language should make a clear, unambiguous and unequivocal commitment to amelioration the status
of LERN groups it deems necessary by undertaking extraordinary or exemplary steps that favor
LERN groups over another group(s). Classical terminology may not be necessary to deem a
provision a LERN precommitment. The LERN precommitments in this study target a variety of
minority groups including racial, ethnic, linguistic and national. Obviously, achieving mutual
exclusivity is a virtually impossibility because there is substantial overlap amongst these groups. Even
still, the overlap does not prohibit rigorous analysis of the prevalence of precommitments that target
these groups.
As it is a widely accepted principle, the ubiquity of economic, social and political
marginalization of LERN minority groups will not be belabored. Suffice it to say, there are several
causal factors that create and reproduce the institutions that facilitate and reify subaltern
marginalization and dispossession. Potential causes include colonial exploits, forms of slavery or
involuntary servitude and immigration. In the case of colonialism, whether colonial powers created
the LERN cleavages upon arrival, or simply manipulated and exacerbated existing tribal/clan/caste
cleavages is a contentious issue and one which must be considered on a case-by-case basis. What we
do know, however, is that in the cases in which colonialism did occur, material and discursive
subordination generally resulted. Colonial powers used LERN cleavages to legitimize their own
subordination of the indigenous peoples and to facilitate the introduction of new economic and
governmental institutions, institutions that inevitably operated to the detriment of the indigenous.
Most of the cases in this study can be classified as former colonies.
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Given the historical specificity and spatial contingency of racial projects, perhaps the best
approach to analyzing the treatment of LERN minorities is to first compare and contrast treatment
by geographical region. In the European context, Panayi (1999) identifies three types of minorities:
dispersed peoples, localized minorities and post-WWII immigrants. Dispersed groups come in four
general types. First, Jews were already residents of Europe and migrated west and north in
subsequent centuries. Gypsies originated in India and moved west and north. Germans began their
move eastward as early as the tenth century, inhabiting the areas left after the collapse of the AustroHungarian and Ottoman Empires. Finally, Muslims moved westward into Eastern Europe.
Localized minorities are indigenous groups that reside in individual states or small areas of Europe.
Some examples are the Celts in Britain and peripheral peoples of the Russian empire. Local
minorities can also be created by states through unification. The unification of Spain in the fifteenth
century, the creation of Italy and Germany during the nineteenth century and the formation of
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia at the end of WWI are instructive examples. In post-WWII Europe,
immigrant and refugee flows increased dramatically. The first phase of this migration affected
primarily Nazi-controlled areas: victims of Nazism, foreign workers used by the German economy,
German expellees and victims of Stalinism. The second phase involved the importing of foreign
labor for European economies. Both push and pull factors contribute to this migration from the
European periphery. Some states like Turkey encouraged emigration as a tool for population
management. During the third phase, many industrial western European states closed their doors to
immigrants while countries on the Mediterranean periphery began importing foreign labor (Panayi,
1999, pp. 2-3).
In Panayi’s view, the emergence of centralized states is what made ethnicity in Europe
problematic. To be sure, the Roman, Ottoman and Habsburg empires all ruled over diverse
populations, favored certain ethnic groups within those populations and persecuted others.
However, assimilationism was not the policy. As Panayi explains,
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in the agrarian non-technological societies and economies of the Ottoman and Habsburg
Empires, different religious and ethnic groups could keep themselves to themselves barely
conscious of their ethnicity…. They recognized the existence of other peoples, but accepted
the differences. They had no desire to eliminate them until nation-states arose in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Panayi, 1999, p. 10).
There were, however, instances of pre-technological and pre-literate ethnic nationalism. Some sense
of ethnicity did exist among English elites in monarchical England as early as the eleventh century
and fifteenth century Spain persecuted Jews, Gypsies, Moriscos, Basques and Catalans. Mass
nationalism spread throughout Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and by the
twentieth century the nation-state had become recognized as the only legitimate political unit. And,
in the twenty-first century socio-political environment immigration and racism are key issues in
Europe. As an extension of Panayi’s discussion of post-WWII migration, there have developed new
patterns of migration to Europe since the fragmenting of the Soviet Union, and a combination of
political instability, economic and natural disasters and the threat of genocide have increased the
number of asylum seekers. Today, Europe has seen a resurgence of right-wing nationalistic animus
directed at racial and ethnic minorities and their cultural, religious and linguistic differences (Wrench
& Solomos, 1993, p. 8).
In Latin America, LERN minority groups have historically been divided between blacks
imported from Africa and the indigenous peoples, with the former considered a “race” and the latter
considered “ethnic” groups. Wade (1997) contends that Africans and Indians occupied different
positions in the Portuguese and Spanish colonial orders. For example, there was little agreement
among Spanish thinkers and clergy as to whether Indians should be made slaves. Popular discourse at
the time characterized them as savages and barbarians, but civilizations such as the Aztecs and Maya
had constructed large cities and a system of rule of law. By 1542, slavery of the indigenous had been
abolished in Spanish colonies. Conversely, enslavement of Africans was not the subject of
controversy (Wade, 1997, p. 27). Over time, the Spanish/Portuguese, Indians and Africans mixed
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creating mestizaje,73 and making rigid classification difficult, if not impossible. A person of blackwhite mixture was called mulatto and black-indian mixed persons were referred to as zambo. For
census purposes, the Spanish maintained an indio category for Indians; however, the classification for
blacks was much more vague. In the Spanish colonies, this system of stratification was referred to as
the sociedad de castas, although the situation in Brazil was more fluid, the basic structure was similar;
“whites were at the top, Indians and blacks at the bottom and positions in the middle were defined
by various criteria of status, among which colour and descent were very important, without being
definitive” (Wade, 1997, p. 29). The Indian/ethnic-black/race dichotomy persisted after
decolonization.
In Latin America, policies to address the race or ethnic question have more recently become
influenced by a “neoliberal anti-racist platform” embodied in a “colorblind ideology manifesting
weak to non-existent race-based collective identities and low, if any, emphasis on race matters in
everyday discussions, public policy or social analysis” (Warren & Sue, 2011, p. 42). Assimilationist
policies such as race-mixing, like that practiced in Mexico, were an attempt to erode racial divisions
and black or indigenous identities. Several countries also employed the strategy of color-blindness,
or ignoring race as a social category. Instead, group disadvantage is explained by class or economic
cleavages (Warren & Sue, 2011; Hoffman & Centeno, 2003, p. 378). Note that both Venezuela and
Peru have publicly denied that racism exists (Warren & Sue, 2011, p. 40). The authors point to
several instances in which the use of race was banned altogether. In post-independence Bolivia,
many sought to ban the term “Indian” and replace it with “Bolivian.” During the Cuban revolution,

Martinez-Eschabal (1998) describes mestizaje as the process of inter-racial and or inter-cultural mixing. In the
nineteenth century it was linked to the trope of lo Americano, or the authentic Latin American. From the 1920s
through the 1960s mestizaje was used to affirm one’s cultural identity. More recently, it has been descriptive of
the mixture of culture in Latin America such as Japanese Brazilians, Argentine Jews and Afro Cubans. As
Martinez-Eschabal states, “because Latin America is one of the regions in which racial and cultural mixing has
taken place most extensively and most violently because of the nature and timing of colonization, mestizaje is a
theme that virtually every Latin American writer/intellectual has addressed in one fashion or another”
(Martinez-Eschabal, 1998, p. 21).
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Afro-Cuban communities were dismantled because their existence conflicted with a colorblind
ideology. In 1930, Mexico removed the question of race from its census because race-mixing has
rendered such data “progressively inaccurate” and “meaningless” (Warren & Sue, 2011, p. 41). The
deleterious effects of these assimilationist and color-blind approaches have been mitigated to some
extent by a trend of multi-culturalism that privileged ethnic diversity. However, this seeming
departure from mestizo nationalism has been undermined by everyday acts of racism and policies that
are more symbolic than substantive.
In their examination of the changes in race and class discourse in Latin American history,
Applebaum, Macpherson & Rosenblatt (2003) identify four critical historical moments. First,
European notions of racial hierarchy were imposed on colonial subjects, excluding racial and ethnic
minorities from political and economic authority. Pro-independence elites purported to restructure
racial classifications while also relying on principles of classical liberalism. Only white or creole
persons could be deemed to have the “civic virtue” required for self-government; blacks, Indians and
those without property were denied full citizenship. For example, Latin American anti-colonialist
Simon Bolivar viewed diversity as an impediment to democracy. He believed that mixed-race
Venezuelans lacked virtue and that they required serious political education before they could be
permitted to participate in government. During the second moment, late nineteenth century
republics experienced a rise in commodity exports, the end of slavery and the spread of
proletarianization. Commercial agriculture was an attack on indigenous communal landholding.
Elites simultaneously sought cultural homogeneity among the races while continuing the racial
classification scheme that was so integral to labor group stratification. Population control of
minorities was attempted, undergirded by eugenic notions of inherent inequality and effectuated
through control of reproduction and other social activities aimed at improving the “lower” races’
stock. In the third moment, late nineteenth and early twentieth century populist nationalist projects
emerged to form independence movements. Many of these movements rallied workers through
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discourses of racial harmony, as the doctrines of import substitution and national self-sufficiency
began to take root. In Cuba, Jose Marti mobilized ex-slaves and slave masters against imperial Spain
by defining the Cuban nation as raceless. Intellectuals like Gilberto Freyre and Manuel Gamio began
to repudiate the eugenics theory and argued that mestizaje actually benefitted humanity. Blacks found
pride through the negritude movement and the indigenistas elevated the beauty of native peoples.
Finally, the fourth moment many Latin American scientific and political elites began to avoid the
terminology of race. In the post-WWII environment, they opted instead for the term “ethnic.”
In the latter part of the twentieth century, ethnic movements began to take shape. Yashar
(2005) describes how indigenous movements shut down commerce in Ecuador, the Ciapas made
demands of the Mexican government, the Maya in Guatemala organized the Second Continental
Meeting of Indigenous Popular Resistance and indigenous movements in Ecuador helped topple two
leaders. In Yashar’s words “they are demanding equal rights; but they are also demanding special
rights as native peoples – with claims to land autonomous juridical spheres and the right to maintain
ethnonational identities distinct from, but formative of, a multinational state” (Yashar, 2005, p. 5).
By using citizenship regimes, the state privileges certain groups. In her comparison of Ecuador,
Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru and Mexico, Yashar (1998) argues that indigenous movements have
emerged to challenge citizenship hierarchies, through exploitation of the opening created by political
liberal liberalization and their own cultural identities. In Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala and Mexico
ethnic cleavages have become more politicized in recent years, spawning national and regional
organizations mobilized around the defense of “Indians as Indians.” Conversely, in Peru ethnic
identity has been overshadowed by class-based identity, leading to weak mobilization efforts (Yashar,
1998, p. 27). Yashar’s arguments are grounded in comparative historical analysis, rather than
primordialist, rational or post-structural paradigms.
Minority treatment in Southeast Asia has been explained by an illiberal application of “Asian
values,” which privileges the collective good over individual and minority rights. However, the
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simplest explanation is that Southeast Asian governments comprise elite ruling classes that prioritize
their own self-interests over those of society. And in the words of Brown (2007),
[t]he capitalist economic development of these nation-states depends in part on their
capacities for transforming the economies of their pre-capitalist peripheries. The location of
ethnic minorities, in particular the ‘indigenous peoples’, in such pre-capitalist peripheries
thus explains the interventionism of the state, and the societal disruptions which stimulate
ethnic minority mobilization (Brown, 2007, p. 68).
Finally, nationalism may explain ethnic majority treatment of minorities. Authoritarian or semiauthoritarian Asian leaders legitimize their rule by constructing the nation-state as ethnic, and whose
survival depends upon the subordination and marginalization of minority interests. Minority
subordination results in uneven economic development, an occurrence which engenders resentment
within the minority consciousness.
Brown asserts that “[t]he dominant view in the literature on Asian nationalism and ethnic
politics has long been that Asian nation-states were conducted so as to favour one dominant cultural
community at the expense of the diverse indigenous, migrant or ethno-national minorities” (Brown,
2007, p. 62). In this narrative, the ethnic minorities are victims with legitimate claims to autonomy.
Brown (2007) argues that western-style multinational federalism may be problematic because many
Asian states have authoritarian or illiberal tendencies. These factors result in a fear that ethnic-based
autonomous or semi-autonomous sub-national units may come to be governed by militant ethnonational elites, perhaps eventuating in political instability and disintegration. In the case of Southeast
Asia, ethnic minorities have indeed been victimized by states’ authoritarian features. This may be
caused or at least complemented by the ethnic majority’s mimicry of oppression wrought against
them by the colonizer (Brown, 2007, p. 67).
In addition to the ethnic dimension of Asian nationalism, a civic dimension operates. Here,
“civic” implies the generally recognized norms embodied in democracy and democratization: legal
and political equality, access to social programs, rule of law, etc. In this scenario, democratization
goes hand in hand with capitalist development. As Brown puts it, “[d]emocratization requires a shift
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of political focus away from the politics of ethnic minority versus ethnic minority, and toward the
politics of collective civic nationalism versus liberal civic nationalism” (Brown, 2007, p. 72). What
also occurs is a shift away from protective democracy and toward deliberative democracy.
Deliberative democracy requires that full citizenship and participatory rights be extended to all
groups, even, and perhaps especially, to marginalized ethnic minorities. This sort of national
integration through accommodation may come in the form of autonomy; however, in states with
weak capacity and legitimacy, state concessions to demands of territorial autonomy may prove
destabilizing and may lead to further demands for outright independence. Brown summarizes his
position on territorial/federal solutions to ethnic minority integration in the following way: “[i]f
deliberative democracy is the goal, then federalism is desirable only if institutionalized and
symbolized in territorially inclusive, rather than ethnically exclusive, terms and if it functions to
reduce the alienation of those in the marginalized provinces so as to promote their state-national
integration, rather than their ethno-national self-determination” (Brown 2007, p. 77).
In Southeast Asia, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities are subsumed under the heading
“ethnic minority” and are distinguished from indigenous peoples. Generally speaking, ethnic
minorities are settler populations with no primordial ties to a particular territory. Conversely,
indigenous peoples are the earliest known inhabitants of a territory (Clarke, 2010, p. 415). In
practice, the distinction between the two can be difficult to make. As Clarke notes, Vietnam does
not acknowledge the term “indigenous peoples” and instead recognizes all minorities as “ethnic
minorities.” In addition, it can be difficult to define the dominant ethnic group and to distinguish it
from minorities. Overlap between ethno-linguistic and religious groups also exists. In terms of
development, the fates of ethnic minorities and indigenous groups have both converged and
diverged. What is clear, though, is that both groups have, as Brown described suffered
discrimination at the hands of the state.
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In the 1990s, political liberalization and democratization led Southeast Asian states to
partner with minority organizations to engage in ethno-development, described by Hettne (1996) as a
combination of cultural pluralism, internal self-determination, territorialism and sustainability. Clarke
asserts that the central cause for the change was the end of the Cold War. As examples, Clarke
points to the 1986 collapse of the Marcos regime in the Philippines, an elected government in
Thailand in 1988, the introduction of doi moi in Vietnam and the New Economic Mechanism in Laos,
and democratic elections in Laos in 1993. These events were followed by the collapse of the Suharto
regime in Indonesia (Clarke 2010, p. 428). States began to pay greater attention to minority issues,
such as territorial autonomy, recognition of ancestral land rights, development projects with NGOs
and international donors. That said, minority policies do vary among Asian cases. For example,
minority policies in China and Japan occupy different ends of the cultural pluralist-assimilationist
spectrum. According to Min (1992), the Chinese Communist government emphasized ethnic
equality and ethnic autonomy, recognizing the value of ethnic diversity. The 1952 Regulation on
Autonomy of Minority Areas adopted by the Communist State Council established politically
autonomous regions for Koreans and other groups such as Mongolians and the Hui. During the
Reunification Movement (1957-1959) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) minority policy
moved toward integration, national unity and political centralization. After the Cultural Revolution,
pluralism returned. The state restored the use of minority languages in ethnic schools and increased
enrollment of minority college students through quotas (Min, 1992, p. 15).
By contrast, Murphy-Shigematsu (1992) notes that for some time Japanese political leaders
have believed that Japan should be mono-ethnic. Minorities such as the Ainu and Ryukyuans were
subjected to assimilationist policies meant to destroy their cultures. Doak (1997) argues that it was
Japan’s Meiji Restoration that precipitated the debate over the relationship between national identity
and state structures. This debate has culminated in Japan’s policy of assimilationism, typified by the
relationship between the majority Wajin and indigenous minority Ainu. As Howell (1996) explains,
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Japan’s policy is an outgrowth of the “myth of ethnic homogeneity” that “protects Japanese society
from overt ethnic conflict because it forces minorities, through the organizations that represent
them, to choose between ethnic abnegation and the purgatory of institutionalized ‘otherness’”
(Howell, 1996, p. 171). The Ainu are Japan’s indigenous minority, the original inhabitants of
Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island. As a result of Japan’s assimilationist policies, very few Ainu
can speak their native language and traditional economies and cultures have almost completely
disappeared. They have a disproportionate poverty rate and suffer from employment discrimination,
consequences brought about by policies such as the 1899 Aboriginees Protection Act, which sought
to turn the Ainu into petty farmers on marginal land (Howell, 1996, p. 173). Although Japanese
policy toward the Ainu taken a sympathetic turn, this sympathy has not been extended to other
indigenous groups such as the Burakiumin, who, although culturally distinct, have no objective
“ethnic” characteristics that distinguish them from the majority.
This brief review was intended to not only frame our discussion of LERN affirmative action
precommitments, but also to illuminate the commonalities and divergences in regional LERN
policies. Historical specificity of racial projects is key; however, serious comparison cannot ignore
the transnational sharing of theories of racial and ethnic hierarchizaton such as those imparted by
Spain upon Latin America and Britain upon African states. When we compare regions, several key
points become remarkable. First, regardless of colonial history, legal heritage or economic system, all
regions exhibited some form of racial and/or ethnic stratification that was perhaps created by, and
certainly exacerbated by, state policies that began with colonial powers and was reproduced by
political elites in the subsequent nascent republics. This is essentially what the Winant, Goldberg,
Marx “racial project” line of argument maintains. Second, LERN classification systems change over
time, with certain group identities undergoing reformation and re-valuation; however, LERN
discrimination and the consequent political and economic power asymmetries never seem to
diminish in salience. The equilibrium of inequality retains intractability even in the face of
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constitutional and legislative reforms that have granted LERN minorities more rights. Third, in
many cases there is a significant policy distinction when it comes to the treatment of indigenous vs.
non-indigenous groups, most notably in Latin America and Southeast Asia.
A.

LERN-specific, Non-domain-specific precommitments
Table 5 shows the cases with social precommitments and LERN-specific, domain-specific

precommitments. Table 6 shows the cases with equality precommitments and LERN-specific,
domain-specific precommitments. The data show that 16 of the 30 cases have classical or tacit
LERN-specific affirmative action precommitments. Of those 16, only one – Brazil - has no LERNspecific equality precommitments. Only five cases lack some sort of social precommitment.
Table 5: Cases with LERN-specific, domain-specific and social precommitments
Social precommitment
Yes
No
India, Brazil, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nigeria,
Russian Federation,
Yes
Philippines, Vietnam,
SA
Ethiopia, DRC, Italy,
LERN-specific
Myanmar, Ukraine,
precommitment
Colombia, Spain
China, Indonesia, Japan,
Germany, Thailand,
US, Argentina, Mexico,
No
Turkey, Iran, France,
Egypt
ROK
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Table 6: Cases with LERN-specific, domain-specific and equality precommitments
Equality precommitment
Yes
No
India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nigeria,
Russian Federation,
Philippines, Vietnam,
Brazil
Yes
Ethiopia, DRC, Italy,
LERN-specific
SA, Myanmar, Ukraine,
precommitment
Colombia, Spain
China, Japan, Mexico,
Germany, Egypt,
US, Indonesia, ROK,
No
Turkey, Iran, Thailand,
Argentina
France

Four of the cases with non-group-specific precommitments – the Philippines, SA, Colombia and
Spain – also have LERN-specific affirmative action precommitments. Seven cases have LERNspecific, non-domain-specific precommitments: India, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Russian Federation,
Vietnam, DRC and Italy. The POL domain has five cases with affirmative action precommitments
and the ECON/EMP domain has eight cases, respectively. Six were found in the EDU domain and
eight were found in the CULT domain. Again, as variables, geography and legal tradition do not
seem to explain variation. Finally, relative homogeneity alone is not determinative. An analysis of
the data reveals that, indeed, several of the cases with relative ethnically heterogeneity – where no one
LERN group constitutes more than 50% of the population – have LERN-specific affirmative action
precommitments. However, several other relatively homogenous states also have precommitments,
such as China, Bangladesh, Russia and Vietnam.
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Table 7: Cases with LERN-specific precommitments by group and domain
Group
Specific
Non-Specific
India, Brazil, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nigeria,
Philippines, Ethiopia,
Specific
Vietnam, SA, Myanmar,
Ukraine, Columbia,
Domain
Spain
India, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Philippines,
Nigeria, Russian
Non-Specific
Thailand, SA, Columbia,
Federation, Vietnam,
Spain, Argentina
DRC, Italy

If we subject three of the LERN-specific, non-domain-specific affirmative action
precommitment cases – India, Bangladesh and Nigeria – to comparative analysis, we can shed light
on two sequential issues crucial to unpacking and elaborating the complexity of LERN-specific
affirmative action precommitments. First, we can gain greater insight into the constellation of
macro- and micro-variables that interact to produce the precommitment. Second and subsequent,
and more specific to the LERN target group, after the preference has been constitutionalized we will
see how its actual articulation can make practical application in the manner intended by the framers a
difficult and contentious enterprise. Stated plainly, whether these three cases are actually indeed nongroup-specific – that is, applicable to all minority groups – becomes debatable because of uncertainty
about what groups are entitled to the preference. This uncertainty can be largely attributed to three
factors: (1) a lack of constitutional definitional specificity, (2) complex historical and constantly
changing LERN political dynamics and (3) a change in social and human rights norms. Finally, it is
important to note that both India and Nigeria are LERN heterogeneous societies, as well as former
British colonies that achieved relatively peaceful independence after WWII. Conversely, Bangladesh,
also with British colonial influence, is a relatively homogenous society that gained independence
through a civil war with Pakistan. India and Bangladesh have classical precommitments, while
Nigeria is characterized by its tacit “federal character” precommitment. All three cases have social
precommitments and LERN-specific equality precommitments.
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Bangladesh has a classical, LERN-specific, non-domain-specific affirmative action
precommitment at art. 28, § 4, the same provision that contains the SEX-specific precommitment
“[n]othing in this article shall prevent the State from making special provision in favour of women or
children or for the advancement of any backward section of citizens.” Gaining its independence
through civil war with Pakistan in 1972, Bangladesh is a relatively homogenous society, with 98% of
the population being ethnically Bengali and 83% being Muslim. An examination of the academic
literature reveals two minority groups of note. First, the plight of the thirteen indigenous
communities that reside in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) has been a major issue for human rights
groups. Each group is linguistically distinct and historically the CHT had been geographically
separate. Under British occupation, the tracts enjoyed a semi-autonomous status, as memorialized in
CHT Regulation 1900. Under the Regulation, outsiders, particularly Bengalis, faced several
administrative hurdles if they wanted to settle on the tracts. In 1935, the tracts gained the status of
“totally excluded area”74 (Chakma, 2010, p. 284).
Curiously, even though Bangladesh has what seems to be a LERN-specific affirmative action
precommitment, several constitutional provisions operate against the Chittagong minorities. The
Bangladesh Constitution has no territorial precommitment and makes no mention of indigenous
people, likely because of their small population. Indigenous peoples, or Adibashi, constitute
approximately 1.5% of the population. Generally speaking, adibashi are viewed as inferior, in part
because of their animistic religious practices. The principal author of the constitution, Kamal
Hossain, recommended specific recognition of indigenous peoples, in art. 29, which prohibits

As relayed by Uddin (2010) the Government of Pakistan changed the administrative status of the CHT from
“excluded area,” opening the area to Bengalis. A 1963 constitutional amendment abolished the special status of
the CHT altogether. According to Uddin,
74

[t]he most significant transformation to take place during the Pakistan period was the change in
designation of the CHT from ‘excluded area’ to ‘tribal area’, which resulted in the shift of identity of
CHT people from ‘hill men’ to ‘tribal people. In fact, this was the state’s politics of marginalization
that designated the Pahari as ‘tribal’ to indicate the people of a lower category and inferior in
comparison to others in Pakistan (Uddin, 2010, p. 288).
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discrimination on grounds of “religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth” alone. This recognition did
not occur. It also seems unlikely that indigenous peoples were intended to be included in among the
“backward class of citizens” which may receive state preferences under art. 29 (Biswas, 2008). Under
the constitution, it seems logical that the CHT groups are citizens under applicable citizenship laws
(unlike the Biharis whose citizenship status is not fully recognized by the government (Paulsen,
2006)). However, whether they qualify under art. 28, sec. 4 as a “backward section of citizens” is
unclear. What is clear is that the CHT minorities’ status as indigenous rather than Bengali has made
them susceptible to victimization by the Bangladesh government.
Chakma (2010) argues that Bangladeshi independence set in motion the “ethnocide” of the
CHT tribes through three cooperative processes: (1) nation-building and development visions of the
bureaucratic state, (2) the struggle for autonomy by CHT indigenous communities, and (3) the
militarized pursuit of a national security agenda in the CHT by the Bangladeshi state. When the new
constitution was passed, the new government’s agenda was furthered, to the unfortunate detriment
of the CHT groups. Article 9 instituted “Bengali nationalism,” implicitly outlawing competing
national allegiances, and art. 9 declared that all citizens were to be referred to as “Bengalis.”. For
Chakma, these provisions evince a classic program of assimilation and homogenization, inimical to
continued CHT autonomy. Indeed, when Manobendra Narayan Larma, a representative of the CHT
groups, met with Prime Minister Rahman during negotiations over the constitution, his demands for
continued political autonomy were met with overtures of Bengali nationalism and the rejection of any
non-Bengali indigenous identity.75 In response, the tract groups formed a political party, the PCJSS,
and when conventional avenues failed, the party opted for armed struggle. The party became viewed
as a national security threat and Bengali settlement in the CHT region increased. Indigenous land
dispossession became state policy (even in light of art. 42), sometimes accompanied by rape,

Uddin (2006) argues that it was the machinations of nineteenth-century reformers and Muslim elites who, in
their attempts create a unified sub-continental Muslim culture, inadvertently reinforced a uniquely Bengali
conception of Muslim community.
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massacre and Islamization (even in light of art. 41). The 1997 peace accord did little to stem the
evictions (Chakma, 2010). In his analysis of the constitution-making process Huq (1973) states that
unlike India, in Bangladesh there was no significant minority problem, as there was general
agreement on the four major issues: democracy, socialism, secularism and nationalism (Huq, 1973, p.
70).
Conversely, India had a significant minority concern. In the Indian Constitution, we can
find the LERN-specific precommitment under art. 15, § 4, Under that article, the state’s antidiscrimination provisions do not prevent the state from “making any special provision for the
advancement of any socially or educationally backward classes of citizens of for the Scheduled Castes
and the Scheduled Tribes.”76 Article 15(4), enacted as a constitutional amendment in 1951 was
precipitated by a legal controversy in Champakam Dorairajan v. State of Madras, 1951 AIR Madras 120.
In that case, the state of Madras had implemented a reservation system for admission to its
institutions of higher education. For example, certain seats at any of the four Madras medical
colleges would be apportioned in a manner that “protect[ed] the weaker flexion of the people.” As
such, seats had been reserved for Non-Brahmin Hindus, Backward Hindu Communities, Brahmins,
Harijans, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians and Muslims. Plaintiffs, prospective students whose

The caste system in India is a system of Hindu societal stratification based on birth. Perhaps beginning in
the sixth century B.C. upon independence from Britain, the ruling Congress Party sought to abolish caste
distinctions and “untouchability” (art. 17). It also attempted to retain the system of reservations that existed
prior to and through the colonial period. India’s reservation policies began toward the end of the 19th century,
mostly benefiting those of the Brahmin caste. According to Parikh (2001), the British had a strategic purpose
in creating reservations. For example, when representatives for the congress were to be elected rather than
appointed in 1906, the British contemplated separated electorates for Muslims. Later, this plan was to be
extended to Sikhs, Christians and untouchables. These separate electorates could have the effect of
maintaining social divisions ate preventing coalition-building. The Indian National Congress (INC), including
Mohandas Gandhi, opposed the move because he believed it would divide Hindu society. Gandhi and others
later relented, due in no insignificant part to increased mobilization on the part of dalits, led by Ambedkar and
his advocacy during the Poona Pact negotiations in 1932. Even after independence, the preference was
retained in the form of congressional seat reservations. Caste is an institution with deep roots in Hindu culture,
and efforts to ameliorate it and other social distinctions have encountered disagreement among decisionmakers and ordinary citizens alike.
76
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application for admission had been rejected, but who would have been admitted had there been no
reservation policy, argued that Madras’ reservation method violated the non-discrimination principles
memorialized in arts. 1477; 15, sec. 178; 15, sec.2;79 and 29, sec. 280 of the Indian Constitution. The
Madras High Court ultimately held that the reservation scheme did violate the applicable equality
provisions of the Indian Constitution. The Indian Supreme Court affirmed.81
Following the decision, art. 15 was amended and subsequent jurisprudence overturned the
Dorairajan decision.82 As amended, art. 15, sec. 4 carved out an exception to India’s nondiscrimination precommitment “for the advancement of any socially or educationally backward
classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.”83 However, controversy
arose over the parameters of the reservation scheme and precisely which groups could qualify for
reservations. In Balaji v. State of Mysove, AIR 1963 S.C. 649, the Court limited education quotas to
50% and held that factors other than just caste had to be considered. Devadson v. Union of India, AIR
1964 S.C. 179, applied the 50% rule to government employment and Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR
1964 S.C. 1825, held that institutions were not mandated to take caste into account. In Rajendran v.
State of Madras, AIR 1968 S.C. 1012, the Court held that caste could be the exclusive criterion for
eligibility, but only if the entire caste was proved to be educationally and socially backward. Finally,
in Indra Sawney v. Union of India, AIR, 1993 S.C. 477, the Court overruled Balaji and Devadson to the

Under art. 14, “[t]he State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the
laws within the territory of India.”
78 Under art. 15(1), “[t]he State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds of only religion, race, caste,
place of birth or any of them.”
79 Article 15(2) reads, in pertinent part, “[n[o citizen shall, on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth
or any of them, be subjected to disability, liability, restriction or condition….”
80 Under art. 29, “[n]o student shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the
State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.”
81 AIR 1951 S.C, 226, 1951 SCR 525.
82 The two seminal cases are State of Kerala v. Thomas, AIR 1976 S.C. 490, and Visanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka,
AIR 1985 S.C. 1495.
83 Article 338 compels the president to appoint a commission to investigate matters relating to the safeguards
for SC and ST.
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212

extent that they construed affirmative action as an exception to constitutional equality. Rather, it was
interpreted as an inherent part of achieving substantive equality (Neuborne, 1993, pp. 496-500).
The controversy over reservations has not been limited to the SC and ST. The OBC
category receives less constitutional treatment, but they have been the subject of recent discussions
regarding how broadly reservations can be applied. Article 341 of the Constitution required the
Indian government to set up commissions to investigate the conditions of OBCs in society. In 1953,
the Kaka Kalelkar Commission issued a majority report that recommended civil service preferences.
The commission was composed of members of backward and non-backward communities. Kalelkar,
the chairman of the commission was staunchly opposed to reservations based solely on caste.
Instead, he favored preferences that took caste and other factors into account when hiring decisions
were to be made. Unfortunately, the report provided no concrete definition of “backward class.” As
such, the 2,399 groups that qualified for the preferences were too numerous for the government’s
liking. Consequently, the government rejected the commission’s recommendations (Maheshwari,
1991, p. 20).
Then, in 1978, the Mandal Commission was formed. The members of this new commission
were exclusively of the backward castes. Under its eligibility criteria, there were 3,743 groups that
qualified for OBC status, approximately 52% of the Indian population. In light of the report, the
V.P. Singh government instituted a 27% quota for socially and educationally backward classes
(SEBC) for civil service appointments. Opponents of the quota maintained that such policies were
unfair, inefficient and perpetuated caste cleavages Proponents supported the quotas on the basis of
social justice (Bajpai, 2011). In 2008, the Supreme Court upheld the Central Education Institutions
Act which, which extended a 27% quota to OBCs in institutions of higher education. It held that art.
15(5) was valid only insofar as it was applied to federally funded institutions, but the Court severed
the reference to “unaided” institutions because it violated the basic structure of the Constitution.
However, the “creamy layer” of OBCs would not qualify for reservations because they are not
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considered socially and educationally backward. Additionally, the Court noted that “creamy layer”
inclusion violates the right to equality. That is, non-exclusion of creamy layer and inclusion of
forward castes in reservations violates the right to equality in art. 14, 15 and 18 as well as the basic
structure of the Constitution.
The “federal character” concept in Nigeria’s Constitution has also resulted in complicated
application. Under art. 14, § 3,
[t]he composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the
conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character
of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty,
thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few State or from a
few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.
Further explanation can be found in art. 14, § 4;
the composition of the Government of a State, a local government council, or any of the
agencies of such Government or council, and the conduct of the affairs of the Government
or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognise the diversity
of the people within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and
loyalty among all the people of the Federation.
Under art. 171, § 5 the President must take federal character into account when making
appointments. Governors must do the same under art. 208, § 4. Federal character also applies to the
composition of the armed services (Nig. Const. art. 217, § 3; art. 219, § b) and the leadership of
political parties (Nig. Const. art. 223, § b). Several provisions in the Third Schedule, passed in 1999,
pertain to federal character.
The federal character idea originated during meetings of the 1975 Constitution Drafting
Committee in an effort to promote national unity in a multi-ethnic society. Afigbo (1989) relays the
position of the proponents:
There had in the past been inter-ethnic rivalry to secure domination of the government by
one ethnic group or combination of ethnic groups to the exclusion of others. It is therefore
essential to have some provisions to ensure that the predominance of persons from a few
states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups is avoided in the composition of
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government or the appointment or election of persons to high offices in the state (Afigbo,
1989, p. 4).
The opposition argued that a federal state alone was sufficient to protect minorities. The
compromise was the “federal character” principle, and, reminiscent of the less-than-comprehensive
language in the Bangladeshi and Indian constitution, “the acceptance of the phrase by most members
[of the committee] lay partly in its novelty, partly in its cosmetic character, partly in its rhetorical
appeal, but above all, in its vagueness. In fact, it was so vague … the Committee ended up displaying
almost total ignorance of what it had accepted” (Afigbo, 1989, p. 4). The committee, however, did
provide a definition. Federal character
[r]efers to the distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster
national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation
notwithstanding the diversities of ethnic origin, culture, language or religion which may exist
and which it is their desire to nourish, harness to the enrichment of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria (Afigbo, 1989, p. 5).
Although the geographical and tribal complexities existed long before 1975, no notion of group
preference can be found in the 1963 Constitution.
As indicated in the discussion of territorial cleavages infra, Ekeh (1989) notes that the NorthSouth problem is the oldest imperative of the federal character doctrine. The second imperative is
the nature of Nigerian federalism itself. The state itself began in 1914 with Northern Provinces and
Southern Provinces, and was followed in 1939 with the devolution of administrative power into
regions. The South was bifurcated and the North remained intact. Nigeria became federal in 1954
and in 1964 the Mid-West and Western Regions were created amid great controversy. In 1966, Gen.
Ironsi overthrew the First Republic government and abolished the federal system. Ironsi was later
killed in a counter-coup and his successor Gowon reinstated the regional system and created more
regions, totaling 12. Then, in 1979, Obasanjo came to power through coup of the Murtala
Muhammad government. He added seven regions in an attempt to create cross-cutting cleavages:
four for the Hausa-Fulani, four for the Yoruba, two for the Igbo and nine for ethnic minority groups
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(Ekeh, 1989). The 1979 constitution cemented the federal government’s authority over the states.
Read (1979) contends that the ascendancy of federal power was inevitable, as ethnic communalism at
the regional level was undermining the creation of truly federal political parties. Ethnic loyalties were
to blame for the conflict over the censuses held between 1964-65 and the combustibility of such
heterogeneity had to be addressed. Even still, “federal character” remained a part of the 1999
Constitution (Yakubu, 2000).
The Federal Character Commission (FCC), the institution charged with implementing the
“federal character” principle, was established in 1996. The scope of its authority is broad, extending
beyond civil service and military appointments to inequalities in social services, infrastructure and the
private sector. The FCC essentially uses a quota system. The Commission must ensure that “each
state in the Federation, and FCT, respectively attain not less than the statutory 2.5% and 1%
representation in the manpower distribution of each of the federal government ministries, agencies
and parastatals by 2010” (FCC, 1997, Functions and Targets, vii.). Although the quota formulae may
be straight-forward, their application has caused consternation among certain segments of the polity.
A central cause of controversy is the indigene/settler dichotomy. Under FCC guidelines, “indigenes”
receive preferential treatment that “settlers” do not.” The Nigerian Constitution implicitly
recognizes the distinction between the two groups, e.g., in § 147; “… [t]he President shall appoint at
least one Minister from each state, who shall be an indigene of such state.” However, the
Constitution does not define either of the terms. Under the FCC definition scheme, an “indigene”
for local government purposes is someone “either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents
was or is an indigene of the local Government concerned; or “[w]ho is accepted as an indigene by the
Local Government” (FCC Guiding Principles, Definitions 1(a), (b)). An “indigene of a state is “an
indigene of one Local Government in that state” (FCC 1997, Guiding Principles, Definitions 1(2)).
Stated plainly, an indigene is “indigenous” to a particular state, which, under “federal
character” policies, would entitle them to preferential treatment in state civil service hiring and state216

administered benefits. Settlers are not native to a particular territory and the states and localities
should protect indigene populations from their encroachment. The indigene/settler dichotomy has
important implications for: educational opportunities and benefits, employment opportunities and
benefits, access to public and military service, property ownership and allocation, government
infrastructure and public works projects, and political participation.84 The indigene/settler issue was
one of the causes of the conflict between the Muslim Hausa-Fulani settlers and the Christian
indigenes (the Berom, Amo, Buji, Anaguta, Jere, Jawawa, Afizere,) in the city of Jos in Plateau State.
The Hausa-Fulani settlers migrated to Jos for tin mining, through the active encouragement of the
colonial government. After mining, the Hausa-Fulani began farming, which was so lucrative others
from the ethnic group were pulled to the region. Having resided in Jos and being in rulership for
over a century, the Hausa-Fulani contended that they were no longer “settlers” and thus entitled in
indigene rights (Adesoji & Alao, 2009, p. 155). Recently, disputes over farmland and local chieftancy
titles in Jos led to the 2002 killing of hundreds of Christians by Hausa militias. In 2004, Christian
reprisal killing left between 650 and 700 Muslims dead. The Plateau Peace Conference was
commenced to resolve the conflict, without much success. Litigation has also been initiated in the
Federal High Court in Kaduna by a group of twenty Nigerian citizens and an NGO over the
indigene/settler dichotomy and its relationship to the 2009 Fundamental Rights Rules.
Given the pervasive problems with the implementation of the “federal character” principle,
many have advocated that it be abolished. Critics like Ekeh argue that the goals of “federal
character,” to mitigate ethnic loyalties and manage sometimes bloody conflict political party conflict
and to provide protections for ethnic minorities, could never be realized, in part because the creation
of the 19 states did little to ease political domination of minority groups by majorities. What’s more,

In terms of employment, indigenes receive job reservations, settlers generally receive contract work, does not
come with pension benefits. Some advertisements for employment read “only indigenes need apply.”
Indigenes have reserved seats in public institutions of higher education, as well as scholarships. University fees
are also higher for non-indigenes. Finally, in many localities, non-indigenes can vote but cannot stand for
elections (Alubo, 2009, pp. 5-6).
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he argues, the concept itself seems flawed. Ekeh identifies four conceptual inadequacies. First, the
concept was overgeneralized to include intra-ethnic conflicts, not just inter-ethnic conflicts. Second,
the principle seeks a permanent solution to what may be a temporary problem, because territorial
boundaries, wealth distribution and other variables that create group conflict may surpass ethnicity in
importance. Third, the implementation of “federal character” may be overly burdensome to
implement because the federal and state governments must apportion appointments in a manner that
pleases many ethnic groups. Fourth, the principle allows politics to invade the domain of the
bureaucracy, which can lead to unqualified persons being appointed to vital government posts,
serving the end of disunity rather than national loyalty (Ekeh, 1989). Ekeh’s criticisms could quite
easily be applied to the Indian and Bangladeshi cases as well.
The comparison of LERN-specific, non-domain-specific affirmative action precommitments
from Bangladesh, India and Nigeria reveals several analytical points that are instructive for
understanding how the provisions operate in practice. First, the language used to articulate a
precommitment matters. The groups that may benefit from a particular LERN precommitment
hinges critically on the political processes that created the constitutional instrument itself, as well as
on future processes that cannot be predicted with any precision. These processes, in turn, shape how
certain provisions are defined and interpreted in the face of controversial application or nonapplication to a specific group. Second, it also seems as if the size and robustness of the group(s)
seeking inclusion of preferences plays a key role in success. In the cases of India and Nigeria,
minorities were actively mobilized and sufficiently large to secure language that permitted
reservations and federal character polices. Conversely, in Bangladesh, the CHT groups were
comparatively small in number and, although mobilized, could not seriously oppose Rahman’s
nationalist schemes as the dalits had opposed Gandhi’s.
Third, just as with preferences for women, the type of preference sought may also play a
role. In the case of LERN groups, territorial autonomy may be more difficult to secure than
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political, economic or educational preferences simply because the former seek separation and the
latter ultimate seek inclusion. Stated plainly, because territorial autonomy is so inherently inimical to
the implementation and consolidation of the nationalist project it may be more difficult to get
political elites, who are in the process of nation-building, to agree to, particularly when the group
seeking territorial preference is small. Furthermore, absolute size of LERN population, degree of
effective mobilization of LERN group, usefulness by political parties of LERN population as a
voting bloc and use of state-directed violence by LERN group are important variables. The clusters
of issues that are prominent in the comparison of the cases with LERN-specific, non-domainspecific affirmative action precommitments – nationalism, nation-building and state-building;
indigently and minority identities; integration, assimilation and territorial autonomy; constitutional
definition and interpretation of LERN preference target groups; and group mobilization,
contestation and conflict – are the same issues that are central to the study of Comparative Politics as
a sub-field on Political Science.
B.

Territorial Precommitments
Although addressed in Chapter 6, the issue of territorial precommitments will receive further

treatment, less as examples of the “territorial precommitment” category,” but more so to illustrate
how these precommitments function as LERN preferences. Of the three types of territorial
precommitments, autonomy is the most prevalent. The cases of the Russian Federation and
Pakistan, reviewed in Chapter 6, are instructive examples. The chief concern here is determining
when a territorial arrangement qualifies as a LERN preference. To reiterate, three criteria must be
met: (1) the territorial arrangement must be provided for in the constitution, (2) territorial boundaries
must be largely coextensive with LERN boundaries and (3) the territories inhabited by minority
LERN group(s), or the members of the groups thereof, must receive some government mandated or
permitted preference that the territories inhabited by other group(s), or the members thereof, do not
receive. Again, the Russian Federation, Pakistan and the US would all qualify because they have
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territorial subdivisions with varying degrees of autonomy, with co-extensive ethnic and territorial
boundaries, and the arrangements are constitutionally provided for, albeit with much more
articulated specificity in the first two cases.
A total of 15 cases in the sample have some form of territorial precommitment. Eleven
cases have autonomy precommitments, five cases have ethno-development precommitments and
four cases have conservation precommitments. Five cases have multiple sub-types of territorial
precommitments. Ten of the cases also have a LERN-specific precommitment, whether domainspecific or non-domain-specific. The fact that half the cases in the sample have a territorial
precommitment means that the conferring minority group preferences through territorial schemes is
a widely accepted tool for managing group conflict, facilitating territorial integrity and for promoting
national unity.
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Table 8: Cases with LERN-specific and territorial precommitments –
specific provisions
LERNSpecific,
Territorial
NonLERN-Specific Domain-Specific
DomainSpecific
POL ECON/EMP
EDU
CULT
Arts. 4 (S,
M, A,
ED); 115
China
(A), 122
(M, A,
ED)
Arts.
243(D)
(Cl, M,
E, Q),
243(T)
(Cl, M,
Art. 38(2)
Art.
E, Q);
(M, ED);
Arts. 16(4) (Cl, 15(5)(Cl,
330(1),
244 (M,
Art. 15(4)
P, CS); 46 (Cl,
P); 46
India
(2) (Cl,
A); Fifth
(Cl, P)
M); 336(1) (Cl,
(Cl, M);
M, E,
Schedule
M, CS, Q, N)
337 (T,
Q);
(5) (P, A)
M, Q, N)
331(T,
P, E),
332(1),
(2), (3)
(Cl, M,
E, Q)
Art. IV(3)
U.S.
(P, A)
Arts.210(2)
Art. 231
(T, M);
Brazil
215(1) (T,
(M, Cons)
M);
Art. 37(f)
Arts. 27(1) (Cl,
(M, ED);
Art.
P, CS); 36 (T,
Art. 28 (T,
Pakistan
247(3) (P,
37(a)
M, CS), 37(a)
P)
A); 247(7)
(Cl, M)
(Cl, M)
(P, A)
Arts. 14(3), (4)
Art.
Arts.
(T, M, CS);
Art. 14(3)
223(b)
Nigeria
14(3), (4)
171(5) (T, M,
(M, ED)
(T, M,
(T, M)
CS, FG);
PP)
208(4) (T, M,
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CS, SG);
217(3) (T, M,
CS, FG)
Russian
Federation
Mexico

Philippines

Thailand

France
Italy

Myanmar

Arts. 65,
66 (P, A)
Art. 2 (A)
Art. Art.
13(6) (M,
Cons);
10(1) (M,
A); 10(15),
(20) (M,
A)
Secs. 66 (S,
M, Cons);
67 (M,
Cons)
Tit. 12 (M,
A)
Art. 116
(M, A)

51(f)-(h)
(M, A)

Art. 69
(T, M)
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Art.
10(20)(7)
(T, M)

Art. 12(5)
(T, M)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Art. 6
(Cl, M)

-

-

-

-

-

Art. 15
(T, M,
E,
SG);
17(c)
(T, M,
E,
SG);
161(b),
(c) (T,
M, E,
SG)

Art. 22(c) (T,
M)

Art.
22(c) (T,
M)

Art. 22(a)
(T, M)

Arts. 246
(M, Cons);
329 (M,
Art.
TA 55 (T,
A), 330
176
Colombia
M, Cons,
(M, A,
(Cl, P,
ED)
Cons); TA
E, FG)
55 (M,
Cons, ED)
Secs. 143
(P, A); 148
Sec. 3(3)
Spain
(M, A);
(Cl, M)
156 (M, A)
Key: Classical (Cl); Tacit (T); M (Mandatory); Permissive (P); Autonomy (A);
Ethno-federal (ED); Conservation (Cons); Elections (E); Political Parties (PP);

222

C.

LERN-specific, Domain-specific Precommitments
As one might expect, the LERN-specific, domain-specific affirmative action

precommitments are more numerous than the non-domain-specific variety. In addition to drawing
our attention to the multitude of variables that determine the mechanics of affirmative action
precommitments within cases, as well as those which determine differences in preference regime
implementation between cases, the above comparisons identified the fundamental overlapping nature
of the POL, ECON/EMP, EDU and CULT issue domains. In assessing how constitutional
preferences operate practically viv a vis LERN minorities, the impossibility of achieving issue domain
mutual exclusivity becomes readily apparent. Indeed, to confine any one constitutional provision to
any one discrete domain denies the synergistic and interactive effects of the policies which are more
often than not cross-domain in their consequences. Further, their cross-domain interactivity cannot
be viewed without also appreciating how precommitments communicate and gain effectiveness
across types and sub-types. This synergistic effect is more salient for LERN minorities than for
women, primarily because of the interaction between the territorial and domain-specific
precommitments. Although there is overlap, these four general domains are in many ways distinct,
and are important analytical tools for understanding broadly the types of preferences considered by
constitution-makers.
i.

POL-specific precommitments
Five cases have POL-specific precommitments. As with women, these precommitments

concern electoral preferences at the local, state and/or federal levels. Although not classified as
domain-specific, territorial preferences also contribute to LERN minority political preferences. The
Colombian case is instructive here. Under art. 176 of the Colombian Constitution, “the law may
establish a special circumscription to ensure the participation in the Chamber of Representatives of
the ethnic groups and the political minorities. Up to four representatives can be elected by this
circumscription.” Article 7 gives support to this exception; “the State recognizes and protects the
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ethnic and cultural diversity of the Colombian Nation.” Provisions such as these are indicative of
constitutional reforms that occurred in Latin America in the 1990s. Regarding the issue of
indigenous rights, the reforms share five general characteristics: (1) formal recognition of the multicultural nature of their societies and the existence of indigenous as distinct sub-state social
collectivities; (2) recognition of indigenous peoples’ customary law as official, public law; (3)
collective property rights with restrictions on alienation or division of communal lands; (4) official
status for indigenous languages in territorial units where they are settled; and (5) a guarantee of
bilingual education (Van Cott, 2000, pp. 42-43). The constitutions of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
and Mexico all have provisions that recognize indigenous peoples in some way. Prior to these
revisions, many Latin American countries operated under a nationalist assimilationist narrative which,
over time, gave way to more multicultural attitudes.
Article 329 of the Colombian Constitution provides for the creation of “indigenous
territorial entities” in accordance with the Organic Law of Territorial Ordering. These entities are
“reservations” which are non-alienable and based on the principles of collective property. Under art.
330, the indigenous territorial entities are to be governed by local councils “formed and regulated
according to the usages and customs of their communities.” These communities have the right to
design their own economic and social programs, promote public investment in their territories,
distribute resources as they see fit and represent the territories before the national government.
Colombia currently has two seats reserved in the senate for indigenous representatives (Van Cott,
2000, p. 48). Colombia has also carved out a space for indigenous law. In 1994, the Colombian
Constitutional Court provided the following criteria for determining the status of indigenous law viv a
vis civil law. First, indigenous cultural traditions are to be respected to the extent those traditions
have been preserved. Second, the decisions handed down by indigenous tribunals must not conflict
with constitutional or international human rights. Third, indigenous customary law has supremacy
over civil law that conflicts with cultural norms and over legislation that does not protect a
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constitutional right of the same rank as the right to cultural and ethnic diversity. A 1996 decision
even permitted Colombia’s Paez Indian community to utilize corporal punishment in contravention
of civil law (Van Cott, 2000, p. 45). Colombia also has a special senatorial district for the indigenous
and has granted autonomy to resguardos, reserves governed by indigenous authorities.
In addition to provisions for indigenous groups, Colombia’s constitution provides
preferences for black communities through territorial, ethno-development/conservation
precommitment. Transitory article 55 states,
Within the two years following the entry into effect of the present Constitution, the
Congress will issue, following a study by a special commission that the Government will
create for that purpose, a law which will recognize to the black communities which have
come to occupy the uncultivated lands in the rural riparian zones of the rivers of the Cuenca
del Pacifico, in accordance with their traditional practices of production, the right to collective
property over the areas which the same law will have to demarcate.
… The same law will establish mechanisms for the protection of the cultural identity and the
rights of these communities and for the promotion of their economic and social
development.
Transitory art. 55, ¶ 1, extends these protections to other parts of the country, pending approval by
the special commission. The Constitution protects the predominantly black Raizal population in San
Andres, Providencia and Catalina (Van Cott, 2000, p. 38). Statues regulate residency and property
ownership in the archipelago, and guarantees Raizal representation in departmental assemblies.
According to Van Cott, the rights afforded to Afro-Colombians are less expansive than
those for the indigenous populations. In Colombia, indigenous groups constitute 3.4% of the
population but have been granted 29.8% of the land, while blacks account for 10.6% of the
population and have been granted 4.1% of the land (Paschel, 2010, p. 735). This finding seems to
contradict the importance of the role of the size of the LERN minority in achieving state
preferences. Both Van Cott and Paschel agree that shifts in global policy norms toward human
rights and multiculturalism allowed indigenous groups to press claims for cultural and collective
recognition. In Colombia, this discursive shift, along with the domestic upheaval brought on by the
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civil war presented an opportunity for already-mobilized indigenous groups to take advantage during
the constitution-making process. Blacks, conversely, were not as mobilized. This discursive shift
may have been absent or less pronounced in the case of the CHTs in Bangladesh.
In the 1980s, black Columbian activists unsuccessfully pressed claims based on affiliation
with student or peasant movements and not based on ant ethno-racial identity. During the
constitution-making process, proposals were submitted on the rights of women and the disabled.
Afro-Colombians were at a disadvantage because of ideological and regional fragmentation, and lack
of resources. In addition, Afro-Colombians faced opposition from political elites concern that the
passage of legislation targeting blacks would contribute to inter-ethnic conflict. One member of the
constitution-drafting committee, Cornelio Reyes, argued that including Afro-Colombians in the
constitution would create apartheid and inter-ethnic conflict. Others agreed, opining that integration,
rather than separation, should be the goal. To combat the opposition, Afro-Colombians forged
alliances with indigenous groups, staged sit-ins and organized marches. They created the Black
Telegram Campaign, sending 25,000 telegrams to policy-makers to demand inclusion in the new
constitution. El Tiempo began covering the protests. Indigenous leader Rojas Birry took up the cause
of Afro-Colombians. In his proposal to the constituent assembly tasked with writing the constitution
(ANC) entitled “The Rights of Ethnic Groups,” he maintained that the indigenous and black causes
were linked and that both deserved inclusion in the constitution.
Blacks did receive mention in transitory art. 55, but in Paschel’s view the simple fact that the
provision was transitory highlight the reluctance of ANC participants to treat blacks and indigenous
groups similarly (Paschel, 2010). Transitory art. 55 does recognize collective property rights for
Afro-Colombians and Law 70, passed in 1993, regulates those communal land rights, as well as
economic and social development, social and health services professional training and the protection
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of cultural identity (Browne & Shea, 2010, pp. 28-9).85 Law 70 also contained language reserving two
seats for Afro-Colombians in the House of Representatives. In 1996, the Colombian Supreme Court
expanded blacks’ rights, perhaps beyond those intended by the constitution’s framers. The Court
held that all Colombian blacks, even though not meeting the constitution’s narrow definition of a
traditional, river-based culture, are entitled to protections and positive measures extended to ethnic
groups under the constitution. The court found that blacks qualified as a “discriminated or
marginalized group” under art. 13 (Colombia’s non-group-specific, non-domain-specific
precommitment), and were thus entitled to state-enforced preferences (Van Cott, 2000, p. 50). As
we can see from the recent legal history, black Colombians have been successful in broadening rights
that they were unable to attain during the constitution-making process.
Hooker (2005) asserts that the disparity in the rights afforded to indigenous groups and
blacks in Latin America is a consequence of political elites’ perception of indigenous peoples as
having a distinct cultural group identity. She agrees with Van Cott and Paschel that significant
multicultural reforms have taken place in Latin America. However, she contends that indigenous
groups have been much more successful than blacks in gaining collective rights. Only in Honduras,
Guatemala and Nicaragua – none of which is included in this study – do the indigenous and blacks
enjoy the same collective rights (Hooker, 2005, p. 286). She posits that theories that rely on variables
such as relative population size, organizational capacity of political movements and mobilization do
not adequately explain indigenous inclusion and black exclusion. Hooker does concede that “the
presence of a well-organized and visible indigenous or black movement that can take advantage of
Unfortunately, many aspects of Law 70 have yet to be implemented. The state has not allocated the requisite
funds for development projects, and bureaucratic and institutional support have been lacking. Many
applications remain without resolution, there is no reliable mechanism for resolving land disputes and black
communities are not always consulted when the legislature adopts land resource legislation (Browne et al.,
2010, pp. 32-3). In her study of the post 1991 property rights regime as it relates to Afro-Colombian
communities on the Pacific Coast, Velez (2011) found that the new property regime had: (1) changed the
political structure of the region, with the emergence of new local authorities; (2) changed the perception of the
territory to a formal common property regime; and (3) promoted the development of new communal
institutional arrangements that co-exist with de facto individual land holdings. Between 1996 and 2008, 156
Pacific Coast communities received collective land titles.
85
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changing political opportunities is an important factor in the adoption of collective rights in Latin
America (Hooker, 2004, p. 296), but concludes the key to understanding the disparity is AfroLatinos’ lack of distinct cultural group status. The issue may be one of framing, for as Hooker notes,
“Latin American states and publics have been much more amenable to the demands made by the
bearers of indigenous rather than black identities, and to calls for group rights posed in terms of
cultural difference or ethnicity (indian-ness) rather than race or racism (blackness)” (Hooker, 2004, p.
299).
The other Latin American cases do not follow Colombia’s lead with regard to LERN
preferences. Argentina, which also has black and indigenous populations, has electoral reservations
for neither group. Paschel notes the diversity among Latin American countries in affirmative action
for blacks. Some have adopted limited legislation, some none at all. Even among those that have,
there is great variation in rights granted. Brazil’s affirmative action controversies are well
documented; however, neither Brazil nor any other Latin American case in this study has LERNspecific, POL-specific precommitments. However, Brazilian women, along with women from
Mexico and Argentina, do benefit from mandatory party list quotas in federal and regional elections.
Fear of deepening LERN cleavages, inter-ethnic conflict or of including certain groups in the formal
electoral process may explain the disparity between LERN and SEX preferences in the POL domain
for certain Latin American cases.
However, as we have seen, other cases have adopted a different approach to the political
management of a multicultural society, perhaps one more amenable to the demands of minorities.
The case of India provides an instructive example. As previously discussed, India confers
preferences on certain LERN groups, specifically the SC, ST and OBC. The Indian Constitution
reserves seats in its House of the People for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Ind.
Const. art. 330). The President also has the authority to “nominate” two members of the AngloIndian community if the President feels they are under-represented (Ind. Const. art. 331). There are
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also mandatory electoral quotas in legislatures at the state level (Ind. Const. art. 332). There are even
mandatory preferences for SC and ST representation in the Panchayats (Ind. Const. art. 243 § D.
para. 1), and permissive preferences for backward class of citizens (Ind. Const. art. 243, § D, para. 6).
India also has POL preferences that extend to the territorial category. These reservations began
under British rule and continued after independence. These quotas apply to the SC, ST and OBC
groups (Jain & Ratnam, 1994). Finally, India also territorial precommitments, found in art. 244.
That article grants certain tribal areas and the state of Assam autonomous status. Assam also
benefits from grants-in-aid from the Consolidated Fund of India for the purpose of development
(Ind. Const. art. 275).86
ii.

ECON/EMP-specific Precommitments
In the ECON/EMP domain, eight cases have precommitments. There are four cases with

provisions which cover the economy broadly and four cases with civil service precommitments.
Even in the absence of a LERN-specific, ECON/EMP-specific precommitment, territorial ethnodevelopment or conservation provisions can work with social and other precommitments to confer
economic preferences for LERN minorities. Article 46 of the Indian Constitution, art. 37, § a of the
Pakistan Constitution and art. 89, § 4 of the Ethiopian Constitution are examples of broad, classical,
mandatory ECON/EMP-specific precommitments. In India, “[t]he State shall promote with special
care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular,

Hussain (1987) argues that primordial loyalties and identity consciousness wee sharpened during the sociopolitical change that occurred during Indian independence. As we have seen with many other cases, the grant
of autonomy came about through movement-based protest. Because of their cultural similarities, three of the
Assam tribes – the Khasis, the Jaintas and the Garos – were able to unite in pursuit of a separate state similar to
that of Nagaland. In January 1967, the Indian government proposed a scheme to reorganize Assam. The
proposal was rejected; consequently, a committee was formed under the chairmanship of Ashoka Mehta to
investigate the issue. The Mehta committee rejected the idea of creating another autonomous hill state.
Instead, proposal to offer the tribes themselves was made and was summarily rejected. And although the
protests, organized principally through the All Party Hill Leaders Conference (APHLC) had been peaceful,
some Khasi youths threatened guerilla warfare if their demands for the creation of a new state were not
immediately met. In the latter part of 1979, Indirah Gandhi indeed sought to grant autonomy to Assam,
culminating in art. 244. The autonomous state of Assam has the authority to make its own laws on 61 out of
66 subjects. This authority distinguished Assam from other “autonomous” Indian states like Nagaland or
Meghalaya (Hussain, 1987).
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of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all
forms of exploitation.” Similarly, but more succinctly, in Pakistan, “[t]he State shall promote, with
special care, the educational and economic interests of backward classes or areas….” Finally, in
Ethiopia, “[g]overnment shall provide special assistance to Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples least
advantaged in economic and social development” (Eth. Const. art. 89(4). Article 22, § c of the
Myanmar Constitution is the lone tacit example, although, unlike India, Pakistan and Ethiopia, it
does mention certain economic sectors to which the provision might apply.
Concerning civil service appointments, Pakistan safeguards “the legitimate rights and
interests of minorities including their due representation in the Federal and Provincial services” (Pak.
Const. art. 36). Under art. 27, § 1 public service posts “may be reserved to persons belonging to any
class or area to secure their adequate representation in the service of Pakistan.” The preference here
is classical and permissive, however, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the government is the
largest employer in Pakistan and there is a long history of civil service quotas for ethnic minorities
from underdeveloped regions. Art. 37, § f seems to address this “federal character” like, geographical
approach to affirmative action for LERN groups as a function of social justice, without mentioning
LERN groups explicitly; the state shall “enable the people of different areas … to participate fully in
all forms of national activities, including employment in the service of Pakistan.” These provisions
must also be read in the context of Pakistan’s social precommitments in which the state obligates
itself to “secure the well-being of the people, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race … by preventing
the concentration of wealth and means of production and distribution in the hands of a few” (Pak.
Const. art. 38, § a).
Kennedy (1984) argues that Pakistan’s quota policies are a result of three familiar variables:
ethnic diversity, unequal regional development and unbalanced institutional growth (Kennedy, 1984,
p. 691). He argues further that the quota policies are governed by two contradictory principles; the
compensatory principle and the proportional representation principle. The original 1949 federal civil
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service quota system was essentially designed to integrate Bengalis. Originally an administrative
directive promulgated by the federal government’s Establishment Division, the quota policy grew to
become a statutory exception to the constitution’s non-discrimination provision in 1956, and again in
1962. After the secession of Bangladesh, the quota transformed to apply to six zones and four
provinces. Then, in August 1973, it was altered to reflect its current form: 10% merit, 50% Punjab
(including Islamabad), 7.6% urban Sind (Karachi, Sukkur and Hyderabad), 11.4% rural Sind (areas in
Sind other than those above), 11.5 NWFP, 3.5% Baluchistan, 4% Northern Areas and FATA and
2% Azad Kasnmir. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s nationalization of the banking insurance, heavy
machinery, natural resource extraction and other industries expanded the quotas to the new semiautonomous corporations. In 1970 the quotas expanded to the sub-national level when provinces
enacted civil service quotas (Kennedy, 1984). The Pakistani LERN civil service preferences do not
seem to extend to federal elections. Although several classical provisions make electoral preferences
for women clear, there is no such similar language for LERN groups. There are reserved seats for
non-Muslim minorities in the Assembly (Pak. Const. art. 51, §§ 1, 4) and the Senate (Pak. Const. 59, §
1, ¶ f).87 Finally, and as discussed in the previous chapter, the LERN minorities that inhabit the
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The treatment of religious minorities in Islamic societies has its foundations in the Constitution of Medina, a
contract between the Prophet Muhammad, his followers and the eight tribes of Medina entered into about AD
627. (Scott, 2007, 3). Under the contract, Jews and other religious minorities were a protected minority, but
were not considered equal. This document formed the foundation of the dhimma relationship. Dhimmis were
not compelled to convert to Islam, as stated in Quran 2:256. They were also granted rights of life, security,
property and retained their own personal codes. Under the Ottoman Empire Dhimma rights were further
institutionalized with the millet system, an ad hoc arrangement that granted significant legal autonomy to major
religious communities. In Scott’s view, this system embodied the ideal of the plural society far before John
Locke articulated the notion. (Scott, 2007, p. 3). That said, the rights granted to dhimmis were not held by the
individual, but by virtue of their membership in a protected class. The dhimma system was effectively abolished
by the 1856 Hatti Humayoun decree. Under the language of the document, there was to be no discrimination
on he bases of race, religion or language, although Shar’ia courts would retain jurisdiction over matters of
personal law.
With regard to religious minority groups that reside within majority Muslim societies, the practice of
toleration, ahl al-kitab, has been used to accord such minorities rights and privileges as a result of their
subjugated status. With the discourse of human rights in 1979 Dr. Muh_ammad Salı¯m al-_Awwa argued that
the Constitution of Medina established by the Prophet Muhammad argued that in the Islamic state citizenship
should be founded on a common commitment to the Prophet and the original community included the Jewish
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FATA do seem to enjoy some degree of political autonomy that the Provinces do not (i.e. relief from
jurisdiction of Supreme Court or High Courts). However, in reality FATA tribesmen only attained
the right to vote in the Assembly in 1996 and political parties were only allowed to operate in 2011.
Like Pakistan, Bangladesh preserves the right to “make[] special provision in favor of any
backward section of citizens for the purpose of securing their adequate representation in the service
of the Republic” (Bang. Const. art. 29, § 3, ¶ a). According to Zafarullah (2001), the framers’
motivation behind for instituting the preferences was to “uphold the values of democracy ant to
provide legitimacy to governance” (Zafarullah, 2001, p. 39). The Bangladesh recruitment policy
began with Interim Recruitment Rules, issued by executive order in 1972. Critics like Wahhab (2009)
argues that the current Bangladeshi quota system is ineffective. He cites a lack of transparency in
implementation and a lack of competence among civil servants as major problems. He concludes
that quotas should apply only to tribal peoples and should be temporary (Wahhab, 2009).

tribes of Medina (Nielsen, 2003, p. 329). He believes that in general the Qur’an and the Sunna require kind and
just treatment, regardless of religion, and that a contemporary understanding of the Islamic state - one rooted
in common struggle, constitution and citizenship, and not conquest and contract – should guide the treatment
of religious minorities. Ah_mad Kama¯l Abu¯ al-Magd is in accord, contending that the traditional concept of
dhimma – non-Muslim subjects of Islamic governments who suffered discriminatory treatment and inferior
social and legal status – is antiquated and that modern Islamic constitutions should provide equal rights for all
(Nielsen 2003, 330). In traditional Islamic thought the, dhimma represented a contract between the Islamic state
and religious minorities.
In his discussion of Islamic approaches to moral obligations to non-Muslims, March (2009) identifies
four approaches. The first, relevatory commands, refers to explicit texts in which rights for non-Muslims are
mandates. This approach is generally limited to specifically enumerated rights and may implicitly prelude a
broader moral dialogue about the rights and duties of non-Muslims. Second, relevatory sources can be read to
demand a “general attitude of treating non-Muslims with equity (March, 2009, p. 49). While clearly broader
than the previous approach, this general approach also has its shortcomings – there are substantive
disagreements among scholars about what justice and equality mean, and that the terms themselves are
inherently vague. Third, the contractual approach, centers on the aman, a contract for mutual security. “Jurists
are unanimous in holding that the enjoyment of the aman imposes on a Muslim certain moral and sometimes
legal obligations to the non-Muslim entity in question” (March, 2009, p. 55). The final approach, the
“comprehensive-qualitative” approach emphasizes mutual concern and soldarit through the discourse of the
da’wa.
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Ethno-development schemes also operate to confer economic and employment preferences
on LERN minorities. The Chinese, Vietnamese and Thai cases demonstrate how economic
preferences can be conferred even in the absence of an ECON/EMP-specific precommitment,
primarily through ethno-development schemes. In Vietnam, the majority ethnic group is the Kinh,
comprising approximately 86% of the population. Current Kinh policy toward minorities mirrors
that of its former French colonial rulers, often referring to minority groups and their customs as
poor, unhealthy, backward, savage and uncivilized. Minority economics, largely dependent upon
jewelry, woven goods and tourism are described as incompetent and inferior because of a lack of
reliance on money. There are 53 minority indigenous cultures in Vietnam, although this figure is
disputed. In 1993, there were five groups with populations under 1,000 and 11 with populations
under 4,000. These numbers indicate that cultural extinction is a very real possibility for some
groups (Lempert, 2001). Most minorities live in the mountainous areas and highlands. Only three
groups – the Hoa, Cham and Khmer – live in the plains. Although they reside in almost all
Vietnamese provinces, ethnic minorities reside mainly in the Northwest, Northeast North-Central,
South Central and Central Highlands. Levels of development among the various groups varies, due
in part to differences in cultivation conditions and infrastructure (Ahn, 2005).88
Article 5, § 4 of the Vietnamese Constitution is a tacit, mandatory LERN-specific, nondomain-specific precommitment; “[t]he State carries out a policy of comprehensive development and
gradually raises the material and spiritual conditions of the national minorities.” Article 94
establishes a Nationalities Council, tasked with “stud[ying] and mak[ing] proposals to the National
Assembly on issues concerning the nationalities; supervis[ing] and control[ling] the implementation
of policies on nationalities, the execution of programs and plans for socio-economic development of
the highlands and regions inhabited by national minorities.” From a plain meaning interpretive

Lempert (2001) asserts that ethnic law in Vietnam can be divided into three categories of rules: (1) written
codified law, (2) law codified in traditions of oral poetry and (3) social practices that can be translated into legal
rules (Lempert, 2001, p. 545).
88

233

perspective, the use of the term “raises” implies a minority rights framework that includes state
assistance of some sort, but it does not necessarily imply minority preferences. It could reasonably
be construed as a rather obtusely worded equality provision which is intended to bestow equality of
opportunity rather than substantive equality. In the absence of any classical terminological cues art.
5, § 4 fails to make it clear that minority groups in Vietnam are entitled to economic benefits that
non-minorities are not.
However, as with all tacit precommitments, context is important. In this case, there are two
relevant and intersecting layers of context that provide evidence for this conclusion. The first
concerns the constitution’s overall ethnic minority protection scheme, embodied most obviously in
art. 5, § 4 and the other provisions of art. 5. Generally speaking, the constitution recognizes the basic
equality of all nationalities and acknowledges the depressed and underdeveloped conditions under
which many minority groups live. Article 5, §§ (1)-(3) contextualize the state’s drive toward
nationalism while also carving out space for the expression of a plurality of cultures. Article 5, § 1
emphasizes Vietnamese nationalism through a unified state, while art. 5, § 3 strikes a more
particularistic tone by focusing on the uniqueness of the various cultures. When read in the light of
the equality provision of art. 5, § 2 there is evidence of intent to give preferential attention to
minorities. Furthermore, there are LERN precommitments elsewhere in the constitution. For
example, under art. 36, § 4 “the State adopts the priority policy to ensure the educational
development in mountainous areas, regions inhabited by ethnic minority people and regions
encountering exceptional difficulties.” Additionally, art. 39, § 2 reads, “[p]riority is given to the
program of health care for highlanders and national minorities.” These two provisions’ emphasis on
priority assistance for national minorities, in conjunction with the constitution’s unambiguous
commitment to the protection of minority rights, evidence an affirmative action precommitment.
A second layer of context – Vietnam’s clear commitment to socialism – provides additional
justification for the precommitment. Some of the relevant provisions were discussed in the previous
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chapter. Under French colonial rule, many of the Central Highland minorities were converted to
Catholicism. At the same time, the French imposed heavy taxes on the indigenous groups and
forced many into corvée indentured bondage. During the war for independence, many of the ethnic
minorities became anti-Vietnamese. After partition in 1954, it became the policy of South Vietnam
to move Kinh settlers into the Central Highlands. This migration also existed in the uplands.
According to Frederichsen (2011) this program of internal migration was an integral part of nationbuilding that served three important functions: (1) to settle “empty” areas and address overpopulation in the delta, coastal plain areas and urban centers; (2) to contribute to the productive
development of areas of in-migration; and (3) so that migrants could ensure security and national
defense in remote and border areas. This sort of resettlement program continued under new postVietnam War government. Poor Kinh farmers migrated to the coffee-producing areas of the Central
Highlands. At the same time, a policy assimilationism was pursued by discouraging minority customs
and languages and by conducting primary education in Vietnamese (Baluch, Chuyen & Haughton,
2008, p. 1164).
The economic changes that accompanied doi moi shifted government policies toward
minorities. Under doi moi the state initiated the process of de-collectivization. There were three
legislative milestones. First, Decree 100 (1981) allocated to households land use rights to fields and
allowed them to keep a percentage of their harvest as surplus. Second, Resolution 10 (1988)
guaranteed households longer-term land use rights and reduced the role of cooperatives to service
provision only. Third, the 1993 Land Law allocated land use rights to households for terms of
between 20 and 50 years. Although ownership of the land would remain with “the people” and be
managed by the state, individuals could exchange, lease or inherit land rights (Frederichsen, 2011).
Also in 1993, the Committee for Ethnic Minorities in Mountainous Areas (CEMMA) was established
with a budget of $546 million to aid in the development of ethnic minorities. The funds have been
used for subsidizing the cost of transporting goods to remote areas, salt, reforestation, potable water,
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road maintenance, livestock, seedlings and for connecting villages to the national grid (Baluch et al.,
2008, pp. 1164-65). Minority languages have been officially recognized and scholarships have been
established to allow ethnic minority children access to secondary boarding schools and institutions of
higher education. Ethnic minority representation has also increased at all levels of government.
Progress has not been uniform, however. In his analysis of quantitative and qualitative data
from Vietnam’s Community-Based Monitoring System (CBMS) Ahn (2005) found that although
Vietnam’s economy has grown, the rate of poverty reduction was not equal across all regions.
Poverty reduction rates for ethnic minorities trailed similar rates for Kinh. Ahn attributes the high
minority poverty rates to several factors including geographical isolation, language barriers, poor farm
land, lack of capital and low education levels. The 1993 Land Law and its formalization of individual
land use rights have clashed with the collective land titling of the minorities. Program 135, a poverty
reduction program for the extremely difficult and mountainous areas, was instituted to eradicate
hunger and improve living conditions. Additional state policies are aimed at freight subsidies and
health care. The government recently implemented Decision 134/2004/QD-TTg to provide general
relief, improve infrastructure, improve social services and assist households. Housing loans with
deferred payments are offered for housing in the Mekong Delta and Central Highlands. From a
strictly economic development perspective, Program 135 focuses on solving the shortage of
production land. Through Decision No. 186/2001/QD-TTG, settlement and cultivation
stabilization through sedentarization programs to stabilize wandering hill tribes, preferential loan
rates to increase credit access and activity, and technology transfer to improve cultivation and
husbandry (Ahn, 2005, pp. 314-315). Thus, even without a territorial, ethno-development
precommitment, Vietnam’s art. 5, § 4 works with Vietnam’s declared socialist status under art. 2, § 1,
its stated tendency toward equitable development under art. 3, and its collectivist economic principles
under Chap. II, to become a LERN-specific, ECON/EMP-specific precommitment.
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If we compare the case of Thailand, we can see similar processes. Like Vietnam, Thailand
has some social leanings in terms of economic redistribution under art. 84, § 6, although it is
decidedly not socialist and Thailand’s constitution makes it clear that the country’s economy is based
on market forces (Thai. Const. art. 84, § 1). Like Vietnam, the Thai Constitution has a classical,
permissive non-group-specific, non-domain-specific precommitment at § 30. It maintains that
“measures determined by the state in order to eliminate obstacles or to promote persons’ ability to
exercise their rights and liberties in the same manner as other persons shall not be deemed unjust
discrimination ….” The list of sources of discrimination in § 30 includes race, sex and disability, but
also mentions economic or social standing. However, the constitution makes no specific mention of
LERN-specific, ECON/EMP-specific preferences. Like Vietnam, Thailand’s constitution also has
territorial precommitments at §§ 66 and 67. Section 66 states that “[p]ersons so assembling as to be
a community, a local community or a traditional community shall have the right to conserve or
restore their customs, local knowledge, good arts and culture of their community and of the nation
and participate in the management, maintenance, preservation and exploitation of natural
resources….” This provision seems more concerned with guaranteeing fairness in resource
extraction than correcting developmental asymmetries between the majority and various ethnic
communities; however, § 78(3) does state that equal development of the economies of the localities is
a directive principle of state policy.
According to Laungaramsri (2003), ethnic relations between the Tai and non-Tai is based on
the hill and valley distinction. Hill-dwelling peoples such as the Karen, Lawa, Thin and Khamu are
native to the land while groups such as the Hmong and the Mien are more recent immigrants from
southern China. In the northeast, the ethnic population is heterogeneous but is comprised mostly of
Laos or Tai-Lo speaking people. In the south the predominant group is the Malay Muslims,
inhabiting the provinces of Pattni, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun. Thailand also has Chinese and Indian
minorities. In Thai discourse, non-dominant groups are defined as chom klum noi, or ethnic
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minorities. Under official classification there are five groups: Chinese (chao chin), the hill tribe peoples
(chao khao), Vietnamese immigrants (chao yuan oppayop), Thai Muslims (chao Thai Muslim) and others.
This scheme does not account for all ethnic minorities.
The Thai government has employed some ethno-development schemes to assist minorities,
with mixed results. In 2007, the Community Forest Bill was passed. It granted communities the
right to manage forest land surrounding their settlements. In her description of the government’s
relationship with hill tribes in Northern Thailand, Gillogly (2008) asserts that initially state
modernization efforts excluded the hill tribes, who were considered “backward,” “problematic” and
“dangerous.” Consequently, the state sought administrative control over the areas. Security also
became a major concern during the war in Indochina in the 1960s. To thwart potential insurgents
entering from bordering countries, the Thai government Border Patrol Police established training
programs and schools in the hills to aid in reconnaissance. From 1967-1973 the government
undertook a policy of forced resettlement to force the nomadic tribes to settle permanently in
villages. Minorities such as the Hmong revolted in the Red Meo Rebellion and were painted as
communist conspirators. This led to the exercise of greater authority over the areas. Eventually, a
policy of minority incorporation was adopted. After efforts at Buddhist conversion failed, the
Department of Local Government attempted to register uplanders and lowlanders as Thai citizens.
Programs to combat opium production were also instituted. Deforestation has also been an issue,
although it remains unclear whether the tribes or Thai government is primarily to blame (Gillogly,
2008).
State investment in the north has been spotty. According to Leepreecha (2005) the state’s
policy of assimilation means that speaking ethnic languages in schools is banned and indigenous
knowledge is not recognized in the school curriculum. The Dhammacarik Buddhism Project has
been initiated to convert highland ethnic minorities to Buddhism and the registration system is
designed to replace ethnic identities with Thai identity. However, the government has invested
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heavily in infrastructure projects in the highland because of the lucrative tourism industry. The
government forbids the growing of opium but does allow some growth as a tourist attraction so that
tourists can see certain ethnic groups in their “authentic” environment. Thus, although the northern
tribes may have benefitted in some way from the state’s investment in tourism, there have also been
significant costs, as the government exploits native cultures for profit and plays ethnic groups against
one another (Leepreecha, 2005). Ultimately, the results of ethno-development in Vietnam and
Thailand have been questionable; however, the cases do show that state-implemented economic
development is possible without an ECON/EMP-specific precommitment. Whether the beneficial
outcomes for the LERN minorities in each case would have been significantly better is an open issue.
It does stand to reason that the addition of a LERN-specific, ECON/EMP-specific precommitment
would provide a more secure legal platform for the minorities, perhaps accelerating poverty
reduction efforts and better managing the cultural assimilationist policies that can accompany ethnodevelopment.
iii.

EDU-specific precommitments
In the EDU domain there are six cases with LERN-specific affirmative action

precommitments: India, Pakistan, Philippines, Vietnam, SA and Myanmar. As discussed above, art.
15, § 5 and art. 46 of the Indian Constitution provide for classical EDU preferences for SC and ST
groups. Pakistan’s art. 37, § a embodies a similar classical, mandatory sentiment with EDU
preferences for its “backward classes or areas.” The term “areas” implies a territorial
precommitment overlay, as is expounded in art. 37, § f; the state shall “enable people of different
areas, through education, training, agricultural and industrial development and other methods to
participate fully in all forms of national activities…” Vietnam also combines EDU and territorial
precommitments. In Vietnam, “[t]he State adopts the priority policy to ensure the educational
development in mountainous areas, regions inhabited by ethnic minority people and regions
encountering exceptional difficulties” (Viet. Const. art. 36, § 4). The language used (“priority”)
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indicates a tacit precommitment with a clear territorial component. Under art. 22, § 3 of the
Myanmar Constitution, the state shall assist “to promote socio-economic development including
education, health, economy, transport and communication, so forth, of less-developed National
races.” Finally, the SA Constitution evidences a classical, mandatory precommitment for LERN
minorities in the EDU domain, albeit less directly than India or Pakistan. The SA state must make
education “progressively available and accessible” through the use of “reasonable measures” (S.A.
Const. art. 29, § 1, ¶ b). All have the right to education in their official language, taking into account
equity, practicability and “the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and
practices” (S.A. Const. art. 29, § 1, ¶ 2).
A comparison of EDU preferences in SA and Brazil might help to illustrate the roles of
variables such as minority population size and colonial history play in whether constitution-makers
choose to incorporate a LERN affirmative action precommitment, and, if so, what type. Gillebeau
(1999) has compared the two cases in a cursory fashion, but neglected to incorporate constitutional
analysis, examination of specific policies, or inspection of legislation. In his comparison of
affirmative action in SA and the US, Lundy (1997) argues that the African National Congress (ANC)
had a conception of affirmative action that was broader than the American conception because “it
not only includes measures to redress past discrimination, but also requires public and private actors
to build an equal society through redistribution and corrective policies” (Lundy, 1997, p. 365).
Horwitz (1991) describes the situation leading up to the constitution-making process as comprised of
a conflict and a meta-conflict over what precisely the conflict is about. He outlines twelve
conceptions of South Africa. They include the official view; SA is divided into four racial groups –
Whites, Coloureds, Indians and Africans – and all should participate in politics at the center with
some power granted over their own affairs, perhaps territorially. However, in 1969 the ANC rejected
the idea of separate political institutions for racial minorities. It was argued that, absent apartheid, a
non-racial classical liberal democracy was possible. An alternative view is that SA is a colonial society
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divided by race-based capitalism. Under this scenario, Africans are the sole legitimate inhabitants and
an anti-colonial revolution is required to bring forth democracy. To achieve this, some degree of
black consciousness or racial self-assertion may be required. Horwitz also presents consociational
and modified consociational views; SA may have to be divided territorially between blacks and
whites, or amongst all four racial groups, or may require some complex organizational structure to
protect minorities. Others argue that regardless of race, a democracy based on majoritarian rule
would suffice (Horwitz, 1991, pp. 5-9).
During the SA constitution-making process, the issue of affirmative action was a contentious
one, with the ANC and the National Party taking opposite sides of the issue. Even after it was
ultimately included in the constitution, implementation was done cautiously. The hiring of nonWhites in the public sector was undertaken robustly, and has set an example for the private sector.
Indeed, affirmative action in SA is most commonly associated with hiring and promotion in the
ECON/EMP domain. The cornerstone of affirmative action in SA has been the 1998 Employment
Equity Act which requires the elimination of unfair discrimination in employment, as well as the use
of positive measures to develop and retain and develop blacks, women and persons with disabilities.
The SA government has made it clear that substantive equality is its policy (CRISE 2010, pp. 5-6).
However, SA affirmative action in the EDU domain is less discussed Lindsay (1997) argues that the
education system was the primary institution used to reproduce the apartheid regime. Segregated
schools were established by the 1905 School Boards Act, with white schools having better teachers,
administrators and resources at both the lower and higher levels of education. At the universities,
teacher’s colleges and technical schools enrollment was overwhelmingly white. For example, in 1978
university enrollment figures 121,869 whites, 25,150 Africans, 10,661 Coloreds and 10,117
Indians/Asians (Lindsay, 1997, p. 324). In the view of Ramphele (1996), apartheid was effectively
affirmative action for poor whites simply because they received preferential access to jobs, housing
and education.
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After the first democratic elections in 1994 affirmative action plans were implemented in
accordance with the new constitution. Under the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Plan
(RDP), the government was to develop proposed policy changes in critical areas such as human
resources and education. The RDP makes it clear that affirmative action is its cornerstone;
“[a]ffirmative action measures must be used to end discrimination on the grounds of race and
gender, and to address the disparity of power between workers and management, and between urban
and rural areas” (RDP. § 4.8.13). Concerning education, these measures must “entail a massive
programme of education, training, retraining, adult basic education and recognition of prior learning,
to overcome the legacy of apartheid…” (RDP § 4.8.13.1) The RDP was based on six basic
principles: (1) an integrated and sustainable program to overcome the legacy of apartheid; (2) a
people-driven process that harnesses the collective determination of all people; (3) peace and security
for all with a national security force that reflects South African diversity; (4) nation-building through
economic, political and social viability; (5) link reconstruction and development, along with a
redistributionary focus, to effectuate infrastructure revitalization and (6) democratization of S.A.
through fundamental policy changes that eliminate minority control and privilege (RDP §§ 1.3.11.3.7). The main purpose of the RDP is to “mobilise all our people and our country's resources
toward the final eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist
future” (RDP, § 1.1.2). The rationale for the plan is encapsulated by the following quote:
[o]ur history has been a bitter one dominated by colonialism, racism, apartheid, sexism and
repressive labour policies. The result is that poverty and degradation exist side by side with
modern cities and a developed mining, industrial and commercial infrastructure. Our income
distribution is racially distorted and ranks as one of the most unequal in the world - lavish
wealth and abject poverty characterise our society (RDP, § 1.2.2).
In accordance with the RDP, Pres. Nelson Mandela initiated the National Commission on Higher
Education (NCHE). In 1996, the NCHE issued its final report, A Framework for Transformation.
Subsequently, the 1996 Green Paper on Higher Education Transformation outlined critical policy areas and
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the Education White Paper 3: A Programme for Higher Education Transformation which focused on diversity
and redress in all levels of higher education.
By contrast, Brazil also has education affirmative action for LERN minorities, but lacks a
LERN-specific, EDU-specific precommitment. Indians in Brazil receive territorial and other
protections under Art. 23189 and women receive preferences in the ECON/EMP domain under art.
7(XX). However, historically, Brazil has taken pride in being a “racial democracy” with overt
discussions of race and racism being largely taboo. Martins, Medieros & Nascimento (2004) argue
that “[t]he racial democracy ideology tends not only to deprive the dominated population of its base
for collective self-defense and self-uplifting but also to convince the ruling elite of its pristine
innocence and fairness” (Martins et al., 2004, p. 790). Until the end of the Franco regime, state
policy was to promote the idea of harmonious and problem-free race relations (dos Santos, 2006, p.
32). This myth was officially repudiated by Cardoso, who openly acknowledged racism. In a
November 2005 speech, he declared that discrimination against blacks did exist. In 2003, Pres. Lula
da Silva created the Special Secretariat on Policies to Promote Racial Equality, the continuing the
Brazilian political discourse on race discrimination.
Htun (2004) explains the policy shift in Brazil as “a dialectic between social mobilization and
presidential initiative, framed within unfolding international events” (Htun, 2004, p. 62). Martins et
al. (2004) generally concur, asserting that the struggle for affirmative action began with mobilization
from below, through various Afro-Brazilian organizations, and was later given momentum by
international pressures. In 1944, Abdias do Nascimento created the Black Experimental Theater
(TEN), primarily to combat the exclusion of blacks from Brazilian theater. TEN later spawned the
Afro-Brazilian Democratic Committee in 1945. In its journal, Quilombo, TEN advocated to make

In Brazil, Indian lands must undergo a process of demarcation to precisely determine the boundaries of the
Indian area. There are three types of Indian lands: (1) lands traditionally occupied by Indians, (2) reserved
lands assigned to the Indians by the government, and (3) Indian-owned land acquired through the regular
means of ownership. Brazilian courts have held that state action to reduce or alienate Indian lands, either by
statute or contract, is unconstitutional (Barroso, 1994. p.-95).
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race discrimination a crime, free primary school for all Brazilians and for subsidized entrance of black
students into institutions of higher education. Although the military coup of 1964 suppressed
activism, there was a resurgence in the 1970s, evidences by meetings such as the sixth Pan-African
Congress and the first, second and third meetings of the Congress of Black Culture. Democracy
returned to Brazil in the 1980s and Nascimento was elected to the House of Deputies. He
introduced legislation calling for compensatory measures in education, government and employment.
He sought a 20% quota for blacks in federal, state and local civil service positions, as well as in the
private sector. Additionally, he favored a 40% goal of government grants to be allotted to black
students. These ideas were viewed as radical and would not be taken seriously until the 1990s. The
efforts of black attorneys and the proliferation of statistical data detailing racial inequality were crucial
(Martins et al., 2004).
In the aftermath of the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban, SA, Brazil began
implementation of its affirmative action program. In 2001, the Ministry of Agrarian Development
adopted compensatory, special and temporary measures to build racial equality in the countryside.
Included in the proposal was a 20% for blacks in decision-making positions, a 20% for blacks in
contracted services and a 20% for positions of public employment in the ministry. Three months
later the Ministry of Justice followed suit. The following year, Presidential Decree No. 4.228
instituted a national affirmative action program within the federal administration. In 2002, legislation
was passed providing for 20% quotas in all civil service entrance competitions, public and private
universities, and race preference programs for prospective government contractors. The next year,
legislation was passed mandating that Afro-Brazilian history be taught at all levels of education
(Martins et al., 2004). In 2001, the state of Rio de Janeiro enacted affirmative action laws for
university admissions. Fifty percent of seats were reserved for public high school graduates, most of
whom were Afro-Brazilian. State legislators and a consortium of private schools challenged the
policy in the Supreme Court of Brazil. Rio mooted the litigation by amending their policy to a 20%
244

quota for blacks, 20% for public school student, and 5% for students with disabilities and indigenous
students (Hernandez, 2005, p. 699).
It is important to note that there is no federal affirmative action law in Brazil. Three bills
were introduced during Lula’s presidency to establish federal affirmative action programs. All were
opposed by the Brazilian Social Democratic Party and the conservative Democrats. Opponents
make three main arguments. First, they contend that to institute formal affirmative action would be
to institute a racial classification system like that found in the US, ultimately causing the racialization
of Brazilian society. Others argue that it would violate Brazil’s equal protection clause. Lastly,
detractors argue that because of race mixing, the implementation of the programs will be
procedurally flawed (Junior, 2011; Rochetti, 2004). That said, many of Brazil’s universities do have
affirmative action programs. Lula created the Special Federal Secretariat for Policies Promoting
Racial Equality as a cabinet level position. In 2003, the Secretariat issued a joint report with the
Ministry of Education, the National Policy for the Promotion of Racial Equality. As a result, several
universities implemented affirmative action programs. In 2004, the University of Brasilia approved a
20% admissions quota for blacks. Prospective admitees under this program are interviewed by a
university panel to determine whether they are “black enough” to qualify. As of 2011, 71% of all
public universities had some type of affirmative action programs. More than 57% of universities
with affirmative action have programs aimed at black students and more than 51% for indigenous
peoples (Junior, 2011).
This comparison of SA and Brazil shows that even without a domain-specific
precommitment – here an EDU-specific precommitment – preferences can be implemented and
upheld by courts. In the case of Brazil’s education affirmative action, Hernandez (2005) points out
that, unlike the US, Brazil’s constitution contains a right to education under art. 6. Thus, as
Hernandez explains,
[o]ne can logically equate [lack of affirmative action] to a denial of the constitutional right to
education, inasmuch as the children are not provided ‘the full development of the individual’
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nor ‘preparation for the exercise of citizenship and qualification for work,’ as mandated in
art. 205 of the Constitution, and are not provided with the ‘guarantee of standards of quality’
as required by art. 206 of the Constitution (Hernandez, 2005, p. 704).
Unlike the apparently sub-optimal outcomes obtained by Vietnam and Thailand in the ECON/EMP
domain, Brazil’s LERN minority preferences seem to be reasonably robust – perhaps as robust as
those in SA – considering its constitution contains no LERN-specific, EDU-specific
precommitment. However, it remains to be seen whether policy outcomes are as optimal as they
could be with the EDU-specific precommitment and whether the outcomes are stable over time.
iv.

CULT-specific Precommitments
Finally, seven cases have CULT-specific precommitments. The provisions in this domain

are the most difficult to code and references to territorial precommitments are usually required.
Generally speaking, CULT precommitments use the terms “culture” or “customs,” or in some way
demonstrate a privileging traditions and are in some way tied to territory or other precommitment
issue domains. These provisions that can be safely categorized as CULT affirmative action
precommitments because they prefer the customs, language, modes of economic activity and other
LERN minority cultural components. For example, art. 22(a) of the Myanmar Constitution reads,
The Union shall assist: (a) to develop language, literature, fine arts and culture of the national
races; (b) to promote solidarity, mutual amity and respect and mutual assistance among the
national races; (c) to promote socio-economic development including education, health,
economy, transport and communication, so forth, of less-developed National races.
The tacit terms “promote” and “assist” are used in an overall scheme that is social in nature, and that
inplies state assistance beyond mere non-discrimination. Similarly, in Brazil the precommitment is
quite clear; “[t]he social organization, customs, languages, creeds and traditions of Indians are
recognized, as well as their original rights to the lands they traditionally occupy. The Union has the
responsibility to delineate these lands and to protect and ensure respect for all their property” (Braz.
Const. art. 231). The constitution recognizes the role of land in the “physical and cultural
reproduction” of the indigenous (Braz. Const. art. 231, § 1). The tacit term “protect” is used and the
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link to a territorial precommitment indicates a preference. In addition, art. 215, § 1 may bolster the
indigenous preference with what seems to be a tacit precommitment; “The National Government
shall protect expressions of popular, indigenous and Afro-Brazilian cultures and those of other
participant groups in the process of national civilization.” Finally, under art. 210, § 2 “[r]egular
elementary education shall be given in the Portuguese language, also assuring to indigenous
communities the use of their native languages and their own learning procedures.” Finally, art. 12, §
5 of the Philippines Constitution provides another example; “[t]he State, subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being.” Like the Brazilian case, the language is mandatory and the tacit term “protect” is used.
In the case of China, there is no CULT-specific precommitment; its cultural preference is
linked explicitly with the territorial as well as the social lenses in a more direct way; “[t]he state assists
areas inhabited by minority nationalities in accelerating their economic and cultural development
according to the characteristics and needs of the various minority nationalities” (China Const. art. 4).
Upon careful reading, we see that the state assists “areas,” not groups directly. Given that
distinction, art. 4 is properly classified as a territorial, ethno-development provision rather than a
LERN-specific, CULT-specific precommitment. The Vietnamese case is even more difficult to code.
Besides the LERN-specific, ECON/EMP-specific precommitment at art. 5, § 4, art. 39, § 2 of the
Vietnamese Constitution states that, “[p]riority is given to the programme of health care for
highlanders and national minorities.” Article 36, § 4 articulates a similar priority policy in the EDU
domain. When art. 5, § 4, art. 36, § 4 and art. 39, § 2 are read together with art. 5, § 3 we can see that
the overall preferential scheme, including social and territorial preferences, seem to permit CULT
LERN minority preferences. However, in this case, in pari matia interpretation must confront the
plain meaning of art. 5, § 3 which requires that cultural recognition apply to all nationalities; “[e]very
nationality has the right to use its own language and system of writing, to preserve its national
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identity, and to promote its fine customs, habits, traditions and culture.” If “every” nationality is
afforded the privilege, then LERN minorities do not enjoy any “preference” that other groups do
not.
Although more numerous than precommitments in the other domains, the lack of classical
precommitments in the CULT domain may be particularly noteworthy because of the politically
symbiotic relationship between cultural assimilationism and the more “benign” manifestation of
ethnic cleansing or genocide. The violence of genocide is not, strictly speaking, physical or bodily;
however, its effects are insofar as the demonization of primordial civilizations results in forced land
appropriation by the state and resettlement of peoples alienated from ancestral lands. Indigenous
cultural preservation and territorial conservation are tools that can mitigate the detachment of LERN
minorities from their land and ways of being, while simultaneously making sure that the state
properly manages its nation- and state-building project in a manner that accords with the imperatives
of political and economic modernity.
II.

Discussion
The above analysis of LERN-specific affirmative action precommitments reveals some

important findings. The first is that the majority cases have some form of LERN minority
preferential precommitment, whether domain-specific, non-domain-specific or both. This perhaps
speaks to the choices constitution-makers make when confronted with the dueling imperatives of
nationalism and multiculturalism. With specific relevance to post-WWII constitutions, constitutionmakers face three distinct layers of pressures during the democratic inauguration or change. First,
there is pressure from above. This pressure usually comes from western countries such as the victors
of war or former colonial powers, or from multilateral regional or global institutions. These
pressures can attempt to infuse liberal principles into new founding documents, and they can also
advocate for minority rights protections as prescribed by various treaties and conventions. Second,
there are pressures from below from LERN minorities to be included in the constitution-drafting
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process so that equality provisions and/or preferences can be included in the constitution. Finally,
there is also pressure from old regime elites who seek to perpetuate the previous power structures
within the new democratic institutions so they may maintain as much power as possible. The
constitutional outcome is essentially a consequence of how these varying manifestations of political
power configure themselves at that particular political juncture and how the participants in the
drafting are able to leverage their power to bargain effectively.
In the case of LERN precommitments, the crucial conflict is indeed among liberalism,
multiculturalism and the role of the state. With the exception of five cases – the US, Indonesia,
Argentina, ROK, and Brazil – all cases had some form of LERN-specific equality precommitment
that at the very least, guarantees non-discrimination under the law. These data indicate that the
LERN category is unique enough to warrant separate constitutional recognition beyond the typical
non-group-specific equality precommitment that all cases have, sometimes numbering in the several.
Thus, on their own, LERN-specific equality precommitments show a need for constitution-makers
to break with liberal orthodoxy and to provide some categories of groups constitutional recognition
not provided to other groups. The fact that no one domain had a majority of cases with
precommitments suggests that liberal orthodoxy is predominant. However, for many cases we see
that ultimately strict adherence to liberal democratic ideals becomes untenable and that they must be
compromised if there is to be any state at all, nation- or otherwise. Furthermore, all cases except the
US, Mexico, and SA have some form of social precommitment, either permitting or mandating
redistribution of resources by the state within one or several domains. Like LERN-specific
precommitments, these provisions demonstrate a departure from traditional liberal norms and
institutions and impress upon the state and its citizens some recognition of group rights that is
perhaps less than preferential but certain more than de minimus. Even cases with no LERN-specific
precommitments like the US and Brazil have non-group-specific equality precommitments that
permit LERN-based affirmative action in multiple domains. Indeed, the data here show that, as it
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pertains to group rights, “liberal democracy” is merely an ideal-type, perhaps so ideal as to become an
unworkable fallacy.
When we examine the data on preferential precommitments, the evidence for a
constitutional departure from liberal individualism and toward group rights becomes clearer. As
mentioned, the overwhelming number of cases have some form of social precommitment, and of the
three cases with no discernible social precommitment, all have some sort of territorial or LERNspecific preference. Of the Fifteen cases with LERN-specific preferences, nine of the cases with
domain-specific precommitments have precommitments in multiple issue domains. Even some cases
with largely ethnically homogeneous populations have LERN-specific preferences. For example,
both Bangladesh and China have majority ethnic groups that constitute well over 90% of the
population, but both have LERN-specific precommitments. In Bangladesh, they take the form of a
classical LERN-specific, non-domain-specific provision at art. 28(4), along with a classical civil
service preference in the ECON/EMP domain. China’s minority preferences are territorial,
incorporating semi-autonomy and ethno-development. Some cases with ethnically diverse
populations have no LERN-specific precommitments. Although there appears to be some
correlation between relative homogeneity and the presence of LERN-specific precommitments (the
more diverse, the more likely the presence of a precommitment), the equation is not a simple one.
Most notably, the case studies tend to show that minority group mobilization and other factors,
rather than their absolute numbers, play a crucial role in whether and how their demands for
recognition are responded to during constitution-making and re-making.
Overall, only seven cases had classical precommitments: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Ethiopia, SA, Columbia and Spain. The pattern among the first three cases has been discussed. The
Indian constitution uses the term “reservations” in several provisions, while art. 37, § a of Pakistan
Constitution uses the classical term “measures” along with the sporadic term “promote” and
Bangladesh uses “special provision” in art. 28, § 4 and art. 29, § 3, para. a. In Columbia, art. 176 uses
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the term “special circumscription” to ensure participation of “ethnic groups and the political
minorities” in the Chamber of Representatives. Classical language is used again in art. 246 to
describe the “special jurisdiction” accorded to certain indigenous groups. Finally, art. 3, § 3 of the
Spanish Constitution represents the only classical precommitment in the CULT domain, “[t]he
richness of the different linguistic modalities of Spain is a cultural heritage which shall be specially
respected and protected” (emphasis added). This paucity of classical language could mean that
constitution-makers prefer language derived from their own culture and historical circumstances.
The historical specificity of linguistics and the socio-legal salience of particularized, site-specific
terminology may outweigh any pull to apply classical language which may prove problematic or
inappropriate in a given case-specific legal context. A prime example would be Nigeria’s “federal
character.” Even the term “reservation,” which this study classifies as classical, originates from the
Indian context of preferences for the SC/ST and OBC groups. Another explanation could be that
constitution-makers seek flexibility in the interpretation and application of preferences and thus
choose sporadic language. We know that neither classical nor sporadic, non-equality language is
required for there to be a constitutionally-permitted LERN-specific preference – cases like the US
and Brazil demonstrate this point. However, it would seem that, at least in the abstract, that classical
language would be the most stable.
In analyzing the LERN-specific and territorial precommitments, it is also important to
recognize that not all LERN groups are created equal. Almost universally, there is a distinct
hierarchy of groups within the LERN category. These racial categorization regimes that are the
progeny of colonialism, slavery and migration, and have been reflected in the amount and type of
affirmative action precommitments conferred. In the case of Colombia we saw the differences in
preferences accorded to the indigenous groups but not to blacks, specifically in the economic domain
through a territorial precommitment. The “legitimacy” of the indigenous “ethnic” identity and the
“manufactured” nature of blacks’ “racial” identity are clearly borne out. Afro-Columbians had to
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undertake serious mobilization efforts in order to achieve legal recognition as a discriminated or
marginalized group. This dynamic was noted in the Nigerian case as well, with the settler-indigene
controversy. The privileging of indigenous groups over immigrant minorities is also apparent in
Southeast Asian cases such as the Philippines. We also saw this phenomenon play out a different
way in India in the controversy over applying reservations to the OBCs.
If we turn to domain-specific precommitments, we can see that in the POL domain, only
three cases had electoral quotas for LERN minorities: India, Ethiopia and Columbia. This indicates
that legislative seat reservations for LERN minorities is generally frowned upon. Myanmar appears
to have legislative seat reservation for “national races with suitable population” (Myan. Const. art. 15)
at the regional, state or self-administered levels, but their political participation is effectively limited
to “national races affairs” (Myan. Const. art. 17, § c). The Nigerian LERN-specific, POL-specific
precommitment pertains to the ethnic make-up of political parties’ executive committees, not to
legislative seats themselves (Nig. Const. art. 223, § 1, para. b). Most of the political preferences that
LERN minorities are granted come in the form of territorial grants of autonomy or indigenous
conservation. This finding seems to underscore the national tension between political inclusion and
autonomy.
The data show the same tension in the ECON/EMP domain, with most LERN minority
economic preferences occurring as a result of territorial precommitments. To be sure, there are
instances such as art. 46 of the Indian Constitution, art. 89(4) of the Ethiopian Constitution, art. 22, §
c of the Myanmar Constitution and art. 37, § a of the Pakistani Constitution where there are
mandatory, classical LERN-specific, ECON/EMP-specific precommitments which cover economic
preferences writ large. There are also cases such as art. 16, § 4 of the Indian Constitution, art. 36 of
the Pakistani Constitution, art. 29, § 3 of the Bangladeshi Constitution and arts. 171, § 5, and 208, § 4
and 217(3) of the Nigerian Constitution which have public sector precommitments. However, most
of the political and economic preferences conferred upon LERN minority groups are in fact done so
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through some form of territorial precommitment, whether through some degree of autonomy,
ethno-development scheme or indigenous conservation plan. Fifteen cases have some form of
territorial precommitment that in some way prefers indigenous groups. Twelve cases provide for
some degree of autonomy, which gives the autonomous groups more authority over their political
and economic affairs than groups residing in non-autonomous sub-national units. Four cases –
China (art. 4), India (art. 38, § 2), Pakistan (art. 37, § f) and Columbia (trans. art. 55) – have ethnodevelopment precommitments. Finally, four cases – Brazil (art. 231), Philippines (art. 13, § 6),
Thailand (art. 67) and Columbia (arts. 246 and 330) – have conservation precommitments. These
data tend to show that constitution-makers are more willing to give special political and economic
recognition to LERN minorities vicariously and separately, through a territorial proxy, rather than
through classical precommitments that effectuate preferences through goals or quotas. This may be
because, practically speaking, in many countries LERN minorities reside together in a delineated
geographical area. This makes it easy to confer preferences using a territorial vehicle. Another
explanation is that LERN minorities may actually demand territorial-based preferences as opposed to
more inclusionary preferences like legislative quotas. This explanation makes particular sense in the
case of indigenous groups, but less so for immigrant groups. Thus, these data reinforce the
conclusion that governments are indeed more willing to accommodate the demands of indigenous
groups than immigrant LERN minorities.
When compared to the POL and ECON/EMP domains, the EDU and CULT domains had
more precommitments, indicating that either they are considered to be more important, or that they
are perceived as lesser included domains of territorial precommitments or the POL and
ECON/EMP domains, and thus easier to accommodate. Of the eight CULT-specific, LERNspecific precommitments, only two were classical – SA and Spain. Many of the constitutional
provisions that referred to indigenous or minority cultures did so in a non-preferential or nondiscriminatory way, articulating the equal promotion of the minority culture and the national culture.
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As with the POL domain, the overwhelming choice of tacit terms such as “promote,” “preserve” and
“respect” may be explained by legal flexibility or cultural specificity. Also, territorial, conservation
precommitments tend to include reference to cultural preservation, perhaps making a separate
domain-specific precommitment redundant or irrelevant. When viewed in terms of nationalism
theory, the linguistic ambiguity in the CULT precommitments makes sense – no matter how many
preferences are afforded to minorities by the state the minority cultures must remain subsidiary to the
interests of the overarching national project.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION
I.

SEX and LERN Target Groups Compared
Overall, the comparison of preycommitment landscapes for LERN minorities and

women yields mixed results. First, the prevalence of group-specific equality
precommitments is similar for both categories.
Table 9: SEX-specific and LERN-specific equality precommitments

LERN-specific
precommitment

Yes

No

SEX-specific precommitment
Yes
No
China, India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Nigeria,
Russian Federation, Japan,
Mexico, Philippines,
France
Vietnam, Ethiopia,
Germany, Egypt, Turkey,
DRC, Iran, Thailand, Italy,
SA, Myanmar, Ukraine,
Colombia, Spain
Brazil, ROK
US, Indonesia, Argentina

Twenty-four cases had LERN-specific equality precommitments and 25 cases had
SEX-specific equality precommitments. Additionally, the total number of equality
precommitments for LERN minorities and women is 58 and 66, respectively. Only the US,
Indonesia and Argentina have no group-specific equality provisions. Almost all cases had
equality provisions for both categories; France was the sole case to have only a LERNspecific equality provision, and Brazil and the ROK were the only cases to have only a SEXspecific equality provision. Thirteen of the cases with LERN-specific precommitments had
more than one equality provision, while 20 of 24 cases had multiple provisions for women.
It must be noted that this study does not sub-categorize equality precommitments by
domain, as it does for preferential precommitments. However, at the very least, these data
indicate that constitution-makers generally view minorities and women as being equally
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entitled to equal protection, non-discrimination and equal opportunity. Thus, most states,
regardless of geography, legal tradition, time of democratic transition, degree of
democratization or ethnic make-up, agree that equal opportunity for LERN minorities and
women is a floor to be aspired to. Unfortunately, there seems to be much less agreement on
the height of the ceiling.
The relative parity between LERN minorities and women is also apparent for groupspecific, non-domain-specific precommitments.
Table 10: SEX-specific and LERN-specific, non-domain-specific precommitments
SEX-specific precommitment
Yes
No
Nigeria, Russian
Yes
India, Bangladesh, DRC
Federation, Vietnam, Italy
China, US, Indonesia,
LERN-specific
Brazil, Japan, Mexico,
Pakistan, Ethiopia,
precommitment
Philippines, Egypt, Iran,
No
Germany, Turkey, ROK,
Thailand, France, SA,
Argentina
Myanmar, Ukraine,
Colombia, Spain

For both categories, most cases have some sort of affirmative action precommitment
including both group-specific, non-domain-specific precommitments. There are a total of
16 group-specific, non-domain-specific precommitments; nine are classical and seven are
tacit. Furthermore, ten are mandatory and six are permissive. Four of the seven cases with
LERN-specific, non-domain-specific precommitments have the classical type (India,
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Italy) and five have mandatory provisions (Nigeria, Russian Federation,
Vietnam, DRC, Italy). For the women, seven of nine cases with SEX-specific, non-domainspecific precommitments have classical (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Turkey, DRC,
Argentina) and five are mandatory (Ethiopia, Germany, Turkey, DRC, ROK). Ten cases
have either a LERN- or SEX-specific, non-domain-specific precommitment. Three cases –
India, Bangladesh and the DRC – have group-specific, non-domain-specific
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precommitments for LERN minorities and women. Most cases have no group-specific,
non-domain-specific precommitmen for either group. When viewed in their entirety, these
data indicate that, although there is relative parity between LERN minorities and women,
group-specific, non-domain specific provisions are simply not overwhelmingly desirable by
constitution-makers for either category. And when they are included in constitutions, only
slightly more often than not do framers choose the more robust classical, mandatory
language over the weaker tacit, permissive language. The possible reasons for these choices
have already been discussed. Suffice it to say, as it concerns the comparison between the
two categories, neither category has a clear advantage in the number of cases, the number of
provisions or the type of precommitment.
Parity among women and LERN categories continues with the group-specific, POLspecific precommitments.
Table 11: SEX-specific and LERN-specific, POL-specific precommitments
SEX-specific precommitment
Yes
No
Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Yes
India
Myanmar, Colombia
China, US, Indonesia,
Brazil, Russian Federation,
LERN-specific
Japan, Mexico, Philippines,
precommitment
Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Vietnam, Germany,
No
Egypt, France, Argentina
Turkey, DRC, Iran,
Thailand, Italy, SA, ROK,
Ukraine, Spain

In the POL domain, there were five cases for both women and LERN minorities. Both the
LERN and SEX target groups had 15 provisions. Most provisions were classical and the
provisions were overwhelmingly mandatory. As indicated above, the overwhelming majority
of the POL-specific provisions concern elections. The lone exception is Art. 223(b) of the
Nigerian Constitution which concerns the application of the federal character principle in
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the appointment of political party executive board members. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh
and Ethiopia have explicit quotas; however, neither target group was significantly more likely
to receive them. This finding may mean that, regardless of target group, electoral quotas are
generally frowned upon by constitution-makers. It could also mean that whether a quota is
the optimal vehicle for ensuring substantive equality in federal, state or local elections is a
decision best to legislatures, other sub-national decision-making bodies or political parties.
Alternatively, the omission of specific quotas from a constitution could be seen as
too rigid, and, if socio-political circumstances change far more difficult to amend than
legislation. As the German and Indian cases illustrated, quotas for women and LERN
minorities, respectively, often do not go over well with the electorate and are thus avoided
for political reasons. The fact that only ten total cases had a POL-specific precommitment
at all can lead to several possible conclusions. The first is that electoral imbalances for
minorities and women are simply not important at all. Second, such issue may be important,
but not important enough to warrant serious constitutional attention, given all of the issues
that must be resolved during democratic transitions. Third, any POL-specific preferences,
particularly quotas, may be viewed as fundamentally anti-democratic because the right of
voters to the representative of their choice should not be infringed and entrenched power
structures should not be threatened. Thus, as it may contravene one of the cornerstones of
the republican form of government, this explanation would counsel against group-specific,
POL-specific affirmative action precommitments of any kind.
Unlike the POL domain, women seem to enjoy a distinct advantage in
ECON/EMP-specific precommitments.
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Table 12: SEX-specific and LERN-specific, ECON/EMP-specific precommitments
SEX-specific precommitment
Yes
No
Pakistan, Ethiopia,
India, Bangladesh, Nigeria,
Yes
Myanmar
SA
China, Brazil, Mexico,
LERN-specific
Philippines, Germany,
US, Indonesia, Russian
precommitment
Turkey, Iran, Thailand,
Federation, Japan, Vietnam,
No
Italy, ROK, Ukraine,
Egypt, DRC, France, Spain
Colombia, Argentina

In total, seven cases had LERN-specific, ECON/EMP-specific precommitments,
while 16 cases had SEX-specific precommitments. The LERN category had a total of 17
provisions, 8 of them classical and 12 of them mandatory. Women had a total of 20
provisions, five of them classical and 18 of them mandatory. The types of preferences in
each category differ markedly. Most of the LERN-specific preferences concern broad
economic preferences or civil service appointments, while most of the women-specific
provisions concern maternity protections. This discrepancy could be attributed to the
durability of male chauvinism and gender roles that cast women as “weaker” and in need of
protection by the state. Furthermore, women should not be granted constitutional civil
service preferences because these are positions of authority and prestige and are best suited
for men. This line of reasoning might accord with the trajectory of history, but it remains
inadequate simply because it denies the political agency of women as illustrated by the ROK
and Turkish cases. Curiously, art. 32, § 4 of the ROK Constitution and art. 50 of the
Turkish Constitution use the tacit term “protect,” which for women could be construed as
paternalistic language. Therefore, although maternal precommitments may in some way
exhibit remnants of a stubborn, resilient patriarchy, they also represent the culmination of
decades of women’s mobilization toward more substantive equality. In the end, this analysis
may be case specific.
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A companion explanation may be that civil service preferences are a nationalist tool
used to effectuate ethnic assimilation, and for assuaging the inclusionary demands of a
restive minority through what is, in effect, a political and economic redistributionary scheme.
Nigeria is the most obvious example. If civil service preferences are indeed devised for this
purpose, then it would make little sense to apply them to women because, no matter how
disruptive women’s movements may become, rarely if ever do they threaten the territorial or
institutional integrity of the state itself. Conversely, uprisings by LERN minorities can, and
perhaps that is why the more “robust” civil service preferences are reserved for the LERN
category. That being said, and although not articulated specifically, the LERN-specific, civil
service preferences can include appointments and promotions for LERN minority women.
As previously noted, China’s art. 48 is an exception; it does provide for preferences for
women in the civil service. The obvious explanation is that socialism mandates gender
equality. Indeed, Gao & Zheng make it clear that the key to the progress was affirmative
action as initiated by the party and the state. “The government established regulations to
guarantee women’s representatives in government organizations. More importantly, the
Central Organization Department enacted a series of policies on women’s political
participation and initiated regular programmes to train and select women” (Gao & Zheng,
2008, p. 7). Vietnam, also socialist, has civil service preferences for women as well, but
under a non-group-specific, non-domain-specific provision (Viet. Const. art. 63, § 4). India
does not have civil service preferences for women.
The data also show that neither target group had ECON/EMP-specific
precommitments that applied explicitly to private sector goals or quotas. Some of the
broader provisions, such as art. 46 of the Indian Constitution, art. 7, § XX of the Brazilian
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Constitution, art. 89, § 4 of the Ethiopian Constitution, art. 32, § 4 of the ROK Constitution
and art. 22, § c of the Myanmar Constitution, could be read to give the state the authority to
compel private enterprises to implement preferential programs for LERN minorities and
women. However, even though all five cases have social precommitments, with all except
South Korea being mandatory, none has a provision specifically mentioning private
enterprise. Some women-specific provisions do offer women workplace protections, but
hiring and promotion are not mentioned. “Private institutions” are mentioned in art. 35, § 3
of the Ethiopian Constitution, but it is a SEX-specific, non-domain-specific provision. For
both LERN minorities and women, this omission of private enterprises from ECON/EMPspecific precommitments seems to demonstrate a balance between a state that must
programmatically acknowledge group rights and the imperatives of social/economic justice,
while simultaneously taking care not to trespass so deeply into the free market that the
growth of industry is impeded and the economic growth of the state as a whole is impaired.
In the EDU domain, the disparity between women and LERN minorities is clear.
Table 13: SEX-specific and LERN-specific, EDU-specific precommitments
SEX-specific precommitment
Yes
No
Yes
China, US, Indonesia,
Brazil, Bangladesh, Nigeria,
Russian Federation, Japan,
LERN-specific
Mexico, Vietnam, Ethiopia,
India, Pakistan, Philippines,
precommitment
No
Germany, Egypt, Turkey,
SA, Myanmar
DRC, Iran, Thailand,
France, Italy, ROK,
Ukraine, Colombia, Spain,
Argentina

Five cases have precommitments, all in the LERN category. One reasonable
conclusion is that education for girls is not seen as very important, at least not as important
as education for LERN minorities, even though both minorities and women have historically
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suffered from discrimination at all levels of education. The LERN precommitments
implicitly permit education preferences for LERN minority girls and women, but the
absence of a women-specific reference intimates that girls’ education is not a priority for
constitution-makers. If we look at SA, we can see that the ECON/EMP preferences for
LERN are relatively weak, but SA has strong legislation for minority preferences in both the
public and private sectors. However, because SA has a non-group-specific, non-domainspecific provision at art. 9, § 2, these preferences have also been extended to women through
equal employment and affirmative action legislation passed under the 1994 Gender Policy
Framework. Could this mean that LERN-specific, EDU-specific preferences could also be
extended to women? It could in theory, but the lack of a constitutional precommitment
might make implementation more troublesome legally. All in all, the data presented here
show that constitution-makers are less likely to include EDU-specific preferences for women
than LERN minorities.
There is also a disparity in the CULT domain.
Table 14: SEX-specific and LERN-specific, CULT-specific precommitments
SEX-specific precommitment
Yes
No
Brazil, Philippines, SA,
Yes
Myanmar, Ukraine,
Colombia, Spain
China, India, US,
Indonesia, Bangladesh,
LERN-specific
Nigeria, Russian
precommitment
Federation, Japan, Mexico,
No
Pakistan, Egypt, DRC, Iran
Vietnam, Ethiopia,
Germany, Turkey,
Thailand, France, Italy,
ROK, Argentina

Seven cases have LERN-specific, CULT-specific preferences and only four cases
have SEX-specific, CULT-specific preferences. Although seven cases represent only slightly
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less than one-quarter of the sample, to some extent it does show state willingness to
acknowledge the importance of LERN minority culture as distinct and worthy of special
attention. Indeed, the same indigenous customs that once were vilified and derided as
primitive and anti-modern become appreciated as integral to, rather than inimical to, the
national project. However, for women the social customs that subordinate them persist. In
the case of women, the lack of precommitments could be explained by the limits of state
action; states simply are loathe to intervene in someone’s domestic, interpersonal familial
affairs in a manner that disrupts or balances deep, historical power asymmetries. Under this
view, the right to privacy – a bulwark of liberalism – trumps any state obligation to protect
women from spousal abuse or other discrimination that may occur in the household;
however, it does not prevent the state from perpetuating, reinforcing of enhancing
patriarchal policies that harm women’s rights. The arguments made by Tucker, MacKinnon
and others support this notion. Additionally, and as previously indicated, patriarchal
remnants do persist. However, the cases with women-specific, CULT-specific
precommitments are comprehensive. Article 14 of the DRC Constitution has already been
discussed, but art. 21 of the Iranian Constitution provides another example. In pertinent
part, it states,
The government must ensure the rights of women in all respects, in conformity with
Islamic criteria, and accomplish the following goals:
(1) create a favorable environment for the growth of woman's personality
and the restoration of her rights, both the material and intellectual;
(2) the protection of mothers, particularly during pregnancy and
childbearing, and the protection of children without guardians;
(3) establishing competent courts to protect and preserve the family;
(4) the provision of special insurance for widows, and aged women and
women without support….
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Provisions such as these are quite scarce, a scarcity that highlights either constitution-makers
disregard for such preferences or their unwillingness to implement them for fear of political
backlash from a conservative populace.
II.

Final Conclusions
Ultimately, when we examine the precommitment data in the context of the case

histories presented above, three main conclusions can be drawn. First, liberal individualism
remains central to the constitution-making process. However, constitutional
acknowledgement of group rights is a rather ubiquitous exception. On certain occasions, it
seems as if the imperative for state integrity and institutional durability supersedes any
exogenous or endogenous push toward automatic adherence to liberal individualist norms.
Most fundamentally, this conclusion is reasonable because almost every case has some form
of social precommitment that recognizes the state as an explicitly social or socialist state, or
maintains the state’s obligation to ensure some form of social security or equanimity in
wealth and resource distribution.
When the prevalence of social precommitments is viewed in light of the fact that
almost every case had some LERN-specific or SEX-specific affirmative action provision –
with many cases having more than one – it is clear that for deeply divided societies, as well as
some that are not so deeply divided, liberal individualism in constitution-making has become
more of a flexible consideration than a strict directive. In the LERN case, it would seem
that in Brown’s characterization of ethnic relations in the Asian context as liberal civic
nationalism vs. collective civic nationalism, the latter has more weight. In the context of
women, insofar as doctrinal liberalism also dictates against group rights for women, liberal
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gendered parochialism seems to be giving ground to more collectivist notions of gender
mainstreaming and the slow but noticeable erosion of male supremacy.
Second, LERN minorities tend to fare better overall than women when it comes to
preferential constitutional precommitments. This may stem from the fact that LERN
minorities have the potential be more politically disruptive, employing tactics such as violent
protest, armed rebellion and sustained independence movements to achieve their goals.
These tactics are deeply destabilizing for any nationalist project because they can threaten
territorial integrity, degrade public approval of the new regime and lead to the wasting of
precious and scant economic resources in the effort to quell the movement. Territorial
precommitments also play an important role here. In many instances, the demands of
certain LERN minorities can be met with grants of some degree of autonomy, ethnodevelopment or conservation, rather than with inclusive preferential devices such as electoral
or civil service quotas. Unlike women, LERN minorities are not homogenous; thus,
different solutions may be effective for different groups. Indigenous groups, which tend to
reside in a defined space, may be satisfied by declarations of semi-autonomy or ethnodevelopment schemes. Conversely, women are not territorially defined and, although
divisions such as ethnicity, class and rural-urban do exist, they lack the political salience of
indigenous-immigrant or other intra-LERN group social stratification categories.
Furthermore, women’s issues tend not to destabilize the state and, thus, may be regarded as
less immediate.
Third, even though a preferential disparity between the categories exists, historical
evidence from the cases presented here suggests that endogenous and exogenous political
pressures matter when it comes to LERN minorities’ or womens’ chances of creating and
265

exploiting democratic openings and convincing constitution-makers to include affirmative
action provisions in constitutions. Endogenous pressures, in the form of grassroots
mobilization, domestic political coalition building, litigation, the election of minority and
women law-makers, organized and sustained protest, and sometimes outright violence
permit subordinated social groups to take advantage of political opportunity structures to
have constitutions rewritten or amended. This pattern played out when women sought
greater electoral representation as well as when indigenous groups sought political and
economic autonomy. Exogenous forces, such as international conventions, legal borrowing,
NGOs, and even economic sanctions or incentives, are also important to realizing
institutional legal change for subordinated groups during political transition. When these
two forces operate in concert, minority groups stand the best chance of achieving a
constitutional precommitment to affirmative action. Exogenous pressures seem to be more
significant for women, while endogenous pressures seem more significant for LERN
minorities.
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III.

Policy Prescriptions
Based on the results of this study, constitution-drafters interested in incorporating SEX-

specific affirmative action precommitments should adopt a holistic, synergistic approach by using a
variety of provisions that can be read in pari material to provide women the most robust legal
preferences. Specifically, the drafters should include: (1) a women-specific equality precommitment,
(2) a social precommitment, (3) a women-specific, non-domain-specific affirmative action
precommitment and (4) women-specific domain-specific affirmative action precommitments for the
four domains examined in this study. The combination of these four elements would provide the
strongest legal foundation for moving toward an end to sex discrimination through special measures
legislation. Drafters should be cognizant that some domains of discrimination are “stickier” than
others and thus require more attention from constitution drafters and legislators. In the POL
domain, if quotas are desired, this should be made clear. The type of quota - whether party-list,
reserved seat or other - should also be made clear. Additional details can be left to legislation and/or
party rules. For the ECON/EMP domain, maternity provisions, following the Mexican example,
should be included. Wage provisions, in a manner that expands upon the Brazilian example, are also
integral. In EDU, the Vietnamese example is good, but the constitutionality of quotas in private and
public educational institutions should be made clear. Finally, for most countries the CULT domain is
the most sensitive. As mentioned, above, the Ethiopian example can be expanded upon and
enhanced through legislation and the creation of appropriate institutional mechanisms.
Constitution-drafters interested in memorializing LERN-specific affirmative action
precommitments should do as was recommended for the women. They should adopt a holistic,
synergistic approach by using a variety of provisions that can be read in pari material to provide LERN
minorities the most robust legal preferences. The drafters should take care to include: (1) a LERNspecific equality precommitment, (2) a social precommitment, (3) a LERN-specific, non-domainspecific affirmative action precommitment and (4) a LERN-specific, domain-specific affirmative
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action precommitments for the domain in which the preference is sought. The combination of these
four elements would provide the most comprehensive constitutional foundation for supporting
preferential legislation for LERN minorities. As with the SEX category, drafters should be cognizant
that some domains of discrimination are “stickier” than others and thus require more attention. In
the POL domain, if quotas are desired, this should be made clear. The type of quota should also be
made clear. For the ECON/EMP domain, whether a provision should/may be applied to the public
and or private sectors should be clearly articulated. In EDU, the SA example is instructive, but
clarity as to the constitutionality of quotas, and for which groups and institutions, must be made
certain. Finally, for the CULT domain, drafters may want to employ classical language that makes
the intent to confer special treatment, rather than simply non-discriminatory treatment, clear.

IV.

Ideas for Future Research
The findings and conclusion presented in this dissertation open many avenues for

future research. The sample of cases could easily be expanded beyond 30. Expansion may
permit greater insight and allow for consideration of more variables that influence whether
and which affirmative action precommitments are implemented. A greater sample size
might also help in answering certain fundamental questions. For example, do constitutional
precommitments to affirmative action “matter”? This dissertation was primarily concerned
with clarifying and cataloguing affirmative action precommitments and devoted less
attention to precommitment effectiveness. A more methodologically rigorous study of
precommitment effectiveness could reveal how important they actually are. A basic research
design could simply add data to the data presented in Chapters 7 and 8, such as (1) national
legislation for all cases in the sample, organized by target group and issue domain; (2) subnational legislation for all cases in the sample, organized by target group and issue domain,
(3) national case law on affirmative action. With this additional data, along with buttressing
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historical materials, it could be determined whether cases with affirmative action
precommitments are more likely to have affirmative action legislation at the national and
sub-national levels, whether the type of precommitment determines the type/amount of
legislation, or whether there is “issue bleeding” – whether precommitments in one domain
or for one target group make legislation more likely to be passed for others. Certain of these
queries may be best addressed through large N and small N comparisons of two or three
cases.
Future research could also examine precommitments for other groups such as
persons with disabilities or religious minorities. As has been mentioned, there is some
overlap between the LERN category and religion. However, elucidating religion as a
separate category could be useful, particularly in countries with multiple religious minorities.
A comparison of such cases would permit intra- and inter-group findings. Additionally,
many constitutions contain precommitments for persons with disabilities. A comparison of
precommitments for LERN minorities, religious minorities, women and persons with
disabilities could provide deeper insight into how societies accord rights and preferences to
different minority groups.
It might also be useful to determine how certain groups take advantage of
opportunity structures during constitutional openings and succeed in having affirmative
action precommitments included. A few cases were treated in Chapter 7 and 8; however, a
larger sample may provide greater insight into precisely which endogenous an exogenous
variables must be present and interact for specific groups to achieve a constitutional
precommitment during onstitutionmaking. Finally, what are we to make of cases that have
precommitments for both categories but use different language to articulate them? For
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example, the DRC’s LERN-specific, non-domain-specific precommitment uses tacit,
(“protection,” “promotion”), mandatory language while its women-specific, non-domainspecific precommitment uses classical (“measures”), mandatory language. Explanations for
these differences in language selection can be social, political, temporal or perhaps even
coincidental. Regardless of the processes at work, understanding them is an interesting
avenue of inquiry.
Another avenue of inquiry is the path dependent nature of affirmative action
precommitments. Specifically, if an affirmative action precommitment is not included in an
initial constitution, what variables operate to make constitutional amendment more or less
likely? Are these variables different for different target groups? How would we account for
institutional variations in amendment processes?
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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY
I.

Introduction
This research project uses a two-pronged qualitative approach to understanding

constitutional precommitments to affirmative action. First, the study develops a basic typology of
affirmative action constitutional precommitments based on the definition of affirmative action
proposed herein – a state mandated or permitted group preference. Then, the various types and subtypes of precommitments are identified using constitutional textual analysis and comparative
historical analysis, with significant guidance from the comparative constitutional law research
program. Textual provisions from the constitutions from the cases in the sample are presented and
analyzed for both illustrative and loosely comparative purposes to provide examples of each
affirmative action type.
Second, after the precommitment types and sub-types are identified, delineated and
articulated, their application for two target groups – LERN minorities and women – and for four
issue domains – economy/employment (ECON/EMP), political (POL), education (EDU) and
culture (CULT) – are evaluated for frequency within the sample of constitutions. Next, using
comparative historical institutional analysis, cases are compared and contrasted through process
tracing to assist in understanding potential patterns in precommitment genesis, implementation,
expansion and modulation. Tables are used to display graphically overall prevalence of particular
affirmative action precommitment types and sub-types by country, target group and issue domain.
Finally, tentative conclusions concerning the most salient variables that influence the comparative
prevalence of affirmative action precommitments across target groups and issue domains are drawn
based on the numerical data, legal histories and political contexts.
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II.

Comparative Constitutional Law
At the heart of this project is the comparison of constitutions. Hirschl (2014) contends that

there has been a “global transformation” – the ubiquitous emergence of constitutional systems – that
“has brought about an ever-expanding interest among scholars, judges, practitioners and
policymakers in the constitutional law and institutions of other countries, and in the transnational
migrational of constitutional ideas, more generally” (Hirschl, 2014, p. 2). However, he is forced to
concede that “as a method and a project [comparative constitutional law] remains under-theorized
and blurry” (Hirschl, 2014, p. 3). He elaborates by observing,
[s]ince its birth, comparative constitutional law struggled with questions of identity. There is
considerable confusion about its aims and purposes, and even about its subjects – is it about
constitutional systems, constitutional jurisprudence, constitutional courts, or constitutional
government and politics? It also remains unclear whether comparative constitutional law is
or ought to be treated as a subfield of constitutional law, or an altogether independent area
of inquiry (Hirschl, 2014, p. 4).
Hirschl enumerates three primary reasons for comparative constitutional inquiry: (1)
necessity – for empires or large political entities to govern diverse nations or minorities seeking to
preserve their status by opening new areas of law: (2) inquisitiveness – for intellectual curiosity,
perhaps motivated by a need to understand one’s own constitution; and (3) politics – for promoting a
concrete political agenda (Hirschl, 2014, p. 148). He argues that the field is comprised of four
different types of scholarship. The first is the single-case study. In this type, the author is usually
familiar with the case and selects it with no particular regard to method. Purposes for section include
highlighting the constitutional idiosyncrasies of a particular case or providing reference material to
students and scholars. Second, contributors to the field may use analogy distinction and contrast to
find solutions to a given constitutional challenge. While the first category is not strictly speaking
comparative, the second type does involve comparison for the potential purpose of emulation in
newly democratizing societies. Commentaries on inter-court borrowing as a means of establishing a
global legal discourse tend to populate the category. The third type emphasizes the broad similarity
of constitutional challenges across cases. It focuses on key liberal democratic concepts as separation
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of powers, statutory interpretation and equal protection. This type contributes greatly to concept
formation and consolidation and forms the basis of most comparative constitutional law textbooks.
In the vein of the second type, the third type also implicates inter-court borrowing, facilitating
normative and juridical analyses concerning positive and negative borrowing. Hirschl refers to this
approach as “concept thickening through multiple description” (Hirschl, 2005, p. 130). Fourth, and
finally, some studies move beyond thick description and concept formation to theory-building and
causal inference. This exercise requires three major steps: (1) hypothesis testing involving causal
links among well-defined variables; (2) confirmation or disconfirmation of the hypothesis through
rigorous data collection, and analysis; and (3) generation of conclusions.90
From a theoretical perspective, Magnarella (1994) posits that personal philosophies and
theories of societal dynamics influence comparison. Relevant dynamics include: the sociocultural,
economic, and political history of the constituent population; the goals, agendas, and strategies of the
society's politically elite; the role of the military within the political and economic system; the society's
religious and political ideologies, norms, and values; and the relationship among the society's
technology, demography, resources, economy, and external but impinging sociopolitical powers. In
Magnarella’s view, “every sociocultural system has its peculiar law that results from a unique mix of
historic and contemporary social, cultural, economic, demographic, environmental, and political
forces. An accurate understanding of constitutions or legal texts requires a knowledge of all these

Tushnet (1999) identifies the field of comparative constitutional law as fertile for rigorous study. He offers a
systematic approach to this enterprise, organized in three possible approaches. First, a functional approach
could help identify those functions that are common to all governments. These functions, however, must not
be specified to broadly or too narrowly. An alternative to functionalism is the expressivist approach. Tushnet
describes the expressivist model as emerging from a state’s particular history and character. In the expressivist
view, a constitution tells a story about a society; “constitutions emerge out of each nation’s distinctive history
and express its distinctive character” (Tushnet, 1999, p. 1269). That character, according to Tushnet, must
“always [be] subject to renegotiation and revision” (Tushnet, 1999, p. 1308). Finally, Tushnet suggests the
bricolage approach, “an interpretive theory that sees insistence that the Constitution is a highly rationalized
document as only one, historically contingent view of the Constitution” (Tushnet, 1999, p. 1308).
90
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forces” (Magnarella, 1994, p. 514). Any comparative constitutional law theoretical framework must
be concerned with both etiology (causal forces and efficient cause explanations) and teleology
(motivational forces and final cause explanations). “A society’s peculiar history, the way its
boundaries were drawn, and the extent to which its pre-state population constituted rival factions or
shared a common identity as a people, have important bearings on the character of its governance
and law” (Mangarella, 1994, p. 515).
In Fontana’s (2011) view, comparative constitutional law had particular prominence
immediately after WWII, but suffered a precipitous drop in interest and use subsequently. During
what Fontana refers to as the Rise Era – from 1945-1972 – comparative constitutional law was an
accepted part of legal scholarship. Prominent articles were published in the Harvard Law Review
and Yale Law Journal, well-known law professors and jurists gave lectures and law schools offered
comparative-themed courses focusing on foreign law. There was a significant degree of inter-state
dialogue among legal professionals, with American scholars advising other countries on their
constitution-making processes. American scholars were fascinated with events overseas Justices
Frankfurter, Jackson and Warren were all interested in the subject. Part of the interest was motivated
by a cultural and legal imperialism married to a sense of American exceptionalism following the
victory in WWII. Thus, the Rise Era can properly be characterized as an opportunity to export its
constitutional ideals to other countries, while importing very little from foreign “negative”
constitutional experiences (Fontana, 2011, pp. 14-22).
However, from 1972-1999 interest in the topic waned quite dramatically. Attention turned
away from international issues and became more focused on domestic litigation. The new generation
of law professors had little foreign experiences and were culled primarily from federal clerkships at
the circuit and Supreme Court levels. This shift had an effect on the law students as well as the types
of scholarship published in law journals. As Fontana notes, there were essentially no substantial
articles about comparative constitutional law written by prominent American constitutional scholars
274

during the Fall Era. The fall of comparative constitutional law was also a function of the rise of
international law. Elites in the American legal profession became interested in international law
because they could use it to bolster domestic law arguments made in federal courts. In Fontana’s
view, the move away from comparative constitutional law has severely limited the types of arguments
made under American constitutional law, thus fundamentally hampering the process of judicial
review. With specific reference to race-conscious affirmative action programs, Fontana opines,
[r]egardless of whether courts should be referencing comparative constitutional sources,
there are many good reasons to think that scholarship about constitutional law – so much
affected by these middle range concerns – could consider comparative sources across all
different types of issues. Since nearly ninety percent of the countries in the world now have
some form of constitutional review, comparative constitutional law potentially offers
enormous amounts of factual information, information that is particularly relevant because
constitutional scholars make arguments based on facts (Fontana, 2011, pp. 33-34).
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Or as Jansen (2006) explains:
To be sure, it may be difficult to understand a foreign legal system, because legal rules and
legal texts are typically deeply rooted within a specific economic, political, moral, and cultural
background, which can often only be explained from a historical perspective. Thus, the
comparative lawyer, as some have put it, must be ‘culturally fluent’ in another legal language.
This is necessary not only for understanding foreign norms and legal texts, but also for
identifying parallel rules or parts of the law. What is more, even in a foreign proposition is
perfectly understood, it may be difficult to translate into one’s own language. This is
especially the case with law which constitutes a partly autonomous reality created by the
norms, doctrine, and concepts of a legal system that do not necessarily find exact
counterparts in another.” (Jansen, 2006, pp. 306-307).
Some scholars are more skeptical about the benefits of inter-state legal comparisons. Lucas
(2010) argues that in the case of the US constitutional comparison must be undertaken with caution.
He compares the role of the judiciary as conceived of in the US Constitution, the German Basic Law,
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and concludes that the Constitution is exceptional
in its lack of judicial constraints. Lucas believes that the American constitutional architecture does
not rest on the same intellectual foundations as the rest of the constitutionalized world. Were judges
to rely on foreign law they may interpret those laws without proper context, and the result may be an
unintended expansion of constitutional rights. This could exacerbate pre-existing rifts in American
society. Furthermore, incorporating foreign law without the accompanying safeguards could lead to
the entrenchment of judicial policy-making. Because Supreme Court decisions can only be
overridden by a subsequent decision or constitutional amendment, justices must be restrained in their
decision-making. Ultimately, “[t]he fusion of American constitutional structure with comparative
constitutional law risks creating a hybrid form of judicial review where justices can employ aggressive
interpretations with little possibility of correction” (Lucas, 2010, p. 2005).
What Lucas alludes to is the idea “legal particularism” makes comparative constitutionalism
a very dubious enterprise in the minds of some jurists. As Choudry (1999) notes, “in its strongest
formulation, legal particularism asserts that constitutions are important aspects of national identity.
Comparative jurisprudence is of no assistance at all, precisely because it comes from outside a given
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legal system” (Choudry, 1999, p. 830). He identifies Alford, Fletcher, and Schauer as adherents to
the legal particularism school. These and similar scholars privilege differences between legal systems
– in such areas as rights, duties, liberties and powers – and ignore similarities, dismissing them as
superficial even when constitutional terminology and vocabulary are the same. Particularists argue
that because reference to extra-constitutional, indigenous sources is crucial for constitutional
interpretation, the comparative effort becomes more cultural anthropology than legal analysis.
However, as Law (2005) demonstrates, there does exist a “generic constitutional theory” that engages
issues such as legitimate sources of law, methods of proper argumentation, and how the judicial
branch is to interact with other branches of government. It is the international legal borrowing, an
act common among constitutional courts that helps create generic legal doctrine. Consultation of
foreign materials and consequent legal borrowing do not themselves predict doctrinal convergence.
Additional factors such as the extent to which constitutional language and history are shared by
different jurisdictions, the recurring practical challenges of governance that courts must confront, the
influence of legal scholarship, the homogenizing tendencies of federal and supranational structures,
and the desire of courts with overlapping jurisdictions to avoid conflict are also determinative (Law,
2005).
Ultimately, we are experiencing doctrinal convergence – what Yeh & Chang (2008) refer to
as transnational constitutionalism – and this process is likely to continue. The authors attribute its
development and expansion to economic globalization and the imperatives of global market
management. Trans-national constitutions or quasi-constitutional arrangements such as the failed
EU Constitutional Treaty are noteworthy. Although it was rejected, the proposed constitution
included standard constitutional components such as federalism, judicial review and a bill of rights.
International agreements like the WTO, the UN Charter and NAFTA are also examples of
international constitution-making. Norms such as human rights are not only recognized in
international agreements, but also in domestic constitutions and legislation as derivations of evolving
277

and expanding standards of rights protections (Yeh & Chang, 2008, pp. 92-95). Also of importance
is increased transnational judicial dialogue, as evidenced by domestic judicial reference to
international norms, judicial reference to foreign laws, and reference made by international tribunals
to international regimes or decisions by other international tribunals.
Law agrees, describing the effect of judicial dialogue on transnational constitutionalism in
functional terms. International judicial communication, constitutional borrowing is also prevalent
and an almost ubiquitous set of generic constitutional concerns support this movement toward
constitutional homogenization. Law believes that this movement is largely organic, with little or no
conscious coordination among judges. When confronted with complex legal issues, constitutional
adjudicators will opt to follow generic law for three basic reasons. First, judges tend to copy each
other because (1) it is the path of least resistance and (2) originality in decision-making is not
rewarded. Second, there is what Law refers to as the “natural inertia to borrowing” (Law, 2005, p.
726). Courts will inevitably look to foreign courts when confronted with the same legal concepts or
issues. The prevalence of federal, supra-national and international law creates a complexity that
makes finding solutions in generic law attractive. Finally, as will be discussed greater detail below, the
predominance of constitutionalism as a form of state organization has contributed to constitutional
convergence. For Yeh & Chang, the result is a “common set of constitutional languages” that can
facilitate international transactions, such as the negotiation of contracts (Yeh & Chang, 2008, p. 98).
What Yeh & Chang refer to as transnational constitutionalism and Law refers to as generic
constitutional theory, McEldowney (2010) characterizes as the “hybridization” of constitutional law.
Hybridization entails “transposing ideas and concepts from different legal systems, partly as a part of
modernization, but also as a consequence of globalization (McEldowney, 2010, p. 328). He points to
contract law as an early example of the assimilation and merger of legal influences, and then cites the
Japanese legal system as an example of a hybrid system. Japan’s indigenous legal order reflects
Chinese imperial imposition the second major influence is Japan’s Meiji period.
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This study adopts the position that a there indeed exists some form of “generic”
constitutional law, or that modern-day constitution law has in many important respects become
“transnational” or “hybridized,” thus permitting cross-country comparison. Furthermore, in
agreement with Hirschl, comparing constitutions is a valuable enterprise. The general position of
Yeh & Chang, Lucas and McEldowney – that transnational legal comparison is possible, inevitable
and potentially valuable – is especially resonant as it concerns rather ubiquitous issues such as
minority rights and group preferences. The concerns of particularists like Choudry are well taken.
However, if their core aversion to constitutional comparison is extended to its logical conclusion
then how can any two legal systems ever be compared. In their attempt to marginalize legal similarity
in favor of difference, what they ultimately accomplish is the creation of some manufactured,
disingenuous notion that there exists some pure, unadulterated version of domestic law, and that it
must be preserved at all costs from the hybridization or mongrelization that accompanies
constitutional comparison. Thus, their critique seems to be less about the idiosyncracies of legal
interpretation and more about the ideology of constitutional nationalism.
Critics like Tushnet (2004) questions the value of comparing affirmative action laws. He
argues generally that “we must be aware of which the institutional and doctrinal contexts limit the
relevance of comparative information” and “direct application of another system’s solution seems
unlikely to succeed” (Tushnet, 2004, p. 662). For him, the idea that constitutional comparison “may
bring to mind possibilities that would otherwise be overlooked, or may allow us to frame new
questions” is questionable (Tushnet, 2004, p. 662). Furthermore, learning about other constitutional
systems is “costly” and “it is not entirely clear that looking elsewhere is actually a productive way of
coming up with new approaches to existing problems” (Tushnet, 2004, p. 662-663). To explain his
claims, Tushnet compares affirmative action law in India and the US, arguing that the concept of the
“creamy later” in Indian affirmative action jurisprudence “cannot inform United States constitutional
law to the very large extent that the idea is bound up with compensatory or distributive justice or
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group-oriented justifications” (Tushnet, 2004, p. 659). In addition, the US Supreme Court requires a
finding of intent to justify an affirmative action program, not simply disparate impact (Tushnet, 2004,
p. 659).
Tushnet’s arguments against comparing affirmative action law fails for several reasons. First,
the relative importance of transnational legal comparison, with affirmative action or any other are of
law, depends largely on the perspective of the person evaluating relevance. If the evaluator is a legal
academic whose chief concern is simply to identify, parse and understand a particular line of cases
then foreign law becomes irrelevant. However, if the evaluator is an advocate – or one of the
“minority groups” described b Hirschl who engages in comparative constitutional law by necessity –
and is interested in changing the course of jurisprudence and introducing new concepts into legal
doctrine for the purposes of effectuating equality and fairness, then foreign approaches to similar
issues is important because they can be valuable sources of novel arguments. This disconnect
illustrates a fundamental dichotomy between doctrine and practice, and the oftentimes opposing
interests of those who focus on what is and those who focus on what should be.
Tushnet’s critique also seems to privilege legal doctrine as such, and not as it relates to
politics more broadly. He seems to rely on the implied supposition that domestic legal doctrine is
developed and operates in a vacuum or closed system. Jurists are of course not immune from
extrajudicial political influences, whether endogenous or exogenous in origin. Parallel institutional
influences, from the executive or legislative branches, routinely influence judicial decision-making,
particularly on the most contentious issues. Even political agents such as corporate interest groups
(both domestic and international), labor unions, other grassroots movements, and even public
opinion can prod judges to made certain decisions by pressing claims derived from preferences
formulated by transnational comparison of the political issues that concern them. This dynamic
typifies the indirect influence of foreign institutions in formulating domestic legal doctrine. Law, like
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all other institutions, is not static, but dynamic, changeable and imminently susceptible to foreign
political influence.
A third observation of Tushnet’s critique has to do with the unknowability of the origination
of concepts or ideas. The US, for example, is a hybrid nation, and the development of American
political institutions is owed to the influence of a variety of “foreign” legal influences imported from
a myriad of cultures and traditions. Ideas that were once foreign are today considered domestic, even
the basic liberal ideas that form the foundation of the US Constitution. Indeed, institutional
hybridization, legal or otherwise, is the norm rather than the exception. The question of whether
transnational legal comparison is in fact a legitimate, productive enterprise should not be answered
by dogmatic predisposition or by the unreasonable segregation of law and politics, but must be a
thoughtful conclusion drawn after thorough investigation of the issues and cases the researcher seeks
to compare. The ultimate determination becomes a function of evaluating the degree or type cultural
specificity, being open and honest about the limitations of comparison and being cautious about
overstating any conclusions drawn.
III.

A Historical Institutionalist Approach
The second methodological prong of this study employs a comparison historical

institutionalist. Thelen & Steinmo (1992) characterize institutionalists as being “interested in the
whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and
that structure their relations of power to other groups” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, p. 2). Institutions
“constrain and refract” politics but are never the sole cause (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, p. 3).
“Institutional analyses do not deny the broad political forces that animate various theories of
politics…. Instead, they point to the ways that institutions structure those battles and in doing so,
influence their outcomes” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, p. 3). Institutionalists tend to focus on
intermediate-level factors like party systems or unions, as well as macro-level phenomena such as
class structure. Micro-level variables such as grass roots mobilized groups can also be included.
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Thelen & Steinmo contend that rather than succumb to the lure of institutional determinism,
institutions must be viewed as dynamic in at least four ways. First, it must be understood that
previously latent institutions may suddenly become politically salient. Second, changes in balances of
power can create a situation in which old institutions are put in the control of new actors who may
seek to pursue new goals. Third, exogenous phenomena may compel old actors to pursue new goals.
Fourth, the institutions themselves may change, forcing political actors to adjust their strategies
(Thelen & Steinmo, 1992, p. 16-17). All in all, “there is nothing automatic, self-perpetuating, or selfreinforcing about institutional arrangements. Rather, a dynamic component is built in; where
institutions represent compromises or relatively durable though still contested settlements based on
specific coalitional dynamics, they are always vulnerable to shifts” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 8).
The complexity of compliance, actor’s cognitive limits, the implicit nature of institutions’
assumptions, the difficulty of rule enforcement are all important factors that influence institutional
shifting (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 11-13).
Historical institutionalists use case studies to generate theories or to illustrate certain ideas.
George & Bennett (2005) define the case study approach as “the detailed examination of an aspect of
a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other
events” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 5). The case study method has several advantages over
statistical approaches. First, case studies “allow a researcher to achieve high levels of conceptual
validity, or to identify and measure the indicators that best represent the theoretical concepts the
researcher intends to measure” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19). Compared to statistical analysis,
case studies allow for conceptual refinement, rather than aggregating a set of data points that may be
overly dissimilar.
Second, the case study approach permits the discovery of new variables and hypotheses
through analysis of deviant cases or outliers (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 20). Third, case studies
explore causal mechanisms. George & Bennett define causal mechanisms as “ultimately
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unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities
operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to
other entities” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 137). Finally, case studies accommodate causal
relationships such as equifinality and path dependency (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 22).
Although the benefits of the case study method are numerous, there are limitations. George
& Bennett identify several of them, chief among them being selection bias. Selection bias occurs
when there are systematic errors in the case selection process. Such biases can include selection
along the dependent variable of a population of cases, or deliberately selecting cases that share a
particular outcome (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 23). Researchers must also be aware of cognitive
biases in favor of preferred hypotheses and avoid limiting the scope of their sample so as to limit
findings and generalizability. And, as George & Bennett point out, it should also be borne in mind
that case study analysis is good at determining whether or how a particular variable matters (necessity
or sufficiency), but is less appropriate for determining how much certain variables matter (George &
Bennett, 2005, p. 25).
This study adopts a case study approach that is comparative in nature. For Mahoney &
Rueshmeyer (2003) comparative historical analysis is well-suited for researchers who seek the
answers to “big questions.” In their view, comparative historical analysts “are frequently able to
derive lessons from past experiences that speak to the concerns of the present” and “can yield more
meaningful advice concerning contemporary choices and possibilities than studies that aim for
universal truths but cannot grasp critical historical details” (Mahoney & Rueschmeyer, 2003, p. 9).
Mahoney & Rueschmeyer comparative historical analysis embodies three important features. First
comparative historical analysis is concerned with “explanation and the identification of causal
configurations that produce major outcomes of interest” (Mahoney & Rueschmeyer, 2003, p. 11).
The authors refer to a methodological eclecticism used by comparative historical researchers which
allows them to address the problems at hand (Mahoney & Rueschmeyer, 2003, p. 12).
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Second, there is an emphasis with the unfolding of processes over time (Mahoney &
Rueschmeyer, 2003, p. 12). The central concept here is path dependence, defined by Pierson (2004)
as “dynamic processes involving positive feedback, which generate multiple possible outcomes
depending on the particular sequence in which events unfold” or a phenomenon in which “outcomes
in the early stages of a sequence feed on themselves, and once possible outcomes become
increasingly unreachable over time” (Pierson, 2004, p. 20-21). For Pierson, attention to processes is
important for three reasons: (1) these processes are important parts of the social world, (2) the
investigation of the causes and consequences of positive feedback is an interesting avenue of inquiry
and (3) self-reinforcing, path dependent dynamics are important in understanding temporal processes
(Pierson, 2002, p. 21-22).
Finally, comparative historical inquiry systematically compares and contrasts cases. As
Mahoney & Rueshmeyer explain, “by employing a small number of cases, comparative historical
researchers can comfortably move back and forth between theory and history in many iterations of
analysis as they formulate new concepts, discover novel explanations, and refine preexisting
theoretical explanations in light of detailed case evidence” (Mahoney & Rueschmeyer, 2003, p. 13).
IV.

Research Questions
This study will examine following research questions:
(1) Can a general classification scheme for affirmative action precommitments be created?
(2) If so, what types and/or sub-types of affirmative action precommitments should be

included?
(3) Can the prevalence of certain types and sub-types be determined, both within and across
(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)

cases?
Can any correlations be found between types, subtypes and issue domains of affirmative
action precommitments and the presence or type of LERN groups?
Can any correlation be found between types, sub-types and issue domains of affirmative
action precommitments and the presence of women?
Are there any differences in the prevalence of certain types, sub-types and issue domains
of affirmative action precommitments used for LERN minority groups as opposed
women?
Are there any differences between the women and LERN minority groups as to how
affirmative action precommitments are obtained?
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V.

Case Selection
A total of thirty cases were selected for this study, although the case of the UK was nor

formally considered because it has no formal constitution. Ordinarily, cases would be randomly
selected to control for selection bias. However, were that method applied here there would be no
guarantee that sufficient cases would have the level of LERN diversity needed for intra- and intergroup comparison. The best way to ensure adequate diversity was to select the cases with the highest
total populations, based on estimates from the 2009 CIA World Factbook.
VI.

Type and Sub-type Selection
Types and subtypes were selected through careful analysis of the text of constitutions of the

cases in the sample, in light of the proposed definition of affirmative action and with an eye toward
specific language used in the US, European and international contexts that can reasonably be
concluded to indicate a group preference for LERN minorities and women. From this analysis the
four basic types, sub-types and issue domains were formulated. Although there is clearly conceptual
and practical overlap, generally speaking categories are conceived of as mutually exclusive. Thus,
there are no precommitments that are classified as both classical and tacit. If a constitutional
provision contains language that would qualify it for inclusion as both classical and tacit, the classical
language takes precedence. If a provision can be categorized as both classical or social, the social
language takes precedence.
For example, under art. 19(2) of the Bangladesh constitution; “[t]he state shall adopt
effective measures to remove social and economic inequality between man and man and to ensure
the equitable distribution of wealth among citizens, and of opportunities in order to obtain a uniform
level of economic development throughout the Republic.” Under the coding scheme used in this
study, the use of the term “measures” could qualify this provision for inclusion as a “classical”
precommitment. However, because of the references to the removal of social inequality and the
achievement of an equitable distribution of wealth, this provision is classified as “social.”
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Additional examples are found in arts. 13(1) and (2) of the Philippines constitution. Under
art. 13(1) “[t]he Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.” Here, both the classical term “measures” and the tacit term “protect” are used,
making this a “classical” precommitment, while the social language clearly makes it a “social”
precommitment. Additionally, that provision refers to “all people” and does not read so as to confer
a preference on a particular group. In the end, the Bangladesh example, the “social” classification
takes precedence. Article 13(2) states, “[t]he promotion of social justice shall include to commitment
to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.” “Promotion” is a
“tacit” term used in what is clearly a “social” context. Again, because of the overwhelmingly ‘social”
language the “social” classification controls.
VII.

Data Collection
After the cases were selected, Hein Online’s World Constitutions Illustrated was used to find

the most recent version of each country’s constitution. It should be noted that all of the
constitutions used were English translations from the original languages. Reliance on translated
documents, legal or otherwise, can be problematic. To combat any potential misinterpretation in
assessing affirmative action precommitmens, this research relies substantially on secondary source
materials, as is discussed below. That said, the constitutions themselves were necessarily the most
important primary sources used in this research. Each of the constitutions was reviewed thoroughly
to determine which provisions qualified as an affirmative action precommittment according to the
“state-mandated or permitted group preference” definition. This operation was performed for all 30
constitutions. Once these data had been collected, they were then evaluated to determine general
categories or types into which each precommittment could be classified.
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Overall, data analysis was two-pronged. First, each constitutional provision was evaluated
for potential inclusion as an affirmative action precommttment. Each general category had its own
criteria for inclusion, which were applied to each constitutional provision. Generally speaking, the
assignment of any specific constitutional provision to a category of affirmative action was dictated by
one or more of four factors: (1) the plain language of the provision itself, (2) the language of the
provision when considered in pari material with other constitutional provisions, (3) comparison of
constitutional language to similar language used in other constitutions and (4) the actual application
of the precommittment, taking into account social, political and legal episodes of implementation.
Additional secondary source materials – including previous constitutions and political histories of
previous and current constitutions – were consulted. Each determination of whether a provision
qualified as an affirmative action precommitment, and, if so, what type or sub-type, was made
individually. If a provision was borderline, it was rejected.
VIII.

Target Group Selection
Although the typology proposed here should apply to affirmative action precommitments

for any group, this project focuses on precommitments for LERN minorities and women. Very few
previous studies have engaged in any serious comparative analysis of these two groups, and to the
author’s knowledge, none have done so using large N constitutional textual analysis. This
comparison is important for several reasons: (1) it can show whether affirmative action
precommitments are more prevalent for LERN minorities or women overall; (2) it can show whether
affirmative action precommitments are more prevalent for LERN minorities or women within
specific geographic regions; (3) it can highlight how constitution-makers perceive certain groups’
worthiness to receive group preferences; (4) it can show what factors prove material in determining
whether each group is able to exploit political opportunity structures and obtain constitutional
preferences; (5) it can show how preferences vary within groups, e.g. preferences for indigenous
peoples vs. blacks in Latin America.
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Target group selection was also motivated by the intellectual curiosity of the researcher. The
SEX target group refers almost exclusively to women. The LERN target group is a composite of
four overlapping and intersecting social-political identity monikers: linguistic, ethnic, racial and
national. The purpose of this dissertation is not to present a treatise on the nature of these four
group identifiers. The distinction is largely linguistic and necessarily contextual. For the purposes of
this study, the four groups were collapsed into a composite group because collapsing the groups is
analytically advantageous and makes comparison of precommitment across cases possible.
Otherwise, the potential for meaningful cross-case comparison is diminished by virtue of being
trapped in a linguistic quagmire. What is important is not so much the particular cultural-linguistic
designation attached to a certain minority group, but the fact that LERN groups share a conceptual
nexus in being the targets of historic oppression perpetrated by or condoned by the state. As such,
LERN minorities need not be numerical minorities, such as in the case of blacks in South Africa. In
terms of determining whether a particular constitutional provision qualified as a group-specific
affirmative action precommittment, secondary source materials such as those described above were
crucial. It should be noted that religious minorities were not included in the LERN group. This is
primarily because many of the constitutions made distinctions between protections and preferences
for religious minorities and LERN groups.
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APPENDIX B
LERN specific, SEX-specific social and territorial precommitments
Group-Specific,
Equality
Social
Territorial
Non-DomainSpecific
LERN

China

Art. 4

SEX

Art. 48

Arts. 1,
15

Arts. 4 (S,
M, A, ED);
115 (A),
122 (M, A,
ED)

India

Arts.
15(1);
16(2)

Art.
38(1)
(M);
42nd
Amend.

POL
LERN
SEX

ECON/EMP
LERN
SEX

LERN

SEX

-

-

-

-

-

Art.
15(3)
(Cl, P)

Arts.
243(D)
(1) (Cl,
M, E,
Q),
243(T)
(Cl, M,
E, Q);
330(1),
(2) (Cl,
M, E,
Q);
331(T,
P, E),
332(1),
(2), (3)
(Cl, M,
E, Q)

Arts.
243(D)(
3), (4)
(Cl, M,
E,5Q);
243(T)(2
), (3) (Cl,
M, E, Q)

Arts.
16(4)
(Cl, P,
CS); 46
(Cl, M);
336(1)
(Cl, M,
CS, Q,
N)

Arts. 38(2)
(M, ED);
244 (M, A);
Fifth
Schedule (5)
(P, A)
Arts. 15(1);
15(2)(a), (b);
16(2); 17;
19(5);
23(2); 30(2)

Group-Specific, Domain-Specific

Art.
15(4)
(Cl, P)
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EDU
LERN SEX

CULT
LERN SEX

Art. 48
(T, M)

-

-

-

-

-

Arts.
15(5)(C
l, P); 46
(Cl, M);
337 (T,
M, Q,
N)

-

-

-

U.S.

IndoNesia

Brazil

Pakistan

-

-

-

-

-

Arts.
5(I);
7(XXX);
215

Arts. 26(1);
27(1); 33;
38(a), (d)

Arts.
25(2);
27(1);
34;
38(a),
(d)

Arts.
33(4)
(M),
34(1),
(2) (M)
Arts.
3(III)
(M); 6
(M);
170(vii)
(M); 193
(M), 194
(M)

Art.
38(a)-(e)
(M)

Art. IV(3)
(P, A)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Arts.
219(2)
(T, M);
215(1)
(T, M);

-

Art.
37(a)
(Cl, M)

-

Art. 28
(T, P)

-

Art. 231 (M,
Cons)

Arts. 37(f)
(M, ED);
247(3) (P,
SA); 247(7)
(P, A)

-

-

-

Arts.
25(3)
(Cl, P);
34 (T, P)
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-

-

-

Art.
7(XX)
(T, M)

-

Arts. 32
(Cl, M,
E, LG);
51(1),
(3) (Cl,
M, E,
FG, Q);
59(1)(c)
(Cl, M,
E, FG,
Q),
106(1)
(Cl, M,

Arts.
27(1)
(Cl, P,
CS); 36
(T, M,
CS),
37(a)
(Cl, M)

Art.
37(e)
(T, M,
Mat)

Bangladesh

Arts. 28(1),
(3); 29(2)

Nigeria

Arts. 15(2);
42(a), (b);
222(b)

Russian
Federation

Arts. 19(2),
(3); 72(1)(b)

Japan

Arts. 14; 44

Arts.
28(1)(3);
29(2)

Arts.
15(2);
42(1);
222(b)

Arts.
19(2),
(3);
46(1)
Arts. 14;
44

Arts.
8(1); 10
(M);
19(2)
(Cl, M)

-

Art.
28(4)
(Cl, P)

Art.
28(4)
(Cl, P)

-

E, SG,
Q)
Art.
65(3)
(Cl, M,
E, FG,
Q)

Art.
29(3)(a
) (Cl, P,
CS)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Art.
223(b)
(C, M,
PP)

-

Arts.
14(3)
(Cl, M),
14(4)
(T, M,
CS);
171(5)
(Cl, M,
CS,
FG);
208(4)
(T, M,
CS,
SG);
217(3)
(Cl, M,
CS,
FG)

-

Arts.
14(3),
(Cl, M);
14(4)
(T, M)

Art.
7(1), (2)
(M)

Arts. 65, 66
(P, A)

Art. 69
(T, M)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Art. 25
(M)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Arts.
16(1)(b)
(M);
16(2)(A(D) (M)

-
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Mexico

Philippines

Vietnam

Ethiopia

Arts. 25;
123(A)(VII)

Arts.
3.1(I)(c);
123(A)V
II

Art. 2(14)

Art.
2(14)

Art. 5(2)

Arts.
26(1),
(2), (3);
36(1),
(2)

Arts. 5(1)
25; 34, 38;
39, 88(2)

Arts. 25;
34; 38;
89(7)

-

Arts.
2(9),
(10)
(M);
12(1)
(P);
13(1)
(M)
Arts.
2(1), (2)
(M); 50
(M);
(51)(1)
(M)

Art.
89(2)
(M)

Art. 2 (A)

-

Arts. 13(6)
(M, Cons);
10(1) (M,
A); 10(15)
(M, A); 10
(20) (M, A)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Art.
5(4) (T,
M)

-

-

-

Arts.
54(3)
(Cl, M,
E, FG,
Q);
61(2)
(T, M,

Art.
35(3)
(Cl, M)
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-

-

Art.
123(A)(
V) (T,
M,
Mat);
123(B)(
XI)(c)
(T, M,
Mat)

-

-

-

-

-

Art.
13(14)(
T, M,
Mat)

Art.
10(20)(
7) (T,
M)

-

Art.
12(5)
(T, M)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Art.
89(4)
(Cl, M)

Art.
35(5(a)
(T, M,
Mat)

-

E, FG,
Q)
Arts.
3(2), (3)

Arts. 15
(P);
20(1)
(M)

Arts. 48, 53

Arts. 11,
53

Arts. 8;
13-19;
27

Turkey

Arts. 10

Arts. 10;
41

Arts. 2
(S, M); 5
(S, M)

DRC

Arts. 5; 14;
26; 45

Arts. 5;
14; 26;
45

Art. 58
(M)

Art. 19

Art. 20

Art.
3(12)
(M)

-

Thailand

Secs. 5, 30

Secs. 5;
30; 80(1)

Sec.
84(6)
(M)

Secs. 66 (S,
M, Cons); 67
(M, Cons)

-

-

-

France

Art. 1

-

Art. 1
(M)

Tit. 12 (M,
A)

-

-

-

Germany

Egypt

Iran

Art. 3(3)

-

-

Art. 3(2)
(T, M)

-

-

-

Art.
12a(1)
(T, P,
Neg)

-

-

Art. 11
(M)(Cl)

-

-

Art. 10
(Cl, M)

-

Art. 51
(T, M)

Art. 14
(Cl, M)

-

-

UK
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-

-

-

-

-

-

Art. 50
(Cl, M)

-

-

-

-

Art. 48

Art.
11
(T,
M,
DV)

-

Art.
14
(Cl,
M)
Art.
21(1)
-(4)
(T,
M)

-

-

-

-

-

-

Art. 21
(T, M,
Mat)

-

-

-

-

-

Sec.
84(7)
(T, M)

-

-

-

-

Art. 1
(T, M,
E, FG)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Italy

South
Africa

ROK

Myanmar

Ukraine

Arts. 3(1)

Arts.
3(1);
29(2);
37(1)

Art. 9(3)

Arts.
9(3)-(5)

-

Arts. 348;
352; 368

Arts. 11; 24;
53

Arts. 11;
36(1)

Arts.
348;
350-352;
368

Arts. 24;
51

Arts.
3(2) (M)

-

Art. 119
(P)

Art.
22(c)
(M)

Art. 1
(M)

Art. 116 (M,
A)

-

-

Art. 51(f)(h) (M, A)

-

Art. 6
(Cl, M)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Art.
34(3) (T,
M)

-

-

Arts.
15 (T,
M, E,
SG);
17(c)
(T, M,
E, SG);
161(b),
(c) (T,
M, E,
SG)

-
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-

-

-

-

Art.
25(6)(8) (Cl,
M)

-

-

-

Art.
37(1)
(T, M,
Mat)

-

-

-

-

-

Art. 29
(2)(T,
M)

-

Art.
6(2)
(Cl, M)

-

-

Arts.
32(4)
(Cl, M);
36(2)
(T, M,
Mat)

-

-

-

-

Art.
22(c)
(T, M)

Art.
26(B)
(T, M,
Mat);
32(a)
(T, M,
Mat)

Art.
22(c)
(T, M)

-

Art.
22(a)
(T, M)

-

-

Arts.
24 (Cl,
M,
Mat);
43 (T,
M, Neg)

-

-

-

Colombia

Spain

Art. 70

Sec. 14

Arts. 13;
42; 43

Art. 1
(M)

Arts. 246
(C, M,
Cons); 329
(M, A), 330
(M, A,
Cons); TA
55 (M, Cons,
ED)

Secs. 32

Secs.
1(1)
(M);
40(1)
(M)

Secs. 143
(P, A); 148
(M, A); 156
(M, A)

-

-

-

Art.
176
(Cl, P,
E, FG)

-

-

-

-

-

Art. 43
(Cl, M,
Mat)

-

-

-

-

-

TA 55
(T, M,
Cons,
ED)

-

-

Sec.
3(3)
(Cl, M)

-

Arts. 37
(Cl, M,
Art.
Art.
E, FG);
Argen75(23)
75(23)
TP
tina
(Cl, P,
(Cl, P)
(Second)
Mat)
(Cl, M,
E, FG)
Key: Classical (Cl); Tacit (T); M (Mandatory); Permissive (P); Autonomy (A); Ethno-development (ED); Conservation (Cons); Elections (E); Political
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